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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of security sector reform in peacebuilding operations 
on the process of democratisation, with reference to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH) between the signing of the peace agreement in November 1995 and the 
parliamentary elections of November 2000. A hard realist model has been applied in 
BiH but has not significantly helped democratisation, leaving the nationalist power 
structure largely untouched because of two factors: the structure of the agreement itself, 
tom between its separatist and re-integrationist provisions, and the incoherence of the 
international community with regard to security sector reform in BiH.
The Bosnian predicament demonstrates the potential of a hard realist/liberal 
model of peacebuilding. It is argued here that it is less the nature of the model itself, 
which combines a hard realist approach to SSR with efforts at democratisation, that 
determines the success of the democratisation effort than the place of SSR within the 
overall peacebuilding process, as well as the roles played by third parties and the extent 
of their commitment in pushing democratisation forward.
3
Acknowledgements
This thesis could not have been written, without the unconditional support of my 
parents. Even though they may not have fully understood what I was doing, their 
constant encouragement gave me the confidence and optimism that I needed to move 
forward. I am also grateful and indebted to them for all the sacrifices they have made to 
help me qualify to do a doctorate.
I am also greatly indebted to my supervisor, Mr. Nicholas Sims. This thesis 
would not be the same without his patient and thorough reviewing of my work. His 
support over the past four years has been invaluable.
I also want to thank those who made a contribution to this work by making me 
think harder about this project and opening up new avenues. They are Dr. Mats Berdal, 
Dr. Spyros Economides, Dr. Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Michael Banks, Ambassador 
Osman Topcagic, Jane Sharp, Louiza Odysseos, Nicky Short, Lothar Rast, Ralph 
Emmers, James Chui and David Styan.
Finally, I would have never got this far without the help of friends, in and 
outside the International Relations Department at the LSE, who sometimes without 
knowing, have supported me along the way. I am particularly grateful to Jose Morlin for 
his financial support, without which I would have never been able to complete this 
work.
4
Table of Contents
A B S T R A C T ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S ...............................................................................................................................................................4
A B B R E V IA T IO N S ................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
IN T R O D U C T IO N : R E C O N S ID E R IN G  T H E  R E L A T IO N S H IP  B E T W E E N  T H E  S E C U R IT Y  
A N D  P O L IT IC A L  C O M P O N E N T S  O F  P E A C E B U IL D IN G  O P E R A T IO N S ................................................11
1. PEACEBUILDING: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, BUT HOW?......................................................................................... 16
2 . P e a c e b u il d in g  In t e r v e n t io n s : L iber a lism  a s  a  G u id in g  Pr in c ip l e .........................................................21
3. P e a c e b u il d in g : W h a t  R o le  a n d  A u t h o r ity  fo r  T h ir d  P a r t ie s? ................................................................29
4 . PEACEBUILDING: DESIGNING A HARD REALIST/LIBERAL STRATEGY....................................................................33
P A R T I ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 39
C H A P T E R  1: P O L IT IC A L  A S P E C T S  O F  U N IT E D  N A T IO N S  P E A C E B U IL D IN G : A S S IS T IN G  
T H E  T R A N S IT IO N  T O W A R D S  D E M O C R A C Y ........................................................................................................... 39
1. E x p l a in in g  t h e  S u st a in a b il it y  o f  D e m o c r a c y : V a l u e s  a n d  In s t it u t io n s? ......................................41
2 . H o w  D o e s  D e m o c r a c y  G u a r a n t e e  P e a c e ? ............................................................................................................... 47
3 . T h e  U N  a n d  t h e  S h ift  t o w a r d s  D e m o c r a c y ............................................................................................................51
4 . U N  P e a c e b u il d in g : S ix  C a s e  St u d i e s ........................................................................................................................... 55
4.1. Angola....................................................................................................................................................... 56
4.2. El Salvador...............................................................................................................................................58
4.3. Cambodia..................................................................................................................................................61
4.4. Mozambique..............................................................................................................................................64
4.5. Rwanda..................................................................................................................................................... 65
4.6. Guatemala.................................................................................................................................................67
5 . C o n c lu s io n :  U N  P e a c e b u i l d i n g - B u i l d i n g  D e m o c r a t ic  I n s t i t u t i o n s .................................................. 70
C H A P T E R  2: S E C U R IT Y  S E C T O R  R E F O R M  IN  U N  P E A C E B U IL D IN G : IM P A C T  O N  
D E M O C R A T IS A T IO N ......................................................................................................................................................................72
1. W e a p o n s  a n d  In t e r s t a t e  W a r : L ib e r a l  a n d  R e a l is t  P e r sp e c t iv e s .........................................................75
1.1 The Liberal Argument: Arms Races as the Cause o f War.................................................................... 76
1.2. The Realist Argument: Political Disputes as the Cause o f  War.......................................................79
2 . U N  P e a c e b u i ld in g :  a n  I d e a l i s t  A p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  R e fo r m  o f  M i l i t a r y  F o r c e s ..............................85
3 . T h e  S ec u r it y  D il e m m a , C o n tr o l  o v e r  T er r ito r y  a n d  M ilita r y  B a l a n c e : C o n s id e r in g  a  
D iffe r e n t  M o d e l  o f  M ilita r y  Refo rm  in U N  P e a c e b u il d in g ............................................................................89
4 . Po lic e  R efo r m  in  U N  P e a c e b u il d in g : Ju s t  B u il d in g  a  R e in t e g r a t e d , D em o c r a t ic  P olic e  
F o r c e? ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 96
4.1. Training o f the Local Police by CIVPOL: Impact on the Balance o f Forces, Control over 
Territory and the Security Dilemma.............................................................................................................98
4.2. CIVPOL: From Soft Monitoring to Robust Monitoring: Impact on the Balance o f  Forces,
Control over Territory and the Security Dilemma.................................................................................... 102
4.3. Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................106
5. C o n c l u s io n : Q u e st io n in g  S ec ur ity  S ec to r  R efo rm  in  U N  P e a c e b u il d in g  O p e r a t io n s  107 *
P A R T  I I .................................................................................................................................................................................................... I l l
5
C H A P T E R  3: T H E  D A Y T O N  A C C O R D S  A N D  T H E  P O L IT IC A L  E Q U A T IO N : S E E K IN G  T O  
C R E A T E  A  C O N S O C IA T IO N A L  D E M O C R A C Y ......................................................................................................I l l
1. B a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  G e n e r a l  Fr a m e w o r k  A g r e e m e n t  fo r  P e a c e  in  B o s n ia -H e r z e g o v in a  
(G FA ): C o n t r o l  o v e r  T er r ito r y  a n d  B a l a n c e  o f  Fo r c e s ................................................................................112
2. D e m o c r a t isa t io n  a n d  t h e  G FA: Co n s o l id a t in g  t h e  P o w e r  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l is t s? ....................133
2.1. Democracy in the GFA: Elections and the Rule o f Law: Annexes 3, 4 and 11............................. 133
2.2. Democracy in the GFA: Human Rights Instruments in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Annexes 4 and 6135
2.3. Paving the Way for the Nationalists? The Constitution, the Structure o f the Bosnian State and the 
Entities: Annex 4 ...........................................................................................................................................139
3. C o n c l u s io n : t h e  Politic a l  P r o v isio n s  o f  t h e  GFA: C o n t in u a t io n  o f  W a r  b y  O t h e r  M e a n s ? 
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................149
C H A P T E R  4 : T H E  D A Y T O N  A C C O R D S  A N D  T H E  S E C U R IT Y  E Q U A T IO N : T H E  H A R D  
R E A L IS T  S T R A T E G Y .................................................................................................................................................................. 152
1. A n n e x  1-A: IF O R ’s  P r im a r y  a n d  S e c o n d a r y  M a n d a t e s : D iv id e  t o  U n it e ........................................154
1.1. IFOR’s Primary Mandate: Paving the Way for an Institutionalised Military Balance 155
1.2. IFOR’s Secondary Mandate: A Licence to Undermine the Nationalist Power Structure............158
1.3. IFOR ’s Enforcement Powers...............................................................................................................161
1.4. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................162
2 . A n n e x  1 -B : t h e  C o r e  o f  t h e  H a r d  R e a l i s t  A p p r o a c h .....................................................................................162
2.1. Article IV................................................................................................................................................ 164
2.2. Article II..................................................................................................................................................168
2.3. Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 174
3 . ‘T r a in  a n d  Eq u ip ’ (T& E): U n d e r m in in g  t h e  Re b u il d in g  o f  a  S in g l e  Po litic a l  Sp a c e .............175
3.1. T&E and the Security o f  the Federation............................................................................................ 176
3.2. T&E: Strengthening the Federation?.................................................  177
3.3. Conclusion....................................   178
4 . A n n e x  11: T h r e e  Po lice  F o r c e s , O n e  K in d  o f  (D e m o c r a t ic ) P o l ic in g : Im p a c t  o n  C o n t r o l  
o v e r  T e r r it o r y , t h e  B a l a n c e  o f  Fo r c es  a n d  t h e  S e c u r it y  D il e m m a ...................................................... 179
5. C o n c l u s io n : T h e  R ole  of  T h ir d  P ar ties  in  t h e  G F A ’s  H a r d  R e a l is t  S t r a t e g y  o f  S ec u r it y  
S ec to r  Re f o r m .............................................................................................................................................................................. 182
P A R T  I I I ...................................................................................................................................................................................................186
C H A P T E R  5: T H E  R O L E  O F  IF O R /S F O R : D IV ID E  A N D  U N IT E  B O S N IA -H E R Z E G O V IN A ,  
1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 0 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 186
1. IF O R /SF O R ’s  Pr im a r y  M a n d a t e : Po lic in g  t h e  S e p a r a t io n  of Fo r c e s ............................................... 188
1.1. Phase I: Creation o f a Zone o f Separation (ZoS) between the Entities.......................................... 190
1.2. Phase II: Transfer o f Territories from One Entity to the Other...................................................... 192
1.3. Phase III: Demobilisation and Withdrawal o f Heavy Weapons.....................................................202
1.4. SFOR and IFOR’s Primary Mandate: Plus ca change, plus c ’est la meme chose?.................... 205
1.5. IFOR/SFOR’s Primary Mandate: Implications fo r the Balance o f Forces, Control over Territory, 
the Security Dilemma and Democratisation............................................................................................. 207
2 . IF O R /SF O R ’s  S e c o n d a r y  M a n d a te :  U n d e r m in in g  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  P o w e r  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  
F a c i l i t a t i n g  D e m o c r a t i s a t i o n .......................................................................................................................................... 2 0 9
2.1. IFOR/SFOR and Support fo r the ICTY.............................................................................................. 210
2.2. SFOR and the Screening o f Military Personnel: Undermining the Military Arm o f the 
Nationalists?................................................................................................................................................. 217
2.3. IFOR/SFOR and the Right to Freedom o f  Movement...................................................................... 219
2.4. SFOR, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and the Rebuilding o f a Single Political Space: 
Protection o f  Returnees................................................................................................................................223
2.5. Supporting Democratisation? SFOR and the Power Struggle in Republika Srpska....................225
2.6. IFOR/SFOR‘s Secondary Mandate: Implications for the Balance o f Forces, Control over 
Territory, the Security Dilemma and Democratisation............................................................................228
3. Co n c l u s io n : IFO R/SFOR: P u ttin g  the  E m p h a sis  o n  its P r im a r y  M a n d a t e .................................... 2 2 9
6
C H A P T E R  6: IN ST IT U T IO N A L ISIN G  A M IL IT A R Y  B A L A N C E  A N D  C R E A T IN G  A  S T A T E ­
W ID E  D IM E N SIO N  O F D EFENC E: THE R O L E  O F T H E  O SC E  A N D  T H E O H R  IN  B O S N IA -  
H E R Z E G O V IN A , 1996-2000 ........................................................................................................................................... 231
1. T he Role of A nn ex  1 -B a n d  the OSCE: Solidifying  the  D ivisions of B iH ? ..................................234
1.1. The CSBM Vienna Agreement, 1996-2000................................................................................................... 235
1.2. Implementation o f the Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement, 1996-2000.......................................238
1.3. Articles II and IV and the Integration o f the Entities Armed Forces................................................... 242
2. ‘T ra in  a n d  Equip’, C r o a t ia  a n d  Y u g o s la v ia :  C e n t r i f u g a l  F o r c e s  in B iH ? ................................247
2.1. T&E and the Security o f  the Federation........................................................................................................ 247
2.2. T&E and Integration between Croats and Bosniaks within the Federation......................................251
2.3. The Role o f Croatia and Yugoslavia............................................................................................................... 254
2. T&E, C r o a t ia  a n d  Y u g o s la v ia :  Im p lica t io n s  f o r  t h e  B a la n c e  o f  F o r c e s , C o n t r o l  o v e r  
T e r r it o r y ,  t h e  S e c u r ity  D ilem m a a n d  D e m o c r a t is a t io n ......................................................................... 258
3. B o sn ia -H erzego vina’s State  D imension of D efence: W ishful Thinking? ................................... 260
3.1. Force Restructuring..............................................................................................................................................261
3.2. Common Security and Defence Policy fo r  Bosnia-Herzegovina............................................................262
3.3. Institutional Development o f the Standing Committee on Military M atters......................................264
3.4. Integrating the Entities Armed Forces and the Issue o f Ethnic Power-Sharing.............................. 267
4. Co nc lu sio n : Is A n n ex  1 -B  Consolidating  the D ivisions of the Co untry? ..................................267
C H A P T E R  7: U N M IB H ’S R O L E  IN  R E F O R M IN G  B O SN IA -H E R Z E G O V IN A ’S P O L IC E  
F O R C E S, 1 9 95 -2000 ............................................................................................................................................................ 270
1. Police Forces in B o snia-H erzegovina since  1995: U nw illing  to  Maintain  the  Rule  of La w  
a n d  to  Protect In d ividu al  R ig h t s ......................................................................................................................... 272
2. IPTF’S MANDATE - TRAINING AND MONITORING POLICE FORCES: IMPOSSIBLE TASKS?.......................279
2.1. Training o f  Police Forces: Screening and Downsizing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Police Forces.. 282
2.2. Integration o f  Minorities in the Police: Undoing the Results o f  the War.......................................... 285
2.3. Monitoring by UNMIBH: Limitations o f ‘Soft’ and ‘Robust’Monitoring......................................... 290
2.4- Implications o f UNMIBH's Work for the Balance o f Forces, Control over Territory, the Security 
Dilemma and Democratisation..................................................................................................................................296
3. T he State B order  S ervice (SB S) a n d  Policing in B rcko : Forced  Reform  a n d  Reintegration  
-  The  W a y  Fo rw ar d?..................................................................................................................................................... 297
3.1. Development o f the SBS: The International Community Takes Control.............................................299
3.2. IPTF and the Police in Brcko ............................................................................  302
3.3. The International Community’s Choice: Full Reintegration or Consociationalism?.....................304
4. Co n c l u sio n : UNM IBH: Im pressive Ma n d a t e , D isappointing  Re s u l t s ............................................305
C O N C L U SIO N : L IN K IN G  T H E  SE C U R IT Y  A N D  P O L IT IC A L  C O M P O N E N T S O F  
P E A C E B U IL D IN G  W IT H IN  A  H A R D  R E A L IST /L IB E R A L  FR A M E W O R K : T H E  N E E D  F O R  A 
C O H E R E N T  S T R A T E G Y ................................................................................................................................................ 308
1. B o sn ia -H erzego vina: Failed  Peacebuilding? ............................................................................................. 309
2. Is a  H ard  Realist/L iberal P eacebuilding  M o del  U nw o rk able? ..................................................... 320
3. C o n c l u sio n .................................................................................................................................................................... 326
A N N E X  I: B O SN IA -H E R Z E G O V IN A ’S T E R R IT O R IA L  D IV ISIO N S U N D E R  T H E  V A N C E -  
O W E N  P E A C E  P L A N ........................................................................................................................................................328
A N N E X  II: B O SN IA -H E R Z E G O V IN A ’S T E R R IT O R IA L  D IV ISIO N S U N D E R  T H E  G F A  329
A N N E X  III: A U T H O R ISE D  W E A PO N  H O L D IN G S U N D E R  A R T IC L E  IV  O F  A N N E X  1 -B .... 330
A N N E X  IV : A C T U A L  W E A P O N  H O L D IN G S U N D E R  A R T IC L E  IV  O F  A N N E X  1-B , A S O F  15 
D E C E M B E R  1 9 9 9 ................................................................................................................................................................ 331
B IB L IO G R A P H Y ..................................................................................................................................................................332
7
Abbreviations
AbiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine
AfD An Agenda for Development
AfP An Agenda for Peace
ASAC Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms
Control
BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina
CDR Coalition pour la Defense de la
Republique
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe
CIVPOL Civilian Police
CSBM’s Confidence and Security-Building
Measures
EAF Entities Armed Forces
EC European Community
ECPHR European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
FMLN Frente Farabundo Marti para la
Liberacion Nacional 
FoM Freedom of Movement
FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GFA General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zaj ednica
HR High Representative
HRW Human Rights Watch
HVIDR Hrvatskih vojnih invalida Domovinskog
rata
HVO Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane
ICG International Crisis Group
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia 
IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line
IFOR Implementation Force
IDP’s Internally Displaced Persons
IPTF International Police Task Force
JCC Joint Consultative Commission
JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija
KR Khmer Rouge
MNRD Mouvement Republicain National pour le
Developpement
MINUGUA United Nations Mission for the
Verification of Human Rights and of
8
Compliance with the Commitments of 
the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights in Guatemala 
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de
Angola
Military Professional Resources Inc. 
Multinational Specialized Unit 
North Atlantic Council 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Non-Commissioned Officers 
Non-Governmental Organisation 
Office of the High Representative 
Office of the Inspector General 
United Nations Operation in
Mozambique
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El 
Salvador
OSCE Organization for Security and Co- 
Operation in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace
PIC Peace Implementation Council
RENAMO Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana
RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRF Rapid Reaction Force
RRTF Reconstruction and Return Task Force
RS Republika Srpska
SACEUR NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe .
SBS State Border Service
s e e Sub-regional Consultative Commission
SCMM Standing Committee on Military Matters
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka
SFOR Stabilisation Force
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute
SOC State of Cambodia
SRT Bosnian Serb Radio and Television
SSR Security Sector Reform
T&E Train and Equip
TLE Treaty Limited Equipment
UN United Nations
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda
UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees
UNIT A Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola
MPRI
MSU
NAC
NATO
NCO’s
NGO
OHR
OIG
ONUMOZ
9
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca
VOPP Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VRS Vrejime Republika Srpska
ZoS Zone of Separation
10
Introduction: Reconsidering the Relationship between the 
Security and Political Components of Peacebuilding 
Operations
This thesis focuses on a particular form of multilateral intervention, called 
peacebuilding.1 Starting in the late 1980’s, the United Nations (UN) became 
involved in assisting former warring parties to an internal conflict with the 
implementation of peace agreements. These operations, which greatly increased the 
depth and scope of UN intervention in the internal affairs of states, came to be 
known as peacebuilding operations. Under the label peacebuilding, the UN 
performed tasks within war-torn states as varied as the organisation of elections, the 
monitoring of human rights and the disarmament and demobilisation of factions. 
Peacebuilding will be defined in this thesis as a form of multilateral intervention, 
following internal wars terminated by a peace agreement, that seeks, within the 
internationally recognised borders of a state, ((1) to (re)build a democracy and (2) to 
restore the state’s monopoly o f legitimate violence.2 Some of these terms will be 
briefly defined.
First, it should be emphasised that the term SSR takes on a particular
i
significance in the context of peacebuilding interventions. Although the term finds 
its origin in the development studies literatwre, the concept has also increasingly 
been used in the context of studies on civil-rmilitary relations.3 In the development
1 Intervention will be defined in the section two.
2 The two objectives o f peacebuilding will be referred to as (1) democratisation (2) security sector 
reform (SSR).
3 For a good overview o f the debate on SSR, see Tim Edmunds, “Defining Security Sector Reform”, 
CMR Network 3 (October 2001): 12-15. See also Niccole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security 
Sector Reform : Policy Options fo r the British Government (London: SaferWorld, 1998); A. Hills,
I f
literature, SSR is seen as a process conducive to a more efficient utilisation of state 
funds but also to more political accountability on the part of governments and 
military establishments, which should eventually facilitate development. The 
concept is also used in studies on civil-military relations to describe the reform 
process undergone by security forces, now broadly understood as comprising the 
military but also police and special paramilitary forces, in the context of 
democratisation. As aptly underscored by Tim Edmunds, all these approaches help 
us to think ‘more holistically about the role of security agencies in the wider 
processes of democratisation and conflict prevention.’ 4 In contrast, SSR is 
understood in this work as the reform process of security forces, as part of 
peacebuilding operations and with the assistance of third parties, in the wider 
context of democratisation and conflict resolution. SSR in peacebuilding operations 
seeks to reform security forces in a way that promotes democratisation and conflict 
resolution.
Second, as for the state and its monopoly of legitimate violence, Max 
Weber's definition will be used as a starting point. He defined the state as 'a human 
community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical
“Security Sector Reform and Some Comparative Issues in the Police-Military Interface”, 
Contemporary Security Policy 21, No.3 (Dec 2000): 1-26; Dillon Hendrickson, A Review o f  Security- 
Sector Reform, CSDG Working Paper, (London: King’s College London, 1999); Nicole Ball, 
“Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches”, Conflict, Security and 
Development 1, 1 (2001); Chris Smith, “Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or 
Institutional Engineering?”, Conflict, Security and Development 1, 1 (2001). For approaches that look 
at the interface between SSR and peacekeeping see M.C. Williams, Civil-Military Relations and 
Peacekeeping (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Karin Von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: a 
Renewed Comjiitment to Nation Building”, Washington Quarterly 23, N o .l (Winter 1999): 95-114; 
John Mackinlay, “Beyond the Logjam: a Doctrine for complex Emergencies”, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 9, N o.l (Spring 1998): 114- 131.
4 Edmunds, Defining Security Sector Reform, p. 13.
( 2
violence within a certain territory...'.5 A state can be defined by the fact that the 
community living on its territory has the monopoly of legitimate violence, and no 
one else. This definition aptly underscores, in the context of peacebuilding, the issue 
of legitimacy of the use o f force by the state. Indeed, the question of who can 
legitimately (or has the 'right' to) use physical violence is often at the heart of the 
peacebuilding effort. One of the key issues of the peacebuilding effort then consists 
not only of rebuilding the state's capacity of coercion, but also of making this 
monopoly of physical violence legitimate for all parties through democratisation. 
This issue of legitimacy also highlights the state-building nature o f peacebuilding, 
which seeks to rebuild a state that can legitimately use force.
However, stricto sensu, many states where peacebuilding interventions have 
been conducted, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, do not fit Weber’s definition. 
Indeed, as just explained, in many war-torn countries, the state does not have the 
monopoly of legitimate violence. These countries are nonetheless recognised as 
states by other states and international institutions, based on a legal definition of the 
state, which will be used here. Indeed, article I of the Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States defines a state as possessing the following attributes: a 
permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states.6 Although the state may lose some of these attributes 
because of war, it retains its personality in international law.7 Indeed, according to 
Ian Brownlie, ‘once a state has been established, extensive civil strife or the
5 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, translated by Edward A. Shils(S.L.: C.N., c. 1935) pp. 310-311.
6 Cited in Ian Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979) pp. 74-76.
7 As witnessed in the 1990’s, some states have ceased to have a functioning government because o f  
internal fighting, have lost their populations through displacement, whilst their borders have also been 
contested.
breakdown of order through foreign invasion or natural disasters are not considered 
to affect personality.’8 This legal definition of the state, even though it does not fit 
the reality experienced by many war-torn states, underscores the importance given 
by states and international institutions to legal sovereignty. In effect, peacebuilding 
interventions seek, through democratisation and SSR, to build the state’s empirical 
statehood, as Robert Jackson calls it, meaning the state’s capacity to ‘protect human 
rights or provide socio-economic welfare’.9
Third, in this thesis a democracy is understood as bearing the following 
characteristics: free and fair elections, institutionalised protection of individual rights 
applicable equally to all citizens, respect for the rule of law, and a set of values 
shared among citizens that legitmises these three formal characteristics of 
democracy.10
Fourth, within the process of democratisation, the (re)building o f a single 
political space is important to mention. The (re)building of a single political space, 
often called 'reintegration', within the internationally recognised borders of the state 
entails the removal of all legal, administrative and physical barriers set up by the
8 Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, p. 75
9 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p. 21. Sovereignty is a central concept both in 
international law and in international relations. A discussion o f  the concept, its origins and 
development is beyond the scope o f  this work. However, it should be emphasised that sovereignty, as 
conceived since 1945, is not dependent on whether a state is capable o f  protecting the rights o f its 
citizens or provide for their socio-economic welfare. In other words, there are not degrees o f  
sovereignty: a state is sovereign or it is not. Jackson speaks o f  quasi-states, but not o f quasi­
sovereignty. Mayall conceives sovereignty as the possession of the monopoly o f legal force within a 
given territory, irrespective o f the actual capacity o f the sovereign to enforce the law. James Mayall, 
Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 36-37. See 
also Robert Jackson, “Quasi-states, Dual Regimes and Neo-classical Theory: International 
Jurisprudence and the Third World”, International Organization 4 1 ,4  (Autumn 1987): 519-550.
10 The notion o f democracy will be discussed in detail in chapter one.
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parties between each other during the conflict. Such barriers can consist of laws and 
regulations applicable only to certain categories of citizens and passed as a 
consequence of the conflict, separate administrative structures and public services 
such as education and health care that are established exclusively for some 
categories of citizens and not subject to the authority of the state, as well as 
restrictions on movement and residence again for certain categories of citizens. This 
process of reintegration presupposes a process o f uniformisation of the laws and 
regulations of the country to make them applicable to all citizens and not just to 
members of i particular ethnic or political group. Finally, these laws and regulations 
have to be enforceable by the state, through the use of physical force if  necessary, 
which presupposes that the state has the capacity to do so.11
SSR and democratisation in peacebuilding operations are connected in that 
the process of democratisation is meant to lead to the (re)building of a single 
political space consisting of democratic laws and regulations as well as institutions, 
whilst the state's use of physical force to maintain this single and democratic 
political space, when its capacity to use it is restored through SSR, is also regulated 
by democratic principles.
This thesis siudies the impact of SSR on democratisation (also called 
political transition) during a peacebuilding intervention. The thesis also considers 
the role played by third parties directly involved in SSR in advancing
11 SSR is therefore essential in the drive to rebuild the capacity o f the state to enforce laws, protect 
individual rights and defend its borders. The security sector is understood in this work as being 
composed o f  security forces. Security forces are armed groups who provide physical protection to a 
given group o f  individuals against other groups from inside or outside the borders of the state. 
Security forces chiefly include those who actually perform this protective function, but also the 
structures that support them, such as intelligence, logistics, communications and commanding 
personnel.
democratisation as well as the degree of control they exercise over the 
implementation of the peace agreement.
SSR in peacebuilding operations has consisted of the disarming and 
demobilising of the various factions’ security forces, and the creation of new, 
integrated police and military forces under state control. This thesis considers an 
alternative model of SSR in peacebuilding operations, based on hard realist 
assumptions, that allows the parties to maintain their control over security forces, 
and seeks to create a military balance between them.12 The main question that this 
thesis seeks to answer is whether such a strategy contributes to achieving the 
political objective of peacebuilding, namely democratisation. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the stability created by such an approach creates the necessary trust 
between the parties to move forward with the political transition. Based on the case 
study selected in this thesis, namely the peacebuilding intervention in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (BiH) between November 1995 and November 2000, it is argued that a 
hard realist strategy of SSR does not facilitate the process of democratisation, 
although some of the specificities of the Bosnian case may lead us to qualify this 
judgement.
The literature on peacebuilding does not reflect enough upon the relationship 
between SSR and democratisation in peacebuilding interventions. This introduction 
will show that the current literature in international relations is lacking in two areas: 
(1) the role that third parties should play once a peace agreement is concluded as
12 The notion o f military balance, also known as balance o f  power or balance o f forces refers in this 
thesis to (1) a situation o f  military equilibrium between various parties, in the sense that none is in a 
position to defeat the other(s) or (2) a policy objective seeking to engineer a particular power relation 
(equilibrium or preponderance) between the military forces o f  various parties.
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well as the degree of authority they should exercise over its implementation and (2) 
the relationship between the security and political aspects of the peacebuilding 
phase. The following literature review traces the origins of the concept of 
peacebuilding, starting with the idea that peacebuilding entails the transformation of 
a conflict. Peacebuilding is at the crossroads between several strands of the 
literature: peace research, conflict analysis, intervention and third party mediation. 
Each will be examined in turn, starting with peace research and conflict analysis.
1. Peacebuilding: Transforming Conflict but How?
The concept of peacebuilding entails the transformation of a conflict in order 
to resolve it. As this section will show, how a conflict is understood determines how 
it is to be transformed in order to be resolved.
Central to peacebuilding is the idea of conflict transformation. Picking up on 
this idea, Peter Wallensteen distinguished between traditional conflict resolution, 
which he saw as ways of accommodating the explicit interests of parties in a 
conflict, and conflict transformation where the conflict itself transforms the parties, 
their interests and actions.10 In this piece, Wallensteen did not tackle the issue of 
third parties and their role, if  any, in the transformation of conflict. However, the 
‘conflict experience’, as Wallensteen called it, affects the parties who in turn 
transform themselves. Eventually, the original conflict takes on new forms. Because 
interests can be transformed, conflict resolution no longer depends on the 
accommodation of supposedly immutable interests, but is a dynamic process by 
which the relations between the parties are altered.
The concept of peacebuilding, in turn, was first introduced much earlier in 
Johan Galtung’s Peace, War and Defense.n In this work Galtung envisaged 
peacebuilding as an associative approach whereby structures would be created in 
order to remove the causes of direct violence. Once again, the idea of transformation 
is central to the concept. Galtung contrasted peacebuilding with peacekeeping which
10 Peter Wallensteen, “The Resolution and Transformation o f International Conflicts: a Structural 
Perspective”, in Raimo Vayrynen, ed., New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and 
Conflict Transformation (London: Sage Publications, 1991) pp. 129-142.
11 Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding", in 
Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Volume II (Copenhagen: 
Christian Ejlers, 1976) pp. 282-304.
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he viewed as a dissociative approach in that it keeps the parties away from each
other, but does not address the underlying causes of conflict, and peacemaking,
which targets the elites and their decision-making processes in order to resolve
specific disputes. Galtung’s peacebuilding focuses on socio-economic development
as a means to transform conflict. Stephen Ryan, also discussing peacebuilding, put
more emphasis on the relational dimension of peacebuilding: he conceived it as a set
of grass-roots activities that would ‘lead to the establishment of new networks and
new institutions.’12 He suggested several strategies that could facilitate these
developments, such as the pursuit of superordinate goals or the implementation of
11confidence-building measures.
John Paul Lederach’s discussion of peacebuilding started by looking at the 
structure of the conflict itself.14 He argued that conflicts are not static but go through 
phases. Peacebuilding activities can help a conflict move through different phases 
until the parties redefine their relations in a non-violent way. The goal of 
peacebuilding is therefore, not to de-escalate a conflict, but to transform it. He 
concluded:
‘Peacebuilding is about seeking and sustaining processes of 
change...Rebuilding societies tom by violence and war involves 
rebuilding relationships and finding new ways to be in relationship. What
12 Stephen Ryan, “Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict”, in Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., 
Conflict Transformation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 257. See also, from the same author, 
“Peacebuilding Strategies and Intercommunal Conflict: Approaches to the Transformation o f Divided 
Societies”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 216-231.
13 A superordinate goal is an objective that can only be achieved by co-operation between the 
conflicting groups. Ryan, Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict, p. 235.
14 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997)
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w e  a r e  t r y in g  t o  m e a s u r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  n o t  a  s t a t i c  o u t c o m e  b u t  a  d y n a m i c  
p r o c e s s . ’ 15
To rebuild relationships, Lederach suggests an integrated framework that 
encompasses different levels of actors, peacebuilding activities, levels of action and 
the dynamics of the conflict.
The idea of conflict resolution as transformation is common to all authors, 
who understand peacebuilding as a transformative process by which either new 
structures, new relations between the parties or a new environment are created. The 
kind of transformation envisaged by the external actors does however depend on 
how the conflict is understood by them. With regard to the analysis of internal war, 
several schools have developed in the field of conflict analysis, suggesting different 
approaches to the resolution of this type of conflict.
The literature on internal wars has grown dramatically in the 1990’s.16 
Internal wars are armed conflicts taking place within the boundaries of a state, 
between the government and insurgent groups, or when the state has collapsed, 
between rival factions. Internal wars often have international ramifications, as 
warring factions within the state often receive support from neighbouring states, 
making a strict distinction between intra-state and inter-state wars difficult to
15 Ibid., p. 135.
16 See for instance, Michael E. Brown, The International Dimensions o f Internal Conflict (Cambridge, 
MA : MIT Press, 1996); Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO.: 
Rienner, 1995); Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds., Managing 
Global Chaos: Sources o f  and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996) esp. chapters 1-10; I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: the 
Disintegration and Restoration o f  Legitimate Authority (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Barbara F. 
Walter and Jack Snyder, Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999).
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maintain.17 In addition, refugee flows and disruption caused to economic networks 
further blur the distinction between internal and international conflict. Within this
1 ftliterature, the issue of ethnic conflict has also been extensively covered. Ethnic 
conflicts are characterised by a conflict between two or more ethnic communities 
living in the same state, as in BiH. A social group can be defined as an ethnic 
community when it meets six criteria. First, the group must have a name for itself. 
Second, people in the group must believe in a common ancestry. Third, members of 
the group must share common historical memories. Fourth, the group must have a 
shared culture, generally based on a combination of religion, language, institutions, 
laws and customs. This means that race is not the only criterion that defines an 
ethnic group. Fifth, the group must feel an attachment to a specific territory. Sixth, 
members of the group must regard themselves as a group in order to form an ethnic 
community.19
Coming to the resolution of ethnic conflict, three different schools have 
emerged in the literature. The solutions put forward are directly tied to the specific
9fiunderstanding of a conflict proposed. The hard realist school considers that the
17 Kumar Rupesinghe, “The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts”, in 
Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., Internal Conflict and Governance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992) pp. 1-26.
18 The focus o f this discussion will be ethnic conflict, since the case study selected in this thesis is an 
ethnic conflict (the limitations of the case study in terms o f generalisation will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter). On ethnic conflict, see Barbara Harf and Ted Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World 
Politics (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1994); Survival devoted a special issue to ethnic conflict in 1993: 
Survival, 35, no.l (Winter 1993); David Lake and Donald Rothschild, eds., The International Spread 
o f  Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); 
Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995).
19 Anthony D. Smith, “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism” in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 28-31.
20 This discussion is largely based on distinctions drawn by Fen Osier Hampson, “Third-Party Roles in 
the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict", Millennium 26, no. 3 (1997): 727-750.
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only way to resolve ethnic conflict is to physically separate the parties. Because 
ethnic identities are immutable once they have been hardened by the conflict 
experience, third parties should use their resources to create a stable military balance 
between the parties and to organise the partition of territories along ethnic lines. 
Chaim Kaufmann, for example, argues in favour of ‘ethnic unmixing’, meaning the 
forced homogenisation of territories through expulsion and population exchanges. 
He foresees a role for third parties in this process in helping to make these
91population movements humane. In this case, the kind of relations envisaged 
between the parties is more germane to peacekeeping than peacebuilding, as defined 
by Galtung, in that it is thought that a resolution of the conflict will come from a 
decrease, if  not cessation, of relations between the parties.
The second school, soft realism, considers political, non-territorial solutions 
to ethnic conflicts. They share the hard realist view that identities are fixed, but also 
consider the role of political entrepreneurs in exploiting these identities to whip up 
fears and polarise societies. The soft realist solution to this predicament lies in third 
party interventions that aim at affecting the cost/benefit calculations of the parties 
towards resolution. Such initiatives include mediation, information exchange, 
elections, the creation of power-sharing arrangements and other institutional
99mechanisms to guarantee the protection of all ethnic communities.
Finally, the liberal approach claims that the denial of human rights, disregard 
for the rule of law and democracy are the causes of conflict. The solution to 
conflicts, therefore, lies in the adoption, by the parties, of liberal norms and
21 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars”, International Security 20, 
no. 4 (1996): 136-75.
22 See, for example, Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).
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democratic political structures and in respect for the rule of law, which third parties 
should actively foster. It is this approach that has been adopted by the UN in its 
peacebuilding operations. It is also worth pointing out that soft realism and 
liberalism overlap, as democratic solutions to ethnic conflict such as holding free 
and fair elections, are regarded as potentially capable of changing the parties’ 
calculations. Soft realist strategies, however, consider the establishment of 
democracy, including elections, the rule of law and respect for human rights useful 
strategies inasmuch as they change the calculations of the actors towards the 
conclusion of a peace agreement. The literature has not, however, reflected upon the 
possibility of combining these three forms of intervention, instead regarding them as 
mutually exclusive and focusing extensively on the liberal approach to conflict 
resolution. This is what the next section will show with regard to peacebuilding 
interventions.
2. Peacebuilding Interventions: Liberalism as a Guiding Principle
This section locates the concept of peacebuilding within the literature on 
intervention. It argues that peacebuilding is a form of intervention informed by 
liberal principles, which may be problematic as far as SSR is concerned. 
Intervention is defined here as interference by external actors in the internal affairs 
of a state. R.J. Vincent formulated the traditional definition of intervention:
23 See Neil J. Kritz, “The Rule o f Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace” and Joshua 
Muravchik, “Promoting Peace through Democracy” in Crocker, Hampson with Aall, Managing 
Global Chaos, pp. 573-606.
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‘activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or 
an international organisation which interferes coercively in the domestic 
affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an94end; and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state.’
Vincent pointed to the target of intervention: the authority structure of a 
state, which was defined by Rosenau as ‘the identity of those who make the 
decisions that are binding for the entire society [and/or] the processes through which
9 ^such decisions are made.’ Although the notion of authority structure as a target for 
intervention is still pertinent to the understanding of post-Cold War interventions, 
developments since the late 1980’s have affected several elements of this definition, 
making it less relevant.
First, most contemporary interventions are now supposed to facilitate the
9 f \transition from war to post-conflict reconstruction, or to end a conflict. Under 
these new objectives, intervention has become less coercive, because governments 
now consent at least to the initial deployment of external actors on their territory. 
Second, post-Cold War interventions not only aim at the authority structure of a 
state, but in most cases seek to redefine the relations between state and society along
24 R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1974) p. 13.
25 James Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept”, Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 13, no. 2 
(June 1969): 163.
26 On these new roles for intervention, see Charles King, Ending Civil Wars, Adelphi paper no. 308 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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77liberal lines. There is therefore a strong ideological dimension to these new 
interventions. Similarly, humanitarian interventions, although more limited, are 
predicated on liberal principles such as the protection of human rights. These new 
considerations have considerably expanded the scope and length of interventions,
• * • 78making the issue of ‘exit strategy’ an important factor in the design of intervention. 
Third, international organisations have played a more important role since 1989 in 
conducting interventions. For instance, the UN has launched 54 peacekeeping
• • 70  »missions since 1948, 36 of which have been established since 1991. Finally, 
internal conflicts have become the main focus of UN intervention, even though they 
have been the main form of war since 1945.30
These changes have contributed to make the issue of intervention in the 
literature less of a problem than an acceptable form of behaviour in international 
relations in need of constant fine-tuning and evaluation. Arguments against 
intervention have been replaced by an ever-growing literature on various aspects of 
intervention, suggesting ways to improve them.31 Writings on UN peacekeeping 
reflect these developments. Since the early 1990’s, research has been conducted to 
conceptualise the transformations undergone by UN peacekeeping. UN operations 
launched by the mid-1990’s in Namibia, Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Bosnia-
27 This point will be developed in the next chapter.
28 On this point, see Gregory Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion”, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 
1998): 56-67.
29 See UN, United Nations Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000: Statistical Data and Charts [source on­
line] (New York: UN, 2000, accessed 9 July 2001); available from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm: Internet.
30 For a thorough analysis o f the issue, see Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, “Armed Conflicts at 
the End of the Cold War”, Journal o f Peace Research 30, no. 3 (August 1993): 331-346.
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Herzegovina, Somalia, El Salvador and Mozambique (1992), Haiti, Cambodia, 
Rwanda (1993), where peacekeepers were mandated with various tasks such as 
election monitoring, demilitarisation, de-mining, refugee repatriation and
32humanitarian assistance, have generated an extensive body of literature. These 
studies developed in two directions, one strand focusing on the concept of post- 
conflict ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping.33 
The literature on second-generation peacekeeping tends not to discuss the 
ideological ‘content’ of these operations, but rather suggests ways to improve co­
31 For an example o f arguments against intervention, see Stanley Hoffman, “The Problem of 
Intervention”, in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) pp. 
7-28.
32 See for instance Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping the Peace : 
Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, 
form er Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Walter Clarke and 
Jeffrey Herbst, Learning from Somalia: the Lessons o f  Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997); John L. Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore 
Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1995); Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future o f Humanitarian 
Intervention”, Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 70-85; Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons 
of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong”, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 2-8; S. Neil 
MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human 
Security: Building Theory in Central America”, Third World Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1994): 277-295; 
David Malone “Haiti and the International Community: a Case Study”, Survival 39, no. 2 (Summer 
1997): 126-146.
33 The other strand focused on humanitarian intervention. See, for instance, Thomas G. Weiss and 
Larry Minear, eds., Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times o f  War (Boulder, 
Co: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Cedric Thomberry, “Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid, and Civil 
Conflicts”, in Jim Whitman and David Pocock, eds., After Rwanda: The Coordination o f  United 
Nations Humanitarian Assistance (London: Macmillan, 1996); Larry Minear, “Humanitarian Action 
and Peacekeeping Operations”, Journal o f  Humanitarian Assistance [article on-line] July 1997 
(accessed 10 July 2001), available from http://www.iha.ac/articles/a018.htm; Internet; Mats Berdal, 
“Lessons Not Learned: The Use o f Force in ‘Peace Operations’ in the 1990’s”, International 
Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 55-74.
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ordination between their different components, or focuses on the capacity- or lack of 
it- of the UN to fulfil these new functions in terms of political will and resources 
available.34 After An Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, introduced a distinction 
between peacemaking, traditional peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, both terms -  
peacebuilding and second-generation peacekeeping- began to be used
o c
interchangeably. Borrowed from the field of conflict resolution, peacebuilding 
entails an intervention, usually by the UN, to redefine ‘the relationship between the 
government and its citizens.’ The literature, however, did not really expand on the 
nature of the relationship to be redefined. But the concept nonetheless entailed that 
UN operations would now seek to help resolve conflicts, not just contain them as 
they did during the Cold War.
34 For example, see Cedric Thomberry, The Development o f  International Peacekeeping (London: 
LSE Centenary Lectures, 1995); Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in 
Lands o f Conflict after the Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); Jarat Chopra, “The Space for 
Peace-Maintenance”, Political Geography 15, 3 (March/April 1996): 335-357; Stephen John Stedman 
and Donald Rothschild, “Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment”, 
International Peacekeeping 3, 2 (Spring 1996): 17-35; Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United 
Nations Peacekeeping”, International Affairs 69, 3 (1993): 451-464; Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del 
Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding”, Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994): 69-93; William Durch, ed., 
The Evolution o f  UN Peacekeeping: Case studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993).
35 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992).
36 Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils o f United Nations Peace 
Building”, Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 392; see also Sonia K. Han, “Building a 
Peace that Lasts: the United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building”, New York University 
Journal o f  International Law and Politics 26, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 837-892; Nicole Ball and Tammy 
Halevy, Making Peace Work: the Role o f the International Development Community (Washington, 
DC: Overseas Development Council, 1996); I. William Zartman, “Putting Things Back Together”, in 
I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration o f Legitimate Authority 
(Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Elisabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., Peacebuilding as 
Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
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It was not until 1997 that some authors began to look into the liberal 
underpinnings of peacebuilding operations as opposed to the more technical 
questions of internal co-ordination, sequencing and resource allocation. Roland Paris 
wrote:
‘peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering- 
an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, 
political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to 
control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and 
economic liberalization.’37
The feasibility of creating liberal institutions in the immediate aftermath of a 
conflict was questioned by Paris, who argued that the process of transplanting these 
Western models -free market economy and democracy- creates an instability that 
can potentially lead to renewed violence: ‘both democracy and capitalism encourage 
conflict and competition -indeed they thrive on it... the process of political and 
economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous and disruptive.’38 He argued in 
favour of strategic liberalisation, ‘an approach to peacebuilding that is designed to 
limit the conflict-inducing effects of economic and political liberalization policies on 
war-shattered states.’39
Although the concept of strategic liberalisation has the merit of 
acknowledging the risks associated with liberalisation, Paris was silent on the risks 
for the peace process associated with the implementation of liberal approaches in the
37 Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits o f Liberal Internationalism”, International Security 22, 
no. 2 (Fall 1997): 56.
38 Ibid., pp. 74, 78.
39 Ibid., p. 82.
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security sector.40 Charles-Philippe David showed a greater awareness of these 
challenges.41 His piece focused on three types of transition -security, democratic and 
socio-economic- that peacebuilding is supposed to facilitate. His analysis of the 
security transition recognised that certain ‘elements of “realist” analysis need to be 
considered’ when thinking about reforming security forces.42 David argued that 
peacebuilding is not only a technical exercise at state-building, but an effort guided 
by liberal ideals that do not consider some of the security dynamics of the post­
conflict period.
David identified three main issues affecting the security transition, which 
will be of use in this thesis. First, the importance of the balance of forces in the 
calculation of the parties ‘may have a greater bearing on the chances for a peaceful 
security transition than does a negotiated settlement.’43 The author concluded that 
intervening actors must be aware of these calculations and not expect that the 
security transition can be handled impartially, as it would always affect the local 
balance of forces. Second, the security dilemma among the parties in the aftermath 
of the conflict was such that they ‘see their own survival as decidedly more 
important than implementation of the peace agreement.’44 Third, control over
40 In the military realm, liberals favour disarmament as a solution to the risks associated with the 
proliferation o f weapons. See chapter two.
41 Charles-Philippe David, “Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace 
Process”, Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (March 1999): 25-41.
42 Ibid., p. 30.
43 Ibid., p. 31.
44 Ibid., p. 31. The security dilemma will be defined here as a condition in which actors, states or 
parties to an internal conflict, acquire weapons in order to enhance their security as they are unsure of  
the intentions o f other actors. This process sets in motion a vicious circle o f armament and 
rearmament as an increase in security through arming on the part o f one actor creates more insecurity 
on the part o f others, who then decide to arm to protect themselves. This definition is largely based on
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territory was likely to remain a subject of dispute between the parties, even if the 
peace agreement provided for the disarmament and demobilisation of forces and 
their reintegration into statewide structures over the whole of a supposedly 
undivided territory. David concluded that the ‘security transition must take into 
account [these] realities which may diminish the chances of success of 
peacebuilding efforts.’45
Stuart Croft traced the origins of the disarmament and demobilisation 
approach adopted in peacebuilding operations back to the debate over disarmament 
at the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament. He wrote that there 
was
‘a very important linkage between thirty years of UN debate over 
international disarmament and the practise of intra-state disarmament that 
has taken place over the past five to ten years.’46
He argued that the UN had favoured disarmament over arms control because 
of the domination exercised by the non-aligned movement at the UN, who supported 
disarmament over arms control. From a theoretical perspective, disarmament has 
been regarded by the literature as the (liberal) idealist solution to the proliferation of 
weapons.47 Croft pointed to the limitations of disarmament and suggested an arms 
control approach in order to address the security dilemma experienced by the parties
Kenneth Waltz’s in Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 
pp. 186-87.
45 Ibid., p. 30.
46 Stuart Croft, “Lessons from the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars”, in Dimitris Bourantonis 
and Marios Evriviades, eds., A United Nations fo r the Twenty-First Century (Boston, MA: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996) p. 274.
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in the aftermath of the conflict. This approach was supposed to bring stability 
between the factions, which ‘would be used either to rebuild the state over a longer
A Q
period, or to manage the separation of the state into new political units.
All three authors contributed to making the liberal foundations of 
peacebuilding not only visible, but also to highlight the difficulties created by a 
liberal approach to conflict resolution. However, the literature has not attempted to 
assess the potential of combining a hard realist approach to SSR and liberal reforms 
in the political realm. In particular, the proposition that such an approach would 
create a breathing space that could be exploited to rebuild the state has not been 
explored. In this context, the role of third parties in helping implement such 
strategies has not been explored either. The next section discusses the role of third 
parties in conflict resolution, showing that their role in and authority over the 
implementation of peace agreements has not been sufficiently studied.
3. Peacebuilding: What Role and Authority for Third Parties?
Third parties are external actors to a given conflict who intervene between the 
parties in order to help them manage, settle or resolve their conflict.49 The literature 
classifies third party interventions according to the nature of the third party 
(individuals, states, international organisations, or non-governmental organisations), 
the level of intervention (official or ‘track I’, unofficial or ‘track II’), the outcome
47 The realist/liberal debate with regard to weapons will be explored in greater depth in chapter two.
48 Croft, Lessons from  the Disarmament o f  Factions in Civil Wars, p. 281.
49 Conflict management refers to the containment o f a given conflict once it has erupted, whereas 
conflict resolution occurs when its root causes are removed. A settlement ends the violent 
manifestations of a conflict, but does not remove its root causes.
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sought (settlement, management, resolution) or the processes adopted (facilitation, 
mediation, arbitration).50 This last distinction is important as it defines the degree of 
authority that third parties exert on the parties. At one end of the spectrum, third 
parties use non-coercive forms of intervention consisting of facilitation and 
consultation. Fisher and Keashley define these as activities to ‘improve 
communication, diagnose underlying relationship issues, and facilitate the search 
toward creative resolution of the conflict.’51 The process of negotiation is still very 
much in the hands of the parties, the role of third parties being limited to facilitating 
and improving communication.
At the other end of the spectrum, arbitration is a form of third party 
intervention in which the parties ‘agree to hand the determination of a final 
settlement to outsiders’.52 In this case, third parties use a formal mechanism to settle 
the conflict. Hoffman notes that this form of third party intervention is of limited 
value in violent, protracted conflicts, where the parties may refuse to engage with 
each other, or because the dispute to be settled is a manifestation of a deeper conflict 
that arbitration will not resolve.53
Between these two extremes lies mediation, which consists of interventions 
to help the parties reach a settlement through ‘persuasion, the control of information, 
the suggestion of alternatives and the application of leverage.’54 With mediation
50 See Mark Hoffman, “Third-Party Mediation and Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War World”, 
in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger, eds., Dilemmas o f  World Politics: International Issues in a 
Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp. 263-264.
51 Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashley, “The Potential Complementarity o f Mediation and 
Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention” Journal o f  Peace Research 28, 
no. 1 (Feb. 1991): 31.
52 Hoffman, Third-Party Mediation , p. 264.
53 Hoffman, Third-Party Mediation, p. 264.
54 Fisher and Keashley, The Potential Complementarity o f Mediation and Consultation, p. 31.
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third parties have an interest in a certain outcome, and use their power and influence 
to create that outcome. For example, Zartman argued that using their resources, third 
parties can help create a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, a situation where the parties 
perceive that to continue fighting is costly whilst not helping them achieve their 
objectives.55
Coming to the peacebuilding stage, Fen Osier Hampson, in his Nurturing 
Peace, argued that third party involvement and staying power are essential for the 
successful implementation of peace agreements following internal wars.56 He writes 
that ‘for peace settlements to succeed, third parties must entrench and institutionalise 
their role in the peace-making and peace-building process.*57 This involvement goes 
beyond what Hampson terms the ‘legitimizing and monitoring functions envisaged 
in traditional notions about peacekeeping.. ,’58 He argued that the degree of authority 
exerted by third parties over the negotiations leading to the peace agreement, such as 
mediation, should continue during the peacebuilding period. Hampson’s argument 
implies that third parties will maintain a certain degree of control over the 
implementation process, which may be reduced as the agreement is being 
implemented. As third parties continue to mediate between the parties and shape 
outcomes in the implementation phase, their own interests and preferences become a 
part of the process, as during the negotiations. With regard to this issue, this thesis 
will explore the issue of self-sustainability, asking whether the degree of authority
55 Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Mediation in Theory”, in Saadia Touval and 
I. William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practise (Washington, DC: 
Westview Press for the SAIS, 1985).
56 Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute o f Peace, 1996); see also Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, “Making 
Peace Settlements Work”, Foreign Policy 104 (Fall 1996): 54-71.
57 Hampson, Nurturing Peace, p. 23.
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exercised by third parties over the implementation phase leads to the creation of 
structures that can be sustained locally after external actors withdraw.
Adopting a critical position about the issue of third party control over the 
implementation of a peace agreement, David Chandler argued that the degree of 
control exerted by the international community over local political processes in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is counterproductive because it undermines state sovereignty 
and interferes with the democratic choices of its constituent communities.59
As for the role played by third parties after an agreement is reached, it has 
not been studied enough in the literature, as most authors have focused on pre­
agreement roles for third parties.60 Stephen Stedman has focused on the issue of 
‘spoilers’ in peacebuilding processes, arguing that they need to be isolated or co­
opted into the peace process by intervening third parties.61 Hugh Miall, Oliver 
Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse dedicate one chapter of their Contemporary
f\0  • ♦Conflict Resolution to post-settlement peacebuilding. They highlight the inherent 
tension for third parties involved in peacebuilding operations between maintaining 
the cease-fire and creating a self-sustaining peace. Even though they discuss the
58 Ibid., p. 222.
59 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 1999). Within the 
context of this work, the international community refers to the sum of states and inter-governmental 
institutions working on the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegivina.
60 Lederach is one of the rare authors who has considered the role played by third parties at any stage 
o f a conflict. See John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 1997); Fisher and Keashley did the same in Fisher 
and Keashley, The Potential Complementarity o f  Mediation and Consultation.
61 Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 
1997): 5-53.
62 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution : the 
Prevention, Management and Transformation o f  Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 
chapter seven.
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functions that third parties should perform, such as helping with demobilisation and 
refugee repatriation, the authors do not discuss the degree of control that third parties 
should exert over the implementation process.
The roles or functions performed by third parties and the degree of control 
they exert over the implementation of the peace agreement are nonetheless two 
separate things. For example, external actors can perform the function of helping 
with refugee return. But the degree of authority exercised by them over the process 
can vary greatly. First, they can facilitate dialogue between the parties, leaving them 
free to decide how to go about the organisation of refugee repatriation. Second, they 
can use their resources to mediate between the parties in order to shape an outcome 
that will suit the normative preferences of external actors, such as enforcing the right 
of all to freely return to their homes. Third, they can arbitrate the issue, issuing and 
enforcing legally binding decisions on disputes between the parties. This thesis 
therefore will study both the functions performed by third parties in the 
implementation of peace agreements, as well as the degree of authority they exert 
over the implementation of the peace agreement, in light of the issue of self- 
sustainability.
4. Peacebuilding: Designing a Hard Realist/Liberal Strategy
Instead of the liberal approach to SSR, outlined above, a hard realist strategy 
is considered here. According to this approach, external actors should help create a 
military balance between the parties, so as to address the security dilemma they
fk 'X  ,face. By doing so, the parties will feel secure enough to proceed with the
63 The notion o f security dilemma will be discussed in chapter two.
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implementation of the political and economic aspects of the peace agreement. This 
thesis points to an important element of the hard realist strategy of SSR in 
peacebuilding interventions: the continuing control exercised by the parties over 
security forces, including the police. Firstly, it asks how this ongoing control, 
coupled with the military balance approach adopted in the military realm, impacts on 
democratisation. Secondly, it asks what role third parties play in implementing this 
hard realist strategy of SSR, whilst also working to achieve the objective of 
peacebuilding, democratisation. Thirdly, it also asks what degree of control third 
parties exert over the implementation of the peace agreement, and how this affects 
self-sustainability.
There is only one case where this strategy has been formally adopted and 
enshrined in a peace agreement. Indeed, the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFA), concluded at Dayton on 21 November 1995, 
left the Bosnian state without an army nor a police force whilst providing for the 
creation of a military balance between BiH’s two constituent entities. This thesis 
will examine the implementation process of the GFA from the adoption of the 
agreement in November 1995 until the November 2000 elections. It looks at the 
impact of the structure of the security sector envisaged in the GFA on the closely 
related process of democratisation, and asks how the intervention conducted by a 
host of international institutions has shaped this structure, and affected both 
processes. This work points to the inherent tension between the liberal and hard 
realist provisions of the GFA, which is the product of the international strategy 
adopted at Dayton. The GFA focused largely on ending the war, and on 
guaranteeing the security of the ethnic statelets carved up during the conflict as a
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means to avoid the resumption of hostilities.64 It underestimated the vitality of the 
nationalist structures it legitimised, and their resistance to the liberal provisions of 
the GFA.
As with any case study, there are features specific to the Bosnian case that 
need to be reckoned with. First, the Bosnian conflict can be characterised as an 
ethnic conflict between three ethnic groups. In addition, two of these three ethnic 
groups have strong affinities with neighbouring states, namely Croatia and Serbia. 
Because of this, the redrawing of BiH’s borders has been an essential issue of the 
conflict as both Croats and Serbs have sought to create ethnically homogenous 
statelets that would later be joined with Croatia and Serbia. In the post-conflict 
phase, there has therefore been a strong emphasis not only on democratisation, but 
also on its reintegration dimension. This issue of reintegration has been evident in 
the field of refugee return, where innumerable obstacles have been created to 
prevent returns.
Second, a host of international agencies have been involved in the 
implementation of the peace agreement in BiH, unlike previous peacebuilding 
operations, where the UN was the main implementing agency. International 
organisations operating in BiH have brought with them enormous military, financial 
and political resources. However, co-operation among these agencies has been an 
uphill struggle, especially between the military and civilian sides of the international 
presence.65 The issue of co-operation among agencies also plagues UN 
interventions, but it is exacerbated in the case of BiH, because of the dichotomy 
between the broadly liberal and realist agendas pursued by the various external
64 Unless stated otherwise, security will be understood in this thesis as the absence of physical threat.
65 This issue will be addressed in chapters four and five.
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actors present on the ground. In spite of these unique features, more general 
conclusions will be drawn with regard to the impact of the hard realist model of 
security sector reform on the two objectives of peacebuilding.
As for the Bosnian case, this thesis argues that the hard realist strategy 
adopted with regard to SSR in BiH has not facilitated the process of democratisation. 
In fact, it has served to largely preserve the nationalist power structure established 
during the war. The term ‘nationalist power structure’ refers to the nationalist parties 
o f Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly but not only, the Serb SDS (Srpska Demokratska 
Stranka), the Bosniak SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) and the Croat HDZ 
(Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) and the control they seek to maintain over the 
institutions of government, the police, the military and state-owned companies 
through appointments, dismissals, corruption and the threat or use of physical 
force.66 This power structure is by and large a legacy of the communist era, with the 
difference that nationalist parties now appeal to specific ethnic communities Using 
an ideology based on ethnicity instead the communist ideology. These parties (SDS, 
SDA, HDZ) who won the 1990 elections, have tried to extend their control over the 
territories they gained during the war, by pitching themselves as the defenders of the 
ethnic community they claim to represent, so as to suppress opposition coming from 
within their ethnic community and maintain their control over political, security and 
economic resources within their respective territories. Their resistance to
66 Following the split between Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic, other political parties were 
created in the Republika Srpska, leading to a fragmentation o f the Serb entity in two parts: one, west 
o f Brcko, under the control o f Plavsic's faction, and the other, consisting o f eastern RS, loyal to 
Karadzic and his faction. All have nonetheless maintained the same objectives as just discussed 
regarding the SDS, differing only in their willingness to co-operate with the international community. 
It is worth pointing out that the political fragmentation in the RS is not the product o f the hard realist 
approach to SSR adopted in BiH.
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democratisation, although the picture may be slightly different in the case of the 
SDA, has to do both with strategy and ideology. Indeed, not only do the SDS (and 
its offsprings) as well as the HDZ, unlike the SDA, pursue a secessionist agenda 
based on ethnicity, seeking the creation of ethnically pure statelets that could be later 
joined with Serbia and Croatia respectively, but also all parties seek to maintain and 
consolidate their grip on the territories and resources they control.
This conclusion, specific to the Bosnian case, points to a more general 
consequence of the implementation of a hard realist/liberal model of peacebuilding: 
that such a strategy consolidates the power of the parties to the agreement and their 
control over the territories they gained during the conflict, which potentially 
undermines democratisation.67
This thesis is structured as follows. Part I explores the theory of 
peacebuilding as conceptualised by the UN. Chapter one argues that the UN has 
adopted and narrowed down the concept of peacebuilding to a top-down process 
aimed at building democracies. It shows that UN efforts at democratisation are not 
sufficient to explain the outcome of peacebuilding operations. Chapter two then 
argues that the disarmament/demobilisation strategy adopted in UN peacebuilding 
with regard to security sector reform is the product of the intellectual dominance of 
liberal ideas of disarmament at the UN. It also discusses the impact of police reform 
on UN peacebuilding on the balance of forces, control over territory and the security 
dilemma. It then considers a hard realist approach to SSR.
Part II then turns to the case study and examines the political and security 
provisions of the GFA. Chapter three argues that the GFA provides for the 
establishment of a democratic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Chapter four argues that
67 This conclusion will be refined in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
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the security provisions of the GFA are largely hard realist, and seek to engineer a 
military balance between the parties, whilst implicitly legitimising three police and 
armed forces.
Part III focuses on the implementation of the security provisions of the GFA 
and on the role played by international organisations in shaping this process between 
the adoption of the agreement in November 1995 and the November 2000 elections. 
Chapter five concentrates on the role of the Implementation/Stabilisation Force 
(EFOR/SFOR) in implementing annex 1-A. It argues that the NATO-led force’s 
minimalist interpretation of its mandate has led to further ethnic division and has 
undermined democratisation. Chapter six looks at the role of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) in the implementation of annex 1-B, which contains the 
military balance strategy adopted at Dayton, and in building a state-wide dimension 
of defence. The chapter discusses the difficulties encountered by the OHR to then 
argue that annex 1-B has not created the stability necessary to induce already 
recalcitrant parties to reintegrate their military forces. Chapter seven, in turn, is a 
study of the activities of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 
implementing annex 11 of the GFA. This chapter argues that both the mandate and 
the institutional weaknesses of IPTF have prevented it from having a decisive impact 
on the reform of police forces, which has been resisted by the parties. Chapter seven 
will be followed by a conclusion.
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Part I
Chapter 1: Political Aspects of United Nations Peacebuilding: 
Assisting the Transition towards Democracy
Since the 1990’s, a new form of multilateral operations, called peacebuilding, has 
developed under the auspices the United Nations (UN). Under this label, UN 
military and civilian personnel have been deployed following comprehensive peace 
agreements with the aim of helping their implementation and preventing the 
resumption of violence in post-conflict situations. UN peacebuilding aims at tackling 
the pervasive problem of internal war, the form of conflict which has received the 
most attention in the post-Cold War era. However, implementing peace agreements 
is not a mechanical process. Oftentimes, these agreements lack clarity, leaving 
implementers a lot of latitude to steer the peace process in a particular direction. It is 
in this context that the preferences of interveners take their significance. This 
chapter argues that VUN interventions have favoured the (re)building of formal 
democracies in war-torn states.
Indeed, UN peacebuilding entails the (re)building of a formal democracy- 
characterised by free and fair elections, the rule of law and individual rights. Such 
UN operations have therefore been mandated with the organisation of elections, the 
monitoring of human rights and the reform of the police. UN peacebuilding also 
seeks to (re)build a single (democratic) political space within the internationally 
recognised borders of the state by breaking down legal, administrative, physical and 
economic barriers set up between the parties during the conflict. Indeed, the 
democratisation process seeks to replace not only the barriers between the parties, 
but also the institutions set up during the war by a new set of democratic institutions
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in order to create a single space. The model of democracy, it is assumed by 
peacebuilders, will bring peace to war-tom states.1
As explained in the introduction, the concept of peacebuilding, borrowed 
from the peace research literature, entails the transformation of relations between 
conflicting parties. UN peacebuilding differs from the peace research concept of 
peacebuilding in two ways. First, although UN peacebuilding also seeks the 
redefinition of relations between the parties, it is a top-down, state-centric form of 
intervention that aims at redefining these relations principally at the level of elites 
and state institutions. Second, UN peacebuilding anchors the new relations to be 
created between the parties in democratic theory. Therefore, this chapter also seeks 
to understand the connection, which informs UN peacebuilding, between peace and 
democracy. The chapter considers three explanations to account for the transition 
towards democracy, the objective of UN peacebuilding: UN efforts at building 
formal democracy, the lack of a democratic culture and the security transition, 
discussed in the introduction, comprising control over territory, the balance of forces 
in the field and the security dilemma.2
This chapter also reviews six peacebuilding interventions conducted by the 
UN. They have yielded different results ranging from peaceful transition towards 
formal democracy to return to hostilities. Based on these varied outcomes, however, 
the question is asked whether realist considerations -balance of forces, the security 
dilemma, and control over territory- can help explain the various outcomes. The 
proposition that they do and need to be taken into account when assessing 
peacebuilding operations is then developed in chapter two.
1 ‘Peace’ is understood in this work as the absence o f war and the presence o f functioning mechanisms 
to manage conflict between and within states without having to resort to war.
2 The notions of balance of forces and security dilemma will be discussed in chapter two.
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The structure of this chapter is straightforward. The first section discusses the 
three elements of formal democracy: the rule of law, free and fair elections and 
protection for individual rights. The argument that democracy is also supported by a 
set of shared values found in society is also discussed in relation to UN 
peacebuilding. The second section examines the connection between democracy and 
peace, and argues that the democratic tradition considered that both democratic 
institutions and values are necessary for peace to be established. The third section 
examines the shift that has taken place at the UN since the end of the Cold War 
towards democracy and shows that building formal democracies is one of the main 
objectives of UN peacebuilding. Finally, in the last section, six peacebuilding 
missions are reviewed, showing that a realist analysis of the security transition helps 
explain the various outcomes.
1. Explaining the Sustainability of Democracy: Values and 
Institutions?
This section proposes a formal definition of democracy as comprising legally 
protected individual rights, free and fair elections and the rule of law. The idea that 
democratic institutions cannot endure without the development of democratic values 
in society is also discussed. It is argued here that this cultural argument is of little 
value in explaining the outcome of UN peacebuilding operations, as these 
operations, of short duration, cannot decisively transform the local political culture 
towards a genuine democratic culture.
The origins of democracy can be traced back as far as Athens and are 
grounded in liberalism. Democracy seeks to answer the question of how government
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1 t
can be sustained and what form it should take. This answer starts with the premise
that individuals are the basic unit of society, capable of rational thinking, possessing 
inalienable rights, which are to be respected by the state and their fellow-citizens, 
thereby enabling them to pursue their self-interest.
Democracy is characterised by three formal elements. First, individual 
citizens possess civil and political rights, which are enshrined in a constitutional 
order. These rights range from a right to life and property to freedom of movement, 
association and expression. These rights are to apply to all citizens, throughout the 
national territory. Their exercise is to be protected through the rule of law, which 
constrains the power of the state and prescribes rules of behaviour for its agents.4 In 
addition, legal procedures and institutions are put in place to redress violations of 
these rights either by the state or by private actors.
Second, the electorate delegates the authority to govern to representative 
legislatures, which can be recalled through regular free and fair elections in which 
almost all adults can participate either as candidates or voters. Joseph Schumpeter’s 
famous definition considers elections as the defining feature of democracy. To him, 
democracy amounts to an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’5 Robert Dahl saw as an essential 
characteristic of democracy ‘the quality of being completely or almost completely
3 See David Held, Models o f Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) p. 88.
4 See Neil J. Kritz, “The Rule o f law in the Post-Conflict Phase”, in Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela 
Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos: Sources o f  and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) p. 588. The rights recognised to citizens vary from 
democracy to democracy. Chapter 3 offers a comprehensive list o f the rights granted to Bosnian 
citizens, based on various international documents, which are found in most democratic constitutions.
5 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1947) p. 
269.
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responsive to all its citizens’, including through elections or eligibility for public 
office.6
Third, social life is governed by the rule of law, defined here as a set of 
publicly known rules which govern the exercise of state power, thereby guaranteeing 
predictability and certainty, in order to protect individual rights. Maintenance of the 
rule of law necessitates at least an independent judiciary, a professional police force 
and an efficient prison system and has to extent to the entire national territory. Rama 
Mani pointed out that the rule of law must be understood in relation to individual 
rights.7 The rule of law should contribute to the protection of individual rights, and 
should restrict the power of the state in order to enforce these rights. In practical 
terms, individual rights cannot be protected if the basic institutions of the rule of law 
do not function effectively, as it is often the case in post-conflict situations. These 
institutions, which are an independent judiciary, a professional police force and an 
efficient prison system, constitute a minimum starting point for the (re)establishment 
o f the rule of law.
This definition leaves out another aspect of democracy that has been 
developed in the literature since the 1990’s.8 Indeed, there has been a shift in the 
democratisation literature away from a formal definition of democracy, such as the 
one proposed here, towards a definition arguing that democratic institutions cannot 
be sustained without a set of shared democratic values found in society such as
6 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)
p. 2.
7 Rama Mani, “Conflict Resolution, Justice and the Law: Rebuilding the Rule o f Law in the Aftermath 
o f Complex Political Emergencies”, International Peacekeeping 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 1-25.
8 See, for instance, Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation”, 
Journal o f  Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994): 4-17 and Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy o f Culture”, 
Journal o f Democracy 6, 1 (1995): 7-14.
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compromise, tolerance or the willingness not to use violence to resolve disputes.9 
These values are to be learned and practised by citizens in voluntary associations 
that form civil society.10 Democracy and democratic institutions, according to this 
argument, depend on a vibrant, democratic civil society where democratic values are 
practised. Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda’s article about the process of 
democratisation in ten Central and East European countries illustrates this dual 
nature of democracy.11 They distinguish between formal democracy, comprising a 
set of rules, procedures and institutions, and substantive democracy, characterised by 
a democratic political culture in which there is a ‘genuine tendency for political 
equalization and in which the individual feels secure and able and willing to 
participate in political decision-making...’12 To them, substantive democracy 
necessitates, among others, political parties that provide a vehicle for political 
participation, a media representing a broad political debate and a civil society made 
up of independent associations and institutions that is able to check abuses of state 
power.
This line of argument raises two sets of difficulties in the context of UN 
peacebuilding. First, the argument can easily become tautological: a country is not 
democratic until it adopts democratic values. Any failed attempt at creating
9 There is, however, no consensus in the literature over what values are necessary to sustain 
democracy.
10 There is no consensus over how long it takes for a society to Team’ democratic values. Fred 
Halliday and Keitha Fine estimate that the process probably takes at least a generation. See Keitha 
Fine, “Fragile Stability and Change: Understanding Conflict During the Transition in East Central 
Europe”, in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., Preventing Conflict in the Post- 
Communist World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996) p. 566 and Fred Halliday, 
Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994) pp. 232-33.
11 Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and East European Countries”, 
International Affairs 73, no. 1 (1997): 59-82.
12 Ibid., p. 66.
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democratic institutions can then be explained by the fact that the target society has 
not yet adopted democratic values in order to support these institutions. However, 
this argument leaves open the questions of why these values have not been adopted 
as well as whether it is possible to transplant them to the target society.
However, and this constitutes the second difficulty, the praxis of UN 
peacebuilding shows that these interventions are state-centric, top-down 
interventions, aimed principally at creating democratic institutions and a single 
political space. The length of these interventions, being usually under two years, 
precludes most initiatives seeking to foster democratic values and develop civil 
society, in spite of claims by the UN to the contrary. Finally, all of these 
interventions take place in societies where Western democratic values are foreign. 
The various outcomes of UN peacebuilding efforts, reviewed in section four, cannot 
therefore satisfactorily be explained by a deficit in democratic values.14 Or, to put it 
differently, UN peacebuilding operations are, according to the cultural argument, 
bound to fail in their efforts at democratisation because of their short length unless 
they are followed by long-term international efforts that seek to facilitate the 
development of substantive democracy, as defined by Kaldor and Vejvoda.
Consequently, a ‘democracy’ in the context of UN peacebuilding should be 
understood as a country that bears the following formal characteristics: delegation of 
the right to govern to legislatures through free and fair elections in which most
13 UN peacebuilding also seeks to foster democratic values, but the main focus o f these operations is 
democratic institutions. This focus becomes clear when looking at the exit strategy o f these 
operations, as they are usually wound up after the installation o f democratically elected government.
14 The same argument can be made with regard to BiH. Even though the intervention is of 
unprecedented length, it is doubtful that six years are sufficient to dramatically transform the local 
political culture. In any case, Halliday and Fine would argue that six years is too short to achieve 
lasting changes.
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adults can participate either as candidates or voters, respect for the rule of law and 
individual rights, including the existence of functioning institutions for preventing 
and redressing violations. The next section asks how democracy guarantees peace.
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2. How Does Democracy Guarantee Peace?
This section elaborates on the idea that democracy is conducive to peace. By 
looking at three authors, it shows that both democratic values and institutions are 
seen as conducive to peace. However, the importance granted to democratic norms 
in the literature to explain why democracies are peaceful casts doubt on the 
feasibility of bringing peace to war-torn states within the time frame of a 
peacebuilding intervention, pointing to the need of other factors to explain the 
outcome of UN peacebuilding operations.
Immanuel Kant, in his Perpetual Peace, argued that republican constitutions 
lead to peaceful relations between states. Although he acknowledged that the 
international system is anarchical, Kant believed that some states could form, as 
Michael Doyle called it, a ‘separate peace’ within that system.15 This peaceful order 
could be created by fulfilling three conditions, that Kant called the definitive articles. 
The first article stated that the constitution of these states had to be republican, 
meaning a constitution that solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, 
individualism and domestic social order. In the private sphere, Kant foresaw a 
private property and market-oriented economy as a solution. The legal equality of 
citizens as autonomous subjects -juridical freedom- in the public sphere was to be 
preserved on the basis of an elected government with a separation of powers. This 
form of political organisation guarantees juridical freedom because individuals 
become self-legislators through representation, while tyranny is avoided by means of
15 Michael W. Doyle, Ways o f  War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New York: 
Norton, 1997) p. 277.
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a separation of powers.16 It is worth pointing out that Kant’s republican constitutions 
did not include universal suffrage. His argument that a certain type of political 
regime, in this case bearing some democratic characteristics, is more conducive to 
peace than others is nonetheless important in understanding why some liberals think 
of democratic institutions as conducive to peace.
Indeed, coming to the issue of war, Kant asserted that in states with 
republican constitutions ‘it is very natural that they [citizens] will have a great 
hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise’ because it would mean 
‘calling on themselves all the miseries of war’.17 Kant therefore saw a representative 
system as a means to avoid war.
Bruce Russett has tested a similar proposition by constructing two models to 
explain why modem democracies are so reluctant to go to war with other
1 ftdemocracies. He argued that such a dislike for war in modem democracies comes 
not only from the nature of democratic decision-making, characterised by checks 
and balances as well as a separation of powers, called the ‘structural/institutional 
model’, but foremost from a spirit of compromise and self-restraint that is inherent 
to democracy (named the ‘cultural/normative model’).19 In democratic societies,
16 The two other articles being the formation o f a pacific federation o f free states and respect, by these 
same states, for cosmopolitan law.
17 Doyle, Ways o f  War and Peace, p. 280.
18 Both Bruce Russett and Samuel Huntington, reviewed next, defined democracy as a political system 
where the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through free and fair elections in 
which most adults can participate either as candidates or voters. This fairly limited definition of 
democracy nonetheless leads both authors to conclude that democracy is conducive to peace.
19 His statistical analysis o f all pairs o f independent states in the world during the period 1946-86 led 
him to conclude that ‘the normative explanation is superior... almost always the cultural/normative 
model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional...often 
does not.’ See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles fo r  a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) p. 92.
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civil disputes are resolved without recourse to violence and this cautious attitude is 
reflected in the way democracies interact with each other. The democratic peace 
theory, as it has come to be known, sees the advancement of democracy in the world 
as a means to promote international peace.20
The proposition underlying the democratic peace theory is that democracy 
guarantees peace within countries, and that these democratic values can then be 
projected onto the international scene. Russett alluded to it when he asserted that
‘the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within 
countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other 
democratic countries.’21
Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave shed some additional light on the role 
of democracy in bringing about domestic peace.22 Although Huntington regarded the 
form of government and political stability as two different variables, he argued that 
the two are interrelated.23 Hence ‘in the modem world democratic systems tend to be 
less subject to civil violence than are non-democratic systems’ for three reasons.24 
First, according to Huntington, domestic governments use far less violence against 
their citizens than do undemocratic governments.25 Indeed, in democratic societies, 
channels exist for the expression of dissent and opposition within the system; the 
government and the opposition have fewer incentives to use violence against each
20 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1991) p. 29.
21 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 31.
22 Huntington, The Third Wave, chapter 1.
23 Political stability ‘refers to the degree to which the political system may be expected to remain in 
existence.’ Ibid., p. 11.
24 Ibid., p. 28.
25 This does not prevent, however, some minorities from trying to fight their way to power.
49
other. Third, because there exist regular opportunities for changing political leaders 
and public policies, democratic systems are more immune to revolutions than 
undemocratic governments. In addition, change in democratic societies is 
incremental and moderate.
The democratic tradition, reviewed in this section, assumes that both 
democratic values and institutions are conducive to peace. However, the short 
duration of UN peacebuilding interventions casts doubt on the capacity of these 
interventions to decisively impact on a society’s values. The question can therefore 
be legitimately asked whether there is any point in attempting to democratise states. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this line of reasoning. The first comes down 
against external intervention, claiming that it is a futile exercise. The second claims 
that intervention can facilitate some sort of transition towards democracy. The 
relative success of the UN in assisting some of these transitions bears out the 
suggestion that some measure of democratisation can be achieved, even in the short 
time of an intervention. However, the success of these interventions in bringing 
peace to war-torn states cannot be solely explained by the UN’s efforts at building of 
democratic institutional mechanisms, as the argument reviewed in this section 
considers that both institutions and values matter in explaining why democracies are 
peaceful.27
This is where the argument that realist considerations help explain the 
various outcomes of these UN interventions becomes relevant. Indeed, in the
26 Although Huntington does not specify at which stage o f political development democratisation 
should take place, his argument that democracies are more stable than non-democracies illustrates the 
point in view.
27 It is not argued here that the building of the institutions o f democracy is a short-term task. However, 
interventions can more easily target institutions like the police, parliament and the judiciary system in 
order to democratise them than create a new political culture.
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absence of a democratic tradition, realist considerations such as the balance of 
forces, the security dilemma and control over territory, as well as the UN’s efforts at 
building democratic institutional mechanisms, both help explain the outcome of the 
democratisation process. The next section shows how, since the end of the Cold 
War, the UN has been more inclined to support democracy.
3. The UN and the Shift towards Democracy
The argument of this section is straightforward: since the end of the Cold 
War the UN has been more inclined to promote democracy in its activities. 
Democracy is now the ideal model to be adopted for war-torn states, but also for 
developing nations. This section shows how democratic values have permeated UN 
thinking.
The end of the Cold War signalled the end of the East-West ideological 
rivalry. At the UN, the ideological balance tilted towards democracy. UN texts 
reflect this shift towards policies supporting democracy in development and conflict 
resolution issues. An Agenda fo r  Peace (AfP) recognised that ‘authoritarian regimes 
have given way to more democratic forces and responsive Governments.’ An 
Agenda fo r  Development (AfD) also alluded to the same changes:
28 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992) p. 41. An Agenda 
fo r  Peace also located the process of democratisation and peacebuilding within the boundaries o f the 
state. Para. 17 o f An Agenda stated that ‘The foundation-stone o f  this work is and must remain the 
State. Respect fo r  its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international 
progress. ' UN Peacebuilding is therefore an exercise at rebuilding states within their internationally 
recognised borders.
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‘The special problems and features of countries with economies in 
transition require particular attention in the post-cold war era. The dual 
transition to democracy and to a market economy makes their situation 
especially complex particularly regarding their economic growth and 
sustainable development.’29
AfP further proposed that ‘solutions [to the challenges of transition lie] in 
commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities,
• ♦ i nwhether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic.’ It also argued that ‘respect for 
democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, 
within States and within the community of States.’31 AfD restated a similar 
argument, but in relation to development:
‘Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic and 
effective institutions, combating corruption, transparent, representative 
and accountable governance, popular participation, an independent 
judiciary, the rule of law and civil peace are among the indispensable 
foundations for development’.32
Kofi Annan’s report on The Causes o f Conflict and the Promotion o f  Durable Peace 
and Sustainable Development in Africa (Afr) also states that ‘respect for human 
rights and the rule of law are necessary components of any effort to make peace 
durable.’33
Finally, AfP restated the Kantian connection between peace and democracy:
29 Kofi Annan, An Agenda for Development [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1998, 
accessed 17 November 1999); available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/ag index.htm; Internet; 
para. 21.
30 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  Peace, p. 44.
31 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  Peace, p. 45.
32 Annan, An Agenda fo r  Development, para. 27.
33 See Kofi Annan, The Causes o f Conflict and the Promotion o f  Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa [article on-line] (New York: United Nations, 1998, accessed 17 November
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‘There is an obvious connection between democratic practices -  such as 
the rule of law and transparency in decision-making -  and the 
achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political 
order.’34
Elsewhere, Boutros Boutros-Ghali also stated that ‘democracies almost never fight 
each other. Democratization supports the cause of peace.’35
In a report on democracy and democratisation to the UN General Assembly 
(DaD), Boutros-Ghali restated the similar claim: ‘Democracy contributes to 
preserving peace and security, securing justice and human rights, and promoting 
economic and social development.’36 Boutros-Ghali also made a connection between 
the three features of democracy discussed in the previous section:
‘Because democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and 
held accountable through periodic and genuine elections and other 
mechanisms, they are more likely to promote and respect the rule of law, 
[and] respect individual and minority rights.. ,’37
Finally, DaD restated the argument that democracy brings peace between states:
‘The accountability and transparency of democratic Governments to their 
own citizens, who understandably may be highly cautious about war, as it
1999); available from http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html: Internet; para. 
72.
34 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 62.
35 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘“An Agenda for Peace’: One year Later”, Orbis 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 
329.
36 UN Secretary-General, Letter Dated 96/12/17 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President o f  the General Assembly, including a Supplement to Reports on Democratization, A /51/761, 
17 December 1996, para. 16.
371bid., para. 17.
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is they who will have to bear its risks and burdens, may help to restrain 
recourse to military conflict with other States.’38
Boutros-Ghali then discussed the role of the UN in helping states towards 
democracy. The assistance provided by the UN ranges from ‘assistance in the 
creation of a political culture in which democratisation can take root, to assistance in 
democratic elections, to assistance in building institutions which support 
democratisation.’39 He cited the examples of UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUSAL in El 
Salvador and ONUMOZ in Mozambique where the UN was involved in organising 
elections, monitored the election campaign and educated voters. He concluded that
‘the peacekeeping mandates entrusted to the United Nations now often 
include both the restoration of democracy and the protection of human 
rights... the entire range of United Nations assistance, from support for a 
culture of democracy to assistance in institution-building for 
democratization, may well be understood as a key component of peace­
building.’40
The UN is now more committed to democracy. Despite resistance on the part 
of some of its members, like China, the Organisation has more often than not 
presented democracy as the model to be adopted by all states. Peacebuilding 
operations are no different: they aim at steering states towards democracy. The next 
section looks at six peacebuilding missions, showing how their mandates are geared 
towards building democracy, as defined in this chapter. These cases show that the 
UN’s efforts at democratisation have centred chiefly on institution-building and have 
not mechanically led to peace. Based on this conclusion, the suggestion that
38 Ibid., para. 18.
39 Ibid., para. 40.
40 Ibid., para. 5 and 46.
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elements of the security transition may account for the outcome of peacebuilding 
operations is considered.
4. UN Peacebuilding: Six Case Studies
This section examines six UN peacebuilding operations, and argues that 
realist considerations are necessary to explain the transition towards democracy. The 
UN’s efforts at creating democratic institutional mechanisms, it is argued, are not 
sufficient to explain the various outcomes, nor is the limited impact of UN 
peacebuilding on the local political culture.
The main characteristics that have guided the selection of these cases as UN 
peacebuilding are the following: first, as identified by Eva Bertam, peacebuilding 
operations usually follow internal wars.41 An Agenda fo r  Peace considered the 
possibility of both interstate and intrastate peacebuilding activities;42 however, the 
record to date of shows that an overwhelming majority of these activities took place 
within states, following an internal war.43 Second, peacebuilding personnel are 
deployed to help the implementation of a comprehensive and multi-faceted 
agreement that seeks to address the root causes of conflict. Third, the UN and its 
affiliated agencies are responsible for the operation. Fourth, UN peacebuilding aims 
at facilitating the transition towards democracy and a single political space. Indeed, 
the barriers that were set up between the parties during the conflict are meant to be 
replaced by a new set of institutions, modelled on democracy, supposed to give
41 Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils o f United Nations Peace 
Building”, Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (Sep. 1995): 390.
42 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  Peace, pp. 61-62.
43 Because this study focuses on internal conflict, only peacebuilding operations that follow this type 
of conflict will be considered here.
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incentives to the parties to reintegrate into the new single political space by offering 
the opportunity to access political resources, through competitive elections, as well 
as institutional protection for their political rights.
Based on these four criteria, six peacebuilding operations can be identified 
since 1989: El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, Guatemala. 
Several other UN operations do not meet these criteria: Namibia and Western Sahara 
which are decolonisation operations, not internal wars; the Central African Republic 
and Haiti, which did not follow an internal war, but military coups; Nicaragua’s 
ONUCA and Sierra Leone, which consist of a military mandate only; Eastern 
Slavonia, which was an interstate operation; Kosovo, which does not follow a 
comprehensive peace agreement. Finally, Liberia is also an exception because the 
UN’s mandate there was restricted to observing the activities of ECOWAS troops.
4.1. Angola
International negotiators secured a political agreement from the warring 
parties -the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Uniao 
Nacionalpara a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in 1991.44 Following the 
peace accord, the UN was mandated with monitoring the police, which in the past 
had been responsible for numerous human rights violations. The mandate of the UN 
lasted from May 1991, when the cease-fire entered into force, until the day after the 
completion o f the presidential and legislative elections, which were monitored by the 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). Indeed, the Peace 
Accords provided for ‘free and fair elections for a new Government’ under ‘the
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supervision of international election observers’.45 Consequently, UNAVEM’s 
mandate was extended to include preparing and conducting the election, including 
its monitoring. The UN helped with the registration of voters, monitored the 
electoral campaign and deployed 400 observers for the election, on 29-30 September 
1992.
The collapse of the peace process in Angola after UNITA’s candidate, Jonas 
Savimbi, lost the first round of elections in September 1992, and went back to 
fighting, has been widely commented on. The UN’s failure in bringing peace to 
Angola underscores one of the main features of democratisation. By seeking to 
create a democracy, peacebuilding re-allocates political resources among the parties 
in a way that may not meet their interests nor address their security concerns. In the 
case of Angola, the ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral system chosen meant that the losing 
party would be excluded from government. It also meant that the new, integrated 
armed forces would constitutionally be under the command of the government. 
From Savimbi’s perspective, losing the election would have amounted to losing his 
control over political and security resources.46 In the aftermath of conflict, where 
mistrust runs high, surrendering control over these resources may represent a greater 
security risk than reinitiating hostilities. Savimbi, who had maintained hidden arms 
reserves, decided to resume the war rather than to accept his electoral defeat47
44 See United Nations, The Blue Helmets: a Review o f  United Nations Peace-keeping (New York, NY: 
United Nations, 1996) pp. 238-254 and Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits o f Liberal 
Internationalism”, International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 70-71.
45 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p. 243.
46 In addition, it turned out that the government transferred troops to an ‘anti-riot’ police force, with a 
parallel command structure to the new integrated armed forces. See Yvonne C. Lodico, “A Peace that 
Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola”, in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, 
American Politics and the Uncivil Wars o f the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) p. 112.
47 Ibid., p. 112.
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4.2. El Salvador
In 1992, a UN-mediated peace accord was signed between the Salvadoran 
government and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional 
(FMLN). The peace agreements provided for radical military, economic, judicial, 
electoral and constitutional reforms. Before the signing of this comprehensive 
agreement, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) had 
been deployed to monitor the human rights situation throughout the country. 
Following the Mexico City Agreement, ONUSAL was mandated with the 
verification of the parties’ compliance with the accord. The human rights component 
of the mission was expanded to include, in addition to the monitoring of the human 
rights situation, mediation in cases of violations and education programmes on 
human rights standards for the Salvadoran population.
ONUSAL’s mandate was enlarged a third time to include the monitoring of 
the election scheduled for March 1994. More specifically, the UN was to help with 
the registration and education of voters, observing the electoral campaign and the 
election. It was also to monitor the counting of votes and the announcements of 
results. ONUSAL was also mandated with verifying the cantonment and 
demobilisation of FMLN troops and with monitoring the work of the police, 
responsible for extensive human rights violations during the conflict. In addition, 
ONUSAL had to verify the dismissal of military personnel from the armed forces 
who had been found responsible for human rights violations, the dismantlement of 
El Salvador’s three police forces, as well as the downsizing and restructuring of the
48 See Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits o f  Liberal Internationalism, pp. 66-67, Sonia K. Han, 
“Building a Peace that Lasts: The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building”, Journal o f  
International Law and Politics 26, no. 4 (1994): 851-56 and United Nations, The Blue Helmets, pp. 
425-44.
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Salvadoran armed forces. The agreement provided that former FMLN members 
could become part of the new police and armed forces.
Overall, ONUSAL is presented by the UN as a success story. Indeed, the 
peace process was not marred by any large-scale violence, and compliance with the 
terms of the agreement was generally good. David H. McCormick, quoting a UN 
military observer, spoke of the process of cessation of hostilities and the separation 
of forces as ‘remarkably smooth compared to [previous] operations’.49 ONUSAL’s 
success cannot, however, be attributed solely to its role in improving the human 
rights situation or conducting democratic elections. Indeed, several other key 
elements of the peace agreement and process help account for the outcome of the 
peace process.
First, as part of the agreement, FMLN guerrillas were granted the possibility 
of buying the land that they occupied. The implementation of the land programme 
was however delayed by the government, under pressure from the land owners, who 
stood to lose most from the redistribution of land. Due to the lack of progress on the 
land question, in October 1992 the FMLN interrupted the third phase of 
demobilisation of its forces, having only demobilised 40% of its troops at that point. 
A compromise hammered out by the UN Secretary-General allowed both processes 
to restart, but this episode shows how the FMLN made clever use of its military 
strength and control over territory in order to achieve progress in land redistribution.
Second, both the government and the FMLN manipulated the process of 
demobilisation and downsizing to their advantage, trying to maintain substantial
49 David H. McCormick, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Restructuring Military and Police 
Institutions in El Salvador”, in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping the 
Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) p. 284.
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military capabilities as a hedge against defection. According to the military 
assessments made by ONUSAL, the amount of weapons declared by the FMLN as 
part of the demobilisation process was grossly inaccurate. A military observer noted 
that
‘it was obvious that the weapons and equipment inventoried were not 
consistent with the types of military operations that the FMLN had been 
waging, nor the numbers of ex-combatants that were demobilizing.’50
The government, in turn, did not disband two of the three police forces to be 
disbanded under the peace agreement, but simply incorporated them in the army. In 
addition, in spite of official statements to the contrary, ONUSAL assessed that the 
government probably kept more troops under arms than officially announced. 
Finally, it is estimated that about 300,000 military weapons found their way into the 
hands of civilians, many of whom had just been demobilised from government 
armed forces.51
The role of ONUSAL in mediating and verifying the different aspects of the 
agreement did play an essential role in defusing situations, such as the lack of 
progress in land reform, that could have degenerated into violence. In addition, both 
parties had come to a realisation towards the end of the 1980’s that they could not 
defeat each other: the Salvadoran government, supported by the US, could not be 
defeated by the FMLN, nor was it in a position to crush the guerrilla without a 
massive outside intervention, which is something that Congress would not support. 
These considerations explain why the parties engaged in the peace process.
50 Ibid., p. 287.
51 Ibid., p. 295
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However, the benefits derived from the peace process for both parties explain 
how it could be sustained. The FMLN obtained access to land, whilst being able to 
retain some military capability with the tacit agreement of ONUSAL. In addition, it 
managed to obtain the reform of police and military forces, and the inclusion of 
FMLN combatants into the new police. The government, even though it 
compromised on the issue of land, obtained the dismantlement of the FMLN and 
managed to reduce the impact of the reform process on the structure of its security 
forces by, for example, transferring some police units directly to the army. The 
government also kept a security guarantee by maintaining more soldiers under arms 
than officially declared. These issues point out how the transition to democracy, 
even assisted by the UN, is not sufficient to maintain the peace in the short-term.
4.3. Cambodia
The 1991 peace accords brought to an end a war between the government 
and a loose coalition of three factions.52 A transition period was agreed upon by the 
parties, during which the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) was ‘granted all powers necessary to ensure the implementation’ of the 
agreement.53 This period was to end with the installation of a new government 
through free and fair elections. The underlying objective of UNTAC was to create a 
politically neutral and peaceful environment in which these elections could be 
carried out. UNTAC’s mandate included seven major aspects, four of which will be
52 The United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People’s Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Party o f Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK) also known as the Khmer Rouge.
53 See Han, Building a Peace that Lasts, p. 847.
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reviewed here.54 In the field of human rights, UNTAC was to ‘foster an environment 
in which respect for human rights [is] ensured’.55 Under this heading, UNTAC 
conducted information and education programmes on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, investigated and, when possible, corrected human rights abuses. 
UNTAC’s electoral mandate included the creation of a legal framework and code of 
conduct for the elections, voter education, training of electoral personnel, voter and 
party registration, polling, co-ordinating foreign election observers, identifying and 
investigating campaign irregularities, and election monitoring.
UNTAC was also responsible for the maintenance of law and order, which 
encompassed monitoring the activities of the police to ensure that they maintained 
public order impartially and effectively while upholding human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The civil administration component of UNTAC exercised 
direct control over the foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and 
information organs of the Cambodian state as they ‘could directly influence the 
outcome of elections.’56
In spite of this democratic agenda, the Khmer Rouge refused to comply with 
the military provisions of the peace agreement, which entailed the cantonment and 
demobilisation of 70% of the various armed forces. The Khmer Rouge claimed that 
UNTAC had failed to control the forces of the State of Cambodia (SOC), which had 
been used to attack and harass political opponents. Subsequently, the three other 
parties to the agreement interrupted the process of cantonment and demobilisation.
54 Military, human rights, civil administration, law and order, elections, rehabilitation o f infrastructure, 
refugees.
55 See Han, Building a Peace that Lasts, p. 847.
56 Ibid., p. 848.
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Elections did go ahead at the scheduled time, but areas controlled by the Khmer 
Rouge remained outside government control until the movement’s collapse in 1996.
One of the major unintended consequences of UNTAC’s intervention was to 
undermine the process of reintegration, as one of the factions, and the territories it 
controlled, remained outside the peace process. The Khmer Rouge’s commitment to 
the peace process was always strategic, and from their perspective, the military 
provisions of the peace agreement took away the means of control over the territory 
they occupied. In addition, the democratic nature of the peace process meant that
‘the KR [Khmer Rouge] concept of pure rural community -untainted by 
any voluntary division of labour or exchange- was and is incompatible 
with an open market economy and pluralist society envisaged in the 
compromise peace the parties negotiated at Paris.’57
The case of Cambodia illustrates two points. First, as explained in the 
introduction to this thesis, democratisation is not necessarily conducive to peace, but 
can create instability. The KR’s ideological opposition to democracy was in 
collision course with the agreement itself, and threatened to undermine the KR in the 
territories they controlled. Second, the security dilemma created by the military 
provisions of the Paris accords led the communist movement to withdraw from the 
peace process so as to preserve the balance of forces with the other factions and its 
control over the territory under its authority. The transition towards democracy 
through institution-building helps account for the KR’s defection. However, realist 
considerations help explain the timing of the KR’s withdrawal from the peace 
process.
57 Michael W. Doyle, “War and Peace in Cambodia”, in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., 
Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) pp. 196-97.
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4.4. Mozambique
A General Peace Agreement was signed between the Frente de Libertacao 
de Mocambique (FRELIMO) and the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 
(RENAMO) in October 1992. As in other countries, the UN was mandated to help 
with the implementation of the agreement. In general terms, the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was to facilitate the demilitarisation and 
democratisation of the country.
Its initial mandate fell under three categories: military, humanitarian and 
electoral. In the military realm, ONUMOZ was mandated with overseeing the 
demobilisation of excessive troops and the reintegration of FRELIMO and 
RENAMO forces. The electoral mandate of ONUMOZ included verifying that the 
electoral process was free and fair; observing all activities relating to voter 
registration, campaigning, polling and conduct of the elections; conducting electoral 
education programmes; and finally monitoring the election, which was the first 
democratic election that the country had known. In addition, ONUMOZ*s activities 
were extended to the monitoring of all police activities.
Mozambique’s ONUMOZ was successful in assisting the transition to peace 
wished by the parties. Their inability to defeat each other, the drought threatening 
them, the state of near-collapse of the economy, and the diminishing support given 
to RENAMO meant that the parties had not many options besides the peace 
agreement. As a direct consequence of the peace process, elections were held and a 
democratic government put in place. These developments were not, however, 
sufficient to make the transition succeed.
Several elements of the military transition are worth noting, because they 
account for the outcome of the UN intervention. First, the parties insisted that the
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troops to be demobilised be cantoned in strategic areas, which from a logistical point 
of view were some of the worst locations, lacking access to roads or drinking water. 
These locations, however, allowed the parties to maintain a degree of control over 
the territories they had occupied during the conflict. RENAMO in particular ‘strictly 
controlled access to the territory it occupied as a means to maintain political 
leverage, leaving the country divided into two de facto states.’58 RENAMO’s control 
of the territory it occupied continued after the election, which the party lost.59
Second, ONUMOZ officials privately acknowledged that the parties had not 
demobilised all their forces prior to the election: around 5,000 FRELIMO troops and 
2,000 RENAMO troops were kept under arms, illustrating how mistrust still played 
a role in the final stages of the transition process.
Finally, Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO, pulled out of the 
electoral process the day before the election. Under immense international pressure, 
he eventually accepted to take part in the election, which his party lost. The 
weakened position of RENAMO vis-a-vis the government meant that the party could 
not afford to revert to hostilities, unlike UNITA in Angola, but sought to cling on the 
territories it still controlled through local administration.
4.5. Rwanda
The Arusha accords concluded between the Hutu-dominated government of 
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) were intended to put an end to a 
three-year open conflict between the parties. The UN was mandated with assisting 
the implementation of the agreement which called for a democratically elected
58 Pamela L. Reed, “The Politics o f Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in Mozambique”, 
in Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars o f the 1990s, p. 290
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government as well as for a power-sharing arrangement until the election in the form 
of a representative, inclusive government.60 The United Nations Assistance Mission 
fo r  Rwanda (UNAMIR) was to ‘contribute] to the establishment and maintenance 
o f a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the 
transitional Government.’61 The operation was to be conducted in four phases. The 
first would end with the installation of the transitional government; the two 
subsequent phases concerned the military aspects of the agreement. In the final 
phase, UNAMIR was to help maintain a secure environment in preparation for the 
election.
The provisional government was, however, never installed and UNAMIR 
was withdrawn following the death of ten peacekeepers in the early stages of the 
genocide. A closer look at the provisional agreement, which was supposed to lead to 
the election, helps to explain the decision of the Hutu regime to proceed with the 
genocide. Both in the transitional government and assembly, the ruling Hutu parties, 
the Mouvement Republicain National pour le Developpement (MNRD) and the 
Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), were assigned a minority 
position. In addition, because of the military provisions of the accords, the Hutu elite 
were also denied the military capacity to protect their position. Under these 
circumstances, striking first became a viable solution to prevent a complete loss of 
power. The promise of democracy, that was to replace the power-sharing transitional
59 Ibid., p. 302.
60 The agreement also called for the repatriation of refugees and the integration o f the armed forces o f  
both sides into a new military.
61 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p. 343.
62 RPF and Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were to be reintegrated in a 40:60 ratio, but the number of  
officers in the new armed forces was to be split evenly between the two forces. See Bruce D. Jones, 
“Military Intervention in Rwanda’s Two Wars”, in Walter and Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity, and 
Intervention, p. 124.
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regime, was not sufficient to alter the calculations of the Hutu regime, which sought 
to maintain its dominant position in Rwanda. The changing balance of forces and the 
potential loss of control over territory by the leaders of the Hutu regime, coupled 
with mistrust of Tutsi intentions, contribute to explain why they decided to engage in 
massacres that left nearly a million people dead.
4.6. Guatemala
In December 1996, the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG) signed a series of agreements that put an end to a 36-year- 
old conflict. The UN, which had been deployed in Guatemala since 1994, when a 
first set of agreements was signed, was mandated to monitor the implementation of 
the accords. MINUGUA’s63 mandate consisted of a military and political 
component: monitor respect for human rights by both parties and strengthen national 
institutions working for the protection of human rights; and monitor the cease-fire 
and the demobilisation of the URNG.
Under the former, MINUGUA was to receive, investigate and determine the 
validity of alleged human rights violations. If MINUGUA deemed the accusations 
founded, it was to transfer the case to the Guatemalan justice system and monitor the 
progress of the case. Under the latter, MINUGUA provided support to existing 
human rights organisations and made recommendations to national authorities in 
order to promote the observance of human rights.
As for the military mandate of MINUGUA, its role in monitoring the 
disbandment of the URNG guerrilla is to be understood in the wider context of the
63 The United Nations Mission for the Verification o f Human Rights and of Compliance with the 
Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala.
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reform of the security sector in Guatemala. Indeed, the government had committed 
to change the mission of the armed forces to the sole defence of Guatemala’s 
borders, disband paramilitary forces responsible for numerous human rights 
violations and reform the police by increasing its size and incorporating Mayas in 
the new police.
The position of the URNG was weaker than that of the FMLN in El 
Salvador, another guerrilla group which turned itself into a political party. In effect, 
the URNG held out longer that the FMLN because
‘there was considerable resistance to the idea of accepting anything short 
of the revolutionary goals which had been fought for during such a long 
and bloody war... by resisting an early settlement, the URNG managed 
to achieve considerably more than might have been expected.’64
It is not until 1986 that the URNG recognised that total victory was 
impossible and replaced its military strategy by an offer to negotiate a political 
settlement with the government. The government, in turn, did not accept until 1991 
the idea of negotiating with a movement that, although weakened, it had failed to 
completely defeat. The Guatemalan military’s marginalisation, in the face of 
diminishing support from the US, meant that it was no longer capable of blocking 
negotiations.65 In 1994, the parties concluded a series of agreements mediated by the 
UN to protect the rights of the Mayan people, that would be monitored by 
MINUGUA.
64 Anna Vinegrad, “From Guerrillas to Politicians: The Transition of the Guatemalan Revolutionary 
Movement in Historical and Comparative Perspective”, in Rachel Sieder, ed., Guatemala after the 
Peace Accords (London: Institute o f Latin American Studies, 1998) pp. 216-17.
65 Susanne Jonas, “Democratization Through Peace: The Difficult Case o f Guatemala”, Journal o f  
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 14-15.
68
However, it was not until March 1997 that the URNG guerrilla began to 
disarm under UN supervision, after the government had agreed to a substantial 
reform package for the police and the military in September 1996, which provided 
for the restructuring of both the army and the police, and the inclusion of URNG 
personnel in the police. Other agreements signed in 1996 consolidated the rights and 
special status granted to the Mayas, and formalised the transformation of the URNG 
into a political party.
As in El Salvador, the stalemate reached on the battlefield was translated into 
a political agreement which allowed the transition towards democracy to begin. 
However, the political transition in Guatemala began before the URNG military arm 
agreed to be dismantled, and the demobilisation of the force was not linked to any 
specific political provision of the peace agreement as in Angola and Mozambique, 
where the rebel forces had to be demobilised and reintegrated with government 
forces before the election. The case of Guatemala shows that disarming the 
opposition movement is not a sine qua non precondition for a successful democratic 
transition as long as both parties have come to terms with the fact that total military 
victory is no longer possible.
The six cases reviewed here point to one conclusion. In the absence of a 
strong democratic set of values shared by society, UN peacebuilding efforts at 
building democratic institutional mechanisms and a single political space do not 
bring peace to war-torn societies unless the dynamics of the security transition are 
taken into account as well. This section has shown how the balance of forces in the 
field, the control over territory exercised by the parties and the security dilemma are 
necessary to explain the outcome of the various UN efforts at building democratic 
institutional mechanisms.
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5. Conclusion: UN Peacebuilding -Building Democratic
Institutions
This chapter has proposed a definition of democracy that focuses mainly on 
three formal elements necessary for democracy: delegation of the right to govern to 
legislatures through free and fair elections in which most adults can participate either 
as candidates or voters, respect for the rule of law and individual rights, including 
the existence of functioning institutions for preventing and redressing violations.
The importance of a set of values underpinning these institutions, and 
granting them legitimacy has also been recognised. However, it has been argued 
here that, given the short life of UN peacebuilding operations, it was improbable that 
the values of the target society would be significantly altered. In addition, the cases 
reviewed have shown that UN peacebuilding focuses mainly on building formal 
democracy, and on (re)building a single political space within the borders of the 
state. This is why the definition of democracy used in the context of UN 
peacebuilding centres on the institution-building aspects of democratisation.
The argument reviewed in section two, that democracy brings peace, 
underscores the importance of both democratic values and institutions in 
guaranteeing peace. Therefore, the UN experiment in peacebuilding cannot 
decisively support the argument that democracy brings peace, because UN 
interventions focus mainly on institution-building. Section three has nevertheless 
shown that the ideological balance has tilted towards democracy at the UN since the 
end of the Cold War, leading the Organisation to more openly advocate democracy 
as a means to bring peace to war-torn states. The section has also shown that the 
building o f democratic institutions, with the aim of (re)building a single political
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space, is the main focus of UN peacebuilding.66 Indeed, these institutions aim at 
creating new relations between the parties to a conflict, within the borders of the 
state.
The last section of this chapter reviewed six peacebuilding operations 
conducted by the UN and argued that the security transition needs to be taken into 
account in order to explain the success of the transition towards democracy and a 
single political space. The elements of the security transition reviewed here, control 
over territory, balance of forces in the field and the security dilemma, as well as the 
efforts of the UN at building democratic institutions, do help account for the 
outcome of these six interventions. Because the way the security sector is managed 
and reformed in the context of peacebuilding operations greatly impacts on the 
political transition, the security transition is important in explaining the transition 
towards democracy. The next chapter now turns to the issue of SSR in UN 
peacebuilding.
66 The UN is not the only international institution that has adopted and promoted the model o f  
democracy in its activities. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well 
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are examples o f organisations which also support 
democracy.
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Chapter 2: Security Sector Reform in UN Peacebuilding: 
Impact on Democratisation
Chapter one has argued that UN peacebuilding Seeks to (re)build a democracy, 
including a single political space, in war-torn countries. It has also been argued that 
the UN’s efforts at building a formal democracy, characterised by the rule of law, 
free and fair elections and legally protected individual rights, do not fully account 
for the outcome of the six peacebuilding operations reviewed in the chapter. 
Elements of the security transition were put forward in order to explain the outcome 
of the UN’s democratisation efforts.
Three elements of the security transition are important in order to understand 
the outcome of UN peacebuilding operations. First, as discussed in the introduction, 
control over territory is an essential determining factor of the transition towards 
democracy. Indeed, it was argued in the introduction that control over territory is 
often regarded by the parties as more important than the provisions of the agreement 
itself. In the case of Mozambique, for instance, RENAMO continued to exercise its 
control over the territories it occupied during and after the peace process.
The second consideration regards the balance of forces in the field. Here 
again the parties are likely to pay close attention to the impact of the peace process 
on the balance of forces in the field. If the balance is being tilted by the peace 
process towards their former enemies, through the process of demobilisation for 
example, a party’s incentive to wreck the peace process is increased. The case of 
Angola, reviewed in chapter one, showed how the disarmament and demobilisation 
provisions of the agreement led UNIT A to renege on their commitment to the 
agreement after the first round of elections, as it seemed that the second round would 
seal the MPLA’s victory and its control over the new military forces.
Finally, the security dilemma, also explains why the parties prefer to go back 
on their word over moving forward with the democratisation process. Using the 
Rwandan case, it was shown that the high level of mistrust between the parties led 
the Hutu leadership to move forward with genocidal policies in order to strike first.
SSR in UN peacebuilding profoundly impacts on these three considerations, 
which in turn, as was shown in chapter one, deeply affect the transition towards 
democracy. Consequently, the way the security sector is managed and transformed 
in peacebuilding operations has a crucial impact on the transition towards 
democracy.
In its peacebuilding operations, the UN has adopted a liberal approach with 
regard to the issue of military reform. It is assumed that a high level of weaponry in 
society is a source of instability in the aftermath of an internal war. Indeed, it leaves 
the parties with the option and the means to resume hostilities or to perpetrate further 
human rights violations against civilians. Early disarmament and demobilisation of 
military forces have therefore, at least in theory, formed an essential part of UN 
peacebuilding operations, whilst police forces were to be reintegrated and trained to 
conduct their operations in accordance with democratic standards of policing.1 The 
aim of this process of restructuring and integration is to create military forces, under 
the control of the state, whose task is limited to the defence of the borders of the 
state (external security) and police forces tasked with the protection of individual 
rights and the enforcement of the rule of law (internal security).
However, the demilitarisation approach does exacerbate the risks for the 
parties associated with the security transition to a point where the transition towards 
democracy may be under threat. Therefore, based on the idea of military balance, an
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alternative model to early demilitarisation is considered in this chapter. Such a 
model assumes that the parties initially continue to exercise their control over 
security forces, and the territory they occupy, whilst third parties help create a 
military balance between them in order to reduce the security dilemma, and assist 
with the reform of their police forces.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the demilitarisation approach adopted 
in UN peacebuilding is located within the debate between realists and liberals on the 
role of weapons in leading to and in exacerbating international conflict. Idealism, a 
variant of liberal thinking on international relations, considers that arms -or rather, 
arms races- are indeed a cause of war. Disarmament guarantees peace by reducing 
political tensions between states and putting an end to arms races. Realism considers 
that it is either the structure of the international system or disputes between states 
that are the cause of war. And in either case, realists do not consider weapons to be 
the primary cause of war.
A second section will then show that the UN has systematically favoured 
early disarmament and demobilisation in its peacebuilding operations. This 
preference stems from the idealist approach adopted by the UN with regard to the 
relationship between weapons and war.
The third section argues that the issues of control over territory, balance of 
forces and security dilemma described earlier militate against early demilitarisation 
as favoured by UN peacebuiling. A hard realist approach is considered, based on the 
creation of a military balance between the parties under arms control and Confidence 
and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) regimes. The suggestion is made here that 
such an approach can help address the three realist considerations discussed earlier.
1 Unless specified, ‘disarmament and demobilisation’ o f security forces and ‘demilitarisation’ will be
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The fourth section examines how police forces have been dealt with in UN 
peacebuilding operations. It argues that the UN seeks to reintegrate these forces and 
bring their behaviour more in line with democratic standards of policing, but that 
this process exacerbates the issues of balance of forces and control over territory. As 
with military forces, in order to address these issues an alternative model of police 
reform is considered, based on the idea that within a hard realist model of SSR, the 
parties initially continue to exercise their control over the police.
1. Weapons and Interstate War: Liberal and Realist Perspectives
This section will briefly look at the debate between liberals and realists with 
regard to the causes of war at the international level. The (liberal) idealist approach 
takes the position that weapons and arms races cause international wars. 
Disarmament, therefore, is seen as a means to prevent war and reduce tensions 
between states.
Realism does not regard weapons as a primary cause of war: rather, realists 
claim that the main source of international disorder is found in political disputes 
between sovereign states and in the anarchical structure of the system itself. Only by 
resolving these disputes, if ever possible, will tension in international relations be 
eliminated. In the meantime, some realists argue that a military balance of power 
between potential enemies is the best guarantee of survival for states in the 
international system. Arms control and confidence-building measures, nonetheless, 
are seen as a means to reduce the risks associated with the arms race.
used interchangeably.
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1.1 The Liberal Argument: Arms Races as the Cause of War
The issue of arms in relation to war appeared on the international agenda 
with the advent of industrialisation.2 Now that states were capable of producing 
highly destructive weapons in large quantities, their role in leading to war as well as 
in its conduct became crucial. As European nations started building up their arsenals 
from the end of the 19th century, a highly destructive -and expensive- war between 
them became a serious possibility. The enormous military expenditures generated by 
the subsequent arms race in Europe increasingly began to be seen as a burden. Two 
international conferences were held in 1899 and 1907 to try and address the potential 
destabilising consequences of the arms race. In 1899, a consensus emerged among 
participants that the best way to prevent war was to stop the arms race.3 In 1907, 
despite the lack of progress on the issue, a similar position was adopted by the 
conference, to no avail.
At the end of World War I, as James Shotwell and Marina Salvin argued, the 
general consensus was that the arms race had been responsible for the war.4 General
2 The issue of the role o f weapons in causing war had not been examined in detail by liberal authors 
before the 20th century. Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham and Richard Cobden proposed ways of 
preventing war between states, but these were not directly related to the issue o f weapons.
3 The final declaration stated: 'A limitation of the military expenses which now burden the world is 
greatly to be desired in the interests of the material and moral well-being o f mankind... the 
governments, having regard to the propositions advanced in the conference, shall take up the study of 
the possibility of an agreement concerning the limitation o f armed forces on land and sea, and of 
military budgets.' Cited in William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to 
International Law (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1908) p. 450. These declarations were however never 
followed by any concrete changes.
4 See James Shotwell and Marina Salvin, Lessons on Security and Disarmament from the History o f  
the League o f  Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1949) p. 10.
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disarmament, was seen as the only solution to prevent another war.5 As Article 8 of 
the Covenant stated:
‘The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace 
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of 
international obligations.’6
The aim of general disarmament set in the Covenant, was never reached, and seemed 
to have been set aside by the authors of the UN Charter.
However, nuclear proliferation and the development of other types of 
weapons of mass destruction gave fresh momentum to the idea of complete and 
general disarmament. As Noel-Baker acknowledged in his book The Arms Race, we 
live in an atomic world that is technologically capable of destroying itself. In his 
view, arms races are a ‘powerful and constant contributory cause’ of war mainly 
because they keep alive the idea that war is inevitable.7 In other words, arms races 
help maintain war on the agenda as a credible option -and possibility- and strengthen
5 Disarmament is part of the liberal approach to international relations, but belongs to the idealist 
strand o f liberalism that gained currency in the early 20th century. As Peter Wilson noted, idealism is 
difficult to define as a unified body of theory. It favours different principles such as collective 
security, disarmament and self-determination. But it has in common with other variants of liberalism 
the assumption that conscious, progressive change is possible in international relations. Disarmament 
is therefore an attempt to alter and improve the course o f international relations by eliminating the 
threat o f war. See David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers o f the Twenty Years' Crisis (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 13.
6 Fred Tanner has defined disarmament as 'a linear process of completely eliminating the military 
capabilities o f warring factions'. Disarmament can therefore be carried farther than the aim set by the 
Covenant. Tanner’s definition o f disarmament will be used here. See Fred Tanner, “Consensual vs. 
Coercive Disarmament”, in United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Managing 
Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues (Geneva: United Nations, 1996) p. 171.
7 Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race: a Programme for World Disarmament (London: John Calder, 
1958) p. 74.
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the position of the military establishment in the decision-making process. An 
improvement in international relations, therefore, can only be achieved by ending 
the nuclear arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons.
Although ideally coupled with a political solution, disarmament can then 
contribute to easing international tensions prior to resolving a given dispute. This 
concern for disarmament is clearly reflected in the debates of the First Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament (1978). In its final 
document it concluded that
‘genuine and lasting peace can only be created through ... the speedy and 
substantial reduction of arms and armed forces... leading ultimately to 
general and complete disarmament under effective international 
control.’8
The Session also agreed to the establishment of a Conference on Disarmament, and 
of a Disarmament Commission which have been in existence since 1979. The 
former’s membership includes 66 states and the Conference’s main function is to 
serve as a ‘disarmament negotiating forum’.9 The Conference, and its predecessors, 
has negotiated several disarmament conventions and treaties: the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968; the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, signed in 1972; and the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in 1993.
8 UN General Assembly, Final Document of the Tenth Special Session o f the General Assembly (First 
Special Session o f the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament), A /S-10/2, 1978, para. 13.
9 UN Conference on Disarmament, Rules and Procedures o f  the Conference on Disarmament, 
CD/8/Rev.8, dated 17 August 1999, para. 1.
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The Disarmament Commission, in turn, has a ‘role within the [UN] 
mechanism on disarmament as the only body with universal membership for in- 
depth deliberations on relevant disarmament issues.’10 The Commission has served 
as a discussion forum on issues related to chemical, biological, nuclear and 
conventional disarmament since its creation in 1978.
The same idealist premises that have informed debates on disarmament at the 
UN, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction, are found in UN 
peacebuilding.11 The development and proliferation of weapons are considered a 
source of instability, let alone a cause of conflict in the first place. Their elimination 
is therefore crucial for a successful transition towards democracy. In the aftermath of 
an internal war, the restructuring of security forces, including the early disarmament 
and demobilisation of the various factions, is a necessary step in restoring the control 
of the state over security forces. The proposed timing of such efforts, however, 
denotes a preference for a rapid elimination of the means of war because they are 
regarded as a source of tension in local politics. The next subsection discusses the 
realist argument that war is not caused by weapons.
1.2. The Realist Argument: Political Disputes as the Cause of War
The incapacity of the League of Nations to achieve any substantial progress 
with regard to disarmament combined with the tragedy of World War II have led
10 UN General Assembly, Report o f  the Disarmament Commission, Decision 52/492, dated 8 
September 1998, para. a.
11 This point was made by Stuart Croft, who argued that the intellectual legacy o f favouring 
disarmament over arms control at the UN has heavily influenced how SSR was conceptualised in UN 
peacebuilding. See Stuart Croft, “Lessons from the Disarmament o f Factions in Civil Wars”, in 
Dimitris Bourantonis and Marios Evriviades, eds., A United Nations fo r the Twenty-First Century 
(Boston, MA: Kluwer Law International, 1996) pp. 271-84.
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realists to argue against the very notion of disarmament as a means to prevent war. 
This intellectual environment contributed to the adoption of a realist approach to 
security in the UN Charter: its system of collective security relied on strong military 
countermeasures in case of aggression. These were to be provided by states with 
substantial military capabilities. It was therefore postulated that states -or at least the 
most powerful ones- would retain sufficient offensive military forces to maintain 
international peace and security, while disarmament was seen as an optional by-
• 17product of conflict resolution.
R.BJ. Walker’s distinction between two strands of realism does not affect 
the argument made here that realists do not consider weapons to be a primary cause 
of war.13 Walker distinguished between historical realism, which considers how 
conflict, created by competition between states, can be managed by statesmen by 
bringing the external environment under their control, and structural realism, which 
identifies the causes of conflict in international relations in human nature or in the 
anarchic nature of the international system, which are perennial conditions. The 
latter does not support the idea that the security dilemma, created by human nature 
or the nature of the international system, can be decisively affected by any 
international efforts at disarmament or arms control; the former argues that military 
balances, understood as military equilibria, can mitigate the security dilemma.
Hedley Bull’s critique of the liberal approach to disarmament exemplified 
how a military balance can mitigate the security dilemma.14 In an anarchic system, 
argued Bull, states are left to rely on their own resources to guarantee their existence
12 Avi Beker, Disarmament Without Order: The Politics o f Disarmament at the United Nations 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1985) pp. 8-14.
13 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) pp. 108-22.
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and will do so by seeking to balance the military power of their potential enemies. 
Bull acknowledges that a balance of power may not prevent war, which is seen as a 
means to maintain order in the international society, but it will guarantee the survival 
-and independence- of the state. To him, a balance of power means a situation where 
a military equilibrium between opposed powers exists, as neither has the prospect of 
decisive victory. The idea of ,a balance of power, however, does not lend itself to 
disarmament because of its fluidity: military power is difficult to assess accurately 
and states do not feel secure until the balance has tilted in their favour.15 The 
stability of military balances is further compromised by changes at the technological, 
political, economic and societal levels. Trying to reduce armed strength to a fixed 
ratio will therefore be incompatible with state security.
However, the dynamics of the balance of power, or military balance, should 
not obscure the role of political disputes, the product of competitive relations 
between states, in initiating arms races. To Bull, arms races are a consequence of 
political tension:
‘But the fact that the arms race contributes to political tension does not 
diminish the difficulty that it cannot be brought to an end without the 
ending of this tension.’16
The primacy of politics is here asserted: political tensions can degenerate into war 
and, until the political dispute is resolved, if ever possible, only the balancing of
14 See, for instance, The Control o f  the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961).
15 Speaking o f the concept o f balance of power as a policy objective, Inis Claude highlighted the 
difference between promoting the creation or the preservation o f a power equilibrium and the attempt 
by one state or group o f states to tilt the balance in its favour. Bull refers here to the latter. See Inis 
Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1965) pp. 18-19.
16 Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System”, in Robert O'Neill and David N. 
Schwartz, eds., Hedley Bull on Arms Control (London: Macmillan, 1987) p. 28.
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military power will guarantee the survival and independence of the state. Bull 
nevertheless acknowledged that arms control measures, when they do not affect the 
balance of power, contribute to an easing of political tensions and of the security 
dilemma.17 The primacy of politics in causing war and the fluid nature of the balance 
of power led Bull to conclude that disarmament agreements can only work if they 
are neither general nor comprehensive, in effect advocating arms control. When an 
agreement is not general, some powers may decide to disarm vis-a-vis each other 
while at the same time not lowering their guard vis-a-vis other states.
More relevant to the notion of arms control, when an agreement is not 
comprehensive, in that it does not embrace all the categories of armaments and 
factors of military power, the arms race is restricted to certain types of weapons for 
which a fixed ratio is engineered.18
Arms control, as exemplified by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE Treaty), and the notion of military balance were deeply embedded in 
post-World War Two East-West relations. It is within this context that the CSBM’s 
were devised. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
adopted some measures aimed at reducing the risk of a surprise attack by NATO and
17 Arms control can be defined as quantitative and/or qualitative reductions o f armaments which to be 
successful have to preserve a given balance of power, although at a lower level. See Hedley Bull, 
“Arms Control and the Balance of Power”, in Robert O’Neill and David N. Schwartz, eds., Hedley 
Bull on Arms Control (London: Macmillan, 1987) pp. 54-55.
18 See Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System”, in O'Neill and Schwartz, Hedley 
Bull on Arms Control, p. 30. Two examples o f this approach are, first, the CFE Treaty (1990), which 
limits five categories o f weapons -tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat helicopters, and 
attack aircraft- on the European territory of the NATO states and those o f the former Warsaw Pact 
and, second, the Vienna Agreement (1996), which, based on the CFE model, limits -and in certain 
cases authorises increases in- the same categories o f weapons for the FRY, Croatia and the two 
Bosnian entities. See chapter four.
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Warsaw Pact forces, effectively agreeing on the first CSBM’s.19 CSBM’s, bom in 
the European context, are voluntary military measures meant to reduce the risks 
associated with misperception or communication failure that could initiate a war. 
Initially, CSBM’s were developed outside arms control initiatives, but were later 
conceptualised as complementary to arms control arrangements.
Marie-France Desjardins argued that the main role of CSBM’s does not lie in 
changing the ‘hard facts’ of the military balance, such as the number of troops or 
types of weapons that the parties maintain, but in changing the parties’ perceptions
* 9 0of their security threats by providing them with accurate information. In effect, 
CSBM’s do not challenge the notions of security dilemma and military balance, but 
seek to mitigate the dynamics they create.
CSBM’s have three major objectives, according to Desjardins.21 First, they 
promote information exchange, which has to be verifiable, between states regarding 
troop movements, manoeuvres, routine exercises and other activities that can create 
misperception and trigger an undesirable reaction. The information exchanged can 
also cover military facilities, budget, weapons systems and planned procurement. All 
this information creates a sense of stability and predictability among states by 
increasing their ability to make accurate assessments of other states’ military 
capacities and intentions.
Second, CSBM’s establish principles and rules in order to regulate the 
behaviour of states. Such rules include the verifiable prohibition, limitation or
19 Notification o f large military manoeuvres 21 days or more in advance, observation o f these 
manoeuvres and prior notification o f smaller manoeuvres and major troop movements. See Marie- 
France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, Adelphi Paper no. 307 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1996) p. 7.
20 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
21 Ibid., pp. 18,21-22.
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constraining of certain types of military activities. Once again, these measures are 
intended to increase stability and predictability by establishing acceptable patterns of 
behaviour. Finally, CSBM’s promote contacts between parties. Indeed, the process 
of negotiating and implementing these measures allows the parties to come into 
contact, explain and discuss their views, and to confront each other’s perceptions 
and interpretations. This process of interaction, in a fashion not very different from 
that of peacebuiliding, is supposed to alter the perceptions, thinking and objectives 
of the parties.
Desjardins nonetheless envisaged three ways in which CSBM’s could work 
against improving the security perceptions of the parties: selective implementation,
99bad faith and deception. Selective or irregular implementation of a CSBM package 
occurs when its weaknesses and loopholes are intentionally used. Bad faith and 
deception, in turn, occur when the intent of a CSBM is subverted or when 
information is used to provide false indications of a state’s intent. Selective 
implementation, bad faith and deception increase mistrust between the parties and 
affect negatively their assessment of security threats. These considerations are 
important in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. Indeed, should CSBM’s be 
implemented in a post-conflict environment, where mistrust still runs high, the 
security risks of subverting these measures are likely to be increased dramatically.23
This section has discussed two approaches to the role of weapons in relation 
to war. The liberal view, which informs peacebuilding, considers that weapons and, 
more precisely, arms races cause war. The realist view, in turn, claims that it is 
politics as well as human nature and the nature of the international system that lead 
to war. Military balances, according to the historical realist view, are the only
22 Ibid., pp. 51-53.
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guarantee of survival for states and can be engineered and managed through arms 
control and CSBM’s. The next section discusses the idealist approach to the reform 
of military forces in UN peacebuilding operations.
2. UN Peacebuilding: an Idealist Approach to the Reform of 
Military Forces
This section shows that UN peacebuilding favours an early disarmament and 
demobilisation of factions in the aftermath of an internal conflict, and their 
reintegration in new unified armed forces, responsible for the defence of the borders 
of the state and under the control of the state. Because of a favourable bias towards 
demilitarisation, the UN has considered, at least in theory, that demilitarisation 
should take place as early as possible. The first subsection reviews briefly the 
military mandate of the UN in the six operations discussed in chapter one, showing 
that the UN has favoured early disarmament and demobilisation, and when 
mandated to do so, the reintegration of the various forces into a unified military 
structure. The rest of the section then turns to a UN policy document, showing why 
early demilitarisation is such a high priority to the UN.
The UN makes a clear distinction between police and military forces in its 
peacebuilding operations. Indeed, military forces are to be disarmed and demobilised 
whilst police forces are to be restructured and reformed. This distinction may be 
analytically useful, but it is often of limited value in the context of internal war as 
the distinction between military and police forces is blurred. This point will be
23 The applicability o f CSBM’s to post-conflict situations will be discussed in section three.
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further developed in section four, which deals with the reform of the police in the 
context of UN peacebuilding.
The six missions reviewed in chapter one (Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Guatemala) have all included some measure of 
disarmament and demobilisation of the various factions in their mandate and in three 
cases, their reintegration into unified military structures.24 In Angola, UNAVEM II 
was mandated with the verification of the cantonment, disarmament and 
demobilisation of UNITA and MPLA troops. About 165,000 troops were to be 
demobilised, and 50,000 of those troops incorporated in the new armed forces. In El 
Salvador, ONUSAL verified the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of 
FMLN forces.25 In Cambodia, UNTAC was initially mandated with the 
regroupment, cantonment and demobilisation of 70% of the combatants from the 
four factions. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ was to verify the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of about 100,000 soldiers.26 In 
Rwanda, UN AMIR was mandated with supervising the demobilisation and 
integration of governmental and RPF forces into an integrated army, but was 
unsuccessful in fulfilling its mandate. Finally, in Guatemala, MINUGUA assisted 
the disarmament and demobilisation of the URNG guerrillas.
As explained in the introduction, Stuart Croft has argued that the preference 
for early disarmament and demobilisation in UN peacebuilding is intimately linked
24 Although disarmament and demobilisation have taken place in BiH, the political consequences 
intended and the context in which they have taken place are different from UN peacebuilding 
operations. See chapter four.
25 The agreement also provided for the incorporation o f ex-FMLN combatants into the police and the 
army.
26 The creation o f integrated armed forces, numbering 30,000 drawn equally from RENAMO and 
FRELIMO troops, was also an integral part of the agreement, although the UN was not involved in 
organising the new armed forces.
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to the debate over disarmament at the UN over the past thirty years.27 In fact, the UN 
Disarmament Commission established in 1997 a working group to study how 
disarmament guidelines, established in previous years, can help the ‘consolidation of
• ORpeace’ in peacebuilding operations. A subsequent report by Kofi Annan suggested 
that ‘recent experience demonstrates that it is critical, particularly to the success of 
peace-building in post-conflict environments, to address the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants.’29
In 1996 the United Nations published an Inventory o f  Post-Conflict Peace- 
Building Activities. It consists of a compilation of peacebuilding activities to be 
undertaken in the immediate post-conflict period. The Inventory states that ‘there is 
a degree of chronological sequence in the way the main categories [of peacebuilding
■j i
activities] are presented’. This sequence is based on the fact that ‘the overriding 
criterion for the selection and establishment of priorities is political and it involves 
addressing the problems which, if left unresolved, could lead to the return of
'X ')fighting.’ Four categories are presented, in the following order:
1. Relief and humanitarian assistance.
2. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.
27 Stuart Croft, “Lessons from the Disarmament of Factions in Civil Wars”, in Dimitris Bourantonis 
and Marios Evriviades, eds., A United Nations fo r  the Twenty-First Century (Boston, MA: Luwer Law 
International, 1996) pp. 271-284.
28 See UN General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Consolidation o f  Peace through 
Practical Disarmament Measures -  Report o f  the Secretary-General, A/52/289, dated 19 August 
1997, section II, para. 3.
29 Ibid., section IV, para. 7.
30 United Nations, An Inventory o f  Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities (New York: United 
Nations, 1996).
31 Ibid., p. 1.
32 Ibid., p. 1.
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3. Enhancement of human rights and building of a participatory system of 
government, including reform of the police.
4. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation.
To be fair, the performance of these tasks should not be seen as a strictly 
sequential process as there is considerable overlap and connections between these 
tasks. However, the order of priority granted to demilitarisation shows again that the 
issue is regarded as one of the first priorities of the peacebuilding process.33 Coming 
to the issue of disarmament and demobilisation, the Inventory also states that
‘in a peace-keeping operation... the main task once a cease-fire and 
separation of forces have been obtained and political solutions to 
conflicts have been achieved is to disarm troops, resettle them as soon as 
possible and consolidate peace.’34
It further argues that ‘early and effective disarmament and demobilisation of
' i  c
combatants are essential to the building of a durable peace...’. This idea of 
consensual disarmament, by which the parties to a conflict formally agree, usually 
under a comprehensive peace agreement, to be disarmed and demobilised under the 
supervision of multinational forces raises some difficulties. Fred Tanner has argued 
that, as time goes by, the willingness of the parties to be disarmed is likely to fade 
away. Tanner attributed the decaying willingness of the parties to be disarmed to, 
among other things, an acute security dilemma. Former enemies will be reluctant to
33 For example, demilitarisation is supposed to take place before the electoral process, which falls 
under category three, is set in motion. Ibid., p. 47.
34 Ibid., p. 25.
35 Ibid., p. 25.
36 See Fred Tanner, “Consensual vs. Coercive Disarmament”, in UNIDIR, Managing Arms in Peace 
Processes: The Issues, pp. 169-204.
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surrender their weapons and demobilise if they feel this leaves them in a vulnerable 
position. Only if external actors are capable and willing to guarantee their security 
will they abide by the agreement. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the re-allocation of political resources that the transition towards democracy entails 
creates a situation where pulling out of the peace process becomes the only choice in 
order to avoid both political and military marginalisation.
Having shown that the UN favours early demilitarisation in its peacebuilding 
operations, the next section turns to three realist considerations crucial in SSR and 
shows how the UN’s demilitarisation approach exacerbates them.
3. The Security Dilemma, Control over Territory and Military 
Balance: Considering a Different Model of Military Reform in UN 
Peacebuilding
This section discusses how the security dilemma, control over territory and 
the military balance between the parties militate against the strategy of early 
demilitarisation found in UN peacebuilding. Based on this conclusion, it considers 
how arms control and CSBM’s can contribute to addressing these three realist 
considerations.
The security dilemma faced by the parties to an intrastate conflict is 
paramount in understanding their reluctance to demilitarise. Barry Posen discussed 
why it is more intense in internal conflicts.37 First, as in interstate conflicts, the
37 See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 
30-35. Posen was not clear as to what extent his argument applies to all groups involved in intra-state 
conflicts. He talked about ethnic, religious and cultural groups, but made no clear distinction between 
these categories.
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distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities is a determining factor in 
assessing whether neighbouring groups are a threat. Military technology is important 
in making this assessment. In the case of collapsing states it is often rudimentary and 
consists of infantry-based weapons. These are usually not seen as offensive
• 3 0  * • •weapons. However, Posen made the point that group solidarity -and exclusivity- 
can make defensive capabilities look offensive, especially when groups are equipped 
with similar types of weapons, be they defensive. In such a situation, groups fear 
each other because they perceive each other’s sense of solidarity and closeness as 
threatening. He concluded that ‘the drive for security in one group can be so great 
that it produces near-genocidal behaviour towards neighbouring groups.’
Second, Posen re-asserted the superiority of offensive strategies over 
defensive tactics in intrastate situations for three reasons. Primo, isolated ethnic 
groups, often found in intrastate conflicts, may see attack as a way to break off their 
isolation. Posen did not specify whether other types of groups may follow a similar 
course. Secondo, there is an advantage in using offensive strategies when the aim is 
ethnic cleansing, as this kind of operation demands swift and brutal actions in order 
to terrorise the targeted populations. Tertio, UN interventions tend to freeze 
situations on the ground rather than change them. In this view, gains made through 
offensive actions are not likely to be lost.
Posen implicitly pointed to the fact that the ethnic nature of conflict is likely 
to exacerbate the security dilemma even further. Indeed, his argument that group 
exclusivity makes any military capacity look offensive is underlined by the 
exclusive nature of ethnic identities, as defined in the introduction, over other forms 
of social affiliation. However, his argument illustrates the importance of the security
38 Tanks and other mechanised weaponry are considered offensive weapons.
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dilemma in internal conflicts, regardless of how these groups define themselves. 
Consequently, the acuteness of the security dilemma in internal conflicts makes it 
even more difficult for parties to accept to demilitarise as part of a negotiated 
settlement. Charles King has acknowledged this problem:
‘Any negotiated settlement that does not involve territorial partition will 
presumably require the belligerents to demobilise or fuse their fighting 
forces into a single, unified national army. But because of the vicious and 
often protracted nature of intrastate war, there is little trust between the 
opposing sides; each may prefer to reserve some fighting forces as a 
credible deterrent should the opposing side scupper the negotiated 
settlement... These reserve forces, however, present a security threat to 
the opposing side, which in turn justifies that side’s unwillingness to 
disarm...’40
The vicious circle set in motion can lead to a relapse into conflict. Both Posen and 
King also pointed to the issue of territory. Posen argued that geographically isolated 
groups are likely to strike first in order to break off their isolation. King mentioned 
the issue of partition as a means to avoid such pre-emptive strikes, which other 
realist authors have proposed as a solution to internal ethnic conflict.41
Control over territory is also of vital importance in the calculations that the 
parties make in relation to the peacebuilding process. The UN’s emphasis on early 
disarmament and demobilisation implies a loss of control over territories often 
gained by force during the conflict, but also is supposed to facilitate the (re)building 
of a single political space. Losing territory may result in losing control over 
economic resources, which may be of vital importance for the survival of the
39 See Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, p. 30.
40 Charles King, Ending Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper no. 308 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the 
IISS, 1997) pp. 50-51.
41 See for example, Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars”, 
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 136-75.
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faction. In the case of ethnic conflict, it may also lead to a change in the ethnic 
composition of the territory. Within the democratisation context, where free and fair 
elections become the rule, changes in the ethnic make up of an area are likely to 
affect the distribution of political resources. Finally, mistrust of each other also 
means that the parties will be wary of giving up control over territory, because it 
potentially leaves them more vulnerable.
A final consideration militates against early demilitarisation: the issue of 
military balance. Early demilitarisation does not necessarily mean that the parties 
will reintegrate their forces. It was not the case in Cambodia, and in both El 
Salvador and Guatemala, the UN presided over the disbandment of guerrilla 
movements. Even though former guerrilla members were integrated in the police and 
the military, government forces absorbed the rebel forces more than merged with 
them. The issue becomes more important when forces are supposed to reintegrate. 
As King pointed out, former enemies will want to maintain some independent 
fighting capability as a guarantee against a possible collapse of the peace process. 
Coupled with the security dilemma, the military balance becomes an essential 
component of the parties’ calculations. Delays in demobilisation, cheating in 
reporting troops and weapons and arms caches show to what extent the parties think 
about maintaining some sort of military equilibrium with the other factions, or even 
to try and gain the upper hand during a peacebuilding operation.
These three considerations cast doubt on the UN model of early 
demilitarisation in peacebuilding operations. Indeed, early demilitarisation can be 
and often has been a source of instability because it intensifies the dynamics just 
discussed. An approach based on arms control and CSBM’s is considered here, 
because it can potentially address these realist dynamics.
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This approach entails that external actors, political and military, involved in 
the implementation of a post-conflict settlement, mediate and verify an agreement 
between the parties regulating the amount of certain types of weapons entering the 
country, the amount of these types of weapons available to the parties, as well as the 
number of combatants under arms and their authorised areas of deployment with the 
aim of creating or maintaining a military balance (equilibrium or preponderance of 
one party) between the parties.42 External actors can also mediate and verify a 
CSBM agreement to reduce the risks associated with misperception and 
communication breakdown.
This hard realist model, made up of an arms control and CSBM component, 
can lessen the intensity of the three realist dynamics identified above 43 It reduces 
the security dilemma, by allowing the parties to keep the means to defend 
themselves and reduces the effects of a local arms race by regulating certain types of 
weapons. In addition, CSBM’s can increase transparency and change the parties’ 
perception of each other as security threats. Control over territory and for that matter 
over armed forces also remains firmly in the hands of the parties. It allows them to 
proceed with the transition towards democracy whilst not having to give up their 
control over territory, and its resources, straight away. Finally, the balance of forces 
established by third parties can be maintained and regulated. CSBM’s help in the
42 This hard realist approach presupposes that the strength and numbers o f each party are known. This 
may not be the case in situations o f near-anarchy where loosely organised factions fight for the control 
of a state that has more than often collapsed. However, as outlined by Trevor Findlay in his talk, a 
baseline with regard to combatants and weapons may be agreed upon among the parties and the 
verifiers. Indeed, such a baseline serves as a basis for verification and helps move the process of  
demilitarisation forward.
43 The realist approach suggested here is called ‘hard realist’ because it is grounded in control over 
territory, unlike soft realism, which offers room for non-territorial solutions to internal conflict. For a 
discussion o f these two strands o f realism and internal conflict, see the introduction to this work.
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assessment the parties make of each other’s strength and therefore can help the 
stabilisation of the military balance. The main idea underlying this approach, which 
was already discussed in the introduction, is that a hard realist strategy in the 
military realm can bring the stability necessary for the transition towards democracy 
to proceed.
Transposing an arms control model to the intra-state level raises three 
questions. First, the duration of such an arrangement is crucial. Is the military 
balance a transitional phase to complete demilitarisation of the factions and their 
reintegration into a unified military or a permanent arrangement? A permanent 
arrangement runs the risk of solidifying the territorial divisions of the country and 
may impede the (re)building of a single political space. It may also further prevent 
democratisation, by not giving enough incentives to the parties to change the status 
quo. This points to the need for a clear agreement among the parties on the nature 
(equilibrium or preponderance of one party) and role of the military balance in the 
overall peacebuilding process.
Second, the level of mistrust between the parties in the aftermath of an 
internal conflict presumes that external actors will have to play a central role in 
creating and maintaining a military balance between the parties. This issue of 
staying power, as Fen Osier Hampson calls it, becomes here crucial. Third parties 
will have to mediate, but also be deeply involved in the verification of a military 
balance agreement, by ‘checking the behaviour of a party in relation to [the] 
agreement.’44 Once again, the duration of that involvement is tied to the role of the 
military balance in the overall peace process.
44 Trevor Findlay, talk at King’s College, 2 February 1999.
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Finally, the distinction between armed and police forces becomes essential 
within the context of a military balance. Indeed, unless the two are clearly separated 
and the structure and composition of police forces brought in line with the 
requirements of democratic policing, the parties may simply transfer military forces 
to the police and not submit them to the provisions of the arms control agreement.
Implementing CSBM’s within states also raises some questions. CSBM’s 
aim mainly at changing the parties’ perceptions of each other through information 
exchange and frequent contact. Following an internal war, perceptions are certainly 
an area that merits attention. However, there is an issue underlying this change of 
perception that CSBM’s may be expected to begin to address: mistrust between the 
parties. Rebuilding trust will be an essential prerequisite for the parties to move 
forward with an eventual reintegration of their armed forces.
Trust finds its foundation in the ability to predict the behaviour of the other 
party, and the impact of this behaviour on the party making the assessment. This 
ability to predict behaviour is not sufficient; trust only comes from repeated 
interactions between parties resulting in positive outcomes for both parties.45 The 
potential of CSBM’s to generate trust between parties in the aftermath of an internal 
war may be limited, precisely because they were devised in a context where the 
parties had never gone to war against each other. Rebuilding trust is however 
essential if the military balance is not to lead to more divisions among the parties.
This section has argued that early demilitarisation in UN peacebuilding 
intensifies the risks associated with the security dilemma, the struggle for control 
over territory and the balance of forces. A strategy based on hard realist assumptions 
was considered, involving arms control and CSBM’s. This strategy, it was proposed,
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could potentially address the realist dynamics discussed and provide the stability 
necessary for democratisation to proceed. The next section now turns to the issue of 
reform of the police in UN peacebuilding.
4. Police Reform in UN Peacebuilding: Just Building a 
Reintegrated, Democratic Police Force?
This section discusses the reform of police forces as conceptualised in UN 
peacebuilding. It shows that these reforms aim at creating police forces that are 
reintegrated, operating according to democratic principles and concerned exclusively 
with the provision of internal security. UN civilian police (CTVPOL) missions do so 
by focusing on two types of activities: training of the police and monitoring of its 
activities. This section argues that the success of these reforms depends on how it 
affects the balance of forces, the parties’ control over territory and the security 
dilemma. Because of this, an alternative model of police reform is considered here, 
which allows the parties to initially maintain their control over police forces.
Reforming police forces in the aftermath of an internal conflict presents 
several challenges. First, the functions performed by police forces during the conflict 
extend well beyond normal policing.46 In effect, the functions of providing internal
45 This definition draws heavily on Ralph M. Goldman, Building Trust: An Introduction to 
Peacekeeping and Arms Control (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) pp. 20-21.
46 Police forces are defined here as officers of the law who have the powers o f arrest and detention. As 
an institution o f the rule of law, democratic police forces use these powers for the protection of 
individual rights and the enforcement of the rule of law. This definition draws on the definition of 
police forces in United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Centre for Human Rights), 
Human Rights and Law Enforcement: A Manual on Human Rights Training fo r  the Police (Geneva: 
United Nations, 1997) p. 7.
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security, usually assigned to the police, and external security, for which the military 
is responsible, are often mixed. Military forces become involved in supporting the 
operations of the police, and police forces become militarised and participate in 
military operations. Indeed, because internal conflicts blur the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, so does the distinction between police and military 
functions become less clear.
In addition, internal wars are conducive to the creation of paramilitary or 
special police forces, who perform both police and military functions and are often 
outside the regular chain of command.47 This lack of a clear distinction between 
internal and external security functions often means that police forces will be taken 
into consideration by the parties in their assessment of the balance of forces because 
of the involvement of these forces in military operations. Their reform or 
disbandment also potentially increase the security dilemma faced by the parties, as 
they see their security forces reduced.
Second, police forces in conflict situations are more often than not used as 
instruments of repression. They are responsible for human rights violations against 
civilians and more concerned with the protection of the ruling elite than ordinary 
citizens. Their activities also serve to assert a party’s control over territory by 
silencing opponents and expelling minorities.
As the process of police reform impacts on the parties’ calculations of the 
balance of forces, their control over territory and the security dilemma, the way it is 
designed is crucial for the transition towards democracy. The following two sub­
sections review both sets of CIVPOL activities, training and monitoring of local
47 Peace agreements usually demand the disbandment o f such forces.
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police, and considers how they affect the balance of forces, control over territory and 
the security dilemma.
4.1. Training of the Local Police by CIVPOL: Impact on the Balance of 
Forces, Control over Territory and the Security Dilemma
The UN’s approach to police reform in the context of peacebuilding entails 
the building of a unified police force that protects individual rights and upholds the 
rule of law.48 In societies where both concepts may not be deeply entrenched, UN 
activities aim at creating police forces that operate according to Western democratic 
standards. From the realist perspective discussed earlier, a central aspect of CIVPOL 
activities can affect the calculations of the parties.
Indeed, CIVPOL personnel train local police, or new police forces, in 
democratic policing49 The UN has prepared a comprehensive training manual, 
covering human rights standards and democratic policing practices.50 The manual 
reviews basic internal texts that underpin democratic policing: the UN Charter, the 
International Bill of Human Rights, and other conventions such as the Genocide 
Convention and the Convention against Torture. It outlines the concept of 
democratic policing, which consists in the protection of individual rights, such as 
freedom of assembly and expression, and the enforcement of the rule of law by 
guaranteeing, for example, equal access to public services and equality before the
48 This discussion is based on a special issue of International Peacekeeping on police reform (vol. 6, 
no. 4) published in the winter o f 1999.
49 Training activities range from short-term courses run by the UN on democratic policing to the 
organisation of police academies by the UN.
50 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Centre for Human Rights), Human Rights 
and Law Enforcement: A Manual on Human Rights Training for the Police (Geneva: United Nations, 
1997)
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law. This type of training differs from short-term advising as it is intended to 
facilitate an in-depth reform of the police and foster a culture of democratic policing.
Not only is training of the new police supposed to lead to an in-depth reform 
of the police, but potentially it impacts on the local balance of forces by drawing a 
clear distinction between military and police forces, and by de-militarising police 
forces. Indeed, this prevents the parties from using police forces to perform tasks 
others than the provision of internal security and increases transparency. However, 
CIVPOL training can increase the security dilemma the parties face by making them 
more vulnerable militarily.
Second, UN efforts at building a new police force will steer the reform 
process towards fostering respect for democratic standards and promoting the 
reintegration of police forces. These changes are likely to undermine the control that 
the parties exercise over these forces and territory, whilst assisting democratisation 
by increasing respect for common, democratic norms. This analysis points to the 
conclusion that the parties may be ambivalent about the process of police reform, 
and that their commitment to it will be affected by the extent to which the reform 
process undermines their control over territory, the balance of forces and the security 
dilemma.
Within the hard realist framework discussed with regard to the security 
sector in peacebuilding operations, control over the police would remain firmly in 
the hands of the parties. The three considerations just discussed (balance of forces, 
control over territory and the security dilemma) would be of even greater importance 
in determining the parties’ support for international programmes of police reform. 
First, support for reform will be affected by calculations regarding the balance of 
forces. Indeed, because the process of reform restricts the role of police forces to the
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provision of internal security, the parties will link progress in reforming the police to 
the evolution of the military balance. Second, the parties, paying close attention to 
its composition, will allow reform of the police to proceed to the extent that it does 
not jeopardise their control over the territory they occupy, at least initially. Third, 
police reform that makes the parties more vulnerable militarily will be resisted. This 
points to the need of a clear agreement among the parties on the role of police 
reform in the overall process of SSR.
Training of the police by CIVPOL often includes the creation of a new, 
reintegrated police force. The composition of the new police forces, and whether 
former officers should be allowed to join the new force, are crucial questions. The 
argument against ‘recycling’ personnel is that attitudes and integrity are harder to 
teach than police techniques.51 Police officers from the old police force may bring 
non-democratic police practices to the new force, and political connections may be 
allowed to endure, allowing the parties to retain some degree of control over the 
police. In addition, the new police may lose its credibility and the public's trust from 
the outset if it looks like it is the same police under a new name.
However, building up a new police force is a long-term endeavour. In a 
post-conflict environment, where the issue of law and order is crucial, the level of 
crime requires a police force fully functional as soon as possible. In addition, the 
difficulties of bringing a CIVPOL mission up to speed and in maintaining political 
and financial support for it militate against a programme of reform that is too far-
51 For a discussion o f this point, see William Stanley, “Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and 
Guatemala: Learning and Counter-Learning”, International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 
119-120.
52 Halvor Hartz argued that it takes at least five years to build a police force from the ground. See 
Halvor Hartz, “CIVPOL: The UN Instrument for Police Reform”, International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 
(Winter 1999): 33.
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reaching, unless there is strong local support for in-depth reform of the police. There 
is a possibility therefore that the process of reform will not decisively steer the 
police towards democratic policing.
The six peacebuilding operations discussed earlier all had a CIVPOL 
component. Two (El Salvador and Guatemala) mandated the UN to assist with the 
training of a new unified police force, and constitute relatively successful examples 
of police training. In El Salvador, the building of a new police force proceeded 
quite rapidly, and the integration of former FMLN combatants into the new police 
has succeeded.54 The agreement struck between the FMLN and the government 
specified that the mission of the military forces would be redefined so as to restrict 
their activities to the sole defence of El Salvador’s borders, and that no ex-FMLN 
guerrilla would be incorporated in the military.
In return, the FMLN obtained the disbandment of the current police forces 
and the creation of a new police force, which would include up to 20% of ex-FMLN 
fighters. The new police were deployed in the north of the country, where much of 
the fighting had taken place. William Stanley wrote that they received ‘strong 
support from a hopeful public’ upon arrival.55 The deal struck between the 
government and the FMLN allowed both parties to achieve their objectives: the 
government regained control over the whole Salvadoran territory and the 
disbandment of the guerilla force, and the FMLN, whilst retaining some military
53 See Stanley, Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and Counter- 
Learning.
54 A very similar agreement was reached in Guatemala: separation between internal and external 
security functions, disbandment o f the police and creation o f a new police force made up o f ex-URNG 
guerrillas.
55 Stanley, Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and Counter- 
Learning, p. 117.
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capability, obtained the reform of the police, the inclusion of some of its fighters in 
the new police and their deployment in areas held by the FMLN as well as the 
confining of military forces to external security functions.
4.2. CIVPOL: From Soft Monitoring to Robust Monitoring: Impact on the 
Balance of Forces, Control over Territory and the Security Dilemma
‘Soft’ monitoring consists of observing and advising the local police in the 
performance of its duties. This type of monitoring often has the effect of increasing 
the costs of inappropriate behaviour on the part of the local police, because such 
behaviour is reported and can potentially be sanctioned by local authorities under 
pressure from external actors. However, the effectiveness of ‘soft’ monitoring in 
inducing long-lasting changes in police behaviour and practices depends largely on 
the willingness of local authorities to consistently sanction inappropriate behaviour 
and on the pressure exercised by external actors to obtain such sanctions. Again, 
local authorities will be willing to sanction inappropriate behaviour to the extent that 
the sanctions do not fundamentally affect the balance of forces, by precluding the 
use of police forces for tasks others than the provision of internal security, their 
control over territory and the security dilemma by making them more vulnerable. If 
sanctions are limited, or are not applied consistently, the effectiveness of ‘soft’ 
monitoring in inducing lasting changes is questionable, and does not alter the 
functions assigned to the police, such as the defence of territories controlled by the 
parties.
In turn, investigative powers granted to UN CIVPOL, or ‘robust’ monitoring, 
allow UN investigators to determine the responsibility of the local police in
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allegations of human rights violations or accusations of negligence.56 These powers 
are potentially far-reaching, because they allow the UN to conduct independent 
investigations, including interviews of witnesses, review of evidence and full access 
to records.57 Based on the findings of UN investigations, recommendations are made 
to the police authorities requesting disciplinary action against offending officers or 
changes in policing practices. These investigations can contribute to democratisation 
by encouraging the adoption of democratic standards in policing throughout the 
country, thereby assisting the (re)building of a single political space, helping to 
enforce individual rights and the rule of law and restricting the role of the police to 
the provision of internal security. Again, CIVPOL investigations can play a role in 
changing police behaviour to the extent that their conclusions are followed by 
disciplinary action, which depends on whether the parties' control over territory, the 
balance of forces and security dilemma they face are not negatively affected by the 
requested changes.
The issue of monitoring points to one aspect of the debate on the role of UN 
CIVPOL in reforming police forces. Indeed, the mandates given to CIVPOL 
components usually do not give enforcement powers to UN monitors. This means 
that UN monitors usually cannot exercise police powers, i.e. powers of arrest and 
detention, nor can they use force themselves when they would deem it necessary.58 
The argument supporting this approach is that by not taking over policing duties, 
CIVPOL monitors put the responsibility on local authorities to make the necessary
56 ‘Soft’ monitoring and human rights investigations by CIVPOL can be seen as two ends o f a
spectrum o f monitoring activities. See Claudio Cordone, “Police Reform and Human Rights 
Investigations: the Experience o f the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, International 
Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 191-93 
51 Ibid., pp. 191-93.
58 CIVPOL officers are usually unarmed anyway.
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reforms and create a local capacity for democratic policing. But resting the 
responsibility for reform on the shoulders of the local authorities may lead to inertia 
on their part, for reasons just explained. In the short-term, it also undermines the 
ability of UN monitors to prevent human rights violations.
In Rwanda and Mozambique, UN CIVPOL was only mandated to investigate 
allegations of police misbehaviour, whereas in Cambodia and Angola, UN CIVPOL 
were assigned soft monitoring functions.
In Cambodia, each of the factions, with the exception of the State of 
Cambodia, used police forces for military purposes. In this context, the CIVPOL 
component of UNTAC had ensure that law and order was maintained and human 
rights protected. CIVPOL’s impact in Cambodia was limited because of the force’s 
own shortcomings. Indeed, it took CIVPOL 16 months after the signing of the peace 
agreement to reach its authorised strength. The force also had limited success in 
maintaining law and order because of ‘poor planning, [poor] staffing and the 
absence of a working justice system...’59 The force was therefore unable to 
effectively monitor the factions’ police forces, which continued to be used for other 
purposes than the provision of internal security.
In Angola, only 89 CIVPOL monitors were authorised under UNAVEM II’s 
mandate.60 They were to accompany the local police and monitor their neutrality. 
The limited number of CIVPOL in Angola precluded them from making any
59 Cheryl M. Lee Kim and Mark Metrikas, “Holding a Fragile Peace: the Military and Civilian 
Components o f UNTAC”, in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping the 
Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) p. 125.
60 CIVPOL’s strength was subsequently increased to 126. See United Nations, UNAVEM II -  
Background [text on-line] (New York: United Nations, 2000, accessed 6 December 2001); available 
from http://www.un.Org/Depts/DPKO/MissionsAJnavem2/UnavemIIB.htm#verification: Internet.
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significant impact on the activities of the police, who continued to be involved in 
human rights violations.
In Rwanda, by the time the Special Investigation Team became operational 
in January 1994, the peace process was already collapsing. It is, therefore, difficult 
to assess the impact of human rights investigations on the calculations of the parties 
and their control over territory.61
In Mozambique, the government initially resisted the idea of introducing a 
CIVPOL component to ONUMOZ, an idea welcomed by RENAMO.62 The force 
was eventually pushed through by the Secretary-General, who used the increasing 
state of lawlessness in the country to justify its introduction in support of the local 
police. In effect, the CIVPOL component was authorised to verify the neutrality of 
the Mozambican police and to conduct its own investigations as it deemed it 
necessary.
The transfer of demobilised government soldiers into the police led 
RENAMO to demand that ONUMOZ beef up its verification and investigation 
activities. Indeed, RENAMO leaders were worried that the government was trying to 
subvert the demobilisation process by transferring troops to the police and hoped 
that ONUMOZ monitoring would restrict the government's capacity to use the police 
as a military force. Under pressure from the UN, the government retorted that 
ONUMOZ was failing to respect an institution of the state. Indeed, the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, Aldo Ajello, had put pressure on the 
government to allow ONUMOZ to fulfil its monitoring mandate.
61 UN Secretary-General, Second Progress Report o f  the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda, S/1994/360, dated 30 March 1994, para. 33-34.
62 Mark Malan, “Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police reform in Mozambique and South Africa”, 
International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 174-76.
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Eventually, the government ‘attempted to exert only that authority [over the 
police] which was necessary to ensure itself of an adequate political future.’ The 
Mozambican case shows how monitoring activities by CIVPOL can restrict the 
government's ability to use police forces for other purposes than the provision of 
internal security.
4.3. Conclusion
This section has shown that the UN’s programme of police reform, including 
training and monitoring, not only seeks to build unified police forces operating 
according to democratic standards of policing and whose mission is limited to the 
provision of internal security but also that such programmes affect the calculations 
of the parties. Indeed, by clearly dividing internal from external security, UN 
peacebuilding affects the balance of forces in the field where this distinction is often 
blurred as a consequence of the conflict. This consideration may be of paramount 
importance if the intervention also seeks to create a military balance between the 
forces. The process of police reform also affects the control that the parties exert 
over the territories they occupy, and its implications for the (re)building of a single 
political space were also outlined. Finally, this section also argued that the activities 
of UN CIVPOL also affect the security dilemma because it can increase the 
vulnerability of parties by de-militarising police forces.
Within a hard realist model of SSR, control over the police remains in the 
hands of the parties. However, CIVPOL training and monitoring activities hamper 
the use of police forces by the parties to maintain control over the territory they 
occupy, to perform other tasks than the provision of internal security and are likely
63 Ibid., p. 176.
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to increase the security dilemma the parties face. CIVPOL activities are therefore 
likely to be resisted by the parties, unless they have agreed on the role of police 
reform within the overall process of SSR and democratisation.
5. Conclusion: Questioning Security Sector Reform in UN 
Peacebuilding Operations
This chapter has discussed SSR in UN peacebuilding operations. It has 
argued that this reform seeks to separate forces providing internal from external 
security, and to reform both types of security forces to make their functions mutually 
exclusive. However, this chapter has shown that the depth of reform of both police 
and military forces has varied from operation to operation. With regard to military 
forces, who usually provide external security, this chapter has shown that the UN 
has favoured early demilitarisation in all its peacebuilding operations, and when 
involved in the reform of military forces, their reintegration into a single, unified 
military. This preference for early disarmament and demobilisation stems from the 
idealist view, largely held at the UN, that weapons are a cause of war and should 
therefore be eliminated. This approach also underlines the state-building nature of 
SSR in UN peacebuilding, as early disarmament and demobilisation seeks to 
restore's the state's control over security forces.
With regard to the police, the UN’s functions have ranged from monitoring 
the activities of the police to training new and integrated police forces. It has been 
shown that police training and monitoring by UN CIVPOL aim at assisting the 
transition of local police towards democratic policing, but also affect the calculations 
of the parties. Indeed, CIVPOL activities potentially undermine the control the
107
parties exercise over territory by redefining the role of the police, affect the balance 
of forces by separating security forces which perform internal security functions 
from those who provide external security and increase the security dilemma 
experienced by the parties by making them more vulnerable militarily.
Control over territory, balance of forces and the security dilemma were also 
identified as crucial considerations to be reckoned with when designing the reform 
of military forces. It has been argued in this chapter that the UN’s preference for 
early disarmament and demobilisation, as well as for the creation of integrated 
military forces, affects the balance of forces in a way that exacerbates the security 
dilemma and undermines the parties’ control over territory.
Instead of this idealist approach by the UN, this chapter has considered a 
hard realist approach based on allowing the parties to maintain their control over 
security forces, and creating a military balance between them, with the help of a 
third party, through arms control and CSBM agreements. It is proposed here that 
such an approach helps alleviate the security dilemma by letting the parties keep 
their weapons and forces, including police forces, within an arms control framework, 
which also creates and maintains a military balance between them. In addition, this 
approach also allows the parties to maintain their control over the territories they 
occupy.
The rest of the thesis seeks to assess the impact of this hard realist approach 
on democratisation, and in particular the (re)building of a single political space, 
thereby clearly linking the security to the political transition. Indeed, Croft’s 
argument discussed in the introduction, that such an approach can create the stability 
necessary to proceed with the political transition, is put to the test. The role of third 
parties in the implementation of this hard realist strategy is also assessed, as well as
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the degree of control they exert over the implementation of this strategy. 
Unfortunately, empirical cases illustrating this approach are rare. The case of BiH 
was eventually selected because it is the only case that broadly fits the hard realist 
model considered in this chapter. Indeed, the Bosnian peace agreement provides for 
the democratisation of BiH. It did not restore the state’s control over security forces, 
but rather sought to create a military balance between military forces within an arms 
control and CSBM agreement, whilst seeking to reform and police forces according 
to democratic standards.
Some particularities of the Bosnian case need to be emphasised here. First, 
the UN is not the main agency responsible for the implementation of the peace 
agreement. As explained in the introduction, a cluster of international agencies have 
been drawn in to help implement the agreement. Two of these organisations, NATO 
and the OSCE, are more suited than the UN for an arms control approach to 
peacebuilding because the former is part of several arms control regimes, concluded 
with the ex-Warsaw Pact, whilst the latter has been involved in arms control and 
CSBM negotiations for nearly three decades. It is not argued here that the hard 
realist approach adopted in the Bosnian peace agreement is the product of a 
preference of these organisations for arms control; but the resources they brought to 
BiH are far superior to the ones available to the UN. The reproductibility of the 
Bosnian model of peacebuilding is therefore seriously curtailed by these institutional 
factors.
Second, in BiH, the military balance and control over security forces is 
granted to two parties: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Croato-Bosniak 
Federation. In effect, there are three parties to the Bosnian conflict but two of them 
(Bosniaks and Croats) are supposed to integrate their forces in order to balance those
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of the RS. This peculiarity simplifies the case study, by avoiding institutionalised 
multiple military balances within BiH, but as chapter six will show, integration of 
Federation troops into a single military force remains elusive. It is argued that BiH 
still fits the hard realist model for two reasons. First, although Croats and Bosniaks 
were supposed to integrate their forces, this integration did not extend below the 
corps level, leaving most troops in separate units, and parallel command structures in 
place. Second, this limited process of integration is part of a strategy that seeks to 
increase the military capabilities of the Federation army in order to balance those of 
the RS. This latter consideration decisively grounds the limited process of 
integration in the Federation army in a hard realist model. The next chapter turns to 
the GFA and asks whether it provides for the building of a democracy, including a 
single political space, in BiH.
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Part II
Chapter 3: The Dayton Accords and The Political Equation: 
Seeking to Create a Consociational Democracy
This chapter sinks its teeth into the case study selected for examination in this thesis. 
It asks whether the settlement adopted at Dayton in November 1995 provides for the 
building of a democracy and a single political space in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It 
argues that the GFA does this, but introduces consociational institutions which, 
because they rely on elite co-operation, could play into the hands of the nationalists. 
In addition, the GFA leaves the Bosnian state with no control over the institutions of 
the rule of law, such as the police, whilst granting extensive autonomy to the 
Entities. This constitutional arrangement opens the door to the consolidation of the 
division of BiH in ethnically pure territories. For example, this chapter shows how, 
until July 2000, certain ethnic communities were legally discriminated against in the 
Entities’ constitutions. This state of affairs has largely put the onus of pushing 
forward democratisation on the shoulders of the international institutions responsible 
for the implementation of the GFA.
Before discussing the political aspects of the GFA, this chapter reviews the 
recent history of BiH and of the involvement of international actors in the conflict. It 
argues that two considerations are essential to understand the chain of events: 
control over territory as a means to achieve or resist nationalist ambitions and the 
balance of forces on the ground. This chapter shows how diplomatic and military 
interventions by external actors have affected the latter, culminating in the Dayton 
negotiation. By pointing to the importance of control over territory, this chapter 
seeks to show how the consociational institutions set up by the GFA allow the
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parties to continue to pursue their wartime objectives. The structure of this chapter is 
straightforward. Section one reviews the chain of events that have led to the GFA. 
Section two then discusses the political provisions of the GFA.
1. Background to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFA): Control over Territory and Balance of 
Forces
This section reviews briefly the history of the war in BiH, and argues that 
two issues are essential to understand the 1992-95 conflict and the outcome of 
various peace initiatives: control over territory as a means to realise or resist 
nationalist ambitions and the balance of forces on the ground. Control over territory 
was and is the essence of the conflict: the parties see it as a means to further or 
counter nationalist ambitions. In the Bosnian context, control over territory means 
more than military conquest and subsequent administration of the conquered 
populations. It means the power to decide the ethnic composition of the population 
living on the territory gained through intimidation and violence against those not 
belonging to the ‘right’ ethnic community.
The issue of the balance of forces explains the success of any policy of ethnic 
purification. The Serbs, who in the initial stages of the war had an overwhelming 
military advantage, were able to successfully ethnically ‘purify’ up to 70% of the 
Bosnian territory. This section will show how various international interventions, 
ranging from interventions by international bodies such as the UN and NATO to 
covert support by states to a party, have changed the balance of forces on the
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ground, to a point where a military stalemate was reached paving the way for final 
negotiations.
The first attempt at bringing all South Slavs into one state took place on 1 
December 1918 when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created 
under the (originally) constitutional monarchy of King Alexander of Serbia.1 Bom 
out of the dismantlement of two Empires, the Austro-Hungarian to the West, the 
Ottoman to the East, the first Yugoslavia (Alexander so renamed the Kingdom upon 
taking autocratic power in 1929) brought together peoples who spoke the same or 
closely related languages, and had been influenced by three religions: Catholicism, 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam. James Gow pointed out that the first Yugoslavia 
initially reconciled two ideas: the unification of all South Slavs into one state and the 
creation of a Greater Serbia, where all Serbs could live together. The first attempt at 
uniting all South Slavs came to an end on 6 April 1941 when Yugoslavia was 
invaded by Germany and Italy. It had been politically dominated by the Serbs, an 
issue that would come back to haunt the second Yugoslavia.
The second Yugoslavia came into existence on 31 January 1946, after Josip 
Broz Tito’s communist Partisans won a long and brutal conflict against the fascist 
Ustasha in Croatia, supported by Mussolini’s Italy, and the Serbian Chetniks loyal to 
the first Yugoslavia. The new state comprised six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and two autonomous 
provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo).
1 The term South Slavs refers to the following peoples: Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, 
Slovenes and Muslims.
2 James Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will (London: Hurst & Company: 1997) pp. 14-15.
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ground, to a point where a military stalemate was reached paving the way for final 
negotiations.
The first attempt at bringing all South Slavs into one state took place on 1 December 
1918 when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created under the 
(originally) constitutional monarchy of King Alexander of Serbia.1 Bom out of the 
dismantlement of two Empires, the Austro-Hungarian to the West, the Ottoman to 
the East, the first Yugoslavia (Alexander so renamed the Kingdom upon taking 
autocratic power in 1929) brought together peoples who spoke the same or closely 
related languages, and had been influenced by three religions: Catholicism, Eastern 
Orthodoxy and Islam. James Gow pointed out that the first Yugoslavia initially 
reconciled two ideas: the unification of all South Slavs into one state and the creation 
of a Greater Serbia, where all Serbs could live together.2 The first attempt at uniting 
all South Slavs came to an end on 6 April 1941 when Yugoslavia was
1 The term South Slavs refers to the following peoples: Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians,')
Slovenes and Muslims.
2 James Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will (London: Hurst & Company: 1997) pp. 14-15. Although an 
analysis o f the causes o f the Yugoslav war is beyond the scope o f this work, the following 
contributions are also important in order to understand the context o f the Bosnian conflict: Susan 
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1995); Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: a Short History (London: Papermac, 1996); Christopher 
Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London: Hurst, 1995); 
Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with St.Antony's College, Oxford, 1996); Xavier 
Bougarel, Bosnie: anatomie d ’un conflit (Paris: la Decouverte, 1996); Sabrina Ramet, Balkan B a b el: 
the Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia from the Death o f  Tito to the War fo r  Kosovo (Boulder, Colo. : 
Westview Press, 1999); Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton: the Making o f  America’s Bosnia Policy 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: the 
Disintegraton o f  Yugoslavia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).
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The 1974 Constitution, which made Tito ‘President for Life’, also granted 
the two provinces more autonomy, creating grievances within Serbia, and gave all 
republics and provinces their own central bank, judicial system and police forces. 
Under the new constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina were also made constituent 
members of the Yugoslav Federation, which now numbered eight. The new 
constitutional arrangement, ‘by virtually abolishing Belgrade’s authority over 
Kosovo and Vojvodina... cut Serbia, now with a manageable population of six 
million down to size... While the constitution gave Serbs something to gripe about,
'i
it also calmed the other republics which feared domination by their big brother.’ It 
is this sense of grievances that was exploited by Slobodan Milosevic, who became 
Serbian president in 1987 on a nationalist agenda.4 Between 1987 and 1990, the 
Milosevic regime in Serbia pushed through reforms of the Serbian and Kosovan 
constitutions, which ended Kosovo’s autonomy and seriously curtailed Vojvodina’s.
In the face of what was seen as Serbia’s attempts at asserting its domination 
in the federation, and multi-party elections in 1990 in all the republics which brought 
nationalists to power, Slovenia and Croatia made proposals seeking to turn 
Yugoslavia into a confederation. Two opposing camps developed: Serbia, favouring 
a more centralised state, and Slovenia and Croatia, arguing for a very loose 
confederal arrangement. BiH and Macedonia were caught in the middle, favouring 
some sort of less tight confederal arrangement.
3 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death o f Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books and BBC Books, 
1995) pp. 32-33.
4 The series The Death o f Yugoslavia shows how Milosevic used the unrest in Kosovo to pitch himself 
as the champion o f the Serb cause. Indeed, he had been sent to the province by the communist party to 
rein in Serbian nationalists, and ended up siding with them against the Albanians. See Brian Lapping 
Associates for the BBC, The Death o f Yugoslavia, programme 1: Enter Nationalism.
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Serbia, on the one hand, and the confederal camp, on the other, were on a 
collision course following constitutional amendments made in Croatia and Slovenia 
asserting their sovereignty. In early 1991, negotiations over the constitutional future 
of Yugoslavia were stalled and the Collective Presidency ceased to function after 
Serbia and its allies prevented the normal rotation of the office of President to the 
Croatian representative.
In Croatia, backed by Belgrade, the substantial Serb minority (11% of the 
population) had already begun to isolate itself from the rest of the republic: 
paramilitary units were organised and a Serb administration set up. Gow commented 
on a declaration made by Milosevic that the ‘Serb nation was sovereign and that all 
Serbs therefore should live in one state -  which meant that if  there was not to be a 
Yugoslav federation, then attempts would be made to unite all Serbs.’5 This 
statement could have potential dire consequences for BiH, where 31% of the 
population were Serb.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, as communism ceased to be a unifying force, three 
nationalist parties, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske 
Akcije - SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka - SDS) and 
the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica - HDZ), 
gradually pitched themselves as the representatives of the three main Bosnian ethnic 
communities. The 1990 first free elections in BiH brought these parties to power.
5 Gow, Triumph o f the Lack o f  Will, p. 19.
6 The 1974 constitution already recognised Serbs, Croats and Muslims as constituent nations of  
Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it also stated that all socialist republics were states ‘where working 
people and citizens enjoy their sovereign rights’, implying a common citizenship and equality o f  
rights between all Yugoslav citizens.
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The coalition formed by the SDA, HDZ and SDS nonetheless soon failed to agree on 
the status of BiH, which could either follow the road to independence that Slovenia 
and Croatia seemed to have chosen, or remain part of a Serb-dominated state.
While the debate was continuing between the three parties, SDS authorities 
organised ‘Serbian Autonomous Regions’ with the objective of having Serb 
administrations and a government ready to take these areas over when a decision 
was made to create a Serb entity in BiH. The Yugoslav Army (Jugoslovenska 
Narodna Armija -  JNA), in support of the SDS leadership, was also very active in
Q
the republic. Troops and weapons were taken out of barracks and frequent 
manoeuvres conducted. Most of the weapons that the JNA held and would move 
back from Croatia were quietly transferred to the local Serb units of the JNA, who 
would become the VRS ( Vrejime Republika Srpska -  Bosnian Serb Army) once the 
conflict in BiH erupted. Parallel to this process, police forces gradually became 
segmented along ethnic lines.
In September 1991, the European Community (EC) formally accepted to 
mediate the Yugoslav conflict and nominated Lord Carrington to chair the Peace 
Conference for former Yugoslavia. Carrington’s strategy for both Yugoslavia and 
BiH was to avert war by advocating decentralisation and ethnic power sharing. In 
November 1991, the EC took one of its first initiatives and mandated Robert 
Badinter, a judge from France, to set up a judicial commission to look into the
7 In this election, 39.5% of the seats were allocated to Bosniak candidates, 35.4% to Serbs, 21.6% to 
Croats and 3.3% to Yugoslavs. The electoral system was a compromise between a majoritarian 
system, favoured by the SDA, and parity of representation between the three groups, supported by the 
HDZ and the SDS. See Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals o f  Partition (London: 
Verso, 1997) p. 174.
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conditions that the Yugoslav republics would have to satisfy for recognition as 
independent states. The Badinter Commission set three conditions: guarantees 
concerning human rights, constitutional protection for ethnic minorities and a 
referendum on independence. More importantly the Commission concluded that the 
Yugoslav state could only be dissolved along republican lines, excluding the 
redrawing of borders along ethnic lines.9 This meant that large Serb communities 
would be left outside a Serbian-dominated rump Yugoslavia should Croatia and BiH 
be recognised as independent states by the EC.
Things moved quickly in January 1992 after Slovenia, Croatia and 
Macedonia became independent. In BiH, the SDS, while remaining in the 
government, set up a ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ and declared it part 
o f the FRY. On 25 January, the SDA and the HDZ announced a referendum on 
independence as a means to fulfil the EC’s demand for granting the country 
recognition. The SDS refused to accept the referendum, and systematically 
obstructed it, intimidating voters, prohibiting the setting up of polling stations and 
removing Serb names from voter lists.
In February 1992, the EC convened an international conference in Lisbon on 
BiH in an attempt to find a constitutional solution acceptable to the three nationalist 
parties. Lord Carrington and the Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro put forward a 
plan for the creation of three ‘constituent units’ linking ethnicity to territorial 
administration. Based on the Swiss constitution, the plan neglected a major
8 The JNA’s support for the Serbs was in line with their policy of lending assistance to those who 
wanted to remain part of Yugoslavia.
9 Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (London: 
Hurst & Co., 1994) pp. 231-32. For a discussion of these issues, see Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  
Will, pp. 67-77.
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difference between the two countries: none of the three Bosnian ethnic groups had 
contiguous territories, as do the Swiss, the Muslim ‘unit’ being the most scattered. 
Although the plan sought to divide the Bosnian territory into three ethnic ‘units’, 
since the three ethnic communities were so mixed, the idea made little sense in 
practice.
Gow pointed out that this acceptance of the principle of linking control over 
territory to ethnicity by the international community ‘bestowed approval on Serbian 
ambition and was in effect a charter for “ethnic cleansing.’” 10 In fact, the Cutilheiro 
plan was not well received by the SDA, and its leader Alija Izetbegovic. The Muslim 
leadership still favoured a unitary state, of which more than 40% of the population 
was Muslim. The Croats of the HDZ initially agreed with the SDA, until their leader 
the moderate Stjepan Kljuic was replaced by Mate Boban, a close ally of the 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who favoured cantonisation as a first step 
towards partition.11 Finally, the SDS led by Radovan Karadzic agreed with the idea, 
but wanted a loose confederal arrangement between the ‘units’ and provisions for 
the establishment of special relations between the Serb parts of BiH and Serbia 
proper.
The SDS leadership had no reason to back down and compromise at this 
point. Backed by Belgrade, having set up parallel administrations and equipped by 
the JNA, Serbs in BiH (and for that matter in Croatia) were in a strong position. 
Since there was no will on the part of the EC to do anything about this imbalance, by
10 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 81.
11 Boban, a Herzegovinian, advocated the annexation o f the Croat Herzegovina region to Croatia 
proper.
118
giving the Bosnian government the means to defend itself before granting BiH 
independence, the Bosnian government had very few options available to them.
The referendum was held on 29 February and 1 March throughout the 
Republic. Boycotted by the SDS, who made sure that no ballot was cast in the areas
under their control, the referendum delivered an unambiguous message in favour of
• 10independence: 99.7% of those voting chose separation from rump Yugoslavia. This 
vote did not change the predicament in which the Bosnian government found itself: 
it did not have the military means to prevent the Serbs from seceding from BiH, 
should they decide to do so, with the humanitarian consequences that such a course 
of action entailed.
In March, Cutilheiro held a series of talks with the parties, reaching what 
seemed to be a breakthrough on 18 March. The SDS, HDZ and SDA agreed to a 
‘Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, which provided for the recognition of the principle of ethnically- 
based ‘constituent units’, a central government responsible for defence and foreign 
policy as well as a bi-cameral parliament. The text also granted extensive powers to 
the units, including control over the police. However, the agreement did not tackle 
the main issue: the borders of the constituent units. The SDS and Boban’s Croats 
nonetheless read an acknowledgement of the principle of territorial governance 
based on ethnicity into it, whilst the Muslims, although unhappy with the document, 
felt they had managed to maintain the borders of the Bosnian state.
Within days, however, the agreement collapsed. The Croats pulled out 
because the new structure had left out their ethnic kin in Central Bosnia isolated and
12 Leonard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: the Disintegration o f Yugoslavia (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
1993) p. 237.
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potentially under Serb or Muslim rule. The Muslims had two reasons to hold out for 
a better agreement: they still held to the idea of unitary state and had received 
signals from Washington that their country would be recognised by the US on 7 
April, which made compliance with the EC demands unimportant in their eyes as far 
as recognition was concerned. The lack of judgement on the part of the SDA 
leadership, who blissfully ignored the fact that war would result from international 
recognition under the present circumstances, is here patent. Indeed, considering the 
turn of events in Croatia, where the Serbs were conducting a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing with the backing of Belgrade, it was difficult to see why things would be 
different in BiH given the military resources at their disposal.
On 6 April 1992, the EC, aware of the US initiative, recognised the
11independence of BiH, which soon descended into war. Led by the infamous 
Arkan’s Tigers, the first Serbian offensives secured the northern corridor of utmost 
strategic importance to the Serbs. Serb forces then laid siege to Sarajevo. Within 
months, the Serbs controlled 70% of the Bosnian territory and were redrawing the 
ethnic map of BiH through their brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing.
With a full-scale war on its hands, two decisions made by the international 
community decisively impacted on the balance of forces on the ground. First, the 
arms embargo imposed on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia on 25 September 
1991 had left the Serbs with an overwhelming military advantage. Although during 
the course of the war this imbalance would be gradually altered through covert arms 
supplies to the Croatians and Muslims and direct military intervention by the 
European-led Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and NATO in 1995, in the initial stages
13 Slovenia, Croatia and BiH were recognised by the US on 7 April.
120
of the war, a show of force by the Serb military machine was often enough to ensure 
territorial gains.
Second, the introduction of a peacekeeping force, the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR), in BiH helped slow down the pace of ethnic cleansing and propped 
up the Bosnian government. UNPROFOR was initially mandated to escort convoys 
of humanitarian relief destined to the victims of the conflict. Even though UN 
peacekeepers were often prevented from fulfilling their mandate, or ‘taxed’ to do so, 
without the UN’s humanitarian assistance the Bosnian government would have been 
utterly defeated within months. Unwilling to use force to obtain a resolution, 
Western governments settled for a humanitarian intervention which was supposed to 
support the peace negotiations underway. This apparently contradictory approach 
between the arms embargo favouring the Serbs and humanitarian assistance 
benefiting the Muslims and Croats can be explained by the fact that neither Western 
European governments nor the US were initially willing to use force to alter the 
course of the conflict, whilst hoping to contain it through the arms embargo.
Having obtained the independence of BiH, HDZ leaders began to work on 
the annexation of Croat parts of BiH to Croatia proper. The Hrvatsko Vijece 
Odbrane (HVO), the military arm of the HDZ, was constituted on 8 April 1992, the 
same day that the Bosnian government declared the mobilisation of the Republican 
Territorial Defence forces. Various meetings between Radovan Karadzic and Croat 
leaders took place in March and May 1992, during which they pored over the map 
together, with a view to partitioning BiH.14 Now that BiH was independent, Serbs
14 The idea that BiH could be divided between a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia was discussed 
several times during the war, not least between the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic.
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and Croats had much more in common. Both were backed by their patron states 
which were favourable to the idea of carving a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia 
out of BiH. Moreover, their populations were less intermingled with each other than 
with the Muslims.15 This characteristic of the Bosnian ethnic make up meant that the 
territorial ambitions of Croats and Serbs were mostly complementary rather than in 
competition. It is the Muslims, in the end, who stood to and did lose the most.
Indeed, the second meeting in May 1992 between Karadzic and Boban led to 
an agreement between the two, ending temporarily the fighting between the HVO 
and the VRS. In July the HDZ proclaimed its own entity, ‘The Croat Community of 
Herceg-Bosna’, comprising the territories under HVO control. In the autumn, 
relations between the HVO and the newly-formed Muslim Armija Bosne i 
Hercegovine (ABiH) had deteriorated to a point where both forces were at war in 
Central Bosnia, as the Croats were conducting a ferocious campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against the Muslims, supported by the VRS.16 Interestingly, in October, 
Vance and Owen had put forward a document envisaging the creation of seven to ten
15 Xavier Bougarel has conducted an interesting study of the demographic ratios between the three 
ethnic communities in BiH’s opstine before the war. He identified three types o f situations: a 
‘hegemonic’ situation, where the dominant ethnic groups represented 80% or more o f the population 
o f the opstina; ‘bipolar’ where the dominant group represented less than 80% o f the population and 
the second group was twice as important as the third one; and ‘heterogeneous’ if  the third largest 
community represented more than half o f the size o f the second, the dominant community 
representing less than 80% o f the population. Bougarel found that situations were the Serb population 
was in direct competition with the Croat for the demographic domination o f the opstina, were rare: 
only 6.7% of the Bosnian Serb population were in a bipolar relation with the Croats. Conversely, only 
18% o f the Croat population were in a bipolar relation with the Serbs. This demographic situation 
reduced the number of contentious territorial issues between Serbs and Croats. See Xavier Bougarel, 
Bosnie: Anatomie d ’un conflit (Paris: Editions La Decouverte, 1996) pp. 140-45.
16 The refusal o f the HVO to integrate their forces with those o f the Republic led the Muslim leaders 
to create the Muslim Armija Bosne i Hercegovine.
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provinces in BiH that would each be dominated by an ethnic group. As the borders 
of the provinces were undecided, the Croats hoped that the territorial gains made 
before the negotiation on the map could be maintained (see below).
By 1993, following tensions between the EC and the UN, the European 
diplomatic initiative gave way to a joint effort between the EC and the UN, the 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by David Owen (for the 
EC) and Cyrus Vance (for the UN). The UN continued to be involved on the ground, 
through UNPROFOR, which with its humanitarian mandate was struggling to 
alleviate the consequences of ethnic cleansing. These forced movements of 
population were reshaping the ethnic map of the country. Yet, intervention to stop 
ethnic cleansing was not being seriously considered, nor was the other option, the 
creation of ethnically homogeneous entities.
The next important diplomatic initiative reflects these considerations. It came 
in January 1993, when Vance and Owen presented their peace plan (the Vance- 
Owen Peace Plan - VOPP) to the Conference, which had been under discussion 
since October 1992. While maintaining the territorial integrity of BiH under a weak 
federal government, it provided for the division of the country into ten provinces, 
each ethnic community controlling three provinces, while Sarajevo would be multi­
ethnic. Most civil powers would be devolved to the provinces, which would be, for
• 17all intents and purposes, self-governing. The provinces, although each under the 
control of an ethnic group, were nonetheless to be multi-ethnic: the ethnic 
composition of the provincial institutions was to be proportional to the 1991, thus 
pre-ethnic cleansing, distribution of population in the country, whilst their political
17 The provinces were to have a governor, from the majority ethnic community, and a vice-govemor, 
from the second largest community. See Bougarel, Bosnie: Anatomie d ’un con/lit, p. 147.
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composition was to be subject to free and fair elections.18 What the plan did, 
however, was to create territories where one ethnic community would be the 
majority, without providing contiguous territories to any ethnic community.
As far as the security sector was concerned, the VOPP devolved control over 
police forces to the provinces. There were no provisions made for an international 
CIVPOL role beyond the monitoring of the activities of the local police. However, 
the mono-ethnic character of these forces, as well as their involvement in human 
rights violations would act as a deterrent for refugee return and jeopardise the 
security of minorities. The VOPP did not address the issue of police reform which 
was essential for refugee return, thereby casting doubt on the applicability of its 
multi-ethnic provisions.
As for military forces, the VOPP provided for the establishment of a cease­
fire within three days after the conclusion of the peace agreement, the separation of 
forces and the withdrawal of heavy weapons to designated locations under UN 
control, and the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. The Plan also provided for the gradual 
demilitarisation of the country under UN/EC supervision, but did not elaborate on 
the means to achieve demilitarisation. This provision also implied that police forces 
would eventually be the only security forces in the country.
Considering the difficulties encountered during the negotiation of the 
constitutional and territorial proposals of their Plan, Vance and Owen divided it into 
three parts: military, constitutional and territorial. They obtained the signatures of 
the parties on the first two parts, but negotiations over the map turned out, as
18 The plan also provided for the return of refugees to their homes o f origin, in effect seeking to 
reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing.
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expected, to be extremely difficult.19 This point highlights the importance of 
territorial control to the parties, even over political arrangements.
The Croats signed up for the map almost immediately, arguing that it left 
them with control over Herzegovina and more territory than they occupied before 
the war. These territories were contiguous with Croatia, and although the Plan made 
provisions against it, the temptation for HDZ leaders to try and join Croatia at a later 
stage was reinforced by the territorial arrangement offered.
The Muslims, in turn, condemned the map as rewarding the Serb campaign
of ethnic cleansing. They argued that the map gave 42% of the Bosnian territory to
00the Serbs, who only made up 32% of the population before the war. In addition, 
they feared that Serbs and Croats could eventually trade the territories they 
controlled to create a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia at their expense. The 
Muslims were encouraged by the opposition to the Plan coming from Washington 
and hoped that this opposition would be matched by military assistance or air strikes. 
Indeed, the new Clinton Administration expressed reservations about some aspects 
of the Plan: the Americans felt, like the Muslims, that the VOPP rewarded ethnic 
cleansing and paved the way for the dismantlement of the Bosnian state. In more 
practical terms, the US felt that the military provisions of the agreement would be 
difficult to implement because the Serbs would not comply with their side of the 
bargain.
19 Izetbegovic had reservations about the military parts o f the VOPP: he accepted it after the UN 
accepted to control, not just monitor, the cantonment o f all heavy weapons.
20 Fiona M. Watson, Peace Proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina, House o f Commons Library Research 
Paper no. 93/35, 23 March 1993, pp. 9-10. The Serbs later made further territorial concessions, 
although not enough to satisfy the Muslims.
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The Serbs also complained about the map. They were unhappy that province 
two (covering north-western BiH) and province four (covering north-east BiH) were 
separated by provinces three and five, respectively under Croat and Muslim 
control.21 In effect, the VOPP made them give up on the idea of having contiguous, 
ethnically pure territories linking Serbia to the Croatian Krajina, even though the 
possibility of territorial swaps with the Croats at a later stage may have been 
envisaged. However, under the Plan, the Serb aim of creating a Greater Serbia would 
have been frustrated. In addition, the territorial concessions demanded by the Plan 
were deemed too important by the Pale leadership. The Pale Serbs, still in a strong 
military position, had little incentive to sign up to the agreement, especially given 
the lack of a credible threat from the from the US to oblige them to do so. The map 
and the other parts of the VOPP, although eventually signed by all parties, were 
rejected in a referendum organised by Pale in May 1993.
Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance as the UN negotiator soon after.
They produced another peace plan in the summer, based on a confederation of three
• • 22republics within Bosnia, which seemed to pave the way for a three-way partition. 
The plan was based on the results of discussions between the Croatian and Serbian 
presidents, as well as between Bosnian Croat and Serb leaders. The proposal was 
also much closer to the Cutilheiro plan of 1992 than to the VOPP. It constituted a 
return to the principle of ethnic separation through territorial division. At this stage 
of the conflict, it also meant on the part of the West a more open acceptance of the 
results of ethnic cleansing. The plan did provide for refugee return, but the prospects
21 This issue was resolved by the acceptance by the ICFY o f the creation o f a ‘super throughway’, a 
free passage road plus a 5-kilometre demilitarised zone on either side of it linking provinces two and 
four. See map in Annex I.
126
of this happening were diminished by the acceptance of the principle of ethnically 
homogeneous territories. The plan, like the VOPP, envisaged the gradual 
disbandment of all armed forces after forces would be separated and cantoned along 
with their heavy weapons. The plan also requested the monitoring of the local police 
by a UN CIVPOL mission. The planned mandate of CIVPOL was to include the 
monitoring of the local police so that it ‘has an appropriately balanced ethnic 
composition’, as requested by the agreement. This appropriately balanced ethnic 
composition is however not defined nor quantified.
Negotiations continued throughout the summer and the autumn, focusing 
now almost exclusively on territorial issues. The ‘Union’ plan was signed by all 
parties on the HMS Invincible in September, but rejected by the Bosnian parliament 
on the basis that the 30% of territory granted to them was not enough. The ‘EU 
Action Plan’, proposed next by French and German foreign ministers, took on board 
the principles of the ‘Union’ plan agreed upon on the Invincible, and increased the 
share of territory granted to the Muslims from 30% to 33.56%.24 Again, the plan was 
rejected by Izetbegovic, who felt that they had not been granted enough territory, 
and by the Pale Serbs who could no longer agree to a UN administration of Sarajevo. 
On the ground, the military situation had reached a stalemate, as no forces were 
capable of making further substantial territorial gains.
With the international community incapable of agreeing on a common 
strategy to end the war, American presence in and influence over the diplomatic 
process became more significant in early 1994. In February, US and German
22 The plan did authorise any Republic to leave the Union, subject to the approval o f the other two.
23 Stoltenberg-Owen Plan in B.G. Ramcharan, eds., Official Papers o f  the International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) p. 307, part 2, para. 3.
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diplomacy brokered an agreement between the Muslims (now Bosniaks) and the 
Bosnian Croats, including both parties into a federation and making them de facto 
military allies. The Federation agreement drew on the VOPP and included ethnic 
cantonisation. The structure of the agreement was a prelude to the GFA: it contained 
provisions for the establishment of unified democratic institutions, refugee return, 
human rights protection while leaving in the hands of the parties control over 
security forces.25
More important, the war between Croats and Bosniaks had now been 
stopped, and Croatia, under American pressure, was moving a step closer to a 
reluctant recognition of BiH, whilst avoiding an embarrassing military defeat in 
Central Bosnia. The end of the conflict between the HVO and ABiH also had a 
significant military consequence: these forces could now be turned against the VRS. 
Finally, thanks to the Federation agreement, illegal weapons destined for the ABiH 
could now transit more easily through Croatian territory. In addition, the US was 
also quietly providing military assistance and intelligence to the Croatians, which 
would play a decisive role in the operation to retake the Krajina.
In the spring of 1994, a Contact Group was formed comprising the USA, 
Russia, France, the UK and Germany with the aim of bringing the Americans and 
the Russians directly into the diplomatic process, whilst hoping to come to a 
coherent international position on how to end the war. The Contact Group produced 
a plan in July, proposing that 51% of the territory go to the Federation for 49% to the
24 Figure cited in Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f Will, p. 257.
25 The agreement provided for a joint command o f military forces. However, integration o f Federation 
forces during the war never went beyond the co-ordination o f military operations, which nonetheless 
turned out to be successful in making military gains.
26 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 263.
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Serb republic, recognising again the reality of forced ethnic separation. Both entities 
would be allowed to confederate with Croatia and Yugoslavia, while the Bosnian
onstate would perform the functions necessary to remain a member of the UN. The 
Serbs rejected it, hoping to secure more territorial concessions. Considering the 
changing balance of forces following the ABiH/HVO alliance and the slow build-up 
of both forces through covert arms deliveries, this was a miscalculation that would 
cost them dearly. Following the rejection of the plan by Pale, Milosevic broke off all
* • • 7 Rrelations with the Bosnian Serbs. This had a direct impact on the already changing 
balance of forces on the ground: the Serbs lost the military and financial support 
they had been receiving from Belgrade, which had helped them maintain their 
territorial gains. Milosevic’s decision to isolate them seriously weakened their 
capacity to resist offensives from ABiH/HVO forces.29
The next few months (until the summer of 1995) did not produce any 
substantial peace proposals, and there were no signs that the war would soon come 
to an end. Events on the ground in the spring and summer of 1995 would 
nonetheless create the conditions for a comprehensive peace negotiation. In May, the 
Croatian army took western Slavonia from the Serbs, sending thousands of refugees 
into BiH. For the first time, Serb forces were losing substantial ground.
In July, the Bosniak enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa fell to the Bosnian 
Serbs, with in the case of Srebrenica in particular, dreadful human consequences. 
This situation made UNPROFOR’s situation close to untenable: it could not carry on 
being pushed around by Bosnian Serb forces. Either it had to react with more teeth
27 See Bougarel, Bosnie: Anatomie d ’un conflit, p. 151.
28 Milosevic was at the time keen to reach a deal over BiH so as to get the UN sanctions over 
Yugoslavia lifted.
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to Serb attacks or its withdrawal plan would have to be executed. The latter option 
would have set in motion a NATO withdrawal plan, involving 60,000 troops 
including American troops. The US Administration balked at the idea of placing US 
troops in the middle of what was going to be a risky operation, possibly involving 
fighting. European capitals, in turn, decided to give more firepower to UNPROFOR, 
whilst preparing the ground for a withdrawal. The introduction of the RRF gave 
General Rupert Smith, UN commander in BiH, the military might he needed to 
make the threat of military action credible. In addition, the fall of the eastern 
enclaves had made UNPROFOR personnel less exposed to Serb retaliation.
On 4 August, the Croatian army launched ‘Operation Storm* in the Krajina 
and drove over 600,000 Serbs out of its territory. Croatian troops then entered 
Bosnia in the northwest and southwest, pushing Serb forces back. The shelling of the 
Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August gave NATO and the RRF a reason for initiating 
a massive bombing campaign against the Serbs until 14 September. The major (and 
successful) offensive launched by Bosnian Croat, Croatian and Bosniak forces in 
western BiH greatly benefited from NATO and RRF operations and was terminated 
by a cease-fire on 11 October.30
On the diplomatic front, the Americans were looking for a three-way 
recognition between BiH, Croatia and rump Yugoslavia and got Milosevic to agree 
that BiH would ‘continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing
29 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 264.
30 The offensive was warmly supported by the US. Richard Holbrooke writes that he encouraged both 
Tudjman and Gojko Susak, the Croat defence minister to continue with the offensive on 17 and 19 
September. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998) pp. 160 and 
166.
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international recognition.’31 Two documents were accepted by all three countries in 
September: the ‘Joint Agreed Principles’, which guaranteed the continuation of 
BiH’s legal existence within its borders, divided the country into two Entities, 
authorised them to establish relations with neighbouring states, and committed the 
parties to adhere to human rights standards. The text also reintroduced the principle 
of refugee return, demanded mainly by the Bosniaks, stating that they had a right to 
repossess their home or receive just compensation. The ‘Further Agreed Principles’ 
provided for democratic elections, a common presidency, parliament and 
constitutional court. When the fighting died down, under American pressure, the 
Bosniaks and Croats controlled 51.6% of the territory for 48.4% in Serb hands, 
paving the way for a final negotiation.32
The military situation on the ground was also propitious to talks. Serb forces, 
on the verge of defeat, had lost over 20% of their territorial gains made in the early 
months of the war, and stood to lose more if  the fighting was to resume. The 
Bosnian government, in turn, was eager to carry on with the offensive, but without 
Croatian backing could not have sustained is recent successes. The Croatians, 
finally, had obtained what they wanted: they had regained control over the Krajina. 
They wanted to keep the favour of Washington, which was against further offensives 
against the Serbs. They were also satisfied with keeping the Bosnian government in 
a relatively weak position.
The final negotiation took place at Dayton, Ohio in November 1995. 
Representatives from each Contact Group country attended, as well as the three
31 Ibid., pp. 129-30.
32 This was extremely close to the 51:49 principle put forward by the Contact Group and the ‘Joint 
Agreed Principles’.
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presidents of BiH, Croatia and rump Yugoslavia, representing the Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs.34 The negotiations centred chiefly on the map and military 
implementation, while constitutional issues were given less attention. The result is 
an agreement that seeks to maintain a state within BiH’s recognised borders, and to 
create peace through democratisation and a military balance between the parties. 
Yet, the GFA, based on the Contact Group Plan, recognises the division of the 
country into largely ethnically pure territories, while declaring that the consequences 
of ethnic cleansing are to be reversed. The agreement itself is a two-page text, and 
the annexes to it contain the main provisions of the accord. The first two annexes 
cover the military aspects of the treaty, and will be reviewed in the next chapter, 
while the remaining nine deal with its civilian aspects.
This section has argued that two considerations are essential to understand 
the Bosnian conflict and the outcome of the various peace proposals: control over 
territory as a means to fulfil nationalist ambitions and the balance of forces on the 
ground, which it was shown, has been subject to alteration due to external 
interventions. The following section looks at the political equation of the GFA. It 
shows that the GFA provides for democratisation, including the rebuilding of a 
single political space as defined in the introduction. It then argues that the 
consociational institutions envisaged in the GFA could consolidate the power of the 
nationalists.
33 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, pp. 280-81.
34 Carl Bildt was present as the EU negotiator.
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2. Democratisation and the GFA: Consolidating the Power of the
Nationalists?
The following subsections argue that the GFA provides for the establishment 
of a formal democracy and a single political space in BiH. They show that the three 
constitutive features of democracy (elections, rule of law and individual rights) as 
defined in chapter one are found in the agreement. However, these subsections show 
that the consociational nature of the Bosnian democracy potentially solidifies and 
entrenches the power of the nationalists, which in the end may prevent 
democratisation by allowing them to use political institutions to serve their divergent 
interests. Indeed, consociationalism is premised on elite co-operation. As shown in 
the previous section, this co-operation was less than forthcoming, which does not 
bode well for the functioning of common institutions.
2.1. Democracy in the GFA: Elections and the Rule of Law: Annexes 3, 4 
and 11
Annex 3 is devoted to the issue of elections. Article I commits the parties to 
ensuring the necessary conditions for ‘free and fair elections’. These conditions are 
defined as a politically neutral environment, the right to vote in secret without fear 
or intimidation, freedom of expression and the press, as well as freedom of 
association and movement. A provisional electoral commission is created and 
mandated, among others, to see to it that ‘the structures and institutional framework 
for free and fair elections are in place’. Nearly all citizens of BiH aged 18 or older
35 Annex 3, art. I, para. 1.
36 Art. Ill, para. 2.
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• ' X lare eligible to vote and to stand for election. Government officials are selected 
through competitive elections at the municipal, cantonal (in the Federation), entity 
(Presidency and Entity Parliaments) and national levels (Presidency and House of 
Representatives).38
As for the rule of law, Article I of the Constitution declares the Bosnian state 
to be a democratic state, ‘which shall operate under the rule of law’, thereby 
providing for the rebuilding of a single political space based on the rule of law. 
The GFA, in the constitution, makes reference to procedural requirements of the rule 
of law, such as the right to a fair trial and ‘other rights relating to criminal 
proceedings’ as well as equality before the law.40 The constitution also states that the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECPHR) and its protocols have priority over all other law.41 They also
37 Those indicted, serving a sentence or not complying with an order to appear before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or any Bosnian court for alleged violations of  
humanitarian law are ineligible to vote and stand for election. In addition, those judged by the High 
Representative (HR) to be obstructing the implementation o f the GFA or those who have been 
removed from office by the HR are not eligible to stand. Finally, anyone not complying with the rules 
and regulations of the provisional electoral commission will not be authorised to stand. See OSCE 
Mission to BiH, Rules and Regulations o f the Provisional Election Commission, art. 2.5d, 7.10 and 
7.11 [text on-line] (Sarajevo: OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2000, accessed 15 July 2000); 
available from http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/pec/eng/pec-rr-english.pdf; Internet.
38 The electoral rules, and their role in trying to induce people to vote across ethnic divisions, will not 
be discussed here. The author’s objective here is to show that the GFA provides for a formal 
democracy and a single political space in BiH, and then assess the impact o f security sector reform on 
democratisation and reintegration.
39 Annex 4, art. I, para. 2. As explained in chapter 1, the mle of law is defined here as a set o f publicly 
known rules which govern the exercise of state power, thereby guaranteeing predictability and 
certainty, in order to protect individual rights. Enforcement o f these mles necessitates at least an 
independent judiciary, a professional police force and an efficient prison system.
40 Annex 4, art. II, para. 3e and 4.
41 Art. II, para. 2.
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contain some procedural requirements of the rule of law. Article 5 of ECPHR, for 
instance, elaborates on the right to liberty and security, and regulates the conditions 
of arrest and detention. Article 2 of protocol 7 to ECPHR affirms the right of appeal 
in criminal matters. However, the GFA is silent regarding the institutions of the rule 
of law, and how they are to be reformed. It leaves authority over them in the hands 
of the Entities, except for inter-entity criminal law enforcement.42
2.2. Democracy in the GFA: Human Rights Instruments in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina: Annexes 4 and 6
The human rights provisions of the GFA are far-reaching and endow the 
Bosnian state with one of the most comprehensive systems of human rights 
protection in the world. The agreement addresses the issue in the Constitution 
(annex 4) while devoting annex 6 to the creation of human rights protection 
mechanisms. Annex 7, in turn, spells out the conditions for refugee return, a right 
enshrined in the Constitution.
Human Rights, the Constitution and Refugee Return
The Constitution states that the ‘rights and freedoms set forth in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina... [and]
42 The Federation constitution entrusts authority over the police to the cantons, which, with the 
exception o f two, are under the control o f either the Croats or the Bosniaks ( ‘they shall have... 
responsibility for...establishing and controlling police forces...’). See Federation Constitution, section 
3, art.4.
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shall have priority over all other law.’43 The Constitution further guarantees freedom 
of movement of people, goods, services and capital across its territory. Article II 
commits BiH and its constituent Entities, as well as all courts, agencies, 
governmental units and instrumentalities to the ‘highest level of internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’, as set forth in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
protocols.44 The Constitution also demands that all parties fully co-operate with the 
different international institutions concerned with human rights law and 
humanitarian law. Finally, the right of refugees and displaced persons to ‘freely 
return to their homes of origin’ is reaffirmed, along with the principle of non­
discrimination.45
The Constitution also assigns a role to the Constitutional Court regarding 
human rights protection. Article VI gives the court appellate jurisdiction over ‘issues 
arising out of a judgement of any other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.46 This
43 Article II, para. 2. Paragraph 3 enumerates some o f these human rights and fundamental freedoms: 
the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude or to perform forced or compulsory labour; 
the rights to liberty and security o f person; the right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, and 
other rights relating to criminal proceedings; the right to private and family life, home, and 
correspondence; freedom o f thought, conscience, and religion; freedom o f expression; freedom of 
peaceful assembly and freedom o f association with others; the right to marry and to found a family; 
the right to property; the right to education; the right to liberty o f movement and residence. In 
addition, paragraph 4 commits BiH to being a party to 15 international human rights agreements, 
listed in annex I o f  the constitution. However, the constitution does not clearly give the same weight 
in domestic law to the latter agreements. See Zoran Pajic, “A Critical Appraisal o f Human Rights 
Provisions o f the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 1 
(1998): 131.
44 Art. II, para. 1.
45 Art. II, para. 4 &5.
46 Annex 4, art. VI, para. 3b.
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provision authorises individuals to appeal a decision that allegedly violated their 
rights. The constitutional court also has jurisdiction, by referral from any Bosnian 
court, to determine whether a law is compatible with the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECPHR).
These provisions complement the rule of law in rebuilding a single political 
space by defining a single set of rights and freedoms to be applied throughout the 
territory of BiH. Provisions regarding refugee return are central to this notion of 
single political space.
Indeed, Article I provides that refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDP’s) will have their properties which they lost in the course of the war restored to 
them, or that they will be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to 
them.47 The annex assigns to the parties, not the Bosnian state, specific duties with 
regard to refugee and IDP return: they are to ensure that the returnees are permitted 
‘to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or 
discrimination...they [the parties] shall take all necessary steps to prevent activities 
within their territories which would hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return 
of refugees and displaced persons...the Parties undertake to create in their territories 
the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and 
harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for 
any particular group’.48
The parties have to ‘demonstrate their commitment to securing full respect 
for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons within their 
jurisdiction’ and have to create ‘without delay conditions suitable’ for refugee and
47 Annex 7, art. I, para. I.
48 Art. I, para. 2 and 3, art. II, para. 1.
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IDP return, concludes article I. These include, among others: the suppression of acts 
of retribution by military, paramilitary, and police services, and by other public 
officials and private individuals; and the prosecution, dismissal or transfer of 
individuals in the military, paramilitary, and police forces responsible for serious 
human rights violations.49
Finally, Article VII provides for the creation of a commission for displaced 
persons and refugees, and binds the parties to respect and implement its decisions 
‘expeditiously and in good faith’. The Commission is composed of nine members, 
three of whom are not to be citizens of BiH, and is mandated to receive and decide 
claims for property that was lost as a consequence of the war. Although the 
commission’s decisions are final, no mechanism is provided to enforce them.
Annex 6: the Human Rights Commission
Article I re-commits the parties to ‘the highest level of internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’, as contained in the ECPHR, its 
protocols and the 15 other international agreements listed in the GFA. The principle 
of non-discrimination is again mentioned. Article II establishes a Human Rights 
Commission (the Commission), made up of the Office of the Ombudsman (the 
Ombudsman) and the Human Rights Chamber (the Chamber). The Commission as a 
whole has jurisdiction to consider ‘alleged or apparent violations of human rights’ as 
provided in the ECPHR and its protocols as well as ‘alleged or apparent
49 Art. I, para. 3.
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discrimination on any ground’.50 It can redress human rights violations by either 
facilitating an amicable resolution or by making decisions that are final and binding.
2.3. Paving the Way for the Nationalists? The Constitution, the Structure of 
the Bosnian State and the Entities: Annex 4
Article I reaffirms the existence of BiH ‘under international law as a 
state...and with its present internationally recognised borders.’51 Article III defines 
the responsibilities of and the relations between the central state and its Entities, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS.52 The prerogatives of the 
Bosnian state are restricted to foreign policy; foreign trade; customs; monetary 
policy; finances of the central state; immigration, refugee and asylum policy; 
international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement; international
50 Annex 6, Art. II, para. 2.
51 Art. I, para. 1. The name o f the country was changed from the Republic o f Bosnia and Herzegovina 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although this point has no legal implications, it is worth noting that 
traditionally in the region the title o f republic is reserved for sovereign entities. All other states that 
have emerged from the Former Yugoslavia are indeed republics. In addition, the 1974 Constitution 
defined socialist republics as ‘states where working people and citizens enjoy their sovereign rights.’ 
Popular perception therefore associates the term republic with statehood. This was clearly a sticking 
point in the negotiation, particularly when the Pale Serbs demanded that the Serb entity be called 
Republika Srpska. The wording used in the Constitution does not, therefore, settle fundamental 
opposing views regarding the borders of the Bosnian state. See Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 130 and 
138 and International Crisis Group (ICG), Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace 
Agreement, ICG Balkans Report no. 80, Section VI [report on-line] (Sarajevo: ICG, 28 October 1999, 
accessed 25 August 2001); available from http://www.intl-crisis- 
group.org/proiects/balkans/bosnia/reports/A400058 28101999.pdf: Internet.
52 ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist o f the two Entities, the Federation o f Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska...’ Annex 4, art. I, para. 3. It was agreed at Dayton that the 
Federation would occupy 51% of territory, while the RS was allocated the remaining 49%. The 
entities also have a ‘right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent 
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Art. Ill, para. B.
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communications; and regulation of inter-entity transportation and air traffic 
control.53 A mechanism to transfer competencies from the Entities to the central 
government was also provided, and within six months of the entry into force of the 
Constitution the Entities were to begin negotiations to extend the functions of the 
central state.54 However, the Constitution stipulates that ‘all governmental functions 
and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shall be those of the entities.’55
Annex 4, while satisfying the Serb demand for recognition of the RS as an 
entity and its political autonomy, is the product of a strategy of decentralisation of 
power as a means to protect all three communities, and to alleviate as much as 
possible the security dilemma among them. It was accepted by the Bosniaks in 
exchange for ‘Train and Equip’, and led to a consociational form of government.56 
The consociational option of the GFA is reflected in the institutions of the state,
53 Art. Ill, para. 1.
54 Art. Ill, para. 5b.
55 Art. Ill, para. 3a.
56 Consociationalism relies chiefly on consensual decision-making and elite co-operation to manage 
conflict. Four principles characterise a consociational polity, three of which are found in the GFA: 
Broad-based parliamentary coalitions. Power is shared in a grand coalition in the executive whose 
leaders represent the various segments of society. This prevents the exclusion o f minorities from 
political power.
Minority or Mutual Veto. Each segment is given guarantees that it will not be outvoted when its vital 
interests are at stake.
Proportionality. At every level o f government decision-making (central, regional, local) proportional 
representation determines the composition of the governing bodies: the demographic strength o f the 
segments is translated into commensurate representation in the legislative and through a proportional 
electoral system parties are awarded seats in parliament.
Segmental Group Autonomy. Decision-making authority is devolved to the segments for issues that 
concern them primarily.
See Timothy D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) pp. 36-37.
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where the three ethnic communities are represented.57 By guaranteeing the rights of 
all three groups in the common institutions through consensual decision-making and 
‘vital interests’ protection mechanisms, the Constitution ensures that no group will 
be threatened by decisions made by the largest group (the Bosniaks) or a 
combination of two groups (Croats and Serbs, who together have a relative 
majority). The next subsections subsequently show how these principles have been 
applied to the GFA.
Broad-based Parliamentary Coalition in the Executive: The Presidency and the 
Council o f Ministers
Article V states that the Presidency shall consist of three members, one from 
each constituent people. The Bosniak and Croat members are elected from the 
territory of the Federation, while the Serb is elected from the territory of the RS. 
Decisions regarding matters falling within the jurisdiction of the state are to be taken 
by consensus. They may nevertheless be adopted by two members if ‘all efforts to 
reach consensus have failed’.58 The Council of Ministers is composed of ministers 
from the Federation and the RS, with no more than two-thirds of its ministers from
57 Indeed, the Constitution recognises ‘Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with 
Others)’ o f BiH. See annex 4, preamble. Carl Bildt recalls that at Dayton ‘a further minor question 
concerned a demand for a constitutional clause in which the state o f Bosnia was said to comprise 
‘three peoples’. The Croats were most definite about this, the Serbs clearly agreed, while the Muslims 
accepted it without making any serious objections.’ Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: the Struggle fo r  Peace 
in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998) p. 139.
58 Article V, para. lc. The procedure adopted to protect the interests o f the group represented by the 
dissenting member will be reviewed in the next subsection.
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the Federation. Each minister has two deputy ministers, who come from the two 
other constituent peoples.
Finally, paragraph 5a states that ‘each member of the Presidency shall, by 
virtue of the office, have civilian command authority over armed forces.’ In 
February 1999, the HR, Carlos Westendorp, issued a decision regarding the 
interpretation of this provision. He wrote: ‘In Bosnia Herzegovina...civilian 
command authority over all armed forces is exercised by the BiH Presidency.. .The 
tri-partite BiH Presidency exercises its authority as an institution, meaning that each 
Member is competent to take part in the decision-making process regarding the 
armed forces. It is not the Chair, but the Presidency, who is the civilian Commander- 
in-Chief. The BiH Presidency is to act and take decisions on this issue 
collectively.’59 The Constitution also provides for the creation of the Standing 
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), of which the Presidency members are 
members, to co-ordinate the activities of the armed forces.60
Although the executive in BiH seems to reflect the principle of a grand 
majority including all segments of society, in fact it fails to grant representation to 
those who do not belong to the three ‘constituent peoples’ or choose to exercise their 
right not to define themselves as not belonging to any of these groups. 
Representation not only in the executive, but also in other Bosnian institutions, was 
restricted during the period under study to the elected leaders of the Bosniak, Croat 
and Serb constituent peoples. As outlined earlier, the work of these institutions is
59 OHR Press Release, Decision on Civilian Command o f the Armed Forces, 20 February 1999.
60 This institution and its development will be discussed in chapter six.
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largely ‘reliant on political cooperation among ethnically-based elites.’61 This co­
operation may not be forthcoming simply because the parties still fundamentally 
disagree on the borders of the Bosnian state. Political institutions will therefore be 
used by the parties to preserve the division of the Bosnian territory into ethnically 
pure statelets.
Minority or Mutual Veto: The Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency
In the Parliamentary Assembly, decisions are taken ‘by majority of those
£*\
present and voting’ in each chamber. Members of both chambers are to ‘make their 
best efforts’ to see that this majority includes at least one-third of the votes of 
representatives from either entity.63 A proposed decision of the Parliamentary 
Assembly may be declared to be destructive of a vital interest of any of the three 
constituent peoples of Bosnia by a majority of Delegates (three) from that 
constituent people in the House of Peoples. A Joint Commission is then convened to 
try and resolve the issue within five days. If it fails to do so, the matter is referred to 
the Constitutional Court.
Decisions in the Presidency are taken by consensus. A dissenting member of 
the Presidency may declare a presidential decision to be destructive of a vital interest 
of the entity from which territory he was elected within three days of the adoption of
61 Robin Luckham et al., Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts o f  Inequality, Poverty, and 
Conflict: A Conceptual Framework, IDS Working Paper no. 104 (Brighton: Institute o f Development 
Studies, 1999) p. 63.
62 Art. IV, para. 3d. The parliamentary assembly is made up o f the House of Representatives and the 
House o f Peoples. See below.
63 Art. IV, para. 3d.
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the decision. The decision is then referred immediately to the representatives of the 
member of the Presidency’s constituent people at the entity level. The decision can 
only take effect if it is confirmed by two-thirds of the said representatives.
The minority veto provision may also be used by the parties to protect the 
division of BiH in ethnically pure territories. Indeed, it allows any party to 
considerably slow down any legislation that may threaten its interests. This 
protection mechanism, although vital for the functioning of consociational 
democracy, can be easily exploited to prevent democratisation.
Proportionality: the Legislative, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank
The principle of proportionality is only partially applied to the institutions of 
BiH. The House of Representatives, on the other hand, comprises 42 members, two- 
thirds (28) elected from the territory of the Federation and one-third (14) from the 
territory of the RS.64 The electoral system used to elect the members of the 
parliamentary assembly (and all other elected bodies, except the RS Presidency) is 
proportional representation by party list.
However, the House of Peoples, reserves an equal share of seats to all three 
constituent peoples.65 The Constitutional Court (two judges from each community) 
applies parity in its membership, along with the Human Rights Chamber and the 
Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, and the Central Bank. This
64 The 2:1 ratio in the House o f Representatives represents the population ratio between the Bosniaks 
and Croats (respectively 44% and 17%) and the Serbs (31%) in the 1991 census.
65 The House of Peoples comprises 15 members, five from each constituent people. Lijphardt calls this 
‘parity of representation’ and sees it as a variation of the principle o f proportionality. See Arend 
Lijphardt, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) pp. 40-41.
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provision allows for the equal representation of all ethnic communities in common 
institutions. However, to avoid deadlocks, the GFA also allocated seats to 
international personnel who can cast deciding ballots. This principle of equal 
representation in common institutions is also reproduced in security-related 
institutions. As will be argued in chapter six, this model, coupled with consensual 
decision-making, seems to represent the path of least resistance for the international 
community, even it considerably reduces the work of common institutions by 
allowing minorities to block decisions.
Segmental Group Autonomy: The Entities
The Constitution assigns to the Entities ‘all governmental *functions and 
powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, including defence and policing.66 At the entity level, however, the law 
does not recognise all three communities as constituent peoples. Although the GFA 
created a consociational form of government at the central level, it grounded it in 
ethnoterritories, which initially allowed the representatives of these ethnic 
communities to maintain homogeneous territorial Entities of which not all citizens of 
BiH are ‘constituent peoples’.
66 Art. HI, para. 3a.
67 Even the Federation, which is supposed to be multi-ethnic, is in fact divided along ethnic lines. Out 
o f its 10 cantons, five are under Bosniak control, three under Croat control and two supposedly multi­
ethnic (in fact divided along ethnic lines, as in Mostar).
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Moreover, the central state in BiH is not competent to settle disputes between
Z Q
these ethnic Entities. The mechanism put in place for the resolution of conflicts 
between them is arbitration, a mechanism generally used for the peaceful resolution 
of conflict between sovereign states.69 This further strengthens the independence of 
the Entities vis-a-vis the central state.
Furthermore, the Constitution of the Federation recognises ‘Bosniacs and 
Croats... as constituent peoples’, along with ‘Others’ without specifying what this 
category means.70 In fact, ‘Others’ means those Bosnian citizens, including Serbs, 
who neither define themselves as Bosniak nor as Croat. An ICG report pointed out
• 71that ‘Serbs [were] denied that status [constituent people] in the Federation’. Zoran 
Pajic wrote elsewhere that ‘to be very precise, Bosniacs and Croats [were] not 
constituent peoples in the entity of the Republika Srpska, and in the same way Serbs
7 9[were] denied constituent peoples status [sic] in the Federation’. In turn, the 
Constitution of the RS unambiguously affirms that ‘Republika Srpska shall be the
68 See Said Hamdouni, ‘Les accords de Dayton et le statut de la Bosnie-Herzegovine’, Etudes 
internationales XXIX, no. 1 (March 1998): 58.
69 Annex 2, art. V, para. 1 and 2 state that ‘the Parties agree to binding arbitration o f the disputed 
portion o f the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in the Brcko area... No later than six months after the entry 
into force o f this Agreement, the Federation shall appoint one arbitrator, and the Republika Srpska 
shall appoint one arbitrator. A third arbitrator shall be selected by the agreement of the Parties’
appointees within thirty days thereafter.’ Annex 5 states that ‘the two entities will enter into reciprocal
commitments... to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.’
70 Constitution o f the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. 1, para. 1.
71 ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, section VI, para. d.
72 Pajic, “A Critical Appraisal o f Human Rights Provisions o f the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, p. 134. Nedjo Milicevic puts the same argument forward in Nedjo Milicevic, “The 
Structure o f the State in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Capacity of the Realization o f Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”, in Wolfgang Benedek, ed., Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
Dayton (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) p. 46.
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State of Serb people and of all its citizens.’73 ICG concluded: ‘It appears that all 
three peoples are constituent only at the level of the central state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Given that the vast majority of state prerogatives, e.g. Military, 
police and the judiciary are in the hands of the entity governments, the reality is 
that minorities, be they Serbs in the Federation or Bosniaks and Croats in RS, are 
legally discriminated against in their dealings with government institutions.’74
The ICG report, however, did not fully consider the role that the 
Constitutional Court could play in this regard, as it has jurisdiction to decide 
‘whether any provision of any entity’s constitution or law is consistent with this 
constitution.’75 In July 2000, the Court concluded that the provisions of the Entities’ 
constitutions with regard to constituent peoples were discriminatory and ruled that 
the Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others be considered constituent peoples throughout 
the territory of BiH. The decision was carried by five of the nine judges: the three 
international and Bosniak judges voted in favour whilst the Croat and Serb judges 
voted against.76 This vote shows how the rebuilding of a single political space, 
where all Bosnian citizens are given equal status, is still a deeply contested notion in 
BiH.
73 Article 1 o f the RS Constitution cited in ICG, Is Dayton Failing?.
74 ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, section III, para. d. Emphasis mine.
75 Annex 4, art. VI, para. 3. The constitution includes human rights provisions which should prevent 
discrimination. The constitution further reads ‘the Entities and any subdivisions thereof shall comply 
fully with this Constitution, which supersedes inconsistent provisions o f the law o f Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and o f the constitutions and law o f the Entities, and with the decisions of the institutions 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The general principles o f international law shall be an integral part o f the 
law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities.’ Annex 4, art. IHb.
76 See Gordon Bardos, “Progress or Stagnation? Bosnia and Herzegovina: Annual Report 2000”, 
Transitions on Line January 2001, accessed 15 June 2001 [article on-line]; available from 
http://archive.tol.cz/frartic/bosarOO.html: Internet.
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However, the ICG report nonetheless aptly pointed out that the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court, or for that matter, of any common institution of BiH, 
cannot be implemented without the consent of the Entities.77 Indeed, no state-level 
enforcement mechanism exists that would allow the Bosnian state to enforce the 
law, resolve disputes between or with its constituent Entities arising from 
discriminatory legislation, by using legitimate force if necessary, in order to rebuild 
a single political space. The international institutions responsible for the 
implementation of the GFA are therefore the only actors with the means to coerce 
the parties to live up to their commitments and abide by the law, as the central state 
is left with no actual control over the institutions of the rule of law, including the 
police.
The annexes of the GFA concerned with the political structure of BiH 
provide for the establishment of a formal democracy and the rebuilding of a single 
political space. However, the kind of democracy that the GFA envisages is based on 
the consociational model. The examples of Belgium and Switzerland show that this 
model is perfectly compatible with democracy, but in the Bosnian context it may 
lead to the further legitimisation of the nationalist power structure by entrenching 
their position in the various institutions of the state. However, given the lack of 
political will to invest the diplomatic and financial resources necessary for the 
creation of integrated, majoritarian institutions, the consociational model may be the 
least bad option available.78
77 ICG, Is Dayton Failing? , section VI, para. b.
78 This issue will be further developed in chapters six and seven.
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3. Conclusion: the Political Provisions of the GFA: Continuation of
War by Other Means?
By giving an account of the war in BiH as well as of the negotiations leading 
up to the GFA, this chapter has sought to show that two considerations are essential 
to understand the troubled story of the 1992-95 war. The first is the issue of control 
over territory as a means to achieve nationalist ambitions. It has been argued that 
these ambitions went beyond the mere conquest of territory to the redefinition of the 
ethnic map through ethnic cleansing. From a peacebuilding perspective, the reversal 
of ethnic cleansing would mean the complete defeat o f those who have sought to 
create ethnically pure territories.
The second consideration discussed in this chapter is the balance o f forces. It 
has been shown how a variety of external actors have affected this balance of forces 
and thereby influenced the course of the war. Given the importance of the balance of 
forces in the politico-military calculations of the parties during the war, the way this 
balance is managed will also bear decisively on the peacebuilding effort at 
democratisation.
This chapter has shown that the GFA indeed seeks to build a formal 
democracy, including a single political space in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The accord 
provides for the three constitutive elements of formal democracy: free and fair 
elections, the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. Yet, the GFA does 
not equip the Bosnian state with the means it would need to enforce the rule of law. 
Indeed, the agreement leaves the control over its institutions in the hands of the 
parties. As all of these parties, at different stages of the war, were also the agents of 
ethnic cleansing, the risk is great that these institutions will be used to consolidate
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the gains made during the war as well as the nationalist power structure, thereby 
undermining the process of democratisation. In short, the GFA, although full of 
good democratic intentions, creates a state which is nearly powerless. This places the 
onus of the process of democratisation on the shoulders of the international actors 
mandated with the interpretation and the enforcement of the accord.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on Entities whose ethnic composition is the 
result of ethnic cleansing. Indeed, the Bosnian constitutional order legitimises the 
results of ethnic cleansing, whilst demanding its reversal. Pauline Neville-Jones’ 
argument that the ‘constitution devised ... is excessively complex and ... at the same 
time does not -because no agreement could be obtained- contain a means of 
breaking the political deadlock’ makes perfect sense.79 The political deadlock she 
refers to is the borders of the Bosnian state. For the wartime leaders of the Bosnian 
Serbs and Herzegovinian Croats, and to some extent for the Bosniak leaders, the 
GFA recognises their right to separate, ethnically pure territories, as the discussion 
over the Entities’ constitutions has shown. Ethnically based territorial Entities 
enshrined in the domestic constitutional order therefore served the purpose of 
strengthening the division of the country along forcibly engineered ethnic lines. In 
this sense, the consociational institutions created at Dayton consolidate the gains 
made by the parties during the war, by entrenching the power of those responsible 
for the current situation in the political institutions of the state. The next chapter 
turns to the security aspects of the GFA, and discusses the assumptions underlying
79 Pauline Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR, and Alliance Relations in Bosnia”, Survival 38, no. 4 
(Winter 1996-97): 49.
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annexes 1 -A and 1 -B and 11. It argues that the hard realist approach adopted for the 
security sector also consolidates the power of the nationalists.
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Chapter 4: The Dayton Accords and The Security Equation:
The Hard Realist Strategy
Chapter three has argued that the GFA seeks to rebuild a formal democracy, 
including a single political space, in BiH. This chapter, in turn, reviews the annexes 
of the GFA that concern the security sector, annexes 1-A, 1-B and 11. Two 
characteristics of these annexes should be emphasised. First, the GFA leaves control 
over military and police forces in the hands of the parties, although it assumes that 
two of these parties (Croats and Bosniaks) will integrate their police and military 
forces.1 Second, in the military realm, the GFA seeks to create a military balance 
between the Federation army and the VRS by committing the parties to establishing 
an arms control and a CSBM regime. The various annexes of the GFA concerned 
with the security sector reflect the hard realist strategy adopted at Dayton.
Annex 1-A defines IFOR’s role in patrolling and enforcing the division of 
the country into two entities, paving the way for an institutionalised military balance. 
In addition, the annex does not challenge the internal division of one of the entities, 
the Federation, between Croats and Bosniaks. The separation of forces between the 
RS and the Federation agreed upon further compounds the rebuilding of a single 
political space of the country by allowing two, in fact three, armies to continue their 
existence, thereby consolidating the nationalist power structure, which it has been 
argued, resists democratisation.
Indeed, the agreement, and annex 1-A in particular, leaves untouched the 
power structure set up during the war: ethnically-based parties controlling military 
and police forces in order to maintain the ethnic homogeneity of their territories, but
1 Chapters six and seven will discuss the difficulties o f integrating Croat and Bosniak security forces.
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also to preserve their monopoly on power. However, annex 1-A and security council 
resolution 1031 authorise IFOR to get involved in tasks that would undermine this 
structure. The arrest of war criminals is of particular significance in this context. 
Although these secondary tasks do not concern the security sector directly, they will 
nonetheless be reviewed in the context of this research to show how third parties can 
make use of their resources to push democratisation forward within a hard 
realist/liberal framework of peacebuilding.
Annex 1-B includes the strategy adopted to prevent a return to war after 
IFOR’s departure, which was to stay in BiH for a year only. The approach adopted is 
one of military balance between the parties, coupled with an arms control and a 
CSBM agreement to be negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The annex further gives the OSCE a 
central role in negotiating and maintaining both regimes.
The military balance between the parties envisaged in annex 1-B is to be 
realised through the US-sponsored Train and Equip' programme (T&E), which aims 
at building up the war-fighting capability of the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats, 
whilst giving them an incentive to integrate their forces. It should be emphasised that 
the balance envisaged is not military parity. Rather, it gives the Federation a military 
advantage in manpower and weaponry which, it will be argued, undermines the 
rebuilding of a single political space and solidifies the division of the security sector 
into three separate entities by generating additional mistrust between the Federation 
and the RS, and within the Federation between Croats and Bosniaks.
This chapter also reviews annex 11 of the GFA, which mandates the UN to 
monitor and train police forces in BiH. Although this mandate broadly fits the model 
of previous CIVPOL missions, the context of its implementation is very different.
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Indeed, the GFA and the constitution of the Federation assign control over the police 
to the ministry of internal affairs in the RS, and to the ministry of internal affairs of 
each canton in the Federation. This means that the UN International Police Task 
Force (EPTF) is to monitor and train three largely mono-ethnic and separate police 
forces. The GFA, in line with the hard realist approach adopted with regard to SSR, 
institutionalised this fragmented structure which is likely to further complicate 
IPTF’s task of creating multi-ethnic police forces solely concerned with the 
provision of internal security. This structure is also likely to facilitate the use of the 
police by the parties to maintain control over territory, and its ethnic composition, 
again undermining democratisation.
The structure of this chapter is simple. The first three sections provide 
respectively an analysis of annex 1-A, annex 1-B and T&E. Section four is 
concerned with annex 11. The conclusion then outlines the central role given to third 
parties in this hard realist strategy of SSR.
1. Annex 1-A: IFOR’s Primary and Secondary Mandates: Divide to 
Unite2
This section focuses on the primary and secondary mandates given to IFOR. 
It is argued here that the primary mandate of the NATO-led force helped prepare the 
ground for the institutionalisation of a military balance by separating VRS and 
Federation military forces, but by doing so opened the door to the solidification of 
BiH’s division in two. However, this section also shows that IFOR, in its secondary
2 1 am indebted to James Gow for this distinction between IFOR’s primary and secondary mandates. 
See James Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f Will (London: Hurst & Company, 1997) p. 287.
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mandate, was also given a licence to assist democratisation, and extensive powers to 
fulfil its primary and secondary mandates.
1.1. IFOR* s Primary Mandate: Paving the Way for an Institutionalised 
Military Balance
Annex 1-A provided for the deployment of NATO and non-NATO troops to 
‘implement the provisions of this Agreement’ under the name of Implementation 
Force (IFOR).3 IFOR’s primary mandate reflects one of the major policy decisions 
made at Dayton to accept the division of the country between the Federation and the 
RS, based on the Contact Group plan. The annex mandates IFOR with the 
implementation of this principle of separation by creating an internationally 
supervised line of separation, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). IFOR’s 
presence, in addition to enforcing the creation of the IEBL, also provided for a 
deterrent presence in order to prevent the parties from attempting to change the 
status quo by force, or to prevent localised incidents from degenerating into outright 
military hostilities.
IFOR’s primary mandate can be broken down into three phases that 
eventually would lead to the separation of forces and pave the way for an 
institutionalised military balance between the two entities. Indeed, IFOR was not 
mandated with the disarmament and demobilisation of the security forces of the 
parties, except in cases of non-compliance with the annex, nor with their integration
3 Annex 1A, art. I, para. 1. The Security Council ‘authorize[d] the Member States acting through or in 
cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A o f the Peace Agreement to establish a 
multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the 
role specified in Annex 1-A...’ UN Security Council Resolution 1031, para. 14, 15 December 1995.
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into common military structures.4 Two factors account for this. First, the parties 
themselves would not have agreed to be disarmed. In fact, the Bosniaks made their 
acceptance of the Dayton package conditional upon the lifting of the arms embargo 
which had crippled them militarily, and upon a US-led programme of military 
assistance. Having found support in the US Congress in favour of unilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo, they had not only put the Administration under pressure to 
achieve a rapid political solution to the conflict, but also secured themselves military 
support by the US. Second, the Pentagon was adamantly opposed to getting troops 
involved in disarming the parties. Richard Holbrooke, the head of the US negotiation 
team at Dayton acknowledged that
‘the most serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Agreement was that it left two 
opposing armies in one country, one for the Serbs and one for the Croat- 
Muslim Federation. We were fully aware of this during the negotiations, 
but since NATO would not disarm the parties as an obligated task, 
creating a single army or disarming Bosnia-Herzegovina was not 
possible.’5
Since IFOR would be under US command within a NATO structure, the 
option of disarming and demobilising the factions was in effect not an option.
Under phase I of IFOR’s primary mandate, annex 1-A demanded the 
continuation of the cease-fire established in October 1995 and mandated IFOR to 
enforce compliance with it. The IEBL, which roughly followed the cease-fire line 
between Federation and Serb troops, consisted of an internal line dividing BiH into 
two entities, the Federation and the RS. The IEBL was supplemented with a two-
4 Article II, para. 3 o f the annex demands that all paramilitary groups be disbanded. IFOR is given the 
authority to enforce compliance with this provision in article I. However, the primary responsibility 
for demilitarisation lies with the parties.
5 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998) p. 361.
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kilometre weapons-free zone (Zone of Separation) on both sides of the Line. IFOR 
was mandated to patrol it and ensure that it remained demilitarised.
Under phase II, a procedure was put in place for areas that had to be 
transferred from one entity to the other as part of the agreement. The entity 
withdrawing from the area had 45 days after the transfer of authority between 
UNPROFOR and IFOR (henceforth ‘transfer of authority’) to withdraw their forces 
and ‘completely vacate and clear this area.’6 During the period of transition, which 
was to end 90 days after the transfer of authority, IFOR was authorised to provide 
military security for the areas.
Under phase III, and within 120 days after the transfer of authority, military
n
forces were to be cantoned, which included the cantonment of all heavy weapons. 
The agreement also required the demobilisation of troops that could not be 
accommodated in cantonment/barracks areas.
IFOR’s primary mandate, besides paving the way for an institutionalised 
military balance by separating the parties and providing the military stability 
necessary for arms control measures, also has consequences for democratisation and 
especially the rebuilding of a single political space, also called reintegration. First, it 
gives legitimacy to the division of BiH in two, whilst not challenging the internal 
division of the Federation. This means that the process of creating a single political 
space may be slowed down by the fact that the IEBL is regarded by the parties as 
something very close to a border dividing sovereign territories where different laws 
can continue to apply. Since these laws and regulations are passed by the
6 Article IV, para. 3a. The article did not provide a definition of ‘forces’ which turned out to be a 
major source o f tension during the transfer o f these areas to the Federation. See next chapter.
7 Heavy weapons refers to all tanks and armoured vehicles, all artillery 75mm and above, all mortar 
81mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20mm and above. Article III, para. 5a.
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representatives of the ruling nationalist parties in each entity, it is likely that many 
will be incompatible with democratic practices, thereby also impacting negatively on 
democratisation.
Indeed, and this constitutes the second consequence of IFOR’s primary 
mandate, leaving the parties’ military forces largely intact consolidates their control 
over territory. Since at some point or another during the war and with various 
degrees of intensity, all parties pursued policies of ethnic cleansing, leaving the same 
individuals in charge of military forces in the post-conflict phase, even under the 
control of IFOR, will not alter these policies, nor build confidence between the 
parties.
1.2. IFOR’ s Secondary Mandate: A Licence to Undermine the Nationalist 
Power Structure
IFOR is mandated not only with inter-entity military security, but also 
potentially with the protection of individuals and support for civilian 
implementation. Indeed, IFOR is authorised to fulfil the following civilian tasks:
’to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks 
associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; to 
assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of 
humanitarian missions; to assist the UNHCR and other international 
organizations in their humanitarian missions; to observe and prevent 
interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and 
displaced persons, and respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life 
and person...’8
8 Article VI, para. 3.
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Annex 1-A also authorises the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to ‘establish 
additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR in implementing this Annex’.9
Article X of annex 1-A obligates the parties to co-operate with all 
organisations involved in the implementation of the peace agreement, including the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Bearing in mind 
article I, this article authorises IFOR to use force to support the activities of the 
Tribunal, if the parties fail to do so. Resolution 1031 also authorised IFOR to use 
force to enforce compliance with Annex 1-A.10
This licence for IFOR to support the implementation of the civilian aspects 
of Dayton should not obscure the fact that the Pentagon was against any 
involvement of IFOR in civilian tasks, especially after the Europeans demanded and 
obtained the post of High Representative (HR) for Carl Bildt. Now that the HR was 
to be a European, the Americans felt they had lost control over one side of the 
equation and tried to restrict the powers of the HR, especially with regard to military 
affairs.11 Moreover, both General Shalikashvili, the Joint Chairman of the Chiefs of 
Staff, and General Joulwan, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), felt that an extension of IFOR’s tasks to helping the civilian 
implementation would lead the military to get bogged down with an unclear mandate 
in a situation a la Somalia.12
9 Article VI, para. 4.
10 UN Security Council Resolution 1031, 15 December 1995, para. 5.
11 Commenting on the decision to choose a European as HR, Pauline Neville-Jones wrote: ‘Thereafter 
the US negotiating tactic seemed to be to concede to this office as little authority as possible, either 
over the agencies engaged in civilian implementation or in relation to the military commander’ who 
was to be American. See Pauline Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia”, 
Survival 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 50.
12 Holbrooke recalls the military speaking of ‘mission creep’ and ‘slippery slope’. Holbrooke, To End 
a War, pp. 216-218.
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They were in favour of a two-fold mission for IFOR: self-protection and 
separation of forces including enforcement of the cease-fire. Since their support was 
essential for Congressional approval of a US involvement in BiH, the 
Administration had to take the military’s view into account and strictly divorce 
responsibility over the military provisions of the GFA from the civilian ones, while 
restraining the powers of the HR.13
Finally, UNPROFOR’s dual key system was a decisive factor in the decision 
to fence the military aspects off. Under this system, any offensive military action by 
NATO during the war in BiH had to be approved by both NATO and UN officials. 
This gave UN officials a de facto veto over military action. Such a situation was 
unacceptable for the US military, who wanted a free hand in BiH. Eventually, it was 
agreed that a Joint Consultative Committee ‘to liaise between the High 
Representative and the IFOR Commander should be set up.’14 The fact remains that, 
even though IFOR was granted the authority to support civilian implementation, the 
negotiators at Dayton knew very well that IFOR’s mandate would be interpreted in 
quite narrow terms by the military.
In an almost schizophrenic fashion, annex 1-A authorises IFOR to get 
involved in tasks that can potentially assist democratisation, and undermine the 
division of the country into two entities. Indeed, IFOR’s secondary mandate 
authorises the force to enforce the rule of law and to protect individual rights by 
arresting persons indicted by the ICTY, or by using its resources to bring down some
13 Carl Bildt lays the responsibility for a nearly powerless HR not least with General Joulwan. See 
Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: the Struggle fo r  Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1998) pp. 130-31.
14 Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 132. Emphasis mine.
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of the barriers set up by the parties by, for example, enforcing freedom of 
movement.
1.3. IFOR’ s Enforcement Powers
Annex 1-A also lays down the powers of IFOR. The NATO-led force is 
authorised under article I to use force to ensure compliance with any provisions of 
the annex: ‘the IFOR [is authorised] to take such actions as required, including the 
use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Annex.. .’15
Moreover, article VI, which defines the scope of IFOR’s authority, also 
contains an enforcement mechanism:
‘The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall have 
the authority, without interference or permission of any party, to do all 
that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of 
military force, to protect the IFOR and carry out the responsibilities listed 
above... and they shall comply in all respects with the IFOR 
requirements.’16
These extensive enforcement powers give IFOR the authorisation not only to 
enforce compliance with its primary mandate, but also to use force to fulfil its 
secondary mandate. As explained above, there was no support at NATO for a wide 
interpretation of IFOR’s mandate during the negotiation at Dayton or even in the 
initial stages of IFOR’s deployment. However, annex 1-A does grant IFOR the 
authority to do more than fulfil its primary mandate, should there be a political will
15 Article I, para. 2b.
16 Article VI, para. 5. Richard Holbrooke and Wesley Clark, who both felt that IFOR needed to have 
more teeth, added this clause. In addition, IFOR has the right to inspect, monitor and observe military 
forces and facilities. Art. VI, para. 6. See Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 223.
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to do so. This issue is worth pointing out, because it creates possibilities for new 
third party roles in implementing peace agreements within a hard realist framework.
1.4. Conclusion
This section has argued that the mandate given to IFOR has the following 
objectives: presiding over the division of BiH into two separate entities and paving 
the way for an institutionalised military balance between the RS and the Federation 
(primary mandate); and assisting democratisation by supporting civilian 
implementation, protecting individual rights and enforcing the rule of law 
(secondary mandate). By doing the former, IFOR and consolidated the control 
exercised by the nationalists over the territory they occupied at the end of the war. 
By fulfilling the latter, IFOR could undermine the nationalist power structure and 
assist democratisation.
Although IFOR's primary and secondary mandates are clearly spelled out in 
the annex, this section has argued that at the time of Dayton there was only 
substantial political will to use IFOR's extensive enforcement powers to implement 
the force's primary mandate. However, should there be more political will to tackle 
IFOR's secondary mandate, these strong enforcement provisions give a lot of 
freedom to act to the NATO-led force.
2. Annex 1-B: the Core of the Hard Realist Approach
As demilitarisation was never considered a serious option at Dayton, a 
different approach had to be adopted regarding the military. In order to deter further 
attacks from the RS, whom the US regarded as the aggressors, a military balance
162
approach was adopted. It tried to reconcile the need for a general reduction of 
armaments and troops in the region, championed by the Europeans, with a perceived 
necessity to build up the Federation in order to prevent aggression by the Serbs. This 
strategy of ‘building up’ the Federation also addressed the issue of IFOR’s 
withdrawal, as a stable military balance, which was to be created by both the ‘Train 
and Equip’ programme and the arms control and CSBM agreements, would 
eventually make NATO presence unnecessary.
The annex itself is a very short text, which only defines the general 
obligations of the parties. It seems to have received very little attention prior to the 
negotiations, and remained a low priority during the discussions. The Americans 
eventually imposed what they named their buildup/build-down approach, which 
authorises increases in armaments on the Federation side while at the same time 
capping holdings in the region. Annex 1-B contains the build-down approach. 
Article I states that co-operation should be ‘aimed at achieving balanced and stable 
defense force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties’ respective
1 7security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region.’ The military balance 
approach is spelled out in article IV. 1: ‘the establishment of si stable military 
balance based on the lowest level of armaments will be an essential element in 
preventing the recurrence of conflict.’18 Annex 1-B thus embodies the hard realist 
approach regarding the military adopted at Dayton and seeks to institutionalise a 
military balance through an arms control and a CSBM regime. Indeed, article IV of 
annex 1-B requests the parties to establish an arms control regime.
17 Emphasis mine.
18 Emphasis mine.
163
2.1. Article IV
This military balance envisaged by article IV is to be established between 
three parties: the Republic of Croatia (Croatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The holdings for BiH are subsequently 
divided between the Federation and the RS: it is the first time that sub-state entities 
are included in an arms control agreement. David Harland views the agreement as 
including five actors, not three, thereby highlighting the Federation’s internal 
divisions (Croatia, FRY, RS, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats).19
Based on the CFE model, it limits holdings in five categories of weapons 
(called Treaty Limited Equipment -  TLE): tanks, artillery (over 75mm), armoured 
combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.20 All participants in the 
agreement have 30 days after the signing of the agreement to report their holdings to 
the OSCE, who was mandated to conclude negotiations on an arms control regime 
within three months.21 Should the parties fail to agree on numerical limits by the 
deadline, the following ratios would apply: taking the FRY holdings as a baseline,
19 Interview by the author with David Harland, Head of Civil Affairs, UNMIBH, Sarajevo, 7 August 
1998.
20 Article IV, para. 2a. The objectives of the CFE treaty, as defined in the negotiation mandate, were 
‘to establish a stable and secure balance o f conventional armed forces, to eliminate disparities 
prejudicial to stability and security, and to eliminate as a matter of priority the capability to 
launch surprise attack and to initiate large-scale offensive action.’ Indeed, NATO’s goal in the 
negotiations was to eliminate the Warsaw Pact’s capacity to conduct short-warning, large-scale 
offensive operations. The TLE were therefore selected because o f their destabilising effect as 
offensive weapons. The arms control agreement to be negotiated under annex 1-B therefore not only 
aims at creating a stable military balance between the parties, but also indirectly at reducing their 
ability to launch offensive operations. See Jane M. O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe”, 
SIPR1 Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
p. 477 and 491. See also Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order: The Origins and 
Consequences o f  the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995) pp. 11-38. Emphasis mine.
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FRY would get 75% of it, Croatia 30% and BiH 30% (Federation: 20% and RS: 
10%).22 The ratios are based on the approximate population of the respective states,
n o
not on force-to-space ratios generally used for defensive posture calculations. The 
annex does not impose limits on any other types of weapons, nor prohibit the 
technological upgrading of TLE’s.
The Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (ASAC) was signed on 14 
June 1996 in Florence. The parties decided to adopt the proposed ratios contained in 
article IV of annex 1-B (see table in annex III for allowed holdings). A 16-month 
implementation period was agreed upon, with a minimum of 40% of excess artillery, 
aircraft, helicopters and 20% of excess tanks and armoured combat vehicles to be 
destroyed by 1 January 1997 (first phase).24 An inspection mechanism was also set 
up, with the OSCE acting as a mediator, to allow the parties to verify the 
information received regarding weapons holdings. Finally, no party could withdraw 
from the agreement for at least 42 months.25 In addition to ASAC, the parties, with 
the exception of FRY, made pledges to reduce their military manpower relative to
21 Article IV, para. 2b and 3. The agreement was signed on 14 June 1996.
22 Called the ‘5:2:2’ key.
23 See Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Arms Control and the Dayton Accords", European Security 6, no. 2 
(Summer 1997): 22. Defensive force-to-space ratios represent the number o f armed forces necessary 
to defend a given area. For example, according to NATO’s doctrinal standards, it was estimated that 
30 divisions were necessary to defend its 900 km border with the Warsaw Pact in the Central Region, 
or one division per 30 km o f frontage. Disagreements existed regarding the soundness o f NATO’s 
doctrinal standards, but the relationship between force and space in calculating defensive requirements 
was not questioned. See Klaus Wittmann, Challenges o f  Conventional Arms Control, Adelphi Paper 
no. 239 (London: Brassey’s for the IISS, 1989) p. 15 and p. 89, n. 22. See below for an analysis o f the 
consequences of this decision.
24 Some exceptions apply. For instance, weapons used for peacetime internal security functions did 
not have to be decommissioned. See article III o f ASAC. Up to 25% o f excess weapons could also be 
exported (Article VI, para. 1 o f ASAC). The second phase was to be completed by 1 November 1997.
25 Until 14 December 1999.
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their late 1995 levels.26 Under this agreement, Croatia would reduce its active forces 
from 80,000 to no more than 65,000; the forces in RS would drop from 80,000 to 
56,000 and Federation forces would be reduced from 150,000 to 55,000.27
One of the main assumptions in ASAC is that the wartime alliance between 
Croats and Bosniaks can be continued and strengthened. If successfully integrated, 
allied Federation forces would then outgun and outman the Bosnian Serbs by 2:1, 
making them extremely vulnerable to an attack. Successful integration of Bosniak 
and Croat forces is nonetheless far from certain, and the armament of Bosniak 
troops, vastly superior in manpower, under ‘Train and Equip* may create security 
dilemma dynamics not only between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs but also 
between Federation allies, thereby hampering the integration of their forces. '
The regional dimension of the military balance is here crucial. Bosniak 
forces, although at a military advantage thanks to ASAC and ‘Train and Equip*, did 
not have the capacity at the end of the conflict to conduct large-scale military
26 FRY decided to keep its force level at 124,339. See Bonn International Center for Conversion 
(BICC), Conversion Survey 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 46.
27 Interestingly, BiH as a whole pledged to reduce its manpower to 60,000 troops, well below 111,000, 
which represents the sum of authorised RS and Federation forces. This goes to show how the entities 
regarded any state-level commitment as meaningless.
28 Federation forces have a 2:1 advantage in manpower if  reserve forces are included in the 
calculation. Michael O’Hanlon pointed out that attacking forces with a 2:1 advantage in troop strength 
in a given sector have historically won battles 2/3 of the time. He concluded: ‘Under the June arms 
control accords, the Muslim-Croat Federation would have that advantage, throughout the entire 
Bosnian theater, in both manpower and equipment. The Federation would be able to do even better 
locally, generating the 3:1 manpower advantage that many U.S. military analysts consider desirable 
for sector-specific offensive operations without having to drop below rough parity in other sectors.’ 
Michael O’Hanlon, “Arms Control and Military Stability in the Balkans”, Arms Control Today, 
August 1996: 7. On the 3:1 rule, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance”, 
International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989): 54-89 and Joshua Epstein, “The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive 
Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies”, International Security 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989): 
90-127.
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offensives without support from Croatia. As explained in chapter three, the Croatian 
government is quite happy to keep the Bosniaks in a relative weak military position. 
Croatian support for further Bosniak offensives, even after the implementation of 
ASAC, is therefore unlikely. Bosnian Croats, in turn, have little to fear from their 
Bosniak allies as long as military support from Croatia continues to be forthcoming. 
However, the Bosnian Serbs, because of the authorised 2:1 ratio between Federation 
forces and theirs, see their military advantage diminished because of ASAC and in 
the face of ‘Train and Equip’ have become more dependent on FRY for their 
defence.29
ASAC undermines the rebuilding of a single political space in two ways. 
First, it further drives both Bosnian Croats and Serbs towards Zagreb and Belgrade 
by authorising the Bosniaks to increase their weapons holdings. In the face of the 
Bosniak military build-up under ‘Train and Equip’, both ethnic communities have 
additional incentives to seek closer connections with Croatia and rump Yugoslavia, 
including military support, thereby undermining the rebuilding of a single political 
space and consolidating the nationalist power structure. Second, the Sub-regional 
Consultative Commission (SCC) set up under ASAC helps legitimise the three 
Bosnian parties as independent actors in the regime. Indeed, in the Commission, 
mandated to resolve issues arising out of the implementation of ASAC, all three
29 Such an unfair balance is based on the assumption that ‘Serbia proper would come in on the side of 
the Serb entity in any future conflict’. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic 
Survey 1997-98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 129. Some military analysts consider RS 
forces as the ‘fourth corps’ of the Yugoslav Army. Yugoslav support, training and logistics was never 
discontinued at the end o f the war, even if  RS officials claim that they co-operate more ‘with the 
Army o f B&H Federation than with the Army o f Yugoslavia’. Djuro Kozar, “The Army o f the 
Federation and Nato Air Strikes on Yugoslavia", Alternativna Informativna Mreza, 3 April 1999 
[article on-line] (accessed 10 Feb. 2000); available from 
http://www.aimpress.org/dvn/trae/archive/data/199904/90416-001-trae-sar.htm: Internet.
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Bosnian parties are represented.30 Since all decisions are made by consensus, the 
SCC further strengthens the idea that the Bosnian parties are parties in their own 
right to ASAC. It also allows the nationalists to largely control the negotiations over 
as well as the evolution of the military balance.
2.2. Article II
In addition to an arms control regime, article II of annex 1-B asks the parties 
to agree on a set of CSBM’s within 45 days after the signing of the GFA. These 
were agreed upon in January 1996, and are based on OSCE CSBM’s implemented 
between NATO and the ex-Warsaw Pact.31 The parties accepted a package of 15 
measures, which aim at achieving the three objectives set out by Desjardins in her 
discussion of CSBM’s: to promote information exchange, to establish principles and 
rules in order to regulate the behaviour of actors, and to promote contacts between 
the parties.32
Promotion o f Information Exchange 
Measure I: Exchange of Information*
30 The Federation delegation is always made up o f a Bosniak and Croat representative. The same 
principle applies to the Joint Consultative Commission created under article II o f annex 1-B to address 
issues related to the implementation o f the CSBM agreement.
31 See OSCE, ed., Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [document on-line] (Vienna: OSCE, 26 January 1996, accessed 01 February 2000) 
available from http://www.oscebih.org/downloads/regstab/art2-Fin.pdf: internet. No party is allowed to 
withdraw from the agreement before 1 January 1998 (Art. IV). A verification protocol was added to 
the Agreement, which authorised the parties, assisted by the OSCE, to conduct inspections on each 
other’s territory to verify the information provided or observe military activities. The measures to 
which the protocol applies are marked with a *.
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Under this heading, the parties are to exchange information annually 
regarding ‘the military organization, manpower, and major weapons systems’ in the 
territory of BiH as well as regarding defence related matters such as training of 
armed forces and weapons procurement.33
Measure II: Notification of Changes in Command Structure or Equipment Holdings*
The parties are to notify each other of changes in the command structure of 
their armed forces and in the holdings of their major weapons systems if these 
changes exceed 10% or more for more than 20 days.
Measure III: Risk Reduction
This measure aims at reducing risks of misperception of military activities. It 
does so by authorising the parties and the OSCE representative to request an 
explanation for ‘any unusual military activities’.34 Likewise, in case of hazardous
32 See chapter two.
33 Article II, measure I, para. 1. ‘Military organization’ includes all personnel and organisations with a 
military capability. ‘Major weapons systems’ means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACV), 
armoured personnel carriers (APC) and armoured infantry fighting vehicles look-alikes, artillery 
above 75mm, combat aircraft, combat helicopters and anti-tank guided missile launchers.
34 Article II, measure III, para. 1. ‘Unusual military activity’ means any military activity which is 
threatening due to its size, location, direction o f fire or other specific features o f the activity. See 
article I, para. 23.
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incidents of a military nature, the parties and the OSCE representative have a right to 
request information on the incident.35
Measure IV: Notification, Observation, and Constraints on Military Activities
The parties are committed to notify each other and the OSCE representative 
of military activities if the forces and equipment engaged exceed certain numbers. 
Following the notification, the other party and the OSCE are invited to send 
observers to the military activity to be monitored. Finally the number of military 
operations and the forces/equipment involved are limited for the years 1996 and 
1997.
Measure IX: Notification of Disbandment of Special Operations and Armed Civilian 
Groups
The parties are supposed to inform each other and the OSCE of the existence
36of special operations groups, whose activities are not to be resumed. If a party or 
the OSCE becomes aware that such a group is operating, it has the right to request 
an investigation by the other party. The same procedure applies to armed civilian
35 ‘Hazardous incident of a military nature’ means accidents or other events caused by military 
vehicles, other military equipment or materiel threatening civilian population or the security of 
another party. See article I, para. 24.
36 A special operations group is an ‘organised military or para-military’ group, conducting activities 
‘such as reconnaissance forward of force positions, and the preparation and carrying out o f sabotage, 
diversions and assassinations’. Article I, para. 28.
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groups. Were the existence of such a group proven, it would have to be disbanded at
37once.
Measure X: Identification and Monitoring of Weapons Manufacturing Capabilities*
Under this heading, the parties are to provide each other and the OSCE a list 
of all weapon-manufacturing facilities, on an annual basis. Visits of these facilities 
by the other party or the OSCE are authorised.
Establishment o f Principles and Rules
Measure V: Restrictions on Military Deployments and Exercises in Certain Areas*
This CSBM puts restrictions on the location of military activities, which are 
to be confined to cantonments/barracks as designated in annex 1-A. In addition, the 
parties are not to conduct notifiable military activities within ten kilometres of 
designated areas.38
Measure VI: Foreign Forces
This measure prohibits the reintroduction of foreign forces that should have 
been withdrawn under annex 1-A. It nonetheless demands that the parties notify
37 All armed civilian groups were to be disbanded under Annex 1-A.
38 The IEBL, any border, Gorazde, Brcko and the Posavina corridor.
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each other of the ‘status of any foreign military personnel that are physically present 
on their territory.’39
Measure VII: Withdrawal of Forces and Heavy Weapons to Cantonments/Barracks*
Under annex 1-A, the parties are to withdraw their forces and heavy weapons 
to cantonments/barracks, as well as disarm and demobilise any forces not removed 
to these designated areas. Heavy weapons may be removed from the designated 
areas for exercises pending notification of the other party and the OSCE. They are to 
be returned immediately to cantonments/barracks at the conclusion of the exercise.
Measure VIII: Restrictions on Locations of Heavy Weapons*
This measure prohibits the removal o f heavy weapons from 
cantonments/barracks, except for the purpose of exercises.
Measure XII: Non-Proliferation
This measure commits the RS and the Federation to contribute to efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
39 Measure VI, para. 3.
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Promotion o f Contacts
Measure XI: Military Contacts and Co-operation
This measure aims at enhancing contact and co-operation between the 
parties, under the auspices of the OSCE, through the establishment of military 
liaison missions, military contacts at all levels, visits to military bases and military 
co-operation, including possible joint military training and exercises. It should be 
emphasised that only the establishment of military liaison missions and visits are 
compulsory.
Measure XIII: Verification and Inspection
The parties have a right to conduct visits of military installations and to 
observe certain military activities such as manoeuvres in order to verify the 
information provided under the provisions of the CSBM agreement. These activities 
are to be facilitated by the OSCE.
Measure XIV: Communications
The commanders/chiefs of armed forces and the OSCE personal 
representative are to establish direct communication lines.
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Measure XV: Implementation Assessment40
The parties are to create a Joint Consultative Commission (JCC), composed 
of a representative of each party and the OSCE personal representative.41 The 
Commission’s role is to consider a wide range of issues related to the 
implementation of the Agreement, such as working procedures, differences of 
interpretation or disputes arising out of the implementation of the agreement. The 
Commission is purely a consultative forum; it holds no enforcement powers.
One criticism levelled against AS AC also applied to the CSBM agreement. 
Indeed, the JCC, like the SCC, treats the parties as independent actors and by doing 
so, consolidates the control exercised by the nationalists over the implementation of 
the CSBM package.
2.3. Conclusion
This section has shown that annex 1 -B contains the core of the hard realist 
approach to SSR in the GFA. Indeed, the annex provides for the institutionalisation 
of a military balance between the RS and the Federation, coupled with a CSBM 
package. This military balance assumes that the precarious alliance between Croat 
and Bosniak forces can be built into a unified military force that will then be in a 
strong position vis-a-vis RS military forces. Indeed, the type of balance sought with 
the RS is not a military equilibrium. Because the negotiators at Dayton assumed that 
FRY would always support RS military operations, they gave Federation forces a 
substantial military advantage.
40 Annex 5 o f the CSBM agreement.
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This approach, it has been argued here, undermines democratisation, and 
especially the rebuilding of a single political space, for two reasons. First, the annex 
contributes to the consolidation of the nationalist power structure's military arm by 
treating them as legitimate parties to the annex. Second, security dynamics created 
by the annex between the RS and the Federation have further pulled the Serbs away 
from BiH; likewise, the same dynamics created within the Federation by 'Train and 
Equip' give further incentives to the Croats to seek integration with Croatia. The 
next section now offers an analysis of 'Train & Equip'.
3. Train and Equip’ (T&E): Undermining the Rebuilding of a 
Single Political Space
One of the main Bosniak demands throughout the war had been the lifting of 
the UN arms embargo against them. The Bosniaks felt, rightly so, that they were 
disadvantaged by the embargo, which left them with hardly any heavy equipment 
while Serb forces had inherited most of the equipment that the JNA left behind when 
it officially withdraw in 1992. A group of US senators began to champion the 
Bosniak cause in 1994 by advocating a US unilateral lifting of the embargo against 
them.42 The Administration argued that such a policy would violate the UN embargo, 
and was also concerned about the impact that such a unilateral action would have on 
NATO and Contact Group unity.43 However, the Administration, facing a defeat in
41 As noted in the previous sub-section, the Federation delegation has always been composed of one 
Bosniak and one Croat representative.
42 The senators in question were Robert Dole (R), Joe Lieberman (D) and Joe Biden (D).
43 The Europeans fiercely opposed the policy for two reasons. First, they feared that arming the 
Bosniaks would lead to an extension of the conflict. Secondly, they were worried about the 
consequences o f an intensification of hostilities on UN peacekeepers, who were mostly Europeans.
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Congress over the issue of troop deployment agreed to a variant of this policy. ‘Train 
and Equip’ (T&E) is the result of this agreement, under which the US is to lead an 
effort to equip and train the Federation army ‘in order to “level the playing field” so 
that it could defend itself.44 Such an approach was made possible under annex 1-B, 
which authorises a build-up of TLE’s within the limits agreed upon. Opposed by the 
Pentagon, because it would undermine American even-handedness in the field by 
making the US appear to support the Federation, it was strongly opposed by the 
Europeans, who favoured the build-down approach only.45 T&E has a twofold 
purpose: to guarantee the security of the Federation and to serve as a means of 
strengthening the Federation and its institutions.46
3.1. T&E and the Security of the Federation
T&E assumes that a renewed Serb attack is the more plausible scenario, or at 
least more plausible than a Croat attempt at secession or a decision by the Bosniak 
leadership to attempt to reunify BiH by force. Being wary of a Serb attack, 
supported by the FRY, T&E patrons have aimed at giving the Federation a 2:1 
advantage over the RS both in weaponry and manpower. This calculation postulates 
that the FRY will always intervene to support the RS militarily which may not 
always be the case in the future. Whilst attaining the objective of further deterring a 
Bosnian Serb offensive, such a development leaves the RS in a highly vulnerable
44 Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 277.
45 T&E was probably the single most important factor in convincing the Bosniaks to accept the GFA. 
Commenting on the arms control approach and annex 1-B, Bildt wrote that ‘it was more important for 
them [the Muslims] to have absolute clarity about the termination o f the arms embargo...’ Bildt, 
Peace Journey, p. 149.
46 T&E was also used as a lever with the Bosnian government to terminate Iranian intelligence co­
operation and military involvement in the country.
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military position. In this context, another assumption underpinning T&E becomes 
crucial: that acquiring a defensive capability does not mean acquiring an offensive 
one as well.
This issue raises the question of the destabilising effect of T&E. The 
programme, by increasing the combat capabilities of the Federation, contributes to 
feeding mistrust on the part of the RS, which is asked to reduce its level of weaponry 
whilst at the same time the Federation is increasing not only its level of weaponry, 
but also the quality of it. In this context, it is unlikely that the RS will be favourable 
to increased co-operation with the Federation, but that instead its authorities will 
continue to seek further integration with the FRY.
3.2. T&E: Strengthening the Federation?
The second condition attached by the US to the launch of T&E was the 
adoption of the Federation Defence Law. This law, passed by the Federation 
legislature on 19 July 1996, creates a unified Croat-Bosniak ministry of defence and 
a joint command for both forces, providing for a unified Federation army above the 
corps level up to the joint command. It also calls for the integration of all Federation 
military forces within three years.47 Initially, integration was not to take place below 
the joint command level and Federation troops were to remain segregated. As most 
of T&E was to be completed within three years, the prospects of using the 
programme as an incentive to encourage the integration of forces were, for all intents 
and purposes, non-existent.48 The continuing separation of Croat (HVO) and
47 Le Monde, 24 July 1996.
48 The reintegration of troops is not a condition sine qua non for a functioning Federation army. For 
instance, most o f Belgium’s armed forces are divided between Flemish and French speaking units, 
with an integrated command structure. It does not prevent the Belgian military from operating as a
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Bosniak (ABiH) brigades nonetheless raises the issue of the distribution of 
weaponry delivered under T&E. As outlined in section two, the strengthening of the 
ABiH relative to the HVO could create security dilemma dynamics within the 
Federation, thereby undermining its integration.
Created in 1994, under strong American patronage, the Federation was the 
first step in trying to stitch BiH back together. More important, the Federation was to 
become the cornerstone of the military balance approach adopted by the US. A 
successful Federation is therefore crucial if the Bosnian Serbs are to be deterred 
from reigniting the war, according to the US. The reasons behind the creation of the 
Federation did not, however, bode well for its future. As explained in chapter three, 
Bosnian Croats only accepted to join the Federation because they were losing the 
Croat-Muslim war in Central Bosnia. Backed by Tudjman and his defence minister, 
Gojko Susak, a Herzegovinian, the Bosnian branch of the HDZ had and still have 
very little incentive to make the Federation succeed. However, should co-operation 
between Croats and Bosniaks be forthcoming in the future, the structure created 
through T&E (a military force with a single chain of command and a single defence 
minister) would then strengthen Federation institutions by enabling Federation 
troops to function as a unified military.
3.3. Conclusion
This section has argued that T&E has two objectives: to ensure the security 
of the Federation by deterring further Serb attacks and to strengthen the Federation 
by consolidating the wartime alliance between Croats and Bosniaks. However, this
single, national military force. However, it is clear within the Belgian military that the mission o f its 
forces is to defend the national territory, not parts o f it against another military force in the country.
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/section has also argued that T&E potentially undermines the rebuilding of a single 
political space by generating additional mistrust between the Federation and the RS, 
and thereby pushing the Serbs further towards Belgrade. The limited duration of the 
bulk of T&E (three years) also gives little incentive to the reluctant Croats to 
substantially integrate their forces with the Bosniak Armija, especially since the 
distribution of weapons between two largely independent forces is also likely to 
generate security dynamics between them. The final section of this examines how 
the GFA envisaged police reform in the GFA.
4. Annex 11: Three Police Forces. One Kind of (Democratic) 
Policing: Impact on Control over Territory, the Balance of Forces 
and the Security Dilemma
The negotiators at Dayton felt that the local police also had to be put under 
international supervision. This section shows that the mandate given to the UN-led 
police force accepts the division of police forces in three mono-ethnic forces, as 
institutionalised in annex 4, whilst providing for the monitoring and reform of these 
forces along democratic lines. However, with no enforcement powers, CIVPOL in 
BiH is dependent on other agencies for political or operational support, should the 
requested co-operation of the parties not be forthcoming.
The mandate to be given to the planned UN CIVPOL turned out to be a 
source of major disagreement between Europeans and Americans. The former were 
against the US proposal to create a robust, four or five thousand strong international 
police force. The Americans argued that policing could not be left ‘to the local 
police, who represented, in all three communities, the worst and most extreme
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elements’.49 The US team envisaged to grant CIVPOL extensive powers to 
‘intervene, make arrests, and generally enforce the law of the land.’50
The Europeans, and the British in particular, argued that taking over policing 
throughout the country would have put CIVPOL in the position of having to enforce 
local laws which it might not find acceptable. Likewise, people arrested by CIVPOL 
had to be turned over to local courts which could release them because they did not 
recognise the legitimacy of the arrests. Either the entire judicial system had to be put 
under international control, which no one was prepared to contemplate, or it had to 
be left alone altogether.51 The Europeans found an unusual ally in the Pentagon on 
this issue. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to support the idea of 
giving CIVPOL enforcement powers on the grounds that ‘if  they got in trouble the 
military would have to come to their aid.’52 Eventually, the Europeans and the 
Pentagon prevailed, and the mandate given to the CIVPOL mission in BiH does not 
constitute a significant departure from previous CIVPOL missions, even though the 
context of its implementation is different.
IPTF was given a mandate which includes monitoring, including inspecting 
and advising local police, and training functions. It locates these activities within a 
democratic framework by demanding that the parties provide a safe and secure 
environment for all persons by maintaining police forces who operate in accordance 
with internationally recognised standards of policing and respect internationally 
recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. This demand gives IPTF a
49 See Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 251.
50 See Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 132.
51 This paragraph is largely based on an interview by the author with Pauline Neville-Jones, British 
representative to the Contact Group at Dayton, London, December 2000.
52 See Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 251.
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standard by which to measure the activities of the local police and on which to base 
its activities.
In accordance with the decision made at Dayton, annex 11 did not grant 
enforcement powers, i.e. powers of arrest and detention, to the IPTF. In addtion, 
IPTF monitors are unarmed. In case of inappropriate behaviour on the part of the 
police or lack of co-operation with the IPTF, the force can only notify the HR and/or 
the IFOR commander of the parties’ failure to co-operate with the UN-led police. It 
can also request the HR to take action following IPTF’s complaints. These are 
restricted to discussing the issues with the parties or in the Joint Civilian 
Commission, and consulting with various international agencies. This means that 
IPTF will be dependent on the HR for political interventions on his behalf, and on 
IFOR/SFOR for operational support. This cumbersome procedure precludes swift 
interventions beyond monitoring to prevent human rights violations by the local 
police.
Annex 11 does not require the reintegration of police forces. Indeed, under 
the BiH and Federation constitutions, control over the police is granted to the 
ministry of internal affairs in the RS and to each canton's ministry of internal affairs 
in the Federation. This means that IPTF have to work with police forces that are 
overwhelmingly mono-ethnic and divided in three separate forces, extensively used 
to support the nationalist power structure and to maintain the division of BiH in 
three largely mono-ethnic statelets. It is this context which makes CIVPOL's 
mandate in BiH unique.
53 The Joint Civilian Commission is made up of the HR, the IFOR commander, senior representatives 
of the parties, and representatives o f various international agencies. Annex 10, article II, para. 2 and 
annex 11, article 2, para. V. IPTF was later given the authority to issue non-compliance reports against
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IPTF’s mandate nonetheless reduces the capacity of the parties to use police 
forces for tasks others than those relating to internal security. However, these forces 
continue to enter into the calculations of the parties regarding the balance of forces, 
even if strictly speaking they are not military forces under annex 1-B, because they 
continue to be used to pursue the objectives of the war, namely the creation of 
ethnically pure statelets. Finally, IPTF’s mandate is not likely to exacerbate the 
security dilemma experienced by the parties because of IFOR’s presence on the 
ground, which guarantees that the status quo will not be changed by force.
5. Conclusion: The Role of Third Parties in the GFA’s Hard Realist 
Strategy of Security Sector Reform
This chapter has focused on the annexes of the GFA that concern the security 
sector. It has shown how the GFA creates a state that has no army and no police 
force by assigning control over the security sector to the entities. The GFA seeks to 
create an institutionalised military balance between the entities' military forces, even 
authorising a military build-up in the Federation in order to achieve it. This new 
balance of forces was to be achieved under the programme 'Train & Equip', which 
sought to enhance the combat capabilities of the Federation army in order to enable 
it to deter further Serb attacks. As for the police, the GFA also legitimised the 
division of control over police forces between entities, and in the Federation, 
between cantons. Within this hard realist framework, the role of third parties in 
shaping the security sector, besides that of directly supporting democratisation, is 
central.
local police for refusal to comply with the provisions o f the GFA. The issuance o f such a report is 
supposed to lead to the dismissal o f the officer in question. See chapter seven.
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This chapter has argued that the mandate given to IFOR has two objectives: 
paving the way for an institutionalised military balance between the RS and the 
Federation, characterised as IFOR’s primary mandate; and assisting democratisation 
by supporting civilian implementation, protecting individual rights and enforcing the 
rule of law, or IFOR’s secondary mandate. By doing the former, IFOR 
institutionalised the division of BiH into two separate entities, did not challenge the 
division of the Federation between Croats and Bosniaks and consolidated the control 
exercised by the nationalists over the territory they occupied at the end of the war. 
By doing the latter, IFOR could directly promote democratisation, and especially the 
rebuilding of a single political space. Although IFOR's primary and secondary 
mandates are clearly spelled out in annex 1-A, this chapter has argued that at the 
time of Dayton there was only substantial political will to use IFOR's extensive 
enforcement powers to implement the force's primary mandate. However, should 
there be more political will to tackle IFOR's secondary mandate, these strong 
enforcement provisions give a lot of freedom to act to the NATO-led force.
This chapter has shown that annex 1-B contains the core of the hard realist 
approach to SSR in the GFA. Indeed, the annex provides for the institutionalisation 
of a military balance between the RS and the Federation, coupled with a CSBM 
package. This military balance was to be created with the assistance of the OSCE, 
who was given a central role in creating and maintaining both regimes. This military 
balance assumes that the precarious alliance between Croat and Bosniak forces can 
be transformed into a unified military force that will then be in a position to balance 
Serb military forces. However, the type of balance sought with the RS is not a 
military equilibrium. Because the negotiators at Dayton assumed that FRY would
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always support RS military operations, they gave Federation forces a substantial 
military advantage.
This approach, it has been argued here, undermines democratisation, and 
especially the rebuilding of a single political space, for two reasons. First, annex 1-B 
contributes to the consolidation of the nationalist power structure's military arm by 
treating them as legitimate parties to the arms control and CSBM regimes. It was 
argued in the introduction that this nationalist power structure opposes 
democratisation for ideological and strategic reasons by seeking, in the case of the 
HDZ and other Serb nationalist parties, to create ethnically pure statelets that could 
later be joined with Croatia and Serbia. All nationalist parties also seek to extend 
their control over political and economic resources within the territories they control, 
thereby again undermining democratisation. Second, security dynamics created by 
the annex between the RS and the Federation have further pulled the Serbs away 
from BiH; likewise, the same dynamics created within the Federation by T&E give 
further incentives to the Croats to seek integration with Croatia.
As far as T&E is concerned, which is to be implemented by a private 
company, this chapter argued that the programme has two objectives: to ensure the 
security of the Federation by deterring further Serb attacks and to strengthen the 
Federation by consolidating the wartime, precarious alliance between Croats and 
Bosniaks. However, this chapter has also argued that T&E potentially undermines 
the rebuilding of a single political space by generating additional mistrust between 
the Federation and the RS, and thereby pushing the Serbs further towards Belgrade. 
The limited duration of the bulk of T&E (three years) also gives little incentive to 
the reluctant Croats to substantially integrate their forces with the Bosniak Armija,
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especially since the distribution of weapons between two largely independent forces 
is also likely to generate security dynamics between them.
Finally, annex 11 was reviewed in this chapter. It was argued that the 
mandate given to IPTF does not differ from previous CIVPOL missions, in that the 
force was given monitoring and training tasks, and no enforcement powers. What is 
different about IPTF’s mandate is the context of its implementation. Indeed, it was 
shown that the constitutional order created by the GFA gives control over police 
forces to eleven ministries of internal affairs (one in the RS, and ten in the 
Federation). The fragmented structure of police forces serves the purpose of 
allowing the nationalist power structure to maintain three separate, mono-ethnic 
police forces. Their task, as during the war, remains the protection of their 
nationalist patrons as well as the continuation of the division of BiH’s territory into 
three largely mono-ethnic statelets.
As explained in the introduction, this thesis seeks to assess whether a hard 
realist strategy with regard to SSR in peacebuilding operations, by adressing the 
dynamics of the security transition, creates a breathing space that can be exploited to 
move forward with the political transition. Within this strategy, the role of third 
parties is essential. The next chapter begins this assessment by examining how 
IFOR/SFOR have implemented their mandate between 1995 and 2000.
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Part III
Chapter 5: the Role of IFOR/SFOR: Divide and Unite Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1995-2000
This chapter examines the role of the Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force 
(IFOR/SFOR) in implementing its mandate found in annex 1-A between December 
1995 and September 2000. IFOR/SFOR derive their mandate from annex 1-A of the 
Dayton agreement (see chapter four) and from subsequent political guidance 
received from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).
Two factors explain how IFOR/SFOR commanders have decided to interpret 
their mandate. The first is the overarching goal of ‘force protection’, meaning the 
avoidance of IFOR/SFOR casualties. An American mantra, ‘force protection’ has 
tainted all NATO-led operations in BiH, restricting their scope. The second 
determinant factor, following from the first, has been the reluctance of IFOR/SFOR 
to get involved in fulfilling its secondary mandate, as such an involvement could 
lead the force to be dangerously embroiled in local politics, whilst taking on more 
and more tasks and risking the lives of its troops.
IFOR/SFOR is the only international agency in BiH with the capacity to use 
force to enforce compliance with the provisions of the GFA, especially those 
concerning democratisation, but also to decisively undermine the security ‘arm’ of 
the nationalist power structure. The NATO-led force could have supported these 
processes in many ways, by arresting ICTY indictees, enforcing freedom of 
movement (FoM), protecting refugees and minorities, aggressively controlling and, 
if necessary, neutralising the parties’ security forces or even by maintaining law and 
order. IFOR/SFOR did not fulfil all of these tasks for the reasons explained above.
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The chapter asks how the NATO-led force’s implementation of its primary 
and secondary mandates affected the security sector as well as democratisation, 
including the rebuilding of a single political space.1 The hard realist strategy adopted 
in the Dayton agreement and continued under IFOR/SFOR was to leave the control 
over security forces in the hands of the parties, and by doing so did not challenge 
enough the power structure that, it is argued in this thesis, is a major obstacle 
preventing democratisation.
As the parties have continued to use security forces to pursue policies of 
ethnic separation and to resist democratisation, it is argued here that IFOR/SFOR’s 
activities with regard to its primary mandate have not challenged these policies, 
whilst the force’s work falling within its secondary mandate has, by for instance, 
enforcing FoM or by arresting persons indicted by the ICTY.
In addition, the role of IFOR/SFOR in implementing their primary mandate 
paved the way for the institutionalisation of a military balance between the Entities 
armed forces (EAF). However, this chapter shows that there has been limited 
political will to implement the force’s secondary mandate, leading to a situation 
where the security arm of the nationalist power structure has remained largely 
untouched, although constrained, by IFOR/SFOR presence.
The first section consists of an assessment of IFOR’s role in the 
implementation of its primary mandate, based on annex 1-A’s recognition of the 
results of ethnic cleansing and the division of the Bosnian territory on the basis of 
military conquest. The section argues that IFOR, under American pressure, 
interpreted its mandate in minimalist terms and focused most of its activities on 
force protection, the separation of the parties and the maintenance of the military
1 As argued in chapter two, security sector reform has a profound impact on the security transition,
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cease-fire. The case of the transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs from the RS to the 
Federation will be presented here to illustrate the consequences of not challenging 
the nationalist power structure. The rest of the section then shows how, in spite of a 
relatively successful implementation of EFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate (leaving the 
transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs aside), democratisation has made little headway in 
BiH under IFOR.
The second section focuses on IFOR/SFOR’s secondary mandate. With the 
change in the overall strategy of the international community in the first half of 1997 
following a poor record in implementation, SFOR began to become more active in 
assisting civilian implementation. The force made its first arrests in July 1997, 
enforced FoM more thoroughly, brought under its control paramilitary police units 
and supported Biljana Plavsic against the Pale Serbs. SFOR’s actions, such as the 
creation of the Office of the Inspector General, contributed to the weakening of the 
nationalist power structure, although not decisively. The first section discusses 
DFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate.
1. IFOR/SFOR’s Primary Mandate: Policing the Separation of 
Forces
The mandate that IFOR got from the negotiators at Dayton was potentially 
far-reaching. Beyond the enforcement of the cease-fire and the separation of forces, 
IFOR had the authority to get involved in multiple tasks ranging from civilian law 
enforcement to support for elections (see chapter four). Although annex 1-A
which in turn deeply affects democratisation, including the rebuilding o f a single political space.
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commits the parties to fulfil these obligations, IFOR had the authority to enforce 
compliance with any aspect of the annex.
From the start of IFOR’s mission, the Pentagon refused to interpret IFOR’s 
mandate in those terms. Paramount to the Pentagon, to the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), as well as to the IFOR commander, who were all 
Americans, was the protection of forces, especially American forces, the 
enforcement of the cease-fire and the separation of the parties’ forces. It is in this 
light that IFOR’s operations must be understood.
Several NATO reports state that IFOR would contribute to the creation of ‘a 
secure and stable environment’ in BiH in order to facilitate the implementation of 
the civilian aspects of the agreement. A secure and stable environment was 
interpreted by IFOR commanders as the maintenance of the cease-fire, the creation 
and patrolling of the Zone of Separation (ZoS) and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line 
(IEBL) between the entities, the cantonment of troops and heavy weapons as well as 
the demobilisation of troops that could not be accommodated and, finally, the 
provision of freedom of movement to civilians, civilian agencies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGO’s) and IFOR personnel.3
IFOR’s primary mandate constituted the core of this set of activities. Besides 
enforcing freedom of movement, all the other activities taken on by IFOR related to 
its primary mandate. This mandate envisaged the separation of the parties’ forces 
according to a detailed, step-by-step plan, the supervision of their cantonment and 
the patrolling of the IEBL in order to prevent a return to hostilities. IFOR
2 This is not to say that the British and the French did not also have qualms about the safety of their 
troops because of the impact incidents could have on public opinion. But considering the central role 
played by the US in IFOR, both politically and with regard to its share of the troops, American 
considerations became the determining factor in deciding on IFOR operations.
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successfully fulfilled these responsibilities. This section will show that fulfilling 
IFOR’s primary mandate contributed to the solidification of BiH’s division into two 
separate entities. Indeed, the lack of vigorous action by IFOR, and its lack of support 
for the various initiatives taken by the OHR during the transfer of the Sarajevo 
suburbs played into the hands of the parties, who were continuing to pursue policies 
of ethnic separation. Moreover, it is argued that IFOR’s role in relation to its primary 
mandate has been to ratify the situation on the ground, thereby paving the way for an 
institutionalised military balance. The next sub-sections focus on IFOR’s primary 
mandate.
1.1. Phase I: Creation of a Zone of Separation (ZoS) between the Entities
The creation of the ZoS in BiH, provided for by the Dayton agreement, was 
greatly facilitated by IFOR’s presence and military might. The ZoS followed the 
cease-fire line and extended for 2 kilometres on either side of it.4 It had to be 
demilitarised 30 days after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR.5 
After 30 days, on 20 January 1996, IFOR observers identified 35 pieces of heavy 
equipment still present in the ZoS. The parties could not remove most of these 
weapons because they were non-operative. Under IFOR’s strict control, the 
complete demilitarisation of the ZoS was achieved on 29 January 1996, by the 
destruction of these weapons, with no resistance from the parties.6 In addition, the
3 Conclusions o f the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC), London, 8-9 December 1995, para. 7-9.
4 Except in Sarajevo and Gorazde, where exceptions applied.
5 ‘No weapons other than those o f the IFOR are permitted in this Agreed Cease-fire Zone of  
Separation...’ Annex 1-A, art. IV, para. 2b.
6 IFOR Press Conference, 20 January 1996 (accessed 3 March 2001) [text on-line]; available from 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960120a.htm; internet and IFOR Press Conference, 29 January 1996 
(accessed 3 March 2001) [text on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960129a.htm:
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parties had to withdraw from some areas in Sarajevo along the cease-fire line seven 
days after the transfer of authority. There were no problems of compliance reported 
by IFOR troops, who took over the areas on 28 December 1995.7
This aspect of the agreement is a major success for the NATO-led force. 
IFOR facilitated respect for the ZoS from all parties, although by doing so it has 
consolidated the division of BiH in two entities. Especially on the part of the RS, the 
ZoS and the IEBL were seen as a border, to be defended from non-Serb incursions. 
Most restrictions to freedom of movement occurred near the IEBL, exactly because 
it was conceived as a border, not an internal administrative boundary. The generally 
good compliance of the parties with this provision of annex 1-A also reflects the 
military balance reached on the ground at the end of the conflict. As explained in 
chapter three, the military situation on the ground paved the way for the Dayton 
agreement. Indeed, the Serbs, weakened militarily, were satisfied with the 49% of 
the Bosnian territory offered to them by the negotiators. The Bosniaks, in turn, 
lacked the military capability to conduct successful offensives without Croat 
support, which was not likely to be forthcoming as the Croatian government was 
content to keep Sarajevo in a relatively weak position. The creation of the ZoS and 
of the EEBL ratified on the ground this state of affairs: 49% of the Bosnian territory 
to the RS and a Federation, although comprising 51% of the territory of BiH, divided 
in largely ethnically pure cantons.
Internet. Violations have been rare because of IFOR strict patrolling and enforcement of the ZOS. 
IFOR intercepted troops from all sides trying to re-enter the ZOS following its demilitarisation, but no 
clashes occurred. Most o f the violations were committed by small groups of soldiers. See IFOR Press 
Conference, 27 January 1996 (accessed 3 March 2001) [text on-line]; available from 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960127a.htm; Internet.
7 IFOR Press Conference, 04 January 1996 (accessed 4 March 2001) [text on-line]; available from 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960104a.htm; Internet.
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1.2. Phase II: Transfer of Territories from One Entity to the Other
The transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs offered an opportunity to the parties and 
the international actors to show their commitment to a multi-ethnic BiH. Indeed, had 
the transfer been successful in keeping Serbs in Sarajevo, it would have put a 
substantial number of Serbs under Federation authority. It would not be realistic to 
argue that all Serbs would have stayed in Serb Sarajevo had the transition process 
been handled differently. Mistrust is high in the immediate aftermath of a conflict 
and security fears would have certainly driven a lot of people away. However, as this 
sub-section will show, the parties did little to build up the trust necessary for a 
peaceful transition. In fact, their willingness to implement this aspect of the 
agreement in good faith is questionable. In this context, the role of IFOR, IPTF and 
the OHR became decisive. They had resources, political and military, to create a 
more secure environment for the Sarajevo Serbs. It is argued here that the failure of 
the international agencies to agree on a common strategy from the outset, especially 
with regard to the local police, IPTF’s lack of personnel and teeth, as well as IFOR’s 
unwillingness to address the issue of law and order led to further ethnic division on 
the ground.
In territories to be transferred from one entity to the other, the parties had 45 
days after the take-over by IFOR to remove their forces, mines and weapons from
o
the area. The Federation, to which the territories were to be transferred, was not
8 This provision applied to the Sarajevo municipalities of Vogosca, Ilijas, Hadzici, Ilidza and Grbavica 
controlled by the Serbs. These municipalities were multi-ethnic before the war, but had been 
‘cleansed’ of their non-Serb inhabitants during the hostilities. By the end o f 1995, they had been 
repopulated by Serb refugees from other parts o f BiH (around 100,000 Serbs lived in Serb Sarajevo). 
For example, Ilijas’ pre-war population was 45% Muslims, 45% Serbs, 10% Croats, Albanians and 
other minorities. The pre-war ethnic composition o f these municipalities is an important point as it
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authorised to put forces in the area for another 45 days (until 19 March 1996), while 
IFOR was to occupy the area in the meantime.9 From the outset, the Bosnian Serbs 
tried to delay the transfer.10 The initial meeting between the HR, Carl Bildt, and the 
Serb representative Momcilo Krajisnik, did not bode well for the future. Krajisnik 
asked for the transfer to be delayed for a year or, if  that was not possible, for 
financial aid to build a new Serb Sarajevo across the IEBL. As early as November, 
Radovan Karadzic gave an interview to the BBC in which he described the 
provisions of the agreement regarding Sarajevo as creating ‘a new Beirut in Europe. 
It is going to bleed for decades.’ He argued that Sarajevo Serbs ‘would never accept 
any Muslim policeman or Muslim soldier to enter the Serbian part of the city for at 
least five years.’11 The Pale Serbs were adamantly opposed to the transfer of Serb 
Sarajevo to the Federation and used the issue to break out of the isolation to which 
Milosevic had confined them.12
After several meetings with local politicians and inhabitants, the OHR 
established that perhaps as many as 50% of Sarajevo Serbs could be convinced to 
stay. Security ranked first on their list of concerns. Their local leaders demanded that 
Serb police officers be allowed to join the new police force and that IFOR and IPTF
determined the composition o f the police force that was supposed to take over from the Serbs (see 
below). See Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals o f  Partition (London: Verso, 1997) 
p. 106 and LeSoir, 29 June 1996.
9 French troops had been stationed in these areas under UNPROFOR. Upon signature of the 
agreement, their commanders almost immediately voiced their disquiet at having to patrol these areas, 
as they feared finding themselves in the middle of riots. See Kumar, Divide and Fall?, p. 107.
10 The Bosnian Serbs were only told about the deal on Sarajevo minutes before the signing of the 
accords and were infuriated that Milosevic had given in. Milosevic gave Sarajevo to the Bosniaks in 
order to get an agreement, which he regarded as essential to get the sanctions against the FRY lifted.
11 Cited in The Times, 27 November 1996.
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monitor closely the Federation police during the transfer. However, when the Pale 
leadership realised that transfer would not be delayed, and that the Serb 
municipalities would not have complete local autonomy, they ordered their 
representatives in the OHR-led negotiations to withdraw.
The Bosniak leadership, in turn, and especially Alija Izetbegovic, had been 
sending mixed signals to the Serbs. He initially invited the Serbs living in Sarajevo 
to stay. After having signed the Dayton agreement, and faced with sharp criticism 
from his own ranks for doing so, he became more cautious. In an open letter to 
President Chirac, he wrote that the people of Sarajevo ‘finally deserved to be freed 
of their murderers’.13 Later, Izetbegovic called on all the Serbs to stay with the 
exception of those who had fought against his government or committed war crimes. 
Since most, if  not all, Serb males had served in the Bosnian Serb army at some 
point, his remarks discouraged many from staying in Serb Sarajevo. In a meeting 
with Bildt in January, Izetbegovic reiterated his position that civilians would not be 
touched whilst those responsible for the shelling of Sarajevo for 43 months would be 
another matter.14
Meanwhile, security issues were coming to the fore in the negotiations 
between the OHR and the parties. Policing in Serb Sarajevo was a sore point, as it 
was unclear when Federation police forces could take over from their Serb 
counterparts.15 Carl Bildt argued that police forces ‘constituted a uniformed and
12 Interview by the author with Pauline Neville-Jones, London, 5 December 2000. Neville-Jones was 
the British Representative at the Contact Group from 1993 to December 1995 and the Senior Head of 
the OHR Brussels Office from January to June 1996.
13 Cited in Louis Sell, “The Serb Flight from Sarajevo: Dayton’s First Failure”, East European 
Politics and Societies 14, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 183. Louis Sell was Carl Bildt’s political advisor from 
May 1995 until June 1996.
14 Ibid., pp. 183 and 186.
15 Annex 1-A speaks o f ‘the removal of all Forces’. See annex 1-A, art. IV, para. 3a.
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armed force’, and therefore came under the responsibility of the IFOR commander.16 
He expected Admiral Smith to lay down the rules regarding the police. Bildt 
however held the view that the exchange of civilian authority, which was not due 
until 90 days after the transfer of authority, applied to the police as well.17
The OHR eventually struck an agreement with the parties. In security terms 
it provided for the following: Serb authorities, including the police, would be 
allowed to stay in Serb Sarajevo until the end of the transition period (90 days after 
the transfer of authority to IFOR) and in addition, Serb police officers would be 
offered an opportunity to join the new police force.
When the deadline for the withdrawal of Serb forces from Serb Sarajevo 
came, 45 days after the transfer of authority, some confusion emerged between the 
OHR and IFOR regarding what types of forces were still authorised in these areas. 
Admiral Smith had still not decided on the issue, although the OHR plan provided 
for the police to remain.18 IFOR lawyers argued that allowing the Serb police to stay 
beyond 45 days after the hand over to IFOR was a violation of the Dayton 
agreement. In addition, hardliners within the Bosniak leadership, interpreting article 
IV literally, demanded that all Serb forces, including the police, be ordered to 
withdraw by IFOR even though these same leaders had initially agreed to the OHR 
plan.
16 See Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: the Struggle fo r Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1998) p. 180.
17 Thereby contradicting his own interpretation o f article IV, which states that all forces are to be 
withdrawn from the area after 45 days.
18 Bildt puts down this hesitation to ‘General Joulwan, NATO Commander for Europe in Mons’ who 
wanted to ‘ensure that he [Admiral Smith] did not suffer the effects of mission creep -  that is to say 
getting involved in situations that he was not really capable o f handling. But since the principles that 
actually applied in this crucial issue were so unclear, matters were just left hanging in the air.’ Bildt, 
Peace Journey, p. 180.
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Eventually, on the day of the transfer of authority from the RS to IFOR (4 
February 1996), a decision regarding policing was made between Bildt, Admiral 
Smith and his deputy General Walker. Bildt writes that the plan entailed that the 
Federation police would only take over the Serb areas in Sarajevo at the end of the 
transition period (19 March), and that the local (Serb) police would be authorised to 
remain as long as Serb police officers were willing to abide by the constitution of 
BiH and of the Federation.19 Finally, they wanted to use the interim period to build 
an integrated and representative Federation police force for these municipalities.20
In fact what was agreed upon was a phased transfer of authority and policing 
to the Federation, starting with Vogosca on 23 February and ending with Grbavica 
on 19 March, and included a gradual introduction of Federation police. Sell writes 
that ‘[cjharging that the new dates for the entry of Bosnian police proved that the 
international community had all along intended to deceive the Serbs, Pale now 
began to openly sabotage prospects for orderly transition.’21 The Pale authorities 
organised an emergency committee for the evacuation of Sarajevo and its head, 
Goran Klickovic, called for the Serbs to leave within 48 hours. Panic seized the 
Serb-controlled parts of Sarajevo, and many hastily set off for Pale with what they 
could carry with them, including over the next few weeks, industrial equipment.
19 Ibid., p. 192.
20 Although before things came to a head Bildt wrote that ‘the question was whether -in  the terribly 
short time available- it was possible to integrate Muslims, Croats and Serbs into any kind o f unified 
policing organization.’ Ibid., p. 180. The composition o f this police force was to reflect the ethnic 
composition of these areas in 1991 census. See OHR, Report o f  the High Representative fo r  
Implementation o f  the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General o f  the United Nations, 
dated 14 March 1996 [report on-line] (accessed 4 April 2001); available from 
http://www.ohr.int/reports/r960314a.htm; Internet.
21 See Sell, The Serb Flight from Sarajevo, p. 192.
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The issue of the introduction of Federation police in Serb Sarajevo is 
delicate. Bildt argued that his and Smith’s aim was to build an integrated and 
representative Federation police force, whereas the Pale authorities claimed that 
Bildt had gone back on his word by allowing Federation police to enter the 
municipalities before the end of the transition period. The refusal of IFOR to get 
involved in the maintenance of law and order played into the hands of the parties. 
The Pale Serbs could claim that international agencies were biased against them, and 
the Bosniaks used IFOR’s passivity to take over the suburbs in an aggressive 
manner, with no real consideration for the security fears of their inhabitants.
Moreover, the following comparison between the planned composition of the 
police and the 1991 ethnic composition of the municipalities casts doubt on the 
whole concept of an integrated and representative police force as defended by Bildt. 
The following table represents the planned composition of the integrated police 
force, under the plan put forward by the international agencies:
Table I : Planned Composition for the Police in the Sarajevo Suburbs during 
their Transfer, 1996
Municipality Serb 
(Opstina)
Croat Bosniak
to* .
Vogosca 30 (34%) 8(11%) 47 (55%) 86
Ilijas 33 (36%) 7 (8%) 50 (56%) 90
Hadzici 15(22%) 5(7%) 50(71%) 70
llidza 28 (24%) 18(15%) 72 (61%) 118
Grbavica (Novo 9(10%) 13(14%) 68 (58%) 90
Sources: Kevin F. McCarroll and Donald R. Zoufal, Transition in the Sarajevo Suburbs, in Joint 
Forces Quarterly, 16 (summer 1997) [article on-line] (summer 1997, accessed 5 June 1999); 
available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/ifq pubs/balkan3.pdf; Internet; Kumar, Divide and 
Fall?, p .l 13; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Bosnia-Hercegovina: Update- Non-Compliance with the 
Dayton Accords, vol. 8, no. 2 (London: Human Rights Watch, 1996) p. 13; The New York Times, 7 
March 1996.
197
The ethnic composition of the municipalities in the 1991 census was the 
following:
Table I I : Ethnic Composition of the Sarajevo Suburbs, 1991
“ I T 0
Serb Croat Muslim Others
(including
Yugoslavs)
Vogosea 35.79% 4.35% 50.79% 9.07%
Ilijas 45.08% 6.81% 42.22% 5.79%
TT J  ♦ *Hadzici 26.41% 3.07% 63.65% 6.86%
Ilidza 37.16% 10.25% 42.96% 9.62%
Grbavica (Novo 34.66% 9.22% 35.67% 20.45%
Source: Bosnian Congress USA, ed., Demografska Struktura Republike Bosne i Hercegovine- 
Nacionalna struktura prema popisu iz 1991 [data on-line] (accessed 6 March 1999); available from 
http://hdmagazine.com/bosnia/census.html; Internet.
A quick comparison between the two tables shows that, in spite of what Bildt 
wrote, the ethnic composition of the projected integrated police forces did not reflect 
the 1991 ethnic distribution in the municipalities. In fact, Bosniak police officers had 
both a relative and absolute majority in each opstina. Also, Serb police were not 
intended to represent more than a third of the new police force, except in one 
municipality.22 Croats, the other party in the Federation, also saw their share of 
police positions disproportionally increased. Considering the fact that the population 
of the municipalities was overwhelmingly Serb, the planned composition of police 
forces could not be perceived as a confidence-building measure.
The international plan for the transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs also provided 
for Federation police to enter the Serb municipalities under close IPTF monitoring.23
22 Except in Vogosca, the municipality with the highest proportion o f  Serb police, which allocated 
34% o f its posts to Serbs.
23 Around 300 UN monitors were assigned to oversee the transition. See Kumar, Divide and Fall?, p. 
112. Before and during the transition period, IPTF increased its presence in Serb Sarajevo, conducting
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The transfer would still be phased, starting on 23 February with Vogosea and ending 
in Grbavica on 19 March, and EPTF monitors would operate in these areas before 
and after the transfer of authority to the Federation, supported by an increased IFOR 
presence. Moreover, only a limited number of Federation police would be authorised 
(545) for all the municipalities and each opstina was allocated a maximum number 
of Federation officers. Police tactics were also regulated by the IPTF commissioner: 
guidelines were prepared limiting the type of arms, searches, checkpoints and 
requiring prompt reports on arrest and detention. IPTF interviewed, registered and 
issued identity cards to the Federation officers assigned to Serb Sarajevo. Although 
Bildt’s plan constituted a step forward in reassuring the Sarajevo Serbs, the 
weakness of IPTF at that stage did not bode well for its success. In February, only 
400 UN monitors had been deployed throughout BiH, two thirds of them being 
assigned to Sarajevo. Clearly, IPTF monitors, unarmed and short in numbers, were 
in no position to effectively monitor, let alone control, events on the ground.
There are different interpretations of the events that surrounded the transfer 
of Serb Sarajevo to the Federation and eventually led to the departure of most Serbs 
living there. The Pale Serbs exploited the situation by manipulating and playing up 
the fears of the Sarajevo Serbs to strengthen their position on the Bosnian Serb 
political scene. Moreover, their actions illustrate an ongoing support for a policy of 
ethnic cleansing pursued throughout the war.24 They organised the systematic 
transfer of the Sarajevo Serbs to RS territory, using intimidation, and pursued a
patrols both with the Serb police and IFOR. See IFOR Press Briefing, 15 January 1996 (accessed 5 
April 2001) [text on-line]; available from http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960115a.htm: Internet and 
IFOR Press Briefing, 29 January 1996 [text on-line] (accessed 5 April 2001); available from 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960129a.htm; Internet.
24 The policy they pursued in the Sarajevo is ironically one o f auto-ethnic cleansing.
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systematic policy of scorched earth in the suburbs.25 The Serb police, under the 
control of Karadzic loyalists, refused to join the new police force.26 Factories, 
offices and housing were systematically looted and destroyed before the arrival of 
the Federation police.
The Bosniaks, in turn, never gave the Serbs the assurances they needed to 
stay in Sarajevo. Their leadership took a hard stance over the issue and constantly 
tried to undermine the OHR’s initiatives. There was little support among Bosniak 
leaders to try and keep Serbs in Sarajevo and Izetbegovic, under pressure for having 
signed an agreement regarded by many as unfair, was keen to be seen as not giving 
in to the Serbs.27
IPTF, understaffed, with no power of arrest, ironically became the ‘lead 
agency’ since IFOR was not willing to get involved in maintaining law and order. 
The constraints put on IFOR by the NATO chain of command gave very little 
leeway to the force to intervene. It took pressures from Bildt, the Bosniak leadership, 
and eventually the American Administration, for a belated intervention to take place. 
NATO commanders eventually ordered their troops to take more vigorous action to 
curb the violence. This mostly took the form of arresting individuals committing 
violence and turning them over to the local (Serb) police. This happened in Grbavica 
on 19 March, where Italian troops arrested one gang suspected of arson attacks and
9  Qtook them to the local police station. In Ilidza, on 12 March, French troops locked
25 Human Rights Watch reported the arrival o f special Serb police in the suburbs ten days before the 
transition. See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Bosnia-Hercegovina: a Failure in the Making -  Human 
Rights and the Dayton Agreement (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch) p. 18.
26 Kumar, Divide and Fall?, p. 112.
27 The Black Swans, a Bosniak elite unit, were sighted in Ilidza after the transfer. Their presence 
could not have been less reassuring for Serbs. See Human Rights Watch, A Failure in the Making, p. 
18.
28 The suspects were almost immediately released by the Serb police.
200
the mayor out of his office and probably prevented him from setting it alight before 
leaving. Enraged by the deterioration of the situation, and the ongoing looting of 
industrial equipment, Bosniak authorities became even less inclined to encourage 
Serbs to stay.
The transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs graphically illustrates the consequences 
of leaving control over security forces to former enemies. If they decide to pursue 
policies that undermine the processes of democratisation, by using these forces to 
violate civil and political rights and preserve separate political spaces, the 
intervening forces have no choice but to act if  their intent is to assist 
democratisation. Indeed, the consequence of IFOR’s lack of action was to further 
contribute to the separation of BiH into ethnically homogeneous territories. By not 
intervening, IFOR also signified to the parties that it was more concerned with 
‘mission creep’ than with preventing further ethnic division in BiH.
Several factors undermined the actions of the international community in 
guaranteeing the security of the Sarajevo Serbs: the first was the lack of political 
support for the OHR plan, mainly from the US. However, at no time did the main 
guarantors of the Dayton agreement, including the US, show active support for the 
plan.
Second, IFOR’s reluctance to interpret its mandate other than in strictly 
military terms also compounded the situation. American pressure springs to mind as 
an explanation for IFOR’s timidity, but French reticence to keep the peace in the 
suburbs shows that many were wary of the potentially explosive nature of the 
security situation. Indeed, an escalation of violence could have undermined political 
support for the operation almost from the outset.
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In effect, what Serb Sarajevo needed was a strong neutral police force that 
could have maintained law and order. The Dayton agreement, with its strong 
emphasis on military tasks, did not provide for that kind of force. Instead, it created 
IPTF, a toothless police force, which was much needed in the long-term for the 
restructuring of the police, but was impotent in the face of the kind of violence that 
erupted in Serb Sarajevo.
This major flaw in the Dayton agreement, nicknamed the public security gap, 
was soon identified. IPTF, with limited powers, was not (and still is not) in a 
position to maintain law and order whilst IFOR has been more often than not 
unwilling to get involved in its maintenance. The consequences in terms of further 
division of BiH into ethnoterritories are dire.
1.3. Phase HI: Demobilisation and Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons
IFOR helped further reduce tension between the parties by enforcing the next 
phase of the redeployment plan. It also curtailed their freedom of manoeuvre to use 
military force. By 19 April 1996, the parties had to withdraw their heavy weapons to 
barracks and demobilise all troops that could not be accommodated in cantonment 
areas. The parties were also to give IFOR all the information it required regarding 
the types of weapons, the quantities and their location. Under IFOR’s control, and 
with considerable delays, heavy weapons and troops were returned to barracks by 
mid-September 1996. The parties often delayed the withdrawal of heavy weapons 
for tactical reasons, and in many places tried to conceal weapons and ammunition
29 ‘Heavy weapons’ refers to all tanks and armoured vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all 
mortars 81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above. See Annex 1-A, art. IV 
para. 5a.
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from IFOR. Demobilisation also proceeded very slowly, because of mistrust and 
scarcity of civilian work opportunities throughout the country.
This development may seem to bear no relation to the processes of 
democratisation. But IFOR and subsequently SFOR’s strict monitoring of military 
activities in BiH has reduced the ability of the parties to use military forces both for 
military and political purposes. This issue was of concern, because military forces 
were often responsible for violence against civilians during the conflict, or could be 
used in power struggles between different factions within an ethnic community. As 
Jadranko Prlic, the former Bosnian foreign minister put it: ‘These days, no jeep 
leaves a military base without NATO’s permission’.31 However, Prlic was probably 
too optimistic in his assessment and even under IFOR, acts of violence against 
civilians or their property were committed by soldiers. For example, in Drvar during 
1996, HVO soldiers of the 1st brigade and the local war veterans* organisation were 
involved in several arson incidents against Serb houses.32 IFOR did not take any 
measures to punish the Croat forces, even though its mandate extends over military 
forces.
IFOR nonetheless conducted several operations to ensure that troops and 
weapons were stored in agreed cantonments and that IFOR had full access to these 
for inspection. In August 1996, IFOR was refused access to a Bosnian Serb army 
(VRS) facility in Han Pijesak. NATO-led troops made publicly known that they 
were preparing an operation to take control of the facility, and after political pressure
30 Many demobilised soldiers joined the police.
31 Interview by the author with Jadranko Prlic, Foreign Minister for Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996 to 
2001, Sarajevo, September 2000.
32 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Hollow Promise? Return o f  Bosnian Serb Displaced Persons 
to Drvar, Bosanko Grahovo and Glamoc [report on-line] (Sarajevo: ICG, December 1997, accessed 
10 May 2001); available from http://www.crisisweb.org; Internet.
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was put on RS authorities, IFOR was eventually granted access to it, even if the 
argument can be made that any compromising piece of equipment or intelligence 
had been removed in the meantime.33 The same month, IFOR discovered 250 tons of 
ammunition in a Serb unauthorised site near Pale. These were confiscated and 
destroyed. Subsequently, the VRS reported another 16 undeclared ammunition sites, 
the contents of which were moved to authorised locations under IFOR control.34 
During an inspection in the Doboj area in July 1996, IFOR discovered that heavy 
weapons had been covertly moved from one site to another, whilst 600 soldiers were 
being mobilised without authorisation, fuelling an already tense situation in the 
area.35 Subsequently, IFOR patrols and helicopter surveillance were stepped up and 
the situation regularised.
IFOR’s control of the parties’ military helped restrict their freedom to use 
force for military purposes, and indirectly for political purposes, such as in 
operations against civilians. However, when these forces were directly used against 
civilians, IFOR did not intervene, as the case of Drvar shows. Once again, IFOR 
stuck to a restrictive interpretation of its mandate in merely limiting the risk of 
military confrontation between the parties, with some potential positive spin off 
effects for democratisation because the movement and use of these forces has been 
restricted. Finally, this last phase of IFOR’s primary mandate also has important 
implications for the implementation of annex 1-B. Indeed, by obliging the parties to 
re-locate their weapons to specific areas, IFOR facilitated the work of the OSCE, 
which was to assist the verification of weapons holdings in the context of annex 1-B.
33 United Nations, Ninth Report to the UN Security Council on IFOR Operations, S/1996/696, 23 
August 1996, p. 4
34 United Nations, Tenth Report to the UN Security Council on IFOR Operations, S/1996/783, 23 
September 1996, p. 4
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It also limited the ability of the parties to cheat by moving weapons around or by 
concealing them.
1.4. SFOR and IFOR* s Primary Mandate: Plus ca change, plus c’ est la 
meme chose?
SFOR, as the follow-on mission to IFOR, carried over the main priorities 
established under IFOR. The force, like IFOR, focuses mainly on its primary 
mandate, such as the maintenance of the military truce, and has tried to avoid 
supporting civilian tasks. However, the major actors (US, UK, Russia, France, 
Germany, the NATO chain of command and the HR) involved in BiH recognised at 
the end of 1996 that a change of strategy was necessary, given the meagre results 
yielded by the first year of implementation. As this lack of progress meant that the 
troops would not be able to withdraw, SFOR has had to become involved in tasks 
that the force carefully avoided under IFOR, such as the arrest of war crimes 
suspects. In addition, SFOR has tightened its grip on the EAF and their activities and 
has thereby contributed to restricting the margin of manoeuvre of the nationalists.
At the end of 1996, a consensus emerged among PIC members and 
international agencies in BiH that the security situation did not warrant IFOR’s 
withdrawal. The truce, although still holding, was deemed too fragile and the lack of 
success of the civilian implementation agencies justified the continued presence of 
troops in BiH.36 The new force, named the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), was
35 See HRW, The Continuing Influence o f Bosnia's Warlords (New York, NY: HRW, 1996) p. 42.
36 A two-year consolidation plan was subsequently developed by the HR, and a role for NATO in 
maintaining stability was envisaged. See Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board and of the 
Presidency o f Bosnia-Herzegovina, Conclusions: Guiding Principles o f  the Civilian Consolidation 
Plan, 14 November 1996 (accessed 2 May 2001), para. 7 [text on-line]; available from 
http://www.ohr.int/docu/d961114b.htm; Internet. In Bergen, in September, NATO defence ministers
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authorised by the UN Security Council on 12 December 1996.37 The force was 
granted the same powers as IFOR (enforcement powers under chapter VII of the 
Charter) and was given the same rules of engagement. The NATO chain of 
command defined its mandate as comprising three elements: the maintenance of the 
truce, the promotion of a climate in which civilian implementation could proceed 
smoothly, and selective support to civilian implementation. Although these 
objectives were still interpreted quite narrowly, especially when it came to 
supporting civilian implementation, SFOR has been more engaged in civilian 
implementation.
SFOR continued to fulfil its primary mission, the maintenance of the truce in 
BiH by patrolling the LEBL and inspecting the armed forces of the parties. Under 
SFOR, reported military incursions in the ZoS have been rare. SFOR conducts 
regular inspections of military bases, ammunition depots and factories and monitors
oo
training and troop movements in order to prevent any surprise attack by the EAF. 
Here also, NATO sources identify few discrepancies between weapons and 
ammunition reported and the actual holdings of the parties in the different facilities 
inspected. Troops movements and exercises are also regularly reported to SFOR.
discussed the issue further and the final decision to create a follow-on force for 18 months was 
officialised at the Ministerial Meeting o f the NAC on 10 December 1996. See Ministerial Meeting of  
the NAC, Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 December 1996 (accessed 2 May 2001) [text on­
line]; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/m961210/nac.htm; Internet.
37 Resolution 1088, S/RES/1088, 12 December 1996.
38 In a typical month, SFOR inspects 300-400 weapon storage sites and monitors up to 900 training 
and movement activities by the EAF. See Greg Schulte, ‘SFOR Continued’, NATO Review 46, no. 2 
(Summer 1998): 32.
39 See for instance, Captain Halvor Molland, ‘Weapon Site Inspections’, SFOR Informer 28 (28 
January 1998). Whether or not these statements are accurate is not as important as it may seem. 
Indeed, the combat-readiness o f the EAF is questionable, according to Brigadier U lf Henricsson, 
because they either cannot maintain their equipment or do not have the expertise to operate some of
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Again, SFOR’s activities also reduce the capacity of the parties to use their armed 
forces to prevent democratisation.
The emphasis laid by IFOR and SFOR commanders on maintaining the 
military truce had prevented SFOR from decisively undermining the nationalist 
power structure and promoting democratisation until the July 1997 NATO summit in 
Madrid, where members agreed that ‘[wjorking with NATO's partners in SFOR, we 
intend to see that its mandate is carried out to its fullest.’40 This sentence essentially 
gave a green light to the governments with troops on the ground willing to fulfil its 
secondary mandate more forcefully.
1.5. IFOR/SFOR’ s Primary Mandate: Implications for the Balance of 
Forces, Control over Territory, the Security Dilemma and Democratisation
The implementation of IFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate did not affect 
positively democratisation. IFOR did preside over the separation of forces, the 
creation of the ZoS and the IEBL, and the cantonment of weapons and troops. These 
measures considerably reduced the risk of a resumption of hostilities, and thereby 
brought some stability to the country. SFOR has carried on with these tasks, 
focusing mainly on controlling the movement of weapons and troops. IFOR/SFOR
their weapon systems (this applies more particularly to Federation forces and the weapons received 
under ‘Train and Equip’). James Lyon told the author that he often observes Bosnian Serb military 
vehicles with no windshield, to him a sign of the bad condition in which the EAF are. These analyses 
point to the doubtfulness of a large-scale war, but do not exclude the possibility o f localised clashes. 
Interviews by the author with Brigadier U lf Henricsson, Director o f the Department of Regional 
Stabilisation, OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, September 2000 and James Lyon, 
Head o f the Bosnia-Herzegovina ICG project, Sarajevo, August 2000.
40 See North Atlantic Council (NAC), Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina Issued by the 
Heads o f  State and Government, Madrid, 8 July 1997 (accessed 7 May 2001) [text on-line]; available 
from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-082e.htm; Internet.
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have both contributed to ratifying the deal made at Dayton between the parties and 
have left untouched, with the exception of the Sarajevo suburbs, the control 
exercised by the parties on the various parts of BiH’s territory. The transfer of the 
Sarajevo suburbs only served to strengthen the division of BiH into ethnically pure 
territories, and signalled to the parties that the international community was not 
prepared to use force to prevent it.
This division of the territory between the parties is very apparent in the case 
of the RS and the Federation, where the IEBL, patrolled by NATO, divides the 
country into two entities. Within the Federation, there is no such thing as an EEBL. 
However, at the cantonal level, intra-Federation divisions become apparent. Three 
cantons (two, eight and ten) were under HVO control whilst five others (one, three, 
four, five and nine) were under ABiH control at the end of the war. The two 
remaining cantons (six and seven) were and are ethnically mixed, but oftentimes 
internally divided between Bosniak and Croat-controlled municipalities. 
IFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate had no impact on this situation, but rather ratified 
the situation on the ground. From a reintegration perspective, this means that the 
territory of BiH has remained largely divided in three, where different regulations 
and laws apply to BiH’s citizens, depending on their ethnic origin. This situation 
also means that the individual rights of these citizens, such as freedom of movement, 
are regularly violated, and that the rule of law continues to be fictional. In effect, 
IFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate has not challenged the control exercised by the 
nationalist power structure over these territories.
The primary mandate of IFOR and SFOR has hardly had any impact on the 
military balance. It has been argued, however, that it has paved the way for the 
institutionalisation of the military balance that existed at the end of the war. Indeed,
208
by strictly controlling the movements of the EAF as well as their weapons holdings, 
the NATO-led forces have facilitated the establishment of the military balance as 
envisaged by annex 1-B. As for security dilemma dynamics among the parties, both 
IFOR and SFOR have provided a deterrent against a resumption of hostilities, which 
were unlikely anyway. The foreign military presence may have helped alleviate the 
security dilemma between the parties, but it has not led to increased trust among 
them. The next section now turns to IFOR/SFOR’s secondary mandate.
2. IFOR/SFOR’s Secondary Mandate: Undermining the Nationalist 
Power Structure and Facilitating Democratisation
Annex 1-A gave IFOR, and subsequently SFOR, the authorisation, but not 
the obligation, to support the activities of other international agencies involved in the 
implementation of the GFA. IFOR/SFOR troops have lent support to the ICTY, by 
moving to arrest persons indicted by the Tribunal, and IPTF in its efforts to restore 
full freedom of movement. They also have intervened to protect refugees returning 
to their pre-war homes. Under annex 1-A, the Office of the Inspector General has 
been created and mandated to specifically monitor the generals of the EAF. Finally, 
in its boldest move, SFOR intervened in the political struggle between the Pale Serbs 
and Biljana Plavsic.
This eclectic collection of activities falling under IFOR/SFOR’s secondary 
mandate has been largely ad hoc in its planning and implementation. Never have 
these various activities been part of a concerted strategy aimed at supporting civilian 
implementation or at undermining the nationalist power structure. This is explained 
by the lack of international consensus on how to use force, or the threat of it, to 
achieve these objectives and also by an aversion to use force. Indeed, the two factors
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examined earlier in order to understand how the force’s mandate has been 
interpreted, namely force protection and the avoidance of casualties, very much taint 
IFOR/SFOR’s work in relation to their secondary mandate. The first two sub­
sections discuss IFOR/SFOR’s activities that could potentially undermine the 
nationalist power structure. Their limitations, however, cast doubt on the feasibility 
of achieving their objectives. The three following sub-sections examine activities of 
the NATO-led force that have facilitated democratisation, arguing that military 
support for specific objectives, because of the absence of an overall strategy, has 
only yielded limited results.
2.1. IFOR/SFOR and Support for the ICTY
As explained in chapter four, IFOR was given the mandate to support the 
activities of the ICTY, even though there was no legal obligation for IFOR to do so. 
In this respect, the arrest of indicted war criminals by IFOR troops became an 
important issue as the Bosnian Serbs proved unwilling to arrest and transfer suspects 
to the Hague themselves, whilst the Croats and Bosniaks, although more co­
operative, at times dragged their feet. It was at best naive to expect that the 
participants of the Dayton peace negotiation would ‘agree to a peace settlement in 
Bosnia if, directly following the agreement, they [or their close associates and 
friends] may find themselves in the dock.. .’4l
In the face of local resistance, the Tribunal turned to the NATO-led force for 
assistance in arresting suspects. Initially, Admiral Smith maintained that the
41 Anthony D ’Amato, ‘Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia’, American Journal o f  International Law 
88, no. 3 (July 1994): 501.
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apprehension of war criminals was beyond IFOR’s mandate.42 After a meeting with 
Tribunal officials in January 1996, a new policy was adopted: IFOR troops would 
arrest indicted war criminals encountered in the course of their normal activities. 
Even though the new policy constituted a significant change, in reality troops were 
not given instructions on how to deal with suspects they might encounter 43 Radovan 
Karadzic, one of the Tribunal’s most wanted men, passed through IFOR checkpoints 
several times without being ‘recognised’.44 Following these incidents, IFOR issued 
photos of and information about suspects to troops on the ground. But without 
political will to tackle the issue, no suspects were apprehended during IFOR’s 
tenure.
This lack of action impacted negatively on the democratic nature of the 
September elections, as many people indicted for war crimes, like Radovan 
Karadzic, were still politically active behind the scenes 45 Because many war crimes 
suspects still controlled the political apparatus, the elections turned out to contribute 
to legitimise the nationalist parties who, once elected, could then claim democratic
42 IFOR nonetheless assisted the ICTY by agreeing to protect designated mass grave sites that the 
tribunal wished to investigate. The force also provided logistical support and protection to tribunal 
investigators.
43 Human Rights Watch interviewed troops on the ground from different contingents. They all came 
up with divergent interpretations o f the new policy, but all seemed to agree that they would not risk an 
armed confrontation in order to arrest a suspect. See HRW, Bosnia-Hercegovina: a Failure in the 
Making, p. 30.
44 A plan was drawn up for the arrest of Karadzic by the US military in August 1996, following an 
order by President Clinton. It was later abandoned, after the Conservative government in Britain 
officially expressed misgivings about the idea. The British considered that the arrest would lead to 
reprisals against IFOR troops and compromise the 1996 September election in BiH. General John 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, also expressed his opposition to the plan on the 
grounds that it would endanger US troops. This argument was very convincing to Clinton, who was 
preparing to stand for a second term in office. See The Sunday Times, 4 August 1996.
45 ICG, Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, ICG Bosnia Report no. 16 (Sarajevo: ICG, 1996) pp. 22- 
24.
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credentials. Flavio Cotti, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office identified this risk when he 
authorised the preparations for the election to proceed. He set the arrest of war 
criminals as a pre-condition for democratic elections. He warned that
‘[i]f no actions are taken right now against the indicted war criminals, it 
can be taken for granted that the elections will very quickly give way to 
developments diametrically opposed to those which they were supposed 
to yield. There exists the most serious danger that they then degenerate 
into a pseudo-democratic legitimisation of extreme nationalist power 
structures and ethnic cleansing.’46
Cotti does not specify which indicted individuals, if  not all, should be 
snatched before the election could proceed. However, his argument makes sense to 
the extent that some key individuals, such as Radovan Karadzic, indicted by the 
ICTY were still active in politics. Their arrest, although not sufficient to transform 
Bosnian politics into democratic politics before the September election, was 
essential in order to weaken the nationalist power structure that emerged during the 
war.
This argument did not convince a lot of people in 1996, during which no 
arrests were made. Several factors explain the lack of action in regard to war 
criminals. In the various capitals, the judiciousness of bringing war crimes suspects 
to The Hague was appreciated differently. Moscow, Paris and London argued that 
bringing war criminals to justice would prolong the conflict and damage the peace 
achieved by the GFA. In particular, the French government may have had reasons 
not to want certain key suspects to be arrested47 As for the British, under the
46 Cited in ICG, Elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina, p. 11.
47 The various military deals that the French made with the Bosnian Serb leadership, possibly granting 
them immunity from prosecution, under UNPROFOR in exchange for the release o f their prisoners, 
the involvement of the government in business dealings between the Milosevic regime and French
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Conservative government, they had no taste for arrests in their sector either.48 
Washington, heavily influenced by the Pentagon, also weighed in on the side of non­
intervention. The US army’s unwillingness to go after suspects in their sector can be 
put down to the overarching goal of avoiding casualties. After the bitter Somali 
experience, where the US lost 18 men trying to capture a faction leader, the idea of 
attempting the same in BiH did not sit well with the American military leadership 
and Administration.49
In addition to refusing to apprehend indictees in their sector, the American 
chain of command repeatedly stated that the arrest of war criminals was not part of 
IFOR’s mandate, and refused requests from the ICTY to arrest war criminals. 
Security concerns also played a role: had civil unrest followed arrests by IFOR, the 
situation could have easily degenerated into widespread violence against 
international agencies, considering that many suspects commanded substantial 
military resources, forcing IFOR to intervene. Following this argument, violence and
companies, and the use o f Bosnian Serb and Serbian mercenaries by the French government, in 
agreement with Yugoslav authorities, in the then Zaire, are some o f the reasons why the French would 
not want to bring some key individuals to justice. In any case, there has been a consistent 
unwillingness on the part of the French government to take the issue o f war criminals seriously, even 
though the geographic configuration of their sector makes arrests more difficult. See Chuck Sudetic, 
“The Reluctant Gendarme”, The Atlantic Monthly April 2000 (accessed 14 September 2001) [article 
on-line]; available from www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/04/sudetic.htm; Internet and ICG, War 
Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srspka: Who Are the People in Your Neighbourhood?, ICG Balkans 
Report no. 103 (Sarajevo: ICG, November 2000) pp. 68-73
48 The new Labour government that came to power in May 1997 would take a much more proactive 
approach (see below).
49 For a good illustration of this argument, see F.M. Lorenz, “War criminals -Testing the Limits of  
Military Force”, Joint Forces Quarterly 16 (summer 1997). Moreover, 1996 being an election year, 
the Clinton administration had little stomach for a series o f risky operations that could cost American 
lives.
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the use of force could have easily undermined international support for the peace 
agreement as well as for IFOR, especially in the US.
However, the issue of war criminals should not be underestimated because it 
touches directly on the power structure that, it has been argued here, constitutes a 
major impediment on the road to democratisation. By refusing to tackle the issue, 
IFOR consolidated the power of those who were in favour of maintaining and 
furthering the division of BiH into ethnically pure territories, each ruled by 
undemocratic nationalist parties. Their continuing presence in Bosnia’s political 
establishment and security apparatus has contributed to the continuation of a climate 
unpropitious to democratisation and prevented progress in areas such as refugee 
return, freedom of movement, and restructuring of police and military forces. This 
analysis led to a shift in the international approach under SFOR.
Indeed, at the end of 1996, American officials on the National Security 
Council and in the Pentagon, among others General Wesley Clark, the future 
SACEUR, prodded by Louise Arbour, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, began to 
reconsider the issue of war criminals. They concluded that unless war criminals were 
arrested, the prospect for democratisation in BiH looked dim. As long as these 
individuals were at large, little progress would be made in helping refugees to return, 
reforming security forces and ensuring respect for human rights. In other words, 
NATO would be bogged down in Bosnia, having to maintain an uneasy truce 
between the parties. This, it was thought, was a worse prospect than having to deal 
with possible unrest and violence on the ground if arrests were made.
An international task force was set up to coordinate arrest operations, 
including elite military units from the US, Britain, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. With the coming to power of Labour in the UK in May 1997, there
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existed now enough political will in London to proceed with arrests. It is therefore 
no surprise that the first arrests occurred in the British sector. One day after the July 
NATO summit, British SAS made their first arrest in Prijedor, killing one suspect in 
the operation. In December, still in the British sector, Dutch troops brought in two 
indicted Croats. And a month after General Clark became SACEUR, US troops 
made their first capture (in January 1998). The following table shows how many 
arrests were made in each sector between July 1997 and November 2000:
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Table III: Arrests by SFOR of Persons Indicted by the ICTY per Year, Sector 
and Contingent Making the Arrest, 1995-2000
Year/ British 
Sector Sector
British
•• ... . • .
Sector
(Dutch)
2 0 0 0
1998 3 0 3 0 17?
0 0 \ c  1 d
2000 2 0 1 2e  0
Total 10 2 4 3 2
Source: Chuck Sudetic, “The Reluctant Gendarme”, Atlantic Monthly 285, no. 4 (April 2000) [article 
on-line] (accessed 17 May 2001); available from
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/20Q0/04/sudetic.htm; Internet; The Coalition for International 
Justice, Who’s Who in the Custody o f  the Tribunal [data on-line] (accessed 25 June 2001); available 
from http://www.cii.org/ictv/ictv.html; Internet.
a one killed resisting arrest. 
b with French participation.
c with German participation, one reported killed resisting arrest. 
d with French participation. 
e with German and other participation.
Where political will exists, suspects have been arrested and sent to The 
Hague. The table shows that the British have made ten arrests, compared to four for 
the Americans, three for the French and two for the Germans (although all arrests in 
the French sector have been made as a result of a combined effort between different 
contingents). 1998 was a peak year in terms of arrest, with seven indictees being 
snatched. In 2000, the number of arrest had gone down to five.
The question whether these 21 arrests have contributed to decisively 
undermining the nationalist power structure is difficult to answer. Two arguments 
can be made. First, along with the analysis made in late 1996 in Washington which 
postulated that the removal of indicted war criminals was essential for 
democratisation, it can be argued that arrests have assisted democratisation in the 
areas where these individuals held a position of power. However, considering the
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large number of indictees still holding governmental positions as well as positions in 
the security forces, it is difficult to imagine how substantial progress can be made on 
issues like refugee return whilst these individuals, responsible for ethnic cleansing in 
the first place, remain in power.50 A sustained campaign of arrests would seem 
warranted following this argument, which is unlikely for the reasons explained 
above.
Short of an unlikely systematic campaign of arrest, co-opting some key 
individuals indicted by the ICTY into the peace process has also proven a useful, 
although morally questionable, means to push democratisation forward. Indeed, the 
removal of these individuals has not always been necessary to promote 
democratisation. As discussed below in detail, international support for Biljana 
Plavsic (now awaiting trial before the ICTY) helped undermine the Pale faction and 
opened up the political space in the RS to new parties. The danger, however, is that 
these new parties emerging will pursue similar policies to the ones they have just 
replaced, although tempered by the constraints created by co-operation with the 
international community. In other words, a new nationalist power structure replaces 
the old one, but the policies, although constrained, remain largely the same.
2.2. SFOR and the Screening of Military Personnel: Undermining the Military 
Arm of the Nationalists?
Besides the control of military activities, SFOR has worked on altering the 
composition of the EAF. In December 1998, the SFOR commander instructed the 
parties, under the authority granted to him under annex 1-A, to implement a
50 In its report on war criminals, ICG published the names o f 17 active police officers and 11 elected 
officials in the RS suspected o f war crimes who were still at large. See ICG, War Criminals in 
Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, p. 77.
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programme of standards for generals.51 Generals in both EAF entities had to abide 
by certain standards, to be verified by SFOR. The stated goal was to eliminate the 
use of military forces by a party for political purposes. Some of these standards have 
a direct bearing on democratisation: the generals are ‘to be neutral in political 
matters, and supportive of the peace process’, and can be removed by SFOR if they 
‘use military means under their control to subvert constitutional and democratic
52processes .
They also are to declare their membership of political parties and other 
organisations. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was created in order to 
‘monitor and investigate as necessary issues of professionalism and ethical 
behaviour.’53 The Office consists of eight officers, two from the US and two from 
each ethnic community. Both entities’ ministries of defence had to submit a list of 
generals who, in their view, met these standards, to the Inspectorate General which 
then was at liberty to review their files and if  warranted dismiss the officers. In 
addition, every action to dismiss or remove a general had to be approved by the OIG 
and the SFOR Commander.
In January 1999, Ante Jelavic, then the Croat member of the Bosnian 
Presidency, promoted eight Croat generals without OIG approval. In the following 
days, SFOR seized tanks, artillery and small arms and began to destroy them as a
51 The stated objectives of SFOR were to ‘exclude from promotion or transfer officers... linked to 
Paramilitary Organisations and those who come under indictment by the International [sic] Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia’. By stating this objective, the SFOR commander recognised the existence 
o f paramilitary forces and their connections with ‘official’ military forces. See SFOR Compendium 
Issue no. 16, internal document.
52 SFOR Compendium Issue no. 16, internal document.
53 COMSFOR Instruction to the parties, December 1998. Cited in European Stability Initiative (ESI), 
Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia (part two): International Power in Bosnia (Berlin: ESI, 
2000) pp. 41-42.
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direct consequence of the decision by Jelavic.54 Eventually, the HDZ backed down 
and accepted to let the nominations be approved by the OIG. And by March 1999, 
SFOR had demanded that three generals be dismissed. One Croat general was 
dismissed because he was ‘politically engaged at HDZ rallies’. Another nomination 
was blocked because the candidate had been indicted for war crimes.55 The third 
nomination was rejected because the Croat candidate refused to make a commitment 
to support the Dayton agreement.
The Office of the Inspector General, as just discussed, did alter the 
composition of the EAF commanders, by allowing the international community to 
veto certain nominations. However, the programme has two weaknesses: it only 
applies to generals, leaving out the rest of the EAF officers. This means that the 
‘target’ group, of about 90 officers, is easy to monitor. But it also limits the ability of 
the OIG to profoundly affect the composition of the officer corps of the EAF. 
Moreover, refused nominations did not prevent rejected candidates from staying in 
the military, albeit at a lower level. The OIG nonetheless allows the international 
community to weaken the links between nationalists and the military establishment.
2.3. IFOR/SFOR and the Right to Freedom of Movement
Fixed roadblocks were the main physical obstacles to freedom of movement 
at the end of the war. Here again IFOR’s limited interpretation of its mandate 
impeded the restoration of full FoM. Even though fixed roadblocks were dismantled 
by IFOR, very little was done to remove the ad hoc roadblocks and checkpoints, 
manned by local police forces, which sprang up to stop people from moving around
54 RFE/RL Newsline vol. 3, No. 6, Part II, 11 January 1999.
55 General Siljeg resumed working in the Federation military, but in a different position.
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the country. A UN report, presented in June 1996, stated that ‘problems are 
encountered mainly along the IEBL, and also, within the Federation, between areas 
controlled by the Government and those controlled by Bosnian Croats, as well as in 
Croat pockets.’56 Several reports by NGO’s also documented cases of ‘taxation’, 
harassment, detention, confiscation of identity documents and violence by local 
police forces and civilians against people travelling to areas dominated by another 
ethnic community or crossing the IEBL.57 People travelling on major roads were 
also subject to violence, such as stone throwing, as witnessed by human rights 
monitors.58 Overall, these reports demonstrate very little commitment on the part of 
the parties to guarantee FoM, in violation of the Dayton agreement.
Restricted FoM also impacted on the electoral campaign leading up to the 
September elections, as many people were intimidated, threatened and attacked 
whilst trying to campaign in areas dominated by another group. On polling day, 
IFOR, IPTF and the OSCE had made preparations to guarantee the security of 
displaced people who wished to cross the IEBL to vote. Specific crossing points (19) 
were designated across the IEBL, and bus services were organised for voters to cast 
their ballots in the other entity. The routes used by these buses were guarded by 
IFOR to avoid any incident. IFOR also increased their patrols and deployed near
56 United Nations, Report o f  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1035, S/1996/460, 21 June 
1996, para. 9.
57 As late as September 1996 the International Crisis Group reported restrictions on freedom of  
movement by the police forces of all three ethnic groups. These restrictions were facilitated by the fact 
that each ethnic group had its own number plates. See ICG, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 
20. See also ICG, Why the Bosnia Elections Must Be Postponed, Bosnia report no. 14 (Sarajevo: ICG, 
1996) pp. 7-8 and Human Rights Watch, Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Failure in the Making, pp. 9-13.
58 US Department o f State, Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices fo r  
1996, released by the Bureau o f Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 30 January 1997 (accessed 16 
May 2000) [report on-line]; available from
http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1996 hrp report/bosniahe.html: Internet.
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polling stations. In spite of these measures, very few people crossed the IEBL to 
vote. Several factors explain this low turn out, many of which unrelated to security, 
but it is undeniable that many IDP’s were afraid to cross the IEBL because they 
feared for their lives. The many well-publicised accounts of violence and 
intimidation against people crossing the IEBL in the months after the signing of the 
Dayton agreement, and the memories of suffering endured by most IDP’s at the 
hands of the people now controlling the disputed territories discouraged many from 
travelling.59
IFOR did nonetheless contribute to increasing freedom of movement 
throughout BiH. As mentioned above, fixed checkpoints were removed by IFOR 
troops in late January and early February 1996.60 IFOR, in conjunction with IPTF, 
also offered protection to the new bus service set up by the UNHCR in April 1996 to 
facilitate visits by IDP’s to their former towns. Buses were escorted by IFOR troops 
and IPTF personnel and monitored from the air. In spite of political and physical 
obstruction by local authorities on all sides, the bus service turned out to be a 
success, because IFOR backed the initiative and imposed the service on the parties. 
These two issues show that FoM could have been restored more comprehensively 
from the outset, had IFOR interpreted its mandate in a more robust way. Indeed, 
many restrictions to FoM occurred in specific locations over a significant period of
59 Only 24,000 people, less than 1% of the electorate, crossed the IEBL to vote on 14 September 1996. 
ICG, Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 43-49 and Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnie reelle et Bosnie 
virtuelle”, in Le monde diplomatique, September 1997.
60 ICG reported that a British IFOR commander in Banja Luka dispatched armoured vehicles to a 
Bosnian Serb checkpoint with orders to attach hooks to the police cars and drag them away. No 
restrictions to FoM occurred in that vicinity after IFOR’s intervention. See ICG, Going Nowhere Fast: 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia (Sarajevo: ICG, 1997) pp. 61-62.
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time, and were reported to the NATO-led force. When robust action was taken, as in 
the case of the UNHCR bus service, the situation was normalised.
Freedom of movement was still problematic at the end of 1996. It was 
chosen as a major objective by the PIC for 1997, and following the Bonn meeting 
IPTF and SFOR devised a new checkpoint policy, which was introduced in May. 
Police forces were only authorised to hold static checkpoints for up to 30 minutes 
without IPTF’s prior approval. The local police could also apply to IPTF for an 
authorisation to establish checkpoints if  they could show that they were necessary 
for the prevention and reduction of crime. Backed by SFOR, IPTF now strictly 
regulates the establishment of checkpoints.61 The subsequent introduction of 
common number plates also greatly improved the situation.62
The success of the policy rests on the threat of the use of force by SFOR in 
case of non-compliance with the checkpoint policy. The example of FoM illustrates 
how third parties can use their resources to promote the exercise of a basic 
democratic right, as well as the rebuilding of a single political space, where laws 
apply equally to all citizens. In the case of the right to FoM, IPTF supported by
61 Between May 1997 and March 1998, 151 illegal checkpoints were removed by IPTF, in 38 cases 
with the support of SFOR. See United Nations, Report o f  the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1998/227, 12 March 1998, para. 12.
62 The author travelled by bus from the Croatian border and back near Bihac, down to Sarajevo 
through Central Bosnia in August 1998. The bus, which could be clearly identified as belonging to a 
Bosniak company, crossed the IEBL four times in total without being stopped. Today, with the 
exception o f some rare violations, FoM has been achieved in BiH as reported in US Department of  
State, Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practises fo r  1997, released by the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 30 January 1998 (accessed 16 May 2000), section 
2.d [report on-line]; available from
http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1997 hrp report/bosniahe.html: Internet and Human 
Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Bosnia and Hercegovina- Human Rights Developments, January 
2000 (accessed 8 August 2000); available from www.hrw.org/worldreport99/europe/bosnia.html: 
Internet.
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SFOR was able to back its demands with the threat of force, should the parties not 
comply.
2.4. SFOR, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) and the Rebuilding of a 
Single Political Space: Protection of Returnees
In the summer of 1998, the MSU was brought to BiH. The main objective 
sought was to bridge the security gap, discussed earlier, by introducing a 
gendarmerie-like force, that would be trained to and focus primarily on maintaining 
law and order, should the local police be unwilling or unable to quell civil unrest. 
Made up mainly of Italian carabinieri, but also of Argentinean and Romanian 
police, the MSU was not really tested until October 1998, when it intervened in 
Capljina to remove a blockade organised to prevent the return of refugees. Since 
then, the MSU has adopted a very low profile as far as law and order are concerned. 
This could be explained by the fact that the Italian government is using the MSU 
chiefly to tackle local organised crime that affects the peninsula.
National differences between SFOR’s contingents were also outlined above 
in the context of the arrest of war crimes suspects. These differences also account for 
SFOR’s degree of involvement in tasks other than those concerned with its primary 
mandate. The British, very active in their sector since the coming of Labour to 
power in 1997, have also lent support to refugee return. Their actions in Croat- 
controlled Prozor-Rama illustrate this point.64 In May 1998, a return of Bosniaks to 
the municipality was organised by the Reconstruction and Return Task Force
63 Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Miailhes, French Gendarmerie, 23 April 2001. 
Miailles was an assistant to General Walker, Deputy Commander o f IFOR in 1996.
64 See ICG, The Western Gate o f  Central Bosnia: The Politics o f  Return in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama 
(ICG: Sarajevo, 1998) pp. 22-23.
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(RRTF). In anticipation, a British general visited the mayor and expressed to him 
that he and his administration were considered by SFOR responsible for the security 
of the returnees. On the day of return, SFOR maintained a visible presence 
throughout the municipality, by going on foot patrols, maintaining patrols 24 hours a 
day, and controlling the roads leading to the municipality. In the weeks following 
the returns, SFOR continued to patrol the area, including night patrols, and stepped 
up its surveillance of previously identified individuals hostile to minority return.
Two factors have decisively influenced the ability of British troops to 
maintain a secure environment for the returnees. The first is an excellent knowledge 
of the municipality, and the key players within it, in particular those individuals 
opposed to minority return. This intelligence has allowed the British to effectively 
monitor the activities of those who could have created tensions during returns. 
Secondly, the UK contingent covering Prozor-Rama and the Vrbas Valley is 
equipped with riot control gear and has been trained to respond to civil unrest. 
Coupled with the will to act, the fact that the British could have responded 
effectively to orchestrated civil violence has deterred those opposed to returns from 
acting. This example shows how military force can be employed to directly assist 
democratisation, in addition to neutralising the ability of the nationalists to prevent 
returns. In contrast, because there has been no political will to make use of the MSU 
to tackle law and order, its contribution to democratisation has been limited to one 
intervention.65
65 James Lyon told the author that the MSU was deployed in Bratunac in May 2000, where the 
UNHCR had organised a visit for about 150 Bosniak refugees. Upon arrival, the four buses 
transporting the refugees were stoned by local Serbs, whilst the MSU stood by. The author has not 
been able to verify the role, if  any, played by the MSU, although the incident was reported in the 
press. See RFE/RL Newsline, 12 May 2000.
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2.5. Supporting Democratisation? SFOR and the Power Struggle in
Republika Srpska
SFOR got involved in the struggle between the Pale and the Banja Luka 
Serbs, led by Biljana Plavsic, in the summer of 1997. Plavsic, a staunch member of 
the SDS during the war, was elected President of the RS in the September 1996 
election. In early 1997, it appeared that she had broken off relations with Karadzic, 
whom she accused of manipulating the RS government and undermining her 
authority. She subsequently dismissed the RS interior minister, Dragan Kijac, close 
to Karadzic, in June and moved to dissolve the RS parliament. The rift created 
within the SDS was soon exploited by the international community, who saw Plavsic 
as more moderate and an alternative to Karadzic’s faction. Indeed, from an 
international perspective, Plavsic was to be supported because she was willing to co­
operate with the international community, unlike Karadzic. In turn, Plavsic, 
considered that co-operation with the international community was the only way to 
preserve the existence of the RS and to break off its isolation.66
Plavsic did not fall out with the Pale Serbs because she did not share their 
goal of maintaining a largely ethnically pure Serb entity in BiH; rather, she sought to 
maintain the existence of the RS by co-operating with the international community 
and by undermining the hold that the Karadzic faction in the SDS had on RS 
institutions and politics. Indeed, at the time, ‘the Karadzic clique controlled almost
66 Up until then, the RS had received hardly any economic assistance from the international 
community because of the non-co-operative stance adopted by Pale.
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all the Serb Republic Army and security forces, as well as the state’s banking, postal 
and telephone operations.’
The international strategy in support of Plavsic consisted of three elements: 
neutralisation of paramilitary forces loyal to the Karadzic faction that threatened the 
security of her faction; seizure of TV transmitters used to broadcast pro-Pale 
propaganda; and occupation of police stations in western RS. These actions, it will 
be argued here, undermined the Serb nationalist power structure and helped 
Plavsic’s faction not only to survive, but also to gain the upper hand in its struggle 
with the Pale Serbs.
Until 1997, paramilitary forces had been regarded as police forces and 
therefore left to IPTF to supervise and monitor. With time, their role in protecting 
indicted war criminals was recognised. RS paramilitaries were especially targeted, 
because they were still loyal to Karadzic and the Pale Serbs, and had refused to co­
operate with IPTF. In order to isolate them and support Biljana Plavsic, seen as more 
pro-West, these forces were targeted. In addition, because the RS still had not 
concluded an agreement with the IPTF on the restructuring of its police forces, this 
policy was used as an incentive to induce RS authorities to collaborate, as any 
paramilitary police force not co-operating with IPTF would fall under the authority 
of SFOR.
In August 1997, the new SFOR commander, US general Shinseki announced 
that SFOR would proceed to put these forces under its control in order to neutralise 
the effect they could have in the struggle between Plavsic and Karadzic. Paramilitary 
police forces were given until 31 August to register with SFOR, and ordered to store 
all weapons other than side arms. By moving to neutralise the paramilitaries, SFOR
67 Leonard J. Cohen, “Whose Bosnia? The Politics o f Nation Building”, Current History 97, no. 617
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did help isolate the pro-Karadzic Serbs, even though it took other interventions by 
SFOR to help Plavsic maintain her grip on power. Still in August, SFOR troops took 
control of five police stations in Banja Luka and found large quantities of explosives 
and weapons. More importantly, the operation led to the removal of police chiefs 
loyal to Kijac and their replacement by pro-Plavsic chiefs. In September, SFOR 
intervened again to stop a crowd of pro-Karadzic supporters, most of them police in 
plain clothes, from attacking the RS presidential office in Banja Luka.
SFOR actions helped Plavsic secure control of the RS west of Brcko and the 
operation is believed to have prevented a coup against the Bosnian Serb President. 
Following these actions by SFOR, the Serb Radio and Television (SRT), under the 
control of the Karadzic faction, began a media campaign depicting SFOR as a force 
of occupation and anti-Serb. The SRT being the only Serb media outlet available to 
most Serbs, the effect of this campaign on Serb public opinion could have been 
disastrous for Plavsic in light of the forthcoming municipal and parliamentary
* /TO
elections. The HR demanded that the propaganda be stopped, and threatened to use 
SFOR to seize control of SRT’s transmitters. In October 1997, in the face of 
continuing anti-West propaganda, the HR carried out his threat and SFOR took 
control of SRT’s TV transmitters in the RS, which were later handed over to 
Plavsic’s supporters.
These actions (neutralisation of the paramilitaries, seizure of police stations 
and TV transmitters) were the boldest on the part of SFOR in interfering with local 
political dynamics. They have led to the further marginalisation of the Pale Serbs, 
undermining their power base. This case is important for two reasons. First, SFOR’s
(March 1998): 106.
68 SRT journalists based in Banja Luka refused to broadcast the propaganda coming from Pale, 
confirming the general impression that the RS was split in two.
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control over security forces prevented them from being used to support one faction. 
SFOR’s move to put pro-Karadzic paramilitary forces under its control bears out this 
point, but tight control exercised by the NATO-led force over the VRS prevented it 
from getting involved.69 Second, SFOR’s direct interventions to seize police stations 
and TV transmitters illustrate how third parties can use their military resources to 
directly promote democratisation. Plavsic, of course, cannot be regarded as a 
democrat; but SFOR’s actions, in co-ordination with the OHR, helped to open up the 
political space in the RS by undermining the monopolistic hold exercised by 
Karadzic’s faction on RS institutions and politics.
2.6. IFOR/SFOR’ s Secondary Mandate: Implications for the Balance of 
Forces, Control over Territory, the Security Dilemma and Democratisation
IFOR/SFOR’s mandate had one crucial implication for the security 
transition. Indeed, it undermined the control exercised by the parties over the 
territories they occupy. All five sets of activities, or interventions, have contributed 
to weakening the ability of the parties to control their territories. By arresting 
persons indicted by the ICTY, SFOR has weakened the position of those who during 
the war advocated ethnically pure territories. Likewise, by monitoring the EAF 
generals, SFOR contributed to weakening the links between nationalist parties, who 
advocated ethnic separation, and military forces. In turn, the enforcement of freedom 
of movement, the sporadic protection granted to refugee return by SFOR and its 
direct intervention in the struggle between Pale and Plavsic have constrained the 
ability of the parties to control territory, or its ethnic composition.
69 Even though it seemed that its commanders were also split between Karadzic and Plavsic.
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These achievements have been translated into some progress in terms of 
democratisation. The rebuilding of a single political space has been promoted by the 
removal of physical obstacles to the free movement of persons. In some cases, 
military forces have been used to increase the security of returnees. Democratisation 
also made headway when the Pale Serbs were prevented from succeeding in their 
attempt to overthrow Plavsic. However, the ad hoc nature of these interventions, 
stemming from unwillingness on the part of the international community to devise a 
coherent strategy to guide the systematic use of SFOR assets in support of civilian 
objectives, has meant that these achievements have often been isolated cases.
3. Conclusion: IFOR/SFOR: Putting the Emphasis on its Primary 
Mandate
IFOR and SFOR have been successful in maintaining the military truce 
ratified at Dayton. This has enabled the international community to achieve its main 
objective in BiH: ending the war. The NATO-led force has done so by presiding 
over the division of the country into two entities, the transfer of Serb Sarajevo to the 
Federation, and the cantonment of troops and weapons. This constituted its primary 
mandate, whose implementation has greatly reduced the likelihood of military 
confrontation between the EAF. The chapter also discussed how the territorial 
division of the Federation has been left untouched by IFOR/SFOR’s implementation 
of its primary mandate. This mandate has consolidated the control exercised by the 
parties over the territories they occupied, with the exception of the Sarajevo suburbs, 
which were transferred to the Federation, whilst not affecting the military balance 
and contributing to the alleviation of the security dilemma. This leads to the 
conclusion that IFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate has not contributed positively to
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democratisation, because it has left untouched, although constrained, the nationalist 
power structure.
Regarding the NATO-led force’s secondary mandate, its record has been 
patchy. SFOR has been involved in increasing security for returnees, enforced 
freedom of movement, and assisted Biljana Plavsic in her struggle with the Pale 
Serbs. These interventions, it has been argued here, have assisted democratisation. In 
addition, the arrest of persons indicted by the ICTY and the creation of the Office of 
the Inspector General, have constrained the security arm of the nationalist power 
structure. All this has undermined the control exercised by the parties over the 
territories they occupy, and brought some measure of democratisation to BiH.
However, the lack of political will to do more (and to suffer casualties) and 
to do it in a coherent manner, constrains SFOR to the point that only ad hoc shows 
of force are possible, such as special operations to snatch war criminals. This 
‘muddle through’ approach has meant that SFOR, nearly six years after the end of 
the war, is still present on the ground. The implementation of the military balance 
approach, which should have allowed IFOR to withdraw after a year, is the theme of 
the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: Institutionalising a Military Balance and Creating a 
State-wide Dimension of Defence: the Role of the OSCE and 
the OHR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996-2000
This chapter assesses the role of the OSCE and of the OHR in assisting the 
integration of BiH’s EAF. The OSCE’s military mandate is found in annex 1-B, 
which contains the strategy devised to enable the withdrawal of IFOR, whilst 
deterring the Serbs from attacking the Bosniaks and the Croats (see chapter four). 
The approach followed in annex 1-B will be contrasted with the strategy adopted by 
the OHR following the December 1998 meeting of the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC). The OHR’s approach is based on annex 4 of the GFA, which confers 
civilian command of the EAF on the Bosnian Presidency and creates a Standing 
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). The OHR has attempted to create a state­
wide dimension of defence through these institutions after 1998.
This chapter will show that the military balance approach contained in annex 
1-B further undermines the Bosnian state by pushing the Bosnian Serbs and Croats 
towards their respective patron states in search for military security and assistance. 
The US-led ‘Train & Equip’ programme, implemented in the context of annex 1-B, 
in spite of its promise to solidify the precarious Croat-Bosniak alliance forged during 
the war, has failed to achieve this objective. In addition, the qualitative advantage 
T&E gives to the Federation army breeds additional mistrust on the part of the RS 
authorities. With regard to guaranteeing the security of the Federation in the face of 
a renewed Serb attack, the second objective of the programme, T&E’s achievement 
is difficult to assess, because of SFOR’s continued presence on the ground, which in 
effect is a recognition that the approach has not been successful.
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The result of the implementation of annex 1-B, and T&E, this chapter will 
argue, is to further strengthen the division of BiH into three military blocs. One of 
the questions that this thesis asks, whether creating a military balance between 
former belligerents can assist democratisation, including the creation of a single 
political space, finds its answer in this chapter. It will be argued that it does not in 
the case of BiH.1 Indeed, by legitimising the existence of two armies, and tacitly 
accepting the division of the Federation army, the military balance approach of 
annex 1-B has left untouched the power structure built during the war: undemocratic 
nationalist parties using the military not only to defend the group they claim to 
represent and create ethnically homogeneous entities but also to maintain themselves 
in power. This structure has not fundamentally changed in the post-war period and 
this does not bode well for democratisation.
Obstruction from the nationalists should not mask another major difficulty 
encountered by the OHR in trying to restore a state-wide capacity of defence: how to 
reconcile the security of the parties with the creation of democratic and functioning 
defence institutions. In a field as sensitive as defence, former belligerents will be 
extremely wary of giving up their control over the armed forces. In this context, 
creating a state dimension of defence cannot be separated from the issue of the 
security of ethnic communities. This chapter shows how the issue of their security is 
preventing further integration in the field of defence. These security fears are 
exacerbated by the military balance approach enshrined in annex 1-B, and create 
disincentives for the parties to integrate their forces.
The first section of this chapter shows how the OSCE’s mandate has helped 
solidify the division of BiH into three military blocs. It looks at the evolution of the
1 This point will be further developed in the conclusion.
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arms control agreement and of the confidence- and security-building measures 
(CSBM’s), and shows that compliance has been limited to the minimum demanded 
by the OSCE. Once again, the parties have attempted to use the agreement to their 
military advantage, mainly because they see their security threats as coming from 
within, not without. The section concludes by arguing that the implementation of the 
Vienna and Florence agreements based on articles II and IV (CSBM’s and AS AC) is 
not as important as it seems for two reasons.2 SFOR is still on the ground, protecting 
the military truce. Secondly, according to assessments by the OSCE in the summer 
of 2000, the combat-readiness of the EAF is questionable although the Federation 
army seems to be in a better state than the VRS. This means that the types of 
weapons falling under article IV of the Florence agreement would be of little value 
in the type of warfare that the agreement envisages.
The second section will concentrate on the role of the OHR in building a 
state-wide defence capacity in BiH. The OHR derives its mandate from annex 10, 
and although its focus is on civilian implementation, some of its work has affected 
military forces. In this chapter, the role of the OHR in relation to the development of 
a BiH-wide dimension of defence, and the proposals made to create some sort of 
defence capacity at the state level, will be examined. These proposals are intended to 
facilitate the eventual integration of the EAF into one force and restore the capacity 
of the state to defend its borders. They have been met with considerable resistance 
from the Serbs and the Croats. This resistance underlines the difficulties of creating 
democratic institutions that guarantee the security of all parties.
2 The terms ‘article II’, ‘CSBM agreement’ and ‘Vienna agreement’ will all be used interchangeably 
here. They refer to the CSBM agreement concluded in Vienna in January 1996 on the basis o f article 
II of annex 1-B. Likewise, ‘ASAC’, ‘article IV’ and ‘Florence agreement’ refer to the arms control 
agreement concluded in Florence in June 1996 as mandated by article IV o f annex 1-B.
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The conclusion to this chapter asks if the OSCE and the OHR are not pulling 
in opposite directions. At first glance, the proposition has some merit: annex 1-B, 
and by implication the OSCE, is bent on implementing a balance of forces approach 
that undermines the Bosnian state. The OHR, on the other hand, tries to restore the 
state’s control over the defence sector, thereby contributing to the restoration of the 
state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. In fact, both strategies come at different 
phases of the conflict: one in its immediate aftermath, the other three years after the 
conclusion of the agreement. They follow the logic adopted in the agreement: 
security through deterrence first, then integration. This strategy underestimated the 
solidity of the nationalist power structure and its grip on the security forces and 
territory.
This strategy also failed to resolve one of the contradictions of the 
implementation process: the idea that external actors can build up the military 
capability of one party, whilst at the same time trying to integrate both parties in 
common defence structures. The first section looks at the implementation of the first 
strategy (security through deterrence) and shows why it has been unsuccessful.
1. The Role of Annex 1-B and the OSCE: Solidifying the Divisions 
of BiH?
This section looks at the implementation of the agreements based on articles 
II and IV of annex 1-B. In terms of stability, it is difficult to assess whether annex 1- 
B has achieved its objective to create a stable balance of forces between the 
Federation and the RS because of SFOR’s presence on the ground, the lack of 
combat-readiness of the parties and the failure of ‘Train and Equip’ to induce the 
Bosniaks and Croats to create a unified military force. This section will show that
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the parties have limited their co-operation to the minimum demanded by the OSCE, 
whilst giving the international institution a central role in the implementation of the 
agreement. This situation casts doubt on the self-sustainability of both regimes. 
Moreover, after nearly six years of implementation, BiH still comprises three armies, 
even though annex 1-B held the promise of co-operation between, and with time, 
possible integration of these three armies. The first sub-section looks at the obstacles 
created by the parties to the implementation of the CSBM agreement first and ASAC 
after.
1.1. The CSBM Vienna Agreement, 1996-2000
Assessing the CSBM agreement presents a challenge. Each measure can be 
individually assessed, and one will find that compliance has been improving since 
the conclusion of the CSBM agreement. However, the objectives to be achieved by 
the agreement are unclear, and it is therefore difficult to measure success against a 
specific benchmark. Two factors nonetheless help explain the pattern of compliance 
with the Vienna agreement.
First, the central role of the OSCE in maintaining the regime casts doubt on 
the parties’ willingness to co-operate. Indeed, like ASAC, the CSBM agreement was 
concluded under pressure from the international community and gives a central role 
to the OSCE in its implementation. In the context of article II, the OSCE also acts as 
a ‘mailbox’ for the parties to use when they wish to communicate or exchange
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information.3 With such an important role given to the international institution, it is 
difficult to see how self-sustainability can be achieved in the near future.
Second, the parties do co-operate on issues that do not significantly 
undermine the division of BiH into three military blocks. Reporting on the progress 
in implementing the CSBM agreement, for the year 1999 SDPRI found that progress 
had been made in transparency of military spending, that the parties did establish 
military liaison missions, are exchanging military information as asked under 
measure I, conducting inspections and notifying each other of military exercises and 
movements.4 Previous reports even noted significant progress in implementation, 
especially in information exchange.5 However, five years after the end of the 
conflict, none of the measures had led to close co-operation on defence issues, even 
in the Federation, where Croats and Bosniaks have maintained parallel defence 
structures
Indeed, the Vienna agreement has not produced a process of integration of 
the armed forces, let alone close co-operation. A reason for this situation that has 
been advanced throughout this thesis is the nationalist power structure, which in the 
case of the Serb parties and HDZ has continued to pursue secessionist policies. 
Because of their control of the military, they have used the CSBM process to their 
advantage, stalling the implementation of the agreement, or refusing to co-operate 
on non-compulsory issues.
3 Interview by the author with Lieutenant Colonel Luther Franklin, Head o f the Verification 
Operations Section, Department for Regional Stabilization, OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Sarajevo, September 2000.
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPR1 Yearbook 2000: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 622-625.
5 SIPRI Yearbook, 1997, 1998, 1999.
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For example, definitions have been the source of constant haggling between 
the parties. A 1999 OSCE report lists seven different terms over which the parties 
have failed to agree.6 This problem with definitions is more than a semantic one, as 
these vague definitions have enabled the parties not to report under measure I some 
security forces, their movements or even production facilities used for military 
purposes. Also, until 1998, the parties did not agree on the format for reporting 
military expenditures, also under measure I, thereby stalling the disclosure of their 
sources of military funding. To this day, total transparency in military budgets has 
not been achieved, especially on the Croat and Serb sides, because of the political 
implications of substantial military support still received from Croatia and 
Yugoslavia respectively.
In addition, under measure XI, the parties are to increase contacts, visits and 
common educational ventures such as seminars or conferences for members of the 
military. Some aspects of the measure are voluntary, but a few are compulsory (see 
chapter four). In 1999, the parties had impeded any progress in the implementation 
of its voluntary aspects to the point that the OSCE representative wrote that ‘the
6 For instance, the Vienna agreement defines forces as ‘all formations and units, both combat and 
support, o f the land, naval, air, and air defense forces o f the Parties’. The parties maintained that some 
forces were ‘police’ forces, and therefore did not fall under this definition. In fact, the parties were 
only capable o f agreeing on a definition o f police forces, after intense pressure from the OSCE 
representative, in August 2000. Before that, some forces with a military capability were portrayed as 
police forces. Minutes of the 27th meeting of the JCC, 31 August 2000 (document seen by the author). 
Moreover, during his visit at the OSCE Department o f Regional Organisation in Sarajevo, September 
2000, the author was told that the parties had agreed on one other definition. OSCE Compendium no. 
11,15 May 1999, internal document.
7 In this field, the role of the OSCE has been limited to facilitating negotiations between the parties 
over these definitions. Interview by the author with Lt. Col. Franklin, September 2000.
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most incredible hindrances have been raised to complicate improvement of co­
operation.’8
Likewise, measure XIV, which asks the parties to establish direct 
communications, has again been met with minimum compliance. RS and Federation 
military headquarters did establish a direct phone connection in June 1996, but the
1999 report explains that even though RS and Federation verification centres are 
equipped with electronic mail and facsimile capacities, they still only communicate 
through the OSCE Regional Stabilisation office in Sarajevo, underscoring once 
again the central role of the OSCE in maintaining the regime.9
Lastly, as late as September 2000, there had not been any progress made in 
creating a state-level inspection team and verification centre that would be able to 
take on inspection duties under article II for the whole country. The original 
situation has remained unchanged: inspections are conducted by the parties on each 
other’s territory, accompanied by an OSCE representative. Federation inspection 
teams are comprised of Croat and Bosniak representatives, and they maintain 
separate verification centres (the same goes for ASAC -see below).
1.2. Implementation of the Sub-regional Arms Control Agreement, 1996-
2000
An assessment of the implementation of ASAC is easier to make than one of 
the CSBM agreement, because very precise quantitative objectives were set. As 
explained in chapter four, the parties had to make reductions in five categories of 
weapons (the ‘TLE’) in two phases. Forty percent of their liabilities had to be
8 OSCE Compendium no. 11, 15 May 1999, internal document. Things had not improved at the time 
of the author’s visit in September 2000.
9 OSCE Compendium no. 11, 15 May 1999, internal document.
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destroyed by 1 January 1997, and the rest by November 1997. Two factors are 
important in understanding the implementation of ASAC. First, as discussed above, 
the OSCE, backed by the PIC, played a central role in pushing the parties to keep 
their commitment. As pointed out earlier, the central role played by the OSCE casts 
doubt on the self-sustainability of the regime. Second, security dilemma dynamics 
among the parties help explain the difficulties encountered, especially in the initial 
stages, in implementing the Florence agreement. These have led to under-reporting, 
stalling tactics and cheating.
The negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Florence agreement 
were already marred by stalling tactics, breaches in weapons rules and disagreement 
over the status of the RS at the negotiation (the RS was not a signatory of the Dayton 
agreement and as such could not technically be a party to the negotiation).10 In 
August 1996, two months after its adoption, the first inspection teams started to 
make reciprocal visits.11 Results were not made public, but refusal to accept 
inspections and discrepancies between declared holdings and findings on the ground 
were reported.12
In October, cases of non-compliance with the agreement were made public. 
Croatia, the Federation and the RS had failed to declare their actual holdings, and 
exceptions under article III of the Florence agreement, authorising excess weapons 
to be used for research purposes or to be exported, were reported to have been 
abused by the RS.13 The December 1996 PIC addressed these problems by asking 
the parties to submit reliable and complete data on their holdings by 16 December,
10 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 545.
11 Inspections under both agreements are made separately.
12 SIPRI, Yearbook 1997, p. 546.
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recalculate their reduction liabilities in light of the new data and with a proviso that 
exceptions under article III should not account for more than 5% of the holdings, 
and complete phase I reductions by 31 December.14 The following table shows the 
expected and actual reductions made at the end of phase I for all weapons systems 
combined:
Table IV: Expected and Actual Weapons Reductions under Phase I of ASAC
Phase I 
Liabilities
Rump
Yugoslavia
626 274 776 442
Total
2,118
Total 
Phase I 
Reduction
662 297 746 45 1,750
Source: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 548.
As shown above, reductions were behind schedule at the end of 1996, even 
though Croatia and rump Yugoslavia reduced the arsenals substantially more than 
expected. These reductions only consider quantitative factors, and a reduction in 
numbers may not necessarily mean a qualitative reduction in weaponry. This issue 
makes an assessment of the military balance more difficult. Moreover, given the 
superiority in weaponry of Yugoslavia, meeting its reductions targets did not 
constitute a significant military risk. The RS, in turn, knowing that the Federation 
was being re-equipped under ‘Train and Equip’, was reluctant to forego its 
advantage in heavy weapons. Finally, Croatia did make significant reductions in 
artillery. It must be noted however that the Croatians were authorised by the 
agreement to increase their holdings in the four other categories of weapons. 
Difficulties also emerged because the Federation and Croatia had not agreed on how
13 SIPRI, Yearbook 1997, p. 545.
14 London Peace Implementation Conference, Lancaster House, 4-5 December 1996.
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to divide their reduction liability, since they had to report separately. This issue
underscores the level of interpenetration between Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces.
Things did not improve substantially at the beginning of 1997. Conflicting
data was coming from NATO, the OSCE and the parties.15 The parties accused each
other of under-reporting their holdings, abusing exemptions under article III, failing
to report equipment supplied under ‘Train & Equip’16, and blocking inspections
largely because of the dispute over the rights of BiH to conduct inspections in
Croatia and Yugoslavia.17 Finally, Croats and Bosniaks had failed to agree on a
1 8division of the Federation reduction liabilities.
Under pressure from SFOR and the OSCE, progress was achieved in late 
January and February. The parties agreed that exceptions should not exceed 5% of 
their holdings, reducing the possibilities of cheating and increasing transparency 
between the parties.19 The RS also raised its reduction liabilities from a total of 72 to 
1,082, although Western estimates assessed that the RS should have had to dispose 
of 2,200-2,300 weapons to be in compliance with the agreement. Again, fears of 
the military build-up taking place in the Federation under ’Train and Equip’ 
motivated these delaying tactics and under-reporting. Finally, the parties agreed to
15 NATO based its information on spot check inspections conducted under the cantonment provisions 
of annex 1-A, whilst the OSCE inspections teams conducted systematic inspections. These differences 
in methods account for the discrepancies.
16 This equipment was under IFOR control because Bosniaks and Croats could not agree on how it 
should be distributed between them.
17 BiH has no forces o f its own, and therefore cannot conduct inspections as such.
18 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 602.
19 Brigadier U lf Henricsson nonetheless identified exceptions under article IV as a major loophole in 
ASAC that has been extensively used by the parties. Interview by the author with Brigadier U lf 
Henricsson, Deputy Director o f the Department for Regional Stabilisation, OSCE Mission to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Sarajevo, September 2000
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give inspection rights to the central government of BiH.21 Another breakthrough 
came in June when Federation officials agreed on a division of their reduction 
liabilities.
On 21 November 1997, the OSCE announced that the parties had met their 
reduction obligations under the Florence agreement. Considering that under­
reporting plagued the whole process, it is doubtful that the parties, especially the RS, 
met their obligations in full, although their obligations with regard to their declared
99holdings were fulfilled. In addition, 350,000 military personnel had been 
demobilised since the end of the war. Again, this apparent demilitarisation of the 
country does not mean that the security situation has substantially improved. When 
asked about the structure of the EAF, Brigadier Ulf Henricsson of the OSCE stressed 
that conscript armies, as in BiH, because they include a large amount of civilians, 
maintain an ‘ability to wage war’ among the population. He concluded by saying
• 91that ‘the military “stuff* is stored away’, meaning military skills, but still there.
1.3. Articles II and IV and the Integration of the Entities Armed Forces
Over the following three years, besides implementing technical 
improvements of both regimes, the OSCE, with the co-operation of the OHR and
20 SIPRI, Yearbook 1998, p. 604.
21 The author was briefed on the issue by Brigadier Hubo Hajrudan, assistant director o f the 
Federation verification centre in Sarajevo, September 2000. He told him that to date, BiH had never 
been able to conduct inspections in Croatia and FRY, as the parties had not been able to agree on the 
composition o f an inspection team. The author later found out that the Croats have a separate 
verification centre in the same building (Federation defence ministry), which is a duplicate o f the 
Bosniak verification centre that the author visited. On paper, there is only one Federation verification 
centre. OSCE officials at the Department o f Regional Stabilisation in Sarajevo were also aware o f this 
situation.
22 See annex IV for the status of weapons holdings under ASAC, as o f December 1999.
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NATO, focused on the development of a state dimension of defence and on a 
reduction and restructuring of the EAF with the intent of facilitating their 
integration.24 The December 1998 PIC in Madrid noted that the level of trust and 
military co-operation between the parties was still low, and underscored the 
destabilising effect of having three armies, with increasingly different doctrine and 
training, on the territory of BiH. It called upon the parties to increase co-operation 
and develop a state dimension of defence. An internal OSCE document stated in 
1999 that the overall aim of the Regional Stabilisation department was ‘to establish 
conditions within Bosnia and Herzegovina, which eliminate the possibility of the use 
of military force as a means to solve internal problems after SFOR leaves or is 
heavily reduced.’23 This objective did not elaborate on the idea of ‘conditions’ to be 
established.
This weakness was identified the following year by General Carlo Jean, the 
new head of the OSCE Department for Regional Stabilisation. He argued the need of 
an ‘end state’, i.e., a specific objective to be achieved by the process set in motion by 
the agreements bom out of annex 1-B. In September 2000, this end was articulated 
by the DRS as ‘a defensively postured military establishment under the democratic, 
civilian control of the State government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is staffed, 
trained and equipped for the sole purpose of ensuring the national sovereignty and
23 Interview by the author with Brigadier U lf Henricsson, Sarajevo, September 2000.
24 An internal OHR memo advised international personnel to avoid the use of words like ‘single’, 
‘joint’ and ‘unitary’ because they ‘stimulate fear and play into the hands o f nationalist, obstructionist 
elements.’ This is why international agencies speak o f ‘unified’ command and control as well as a 
‘state dimension’ o f defence. The stated objective is nonetheless to 'to bring the discrete armies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina closer together, softening the boundaries and barriers between them and 
fostering the evolution of confidence.’ OHR Document no. 1, internal document (no date).
25 OSCE Mission to BiH, Department for Regional Stabilization, Regional Stabilization 1999 and 
Beyond, January 1999, OSCE Document no. 3, internal document.
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9 6security of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ An internal OSCE memorandum 
also produced in September linked a stable peace in BiH with ‘a change [of the 
EAF] from the present offensive oriented posture to a more “rational” military
97mission’. In short, the strategy clearly makes a connection between self-sustaining 
peace and a change of the EAF mission, or in other words their integration into a 
unified military force. Such a mission change is seen as a sine qua non condition for 
force restructuring and downsizing.
This new thinking on the role of the EAF is a far cry from the American- 
inspired balance of forces approach adopted at Dayton. This idea of integration of 
forces was always in the background of international thinking, but its introduction 
constitutes a major shift of strategy that was not appreciated by the Serbs nor the 
Croats. In this new context, a specific function was assigned to articles II and IV. 
The memo continues: ‘full implementation [of articles II and IV] is required to set 
conditions of adequate trust and confidence to make military mission changes and 
eventual integration possible.’ The ‘carrot’ used is promising the parties access to 
Euro-Atlantic structures. The 2000 PIC asked them to ’have armed forces with a 
unified command and control capable of joint deployment and action under
9Rinternational and regional security organisations.’ This is where the OHR strategy 
of building common security institutions and the implementation of annex 1-B 
overlap, the latter being seen as conducive to the former.
After nearly five years of implementation, the effectiveness of articles II and 
IV in bringing about trust between the parties is questionable. From the outside, both
26 OSCE Mission to BiH, Department for Regional Stabilisation, Draft Strategy fo r  Shaping BiH 
Armed Forces, September 2000, OSCE Document no. 4, internal document.
27 OSCE Document no. 2, 14 September 2000, internal document.
28 Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Brussels, 23-24 May 2000.
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agreements seem to have largely been implemented, reshaping the balance of forces 
in the field. But a closer examination of the situation shows that, in spite of 
quantitative and demonstrable achievements, compliance has been restricted to what 
is necessary ‘to keep the international community happy’. The parties comply with 
the minimum demanded by the OSCE, but military stability (not considering 
IFOR/SFOR’s role) and trust have made little headway. The 1999 OSCE report cited 
above points to this problem: ‘they [the parties] consider the [sic] inter-Entity co­
operation like a ’’gift” to be given to the International Community [sic] rather than a 
substantial obligation deriving from the Dayton Peace Accord and a substantial and 
specific advantage for their peoples.’30
In addition to the difficulties in implementing the Florence and Vienna 
agreements identified above, the following issues illustrate why full implementation 
of articles II and IV is still elusive.31 OSCE officials interviewed point to the issue of 
inspections. Even though the parties have entered into a working relationship and 
inspections do take place on a regular basis, their professionalism is doubtful: the 
parties often come unprepared to the inspection sites, and even though they have a 
right to inspect certain areas, they do not exercise it. Lt. Colonel Franklin described 
these inspections as 'a routine, a game’, partly also because the inspectors know
29 Interview by the author with Brigadier U lf Henricsson, Sarajevo, September 2000.
30 OSCE Compendium no. 11, 15 May 1999, internal document.
31 OSCE officials at the Regional Stabilisation Department in Sarajevo confirmed that compliance had 
not been good, or as sarcastically put by one o f them: ‘compliance has been good by Bosnian 
standards.’ Interviews by the author with Brigadier U lf Henricsson, Sarajevo, September 2000 and Lt. 
Col. Franklin, Sarajevo, September 2000.
32 OSCE officials interviewed wonder if  the parties do not have things to hide from each other, and 
knowing it, have tacitly agreed not to be too intrusive in their inspections.
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each other too well.33 Both the self-sustainability of inspections and their usefulness 
in generating trust are therefore doubtful.
Second, because Croat and Serb forces are still financially supported by 
Zagreb and Belgrade respectively, they have even less incentive to co-operate and 
integrate their forces with the Bosniaks.34 The agreements aimed at creating a stable 
military balance between the parties, and had the effect of enabling both Serbs and 
Croats to further strengthen their ties with their patron states, thereby encouraging 
further separation.
Finally, because annex 1-B does nothing to undermine the nationalist power 
structure, but instead treats the representatives of this structure as legitimate actors, 
the local parties have been able to maintain a minimum level of co-operation, whilst 
keeping their separatist agendas. In addition, both agreements are based on an 
interstate template, and make the parties interact as independent actors, further 
legitimising the existence of three military blocks within BiH.36
As the implementation of the Vienna and Florence agreements has remained 
problematic, mistrust between the parties is still running high. This puts into 
question the success of the first strategy of ‘security through deterrence’, to which 
the continuing presence of SFOR to guarantee the truce attests. In this context, the 
second strategy, ‘integration’, has not made much headway either. There is no will
33 Interview by the author with Lt. Col. Franklin, Sarajevo, September 2000.
34 Bosniak forces are also supported by foreign governments, many o f them Islamic, but nonetheless 
favour integration.
35 The Serbs, because they were wary of the military build-up in the Federation, and the Croats 
because they feared the increasingly strong Bosniak Armija.
36 The point could be made that Croats and Bosniaks are made to co-operate under the Federation 
umbrella. In fact, as illustrated above with the example of the verification centre, both forces have 
maintained duplicate structures and send two representatives to meetings of the commissions 
overseeing the agreements.
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among the Croats and the Serbs to co-operate beyond the minimum required by the 
OSCE, and whilst the Bosniaks have shown more willingness to co-operate with the 
two other groups, their majoritarian approach to institution building does not help
IT
alleviate the fears of the two minorities. The next section examines the 
involvement of Croatia and Yugoslavia, as well as the role of ‘Train and Equip’ in 
pulling away from BiH both Croats and Serbs.
2. Train and Equip*, Croatia and Yugoslavia: Centrifugal Forces in 
BiH?
This section looks at the respective roles of T&E as well as Croatia and 
Yugoslavia in further pulling away Croat and Serb forces from BiH. It will show 
that the US-sponsored programme has not fulfilled its promise of helping the 
integration of Croat and Bosniak forces in one fighting force, whilst the success of 
the military balance approach is questionable. Likewise, the continuous support that 
the Bosnian Serbs and Croats receive from Belgrade and Zagreb creates 
disincentives for a rapprochement with the Bosniaks already difficult to engineer.
2.1. T&E and the Security of the Federation
The US government, although it agreed to equip the Bosniaks at the end of 
the war, was unwilling to get involved in the actual process of training and 
equipping local forces. Opposition came mainly from the Pentagon, which was 
worried about the safety of US troops, who could be perceived by the Serbs as 
partial were the US to directly train and equip the Bosniaks. As explained in chapter
37 This point will be examined in more detail below.
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four, the US contracted Military Professional Resources Inc (MPRI) to train the 
Federation army. One of the objectives of T&E, that of ensuring that the Federation 
army had the military capability of deterring and, if necessary, resisting a Serb attack 
will be assessed in this sub-section.
MPRTs role in the Balkans dates back to September 1994, when the 
company was hired by the Croatian government to reorganise their army in order to 
enter the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Even though the role of MPRI in Croatia was 
described as restricted to ‘classroom teaching’, the firm has been suspected of 
having advised the Croatian military during the ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ operations, 
which led to the defeat of Croatian Serb forces in Western Slavonia and the 
Krajina.38 Such suspicions helped shape the view among Serbs that MPRI’s training 
of the Federation army is aiming at achieving another Serb defeat.
The company started to operate in Bosnia in July 1996, following the 
adoption of the new Federation defence law and after the Bosniaks severed all ties 
with Iranian fighting and intelligence groups. In October, the first training under the 
programme was initiated. MPRI were keen to emphasise that their teaching was 
geared towards defensive tactics.40 Initial reactions among Federation officers were 
less than enthusiastic, because they were expecting training centred on offensive 
tactics 41
38 For a discussion o f these allegations, see Yves Goulet, “Washington’s Freelance Advisors”, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review 10, no. 7 (1 July 1998): 38.
39 The second major training programme initiated by MPRI began in May 1998, with the training of a 
Federation Ranger battalion, based on the US Rangers model.
40 Goulet, Washington’s Freelance Advisors, p. 58.
41 See Tammy Arbuckle, “Building a Bosnian Army”, International Defense Review  30, no. 8 (1 
August 1997): 58.
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In a first phase, five defensive tasks were taught to officers, company 
commanders and non-commissioned officers (NCO’s). The training comprised four 
other phases. In the second phase, the newly acquired skills in defensive warfare 
were to be taught under the supervision of MPRI instructors in the various units by 
the officers and NCO’s who had just completed the courses. Thirdly, brigade, 
battalion and company commanders were sent to a simulation training centre, with 
state-of-the-art combat simulators. There the trainees’ knowledge of the five tasks 
was tested in an electronically created combat scenario. The final two phases of the 
training consisted of training on some of the new weaponry delivered under T&E, 
including live exercises at the Livno training grounds.
In spite of MPRI’s emphasis on defensive tactics, the destabilising effect of 
T&E cannot be underestimated. A SFOR official interviewed complained that it 
made little sense to try to re-create a state dimension of defence whilst at the same 
time increasing the Federation army’s military capability, because of the mistrust 
that such an endeavour generates among VRS officials.42 This comment casts doubt 
on the compatibility between the military balance approach enshrined in annex 1-B 
and the OHR effort at recreating a state-wide defence capacity. However, from a 
Federation perspective, T&E has certainly helped enhance its security. But because 
of the lack of integration among Croats and Bosniaks, weapons deliveries have also 
increased mistrust among Federation partners 43 The Croats, outnumbered by three 
to one have happily continued to receive military assistance from Croatia in the face 
of the Bosniak military build-up. This lack of unity further undermines the military
' Confidential interview a.
2 See annex 2 for a list o f the weapons delivered under T&E. It is worth pointing out that many of 
these weapons have an offensive potential.
balance strategy contained in annex 1-B because the wartime alliance between 
Bosniaks and Croats could not be solidified.
As explained above, one of the stated objectives of T&E was to guarantee the 
military security of the Federation in the face of a renewed Serb attack. The extent to 
which T&E has achieved this objective is unclear. However, this consideration is of 
lesser importance for two reasons. First, SFOR is still on the ground, maintaining the 
truce. Even with reduced troop numbers, the NATO-led force still acts as a deterrent 
force. Its presence is in itself an acknowledgement that the strategy of military 
balance, advocated by the US, has been unsuccessful. Indeed, the establishment of 
such a balance should have facilitated the withdrawal of the peacekeepers.
The second consideration has to do with the preparedness of the EAF. An 
OSCE official interviewed in September 2000 painted a bleak picture of the EAFs’ 
level of combat readiness, even though the Federation still has a qualitative 
advantage because of T&E.44 He described their weapons systems as not operational 
and their personnel as ill-motivated. He underscored the lack of funds for training 
and the maintenance of military hardware45 When asked specifically about the 
impact of T&E on the military situation, he questioned its impact by citing 
maintenance problems, the lack of spare parts and training in hampering the 
Federation’s ability to use the hardware to its full potential.
3 Interview by the author with Brigadier U lf Henricsson, Sarajevo, September 2000.
4 This analysis seems congruent with that o f Robert Barry, OSCE head o f  mission, who in an internal 
memo stated that a discussion should begin with Croatia and BiH to reduce their levels o f heavy 
weaponry. He then concluded that ‘heavy weapons now in storage are deteriorating in any case and 
neither BiH nor Croatia can afford to maintain them.’ Memo by Ambassador Robert Barry to 
Lieutenant General Ronald Adam, SFOR Commander and Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, HR, 
dated 7 March 2000. A SFOR official told the author that a lot o f  the Federation equipment was 
maintained with MPRI money. Confidential interview a.
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The lack of combat-readiness of the Federation army does not mean that their 
heavy weapons are inoperative. Rather, it means that these weapons could not be 
used to their full potential in the event of military confrontation. It also means that 
the mistrust that such a large amount of weapons creates between the former 
belligerents may not be completely justified, since all parties seem to be 
experiencing difficulties in maintaining their military equipment.46 However, the 
qualitative advantage acquired by the Federation army because of T&E does 
legitimately generate mistrust in the RS, thereby undermining efforts at integration 
in the field of defence.
2.2. T&E and Integration between Croats and Bosniaks within the Federation
The Federation army is made up of four corps, three of which are Bosniak 
and one Croat. There is no integration of troops below the corps level, despite plans 
drawn up by the US to start integration after three years.47 Brigades trained under 
T&E at the Pazaric training ground were housed separately, and did not mix 
together, except for military exercises 48 Likewise, weapons delivered under T&E 
were probably divided between Bosniaks and Croats in the ratio of 2:1 for battle 
tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and 1.9:1 for armoured combat 
vehicles 49 At the political level, the minister of defence is a Croat, and his deputy a 
Bosniak. Decisions between them are taken by consensus. As for commanding
46 In June 1997 the LA Times reported that the RS had difficulties maintaining its military equipment. 
This was confirmed to the author in an interview in September 2000 with James Lyon o f the ICG.
47 The US was hoping to use T&E as a carrot to induce Bosniaks and Croats to integrate their forces. 
Resistance from the parties has prevented any form o f integration below the corps level.
48 See LA Times, 4 June 1997.
49 This assumption is based on the allocation of destruction liabilities between Croats and Bosniaks 
under article IV. See SIPRI, Yearbook 1997, p. 519.
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positions, the commander of the Federation army is a Bosniak, whilst his deputy 
commander, also his chief of staff is a Croat. When the Federation army commander 
is absent, he is not replaced by his deputy, but by a Bosniak general. Likewise, were 
his deputy to be away, he is replaced by a Croat officer.50
This policy was decided between the SDA and the HDZ, who, as further 
developed below, also appoint military commanders in the Federation army.51 
Decisions within the Federation ministry of defence are taken by consensus, on the 
insistence of the Croats, who largely outnumbered and not holding the position of 
army commander, have managed to maintain some control over decisions in the 
Federation army.52 Bosniaks criticise this system as impractical in a military 
structure, where decisions have to be taken swiftly by the commander.53 
Consequently, they have been pushing for granting the Federation army commander 
the authority to take decisions without the consent of his deputy.54 The Croats retort 
that they would be open to non-consensual decision-making if there was parity 
between them and the Bosniaks in the composition of the Federation ministry of 
defence and joint operations centre, and rotation between the two groups for key 
positions such as Federation army commander, deputy commander, chief of staff or
50 ICG, Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement, ICG Balkans Report no. 80 
(Sarajevo: ICG, 1999) pp. 8-9.
51 ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, pp. 8-9.
52 The ratio between Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation ministry o f defence and the joint 
operations command is 2.3:1.
53 Interview by the author with Brigadier Enes Becirbasic, military advisor to President Alija 
Izetbegovic, Sarajevo, August 2000.
54 Interview by the author with Brigadier Vlado Juric, Croat member o f the Defence Policy Working 
Group of the SCMM, Sarajevo, August 2000.
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other commanding positions.55 As late as November 2000, no compromise had been 
found between the two positions.
The situation in the Federation army and ministry of defence has not been 
altered by T&E. In this sense, the programme has been unsuccessful. Indeed, 
integration of the Federation armies has remained superficial, as shown by the Croat 
walkout from the Federation army in March 2001. However, T&E has helped the 
building of Federation structures that, should there be a will to make them function, 
could constitute the basis for a truly unified Federation army, although some factors 
are likely to make integration difficult.
First, Bosniaks and Croats were bitter enemies during the war in Central 
Bosnia. The fragile alliance that the US pressured them into will take time to 
become a true partnership. In this context of mistrust, hoping for complete 
integration is wishful thinking. In addition, Western nations like the UK, Belgium 
and Switzerland have not completely integrated their forces, as there exist separate 
units. Complete integration, therefore, is neither necessary nor desirable in order to 
achieve the creation of a state dimension of defence in BiH. What is necessary, 
however, is for Bosniak and Croat forces to change their perceptions of each other. 
As long as they regard each other as enemies, integration will remain elusive. In this 
context, the control still exercised by the nationalist parties over the Federation 
armies, especially by the HDZ whose separatist preferences are well-known, and 
their insistence on the ethnic criterion in the command structure and in 
appointments, is an obstacle on the road to co-operation.
Second, the situation of the Croats in the Federation needs to be taken into 
consideration if  integration is to make headway. There is little hope that they will
55 Interview by the author with Brigadier Vlado Juric, Sarajevo, August 2000.
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agree to look towards Sarajevo if their fear of being completely dominated by the 
Bosniaks is not addressed (should integration with the Serbs be possible, it would 
lead to a further marginalisation for the Croats). This issue illustrates the difficult of 
reconciling minority rights (and in this case, security) with majoritarian democracy.
2.3. The Role of Croatia and Yugoslavia
Since the end of the war, all three parties in BiH have received outside 
military assistance. The Bosniaks have received aid under T&E mainly from Islamic 
countries, whilst the Croats and Serbs have been militarily supported by Croatia and 
Yugoslavia.56 Serb officers still receive their salaries from Belgrade and hold ranks 
concurrently in the Bosnian Serb and the Yugoslav armies. In addition, incumbent 
Serb officers receive military training in Belgrade.57 Croatia has also militarily 
supported Croats in BiH. Assistance has been reduced since the HDZ lost power in 
2000, but not eliminated. In spite of a commitment from Croatia in June 2000 to 
channel its military assistance through the Standing Committee on Military Matters 
(SCMM) in order to make it more transparent, in September 2000 the change had 
still not come into effect.58 The following table shows the levels of foreign military 
assistance for all three parties since they have begun reporting them under measure I 
of article II:
56 In 1998, the ABiH received its military assistance from the US (through MPRI), Brunei, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Malaysia. These countries also supported the Croat 
component o f the Federation army, at a ratio o f 1:3. See ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, pp. 9-10.
57 Interview by the author with Brigadier Enes Becirbasic, Sarajevo, August 2000 and Lieutenant 
Colonel Philip Cox, SOI to the military advisor, OHR, Sarajevo, August 2000.
58 This was confirmed to the author by Brigadier Enes Becirbasic and by Phil Cox in his interviews 
with them.
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Table V: Military Budgets of the EAF, 1998-2000, German Deutsche Marks 
(DEM), in Millions___________________________________________________
Military Budgets, 
DEM, in millions
1998 1999 2000 
(planned, as of
Federation Total 418 495 390
Foreign Assistance
252 (48%) 215(45%) 102 (26.1%)
HVO 141 127 Unavailable
HVO Fo 141(100%) 127(100%) Unavailable
Armija 277 368 Unavailable
Armija BiH  
Foreign Assistance
111 (40%) 64 (5,75%) Unavailable
RS Total 101 124 105
RS Foreign
' *• A •  AAssistance
28 (28%) 30 (24%) 19(18%)
Source: ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, pp. 9-10 and OSCE internal document no. 6, June 2000.
The substantial amount of foreign military assistance that the parties receive, 
as shown in the above table, is one that concerns all three parties and makes 
integration more problematic. Indeed, the support that the Croats and the Serbs 
receive has one major consequence: so far it has allowed most of the people who 
prosecuted the war to stay in command of military forces, without having to change 
their secessionist policies. This means that the same people who fought a 
secessionist war are still for the most part present in military structures.
In addition, appointment in the Federation army, is based on political 
affiliation.59 Since the HDZ has proven resistant to attempts at integration, there is 
little doubt that those appointed by the party will not espouse a different line. 
Considering the sympathies of Belgrade for a RS as ‘autonomous’ as possible, again 
it is doubtful that the personnel trained and supported by Yugoslavia will be open to 
integration either. The fact that Croats and Serbs receive military assistance from
59 Croat and Bosniak military personnel are appointed by the HDZ and the SDA respectively. See 
ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, pp. 8-9.
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neighbouring states who played a significant role during the war in undermining the 
Bosnian state further complicates the task of state-building.60
However, the international community does not necessarily regard support 
for the Croat component of the Federation army as a problem in the short term. In a 
memo to the HR and the commander of SFOR, written after meeting the new 
authorities in Zagreb, the head of the OSCE mission in BiH, Robert Barry, suggested 
that Croatia should be urged to continue its support to the HVO for a transitional 
period, as long as this ‘subsidy [was used] to promote transparency, integration of 
the Federation armed forces and a phase-out of all foreign military support to the 
BiH armed forces.’61 It is worth pointing out that Barry does not think that the 
integration of the HVO in the Federation army will result from a decreasing support 
from Croatia. In his view, what is preventing integration is not Croatian support, but 
rather the conditions of its provision.
A paper produced by Jacques Klein, the head of UNMIBH, for the SCMM, 
points to the potential consequences of the political change in Croatia for the HVO. 
Klein is wary that the Croat component will receive less support from Croatia, 
thereby undermining the military balance struck with the RS (even though he 
recognises that the Bosnian Serb army is weak) and leaving the Bosniaks as ‘the 
dominant force in a post-SFOR BiH.’62 Both diplomats seem keen to see a less 
nationalist Croatia still play a role in support of the HVO.
60 Things have improved on the Croat side since the defeat o f the HDZ in 2000, but the Bosnian 
branch o f the HDZ has been able to remain in command o f significant military resources in BiH.
61 Memo by Ambassador Robert Barry to Lieutenant General Ronald Adam, SFOR Commander and 
Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, HR, dated 7 March 2000.
62 Memo by Jacques Paul Klein, UN Special Rep to Zivko Radisic, Chairman o f the SCMM, 28 
March 2000.
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This concern points to another issue when it comes to integration of forces: 
the dominant position that the Bosniaks would like to occupy in emerging joint 
military structures. Their insistence on dominating military structures because they 
represent the largest group in the Federation and in BiH does not help create the trust 
necessary for integration.63 The creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the security of 
all groups in a sector as sensitive as defence is crucial to any effort at integration. 
This issue, in conjunction with resistance from the HDZ and Serb power structures, 
explains the lack of integration. Moreover, given the fact that they receive support 
from Islamic states, and given the involvement of the SDA in appointments, Croats 
and Serbs can easily claim that the Bosniaks still have connections with Islamic 
fundamentalism.64
Finally, the amount of foreign military assistance that the parties receive 
allows them to maintain high military expenditures and large armies that would not 
be sustainable without this outside help. The levels of military spending in BiH are 
enormous compared to other European countries: for 1999, military budgets 
represented respectively 38% and 21% of the Federation and RS budgets (without 
counting foreign assistance). In addition, 1.7% of the Bosnian population was under
63 Enes Becirbasic insisted in his interview with the author that consensual decision-making would be 
impractical were the EAF to be reintegrated. He did not specify to what extent he would be willing to 
see non-Bosniaks in key decisional positions.
64 Throughout the war, the SDA received substantial military and financial support from Iran. These 
connections were a source of concern among Western powers and the US conditioned its assistance to 
the Bosniaks on the removal o f officials with Iranian connections. Political and military influence 
from Iran has been eliminated , but the ‘Islamic argument’ is used by the Croats and Serbs with great 
ease. For an interesting analysis o f the role o f Islam in Bosnia, see Slavejko Sasajkovski, “’Political 
Islam’ and Bosnia and Herzegovina” New Balkan Politics 2 (Spring 2001, accessed 18 June 2001) 
[journal on-line]; available from www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/issue 2/sasaikovski.eng.asp; 
Internet.
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arms.65 The decision to maintain large military forces is one that is taken within BiH, 
but the support received from outside sources has helped the parties to avoid the 
issue of force restructuring until 1999 or a change in the mission of the EAF.66
2. T&E, Croatia and Yugoslavia: Implications for the Balance of 
Forces, Control over Territory, the Security Dilemma and 
Democratisation
The first section already pointed to the fact that the implementation of annex 
1-B has not been successful in alleviating the security dilemma between the EAF, 
but also between Croats and Bosniaks. Annex 1-B did affect the balance of forces, 
by strengthening the hand of the Federation army, thereby contributing to increase 
mistrust on the part of a weakened VRS. Finally, by granting further legitimacy to 
the representatives of the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs, the regimes set up under 
annex 1-B haVe contributed to consolidating the grip of the nationalists on military 
forces, allowing them to maintain the status quo: a BiH largely divided into three 
ethnically pure territories, each defended by armed forces whose security threats 
come from within, not without.
These trends have been consolidated by T&E as well as the role played by 
Croatia and Yugoslavia. The changes in the military balance that both annex 1-B and 
T&E have brought about have heightened the security dilemma for the RS. As
65 For example, if  the same proportion of the German population was under arms, the Bundeswehr 
would total 1.3 million active duty personnel, whereas it only comprises 310,000 at the moment. See 
OSCE document no. 5, internal document.
66 As asked by the PIC both in 1999 and 2000, the parties have agreed to two 15% reductions of their 
forces. Brigadier Henricsson told the author that priority had been given to force restructuring over 
agreeing on a common security policy, because the latter was almost impossible to achieve in the
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explained, the VRS is asked by the international community to co-operate more 
closely with a force whose combat capacity has been quantitatively and qualitatively 
increased since the end of the war. Co-operation, already resisted for ideological 
reasons, is likely to be further undermined by the mistrust generated. Moreover, the 
military build-up in the Federation has led the RS to strengthen the existing military 
ties it has with rump Yugoslavia. Within the Federation, in the face of the Bosniak 
military build-up, Croats have continued to receive military assistance from and to 
look towards Croatia, even if the situation might be changing with the coming to 
power of a new coalition in Zagreb. However, these developments have not 
challenged the division of the country into three territories largely ethnically 
homogeneous, as the presence of IFOR/SFOR has not allowed the parties to 
consider military action as a viable option.
As far as democratisation is concerned, T&E as well as Croatia and 
Yugoslavia have contributed to the further solidification of the nationalist power 
structure. In the case of Croats and Serbs, the support received has allowed them to 
maintain large armies whose mission is the defence of the territories they control. 
This has clearly undermined reintegration, which seeks to remove barriers between 
former belligerents, not to maintain structures that resist it. As far as other aspects of 
democratisation are concerned, the military support that Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs 
receive strengthens the hand of the nationalists who are in a position to use these 
resources to pursue their wartime agendas of ethnic separation and undemocratic 
politics. The next section turns to efforts of the OHR at rebuilding a state-dimension 
of defence.
short term. The idea was to kick-start the process o f force reduction by presenting it as an economic
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3. Bosnia-Herzeqovina’s State Dimension of Defence: Wishful 
Thinking?
The Madrid PIC in December 1998 instructed the parties to work on a 
common security policy and a state dimension of defence. At the heart of the 
planned development lay the Standing Committee for Military Matters (SCMM), the 
institution that would eventually become the embryo of a ministry of defence, as 
wished by the international community.67 In May 2000 the PIC restated its wish to 
see the SCMM developed into a state defence structure.68 The international 
community has linked this development to the issue of force restructuring. In 
essence, the international strategy regarding the military has evolved to focus on 
three issues: a redefinition of BiH’s security and defence policy, parallel to a 
restructuring (and reduction) of the EAF that would eventually fit the new defence 
policy, and the development of a state dimension of defence.
This section examines the attempts by the OHR at pursuing these three 
objectives. These efforts have met with little success mainly because of two factors. 
One is the nationalist power structure, which in the case of the Croats and the Serbs 
prevents any form of centralisation in the field of defence, and the other is the 
question of ethnic power sharing in joint defence structures. Indeed, in such a 
sensitive field as defence, the question of political control is crucial. This section is 
divided in three. The first sub-section examines what has been achieved in the field 
of force restructuring. The second sub-section looks at the developments that the
necessity (see below).
67 Peace Implementation Agenda , Madrid, 16 December 1998.
68 Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council, Brussels, 23/24 May 2000.
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SCMM has undergone. Finally, the third sub-section focuses on the development of 
a common security and defence policy.
3.1. Force Restructuring
The parties agreed to two reductions of forces in 1999 and 2000. The goal of 
these reductions on the part of the international community was to trigger a process 
of restructuring of the EAF towards a less confrontational posture as well as to 
reduce the share of defence costs in the budgets of the entities.69 Indeed, a large 
proportion of international assistance was absorbed by the military through the T&E 
programme and the funding of the budget deficit, which allows the parties to 
maintain high defence expenditures. Federation officials were, however, quick to 
specify that reducing ‘military potential’ as asked for by the PIC, did not mean a 
reduction in arms and military equipment.70 For 1999, force reduction did not lead to
• • • 7 1any significant force restructuring, although 7,064 soldiers were demobilised. For 
2000, another 5,984 were to be demobilised, with SFOR playing a role in planning 
and verifying force reductions.
Little progress has been made towards a real restructuring of forces and the 
parties have managed to make quantitative cuts in their forces without 
fundamentally changing their mission. In addition, an agreement over cuts in heavy 
weaponry is compounded by the regional dimension: indeed, in order to maintain the 
5:2:2 ratio in military equipment between FRY, Croatia and BiH, all three countries 
would have to agree to further cuts, which is unlikely in the near future. The
69 OHR Military Cell Update -Current Events- 15 March 2000, internal document.
70 This means that the military balance approach would be preserved (see below). Federation 
document on force restructuring in the Federation.
71 3,450 from the ABiH, 1,500 from the HVO and 2,114 from the VRS.
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difficulties experienced in force restructuring are therefore compounded by the 
military balance approach enshrined in Dayton. The US government, sponsor of the 
military balance approach, was wary that force reductions would undermine the 
ability of the Bosniaks to resist a Serb attack supported by the JNA.72 More 
realistically, force reductions in BiH make SFOR’s withdrawal more difficult, unless 
similar reductions also take place in Yugoslavia and Croatia to stay within the 5:2:2 
ratio or unless the EAF change their mission to the protection of BiH’s borders. 
Finally, Serb and Croat nationalist power structures are resisting change in the 
mission of the EAF because it is seen as potentially conducive to the integration of 
forces, which would undermine their capacity to control both their armies and their 
territories. This lack of progress in force restructuring is mirrored in the field of a 
common security and defence policy.
3.2. Common Security and Defence Policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina
The OHR has been driving the process of drafting a security and defence 
policy for BiH for several reasons. First, it would help rationalise the EAF and 
reduce the strain they put on the economy. Second, a common defence and security 
policy would help guide the process of force restructuring commenced earlier. Third, 
the OHR hoped that creating a common security and defence policy would lead to a 
spill over effect in other common institutions, where progress had been slow.
The writing of a security policy for BiH was assigned to a working group 
composed of the entities’ defence ministers, and a representative of the ministry of
72 This argument is, however, unrealistic: even at the peak o f their military strength, the Bosniaks 
would never be capable of resisting a combined VRS/JNA offensive. Fax from Robert Barry to State 
Secretary Jan Eliasson, 11 February 2000.
73 Draft o f OHR Military Cell, 17 January 2000, internal document.
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foreign affairs. The process was overseen by a representative from the OHR. This 
working group began working in July 1999 and reached a consensus over key 
principles in December of that year. These were broad enough to accommodate all 
the parties. These key principles were: respect for the territorial integrity of BiH, 
acceptance of the GFA as the basis for the constitutional order of BiH, protection of 
the rights of all three constituent peoples, development of special relations between 
the RS and the Federation and Yugoslavia and Croatia respectively, and transition to 
democracy. In effect, these principles built on the ambiguities of the GFA. They 
recognise the territorial integrity of BiH, but reaffirm the importance of the military 
balance approach as a prerequisite for trust and security, as well as the possibility of 
special relations with neighbouring states.74
Under the impulsion of the OHR, the SCMM mandated another working 
group to draft a common defence policy, composed of representatives of the entities’ 
defence ministers and a representative of the OHR. The process consisted of three 
phases, which would eventually lead to a common defence policy. In the first phase, 
the working group was to gather information about defence policies in other multi­
ethnic states. Each member of the working group was then to prepare his draft of the 
defence policy. Finally, the three papers should be turned into a common defence 
policy. Progress on the issue has been very slow, and the parties have put forward 
conflicting views. The Bosniaks insisted on the Presidency as having overall civilian 
command over the EAF, thereby implying that the constitution provides for a state 
dimension of defence. The Serbs, in turn, refused any form of centralisation on the 
grounds that defence is within the jurisdiction of the entities. The Croats, finally, 
were not openly opposed to integration, but would allow it only on the basis of
74 Security Policy Working Group, Basic Recommendations fo r Defining the BiH Security Policy, 23
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consensual decision-making, equal representation and rotation in positions of all 
three groups in common defence structures, demands that the Bosniaks find 
unacceptable.75
This debate is heavily influenced by three factors, identified earlier. First, 
Croat and Serb nationalists seek to maintain their grip on the territories they control, 
and see any form of centralisation as a menace to it. Second, because defence is such 
a sensitive field, the parties, and especially the Croats, want to stay in control of the 
decision-making process, and resist plans that would marginalize them. Finally, the 
role played by T&E further exacerbates the security fears of the Serbs. They are 
confronted with two realities: on the one hand, the Federation army is being built up 
by MPRI, and on the other, they are being asked to gradually give up the control 
they exercise over their armed forces.
3.3. Institutional Development of the Standing Committee on Military Matters
The SCMM did not meet for the first time until May 1997, after intense 
pressure by the international community. The three members of the Presidency then 
agreed on the rules of procedure for the committee. Some of these have a direct 
bearing upon the creation of a state dimension of defence. Indeed, under these rules, 
the SCMM is authorised to co-ordinate the activities of the EAF and serve as a 
forum for discussion of any military issue. It can also consult with the RS and 
Federation presidents for the purpose of reviewing the military situation in BiH and 
recommend to the entities measures to enhance the security of BiH as a whole.
December 1999. By November 2000, no common security policy had been agreed on.
75 The author attended a seminar for the Defence working group at King’s College, London in August 
2000. These arguments were presented by the Bosniak, Serb and Croat representatives.
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Finally, it can also make suggestions on how the EAF should operate in order to
nc
enhance the sovereignty and protect the territorial integrity of BiH.
These objectives, quite broad, give a lot of latitude to the SCMM to serve as 
the engine for the creation of a state dimension of defence, should there be a political 
will to move in that direction. A NATO background brief written in March 2000
77points to some of the difficulties plaguing the SCMM. These revolve around two 
issues: the lack of resources and the lack of consensus over the role of this common 
institution. Both issues underscore the fact ‘that [the] Entities still seem wary of 
allowing the SCMM to become too powerful and detracting [sic] from their control 
over defence’.78
As with other parts of the GFA, the international community is given a 
central role in overseeing the functioning of the SCMM. In addition to the three 
members of the Bosnian presidency and their advisors, the two ministers of defence 
and the commanders of the EAF, who are the regular members of the committee, the 
international community sends as observers to its meetings a representative from the 
HR, the SFOR commander, the OSCE and the UN special representative. The 
international community also increased the importance of the SCMM when the HR 
decided to interpret article V.A. of annex 4 (on the civilian command of armed 
forces) as meaning that the presidency as a whole exercises civilian command over 
all armed forces. This decision was fiercely contested both by the RS president at the 
time, Nicolai Poplasen, in February 1999, and by the Croat member of the
76 SCMM rules o f procedure, art. II, para. 1 and 2. All decisions in the SCMM are taken by consensus.
77 Michelle Adhimar, NATO Balkans Task Force, “Standing Committee on Military Matters - 
Backgound B rief’, 22 March 2000, internal document.
78 Adhimar, Standing Committee.
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presidency, who in February 2000 denied ‘that the Presidency has accepted the final 
responsibility for the [sic] defence issues’.79
In July 1999, the SCMM agreed to establish a permanent secretariat, 
consisting of the three military advisors to the members of the presidency (who can 
be seconded) and three permanent administrative staff. Once again, representatives 
from the OHR, OSCE, SFOR and UNMIBH attend the weekly meetings of the 
secretariat. The task of the secretariat is one of administrative support to the SCMM 
in all its activities, as well as one of liaison with the EAF, their ministries of defence 
(MoD), and the Bosnian ministry of foreign affairs. As with the SCMM, all
OA
decisions are taken by consensus. The international strategy adopted has been to 
make the parties co-operate on specific issues in the various working groups. By 
separating the issues, the OHR was hoping that the lack of progress in one area 
would not prevent progress in another. This functionalist approach has bome some 
fruit: the working group on peacekeeping operations has made considerable 
progress, so much so that police and military observers from all three groups 
participated in UN peacekeeping missions in 2000. However, these achievements 
should not mask the fact that the parties have not given up any competence in the 
field of defence, and that the secretariat is not much more than a co-ordinating 
mechanism for the EAF.
79 Letter from Wolfgang Petritsch, HR, to Ante Jelavic, Alija Izetbegovic and Zivko Radisic, dated 11 
February 2000. The letter reiterates the decision made by the HR that civilian command over the 
armed forces rests with the presidency.
80 Powerpoint presentation on the SCMM and its secretariat by Enes Becirbasic (no date). In addition, 
five working groups were formed to work on specific defence issues: security/defence policy, 
reduction of the EAF, participation in peacekeeping missions, military budgeting and housing, 
fulfilment o f BiH’s obligations under the GFA.
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3.4. Integrating the Entities Armed Forces and the Issue of Ethnic Power- 
Sharing
The difficulties encountered by the international community in trying to 
create a state-wide dimension of defence stem from two factors. First, as argued in 
the previous sections, the Vienna and Florence agreements have not led to increased 
trust and close co-operation between the parties in the field of defence, as the 
nationalists have complied with the agreements only to the extent that they allowed 
them to maintain the three-way division of BiH’s armed forces.
Second, the question of the nature of power-sharing mechanisms has been 
central to the limited institutional development that has taken place in the field of 
defence. In a field as sensitive as defence, the parties have been reluctant to agree to 
any arrangement that would undermine their control of the decision-making process. 
How to address this concern, whilst allowing for some measure of integration to take 
place is an ongoing concern for the international community.
4. Conclusion: Is Annex 1-B Consolidating the Divisions of the 
Country?
The OSCE and the OHR, as explained in the introduction, may seem to have 
been working in opposite directions in BiH. The OSCE, by implementing the 
Vienna and Florence agreements, has been solidifying the division of the country 
into two military blocs, whilst not challenging the continuing division of the 
Federation army. The OHR, on the other hand, has been attempting to re-create a 
state dimension of defence. This chapter has shown that both approaches are seen as 
complementary by the international community. Annex 1-B is supposed to ensure
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the security of the parties, and build the trust necessary between them to proceed to 
build a state-wide defence sector.
However, the destabilising effect of having three armies in the country, who 
see their security threats as internal, has prevented any meaningful progress with 
integration. In this context, the impact of T&E on these security threats has been 
underscored, and the inconsistency of the international community has further 
compounded the situation. Indeed, external actors have, at the same time, asked the 
parties to co-operate in the field of defence, whilst increasing the military potential 
of the Federation army. This inconsistency highlights the difficulties of combining a 
military balance approach with the creation of a unified defence sector, geared 
towards the defence of the borders of the state. It also points to the differences, 
exploited by the parties, between the US, who support T&E and the military balance 
approach, and the Europeans, as well as some in SFOR and the OSCE, who regard 
the programme as counter-productive and destabilising.
In addition, implementation of articles II and IV has been limited to the 
minimum required by the OSCE, whilst attempts at developing the SCMM or 
common security and defence policies have been stalled by the parties. Progress is 
undeniable, but the central role played by the OSCE and the OHR in pushing the 
parties forward casts doubt on the willingness to co-operate. Several reasons for this 
lack of progress have been identified in this chapter. Croat and Serb nationalists, 
with separatist agendas, certainly play a large role in hampering progress. Supported 
by neighbouring states, they have little incentive to abandon their position or 
significantly reduce their defence expenditures, although this chapter has shown that 
the picture may be changing with regard to the Croats. Their and the Serb separatist 
agenda should not mask the fact that all nationalists, including the Bosniaks, are
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keen to maintain their grip on the territories they control, and to continue their policy 
of sharing resources among themselves. The development of a state dimension of 
defence therefore threatens the control that all three groups exercise over these 
territories.
The issue of power-sharing is also slowing down progress in making 
common defence institutions work and develop, because the fears of the two 
Bosnian minorities that they would be dominated in common structures have not 
been addressed. The issue is particularly acute in the field of defence, where the 
security of minorities can only be guaranteed by consensual decision mechanisms, 
which inevitably slows down progress. As long as the parties see their security 
threats as coming from within, an issue exacerbated by annex 1-B’s military balance 
approach, it is doubtful that these institutions will further develop or that the 
structure of the EAF will be significantly altered. The next chapter will look at the 
role of EPTF in reforming police forces.
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Chapter 7: UNMIBH’s Role in Reforming Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’s Police Forces, 1995-2000
This chapter examines the role of the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(UNMEBH), and particularly of one of its components, the International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) in assisting the reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s police forces. These 
forces, loyal to the nationalist parties, have been responsible for extensive human 
rights violations during and after the war, and have been widely used by the 
nationalists to maintain their grip on the territories they control, thereby preventing 
respect for individual rights and the rule of law. One of the main questions of the 
thesis, regarding the consequences for democratisation, including the rebuilding of a 
single political space, of entrusting the control of security forces in the hands of the 
parties in line with a hard realist strategy, is therefore answered in this chapter.
However, another dimension of the equation, the role of third parties in 
restructuring the security sector leads one to qualify this answer. UNMIBH’s 
mandate falls short of granting enforcement powers to the UN mission (see chapter 
four). Because of this situation, the international agency has been unable to bring 
significant pressure to bear on the parties to reintegrate and reform their police 
forces along democratic lines. The reform process conducted by EPTF, consisting of 
monitoring and advising, has nonetheless borne limited fruit.
Three sets of results stand out: police forces have been reduced to numbers 
more consistent with democratic policing whilst those serving in the police have 
been identified, increasing transparency; minorities have begun to be integrated in 
the police, although very slowly; and UNMEBH has been able to use the 
investigation powers it was granted in 1997 to somewhat rein in local police forces. 
However, internal deficiencies have reduced the impact of UNMIBH on the reform
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process. Three are identified in this chapter: a lack of resources, the high turnover in 
the mission and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
The cases of the State Border Service (SBS) and of police reform in Brcko 
will be used to show that the reintegration of forces and progress towards democratic 
policing have taken place where the international community has been granted more 
control over the reform process, whilst being willing to invest the necessary 
resources in the process.
However, the limited impact that UNMIBH has had on the structure of BiH’s 
police forces has implications for the security transition. First, it has allowed the 
nationalists to largely continue to use police forces to maintain their control over 
territory, as well as the ethnic composition of the areas they control. Second, 
although UNMIBH’s work has reduced the capacity of the parties to use police 
forces for tasks others than those relating to internal security, police forces have 
continued to contribute to the main aim of the war: the creation of ethnically pure 
statelets carved out of the territory of BiH. In that sense, police forces continue to 
enter into the calculations of the parties regarding the balance of forces, even if 
strictly speaking they are not military forces under annex 1-B. This point underlines 
the nature of the conflict in BiH, where most targets were civilian.
The first section of this chapter will show how police forces are linked with 
and have supported the agenda of the nationalists, thereby preventing respect for 
individual rights and for the rule of law. The second section looks at the role of IPTF 
in training and monitoring police forces. IPTF, because it does not have the power to 
directly dismiss officials, but rather relies mainly on persuasion and cajoling, has 
been able to do little to bring about in-depth changes in police practices. The final 
section examines the role of the UN in creating the state border service and an
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integrated, multi-ethnic police force in Brcko, arguing that only through sustained, 
resource-intensive efforts has the international community been able to create 
reintegrated police forces operating according to democratic standards of policing.
1. Police Forces in Bosnia-Herzeqovina since 1995: Unwilling to 
Maintain the Rule of Law and to Protect Individual Rights
This section discusses the role played by police forces in the aftermath of the 
war. It argues that these forces have continued to operate under the direction of 
nationalist authorities seeking to prevent democratisation. They have done so by 
either being directly involved in actions against minorities or political opponents, or 
by turning a blind eye to the activities of paramilitary organisations or individuals 
responsible for human rights violations.
Various human rights reports published since the end of the war report 
widespread human rights violations against ethnic minorities and political opponents 
throughout BiH.1 The role of the local police in relation to these violations is often 
one of non-intervention against the offenders, or against paramilitary groups 
operating throughout BiH. In other cases, the police has been directly involved in 
incidents against minorities or political opponents. Incidents have been, as during 
the war, more frequent in Croat and Serb-held areas, but as early as 1996, there were 
signs that the Bosniaks were adopting a harder stance towards minorities, and 
committing similar violations to the ones experienced in areas where Bosniaks
1 See, for instance, HRW, Bosnia-Herzegovina: No Justice, No Peace, vol. 8, no. 15 (London: Human 
Rights Watch, 1996) pp. 9-15; ICG, House Burnings: Obstruction o f  the Right to Return to Drvar, 
ICG Bosnia Report no. 24 (Sarajevo: ICG, 1997); HRW, ’A Closed, Dark P lace’: Past and Present 
Human Rights Abuses in Foca [report on-line] (New York, NY: 1997, accessed 7 August 2000); 
available from www.hrw.org/reports98/foca.: Internet.
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represent the minority. A report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) covering the period August to November 2000 stated that
‘[l]ocal police have, in many instances, failed to provide effective 
protection to members of minority constituent people and reports 
continue to be received of returnees experiencing harassment that may be 
sanctioned by the local police. Widespread insecurity continues to prevail 
in certain areas, and perpetrators of criminal acts against minority 
returnees regularly go unpunished.’3
Examples drawn from the Federation and the RS show how the parties have 
continued to implement their wartime policies of forced ethnic separation.
The city of Mostar epitomises the fracture of the Federation in cantons 
largely mono-ethnic, and the continuation of the policy o f ethnic cleansing. The city 
is divided between east and west Mostar, respectively dominated by Bosniaks and 
Croats. There too this ethnic make up is the result o f wartime ethnic cleansing. 
Mostar’s continuing division exemplifies the refusal o f the HDZ leaders to be 
integrated in political structures with the Bosniaks because they see integration as a 
menace to their interests.4 Even though the annexation of Croat-dominated territories 
to Croatia proper has become impossible since the change of regime in Croatia,
2 Harassment o f opposition parties by SDA militants was frequently reported during the 1996 election 
campaign. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1035 
(1995), S/1996/820, 1 October 1996, para. 7.
3 UNHCR, UNHCR’s Position on Categories o f Persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Continued Need 
o f  Internal Protection, UNHCR internal document, September 2001, p. 6.
4 HDZ Croats are particularly opposed to integration with the Bosniaks because the Herzegovinian 
mafia, with whom they have strong connections, wants to maintain its monopoly over economic 
activity in southwestern BiH. In addition, immediately after the war, the mafia controlled access to the 
Dalmatian coast, which had been cut off from Croatia during the war due to the Serb presence in the 
Krajina. The Herzegovinian mafia, the HDZ and the Croat security forces (HVO and police) are 
connected and support each other in maintaining their political and economic supremacy over 
Herzegovina and its capital, west Mostar.
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HDZ leaders have not given up on maintaining an ethnically pure Croat statelet in 
southwestern BiH.
In Mostar, after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 
April 1994 between Bosniak and Croat representatives, which provided for the 
reunification of the city, the HDZ systematically obstructed its implementation. 
Refugee return was prevented, freedom of movement between east and west Mostar 
was non-existent, and police forces remained segregated. The HDZ also made use of 
the HVIDR-a (Croatian War Veterans and Invalid Association) to maintain a climate 
of insecurity in west Mostar through propaganda and intimidation. Moreover, 
Bosniaks continued to be attacked and expelled from the Croat side of the city until 
1998, in some cases with the active participation of the police.5
Elsewhere in the Federation, in the suburbs of Sarajevo, Serbs who decided 
to stay after the transfer in 1996 were systematically intimidated and attacked. The 
police turned a blind eye to the violence or were sometimes directly involved in 
beatings, expulsions and looting. Bosniak soldiers were also seen committing 
violence against civilians (in this case, beatings).6 When IPTF asked the local police 
to investigate cases of violence involving soldiers, they were told that these 
individuals were outside their jurisdiction.7 IFOR, as the international agency 
responsible for the armed forces, was the only actor that could investigate these 
cases, but declined to do so.
5 See Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals o f  Partition (London: Verso, 1997) p. 123 
and ICG, Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities fo r  Progress, ICG Balkans Report no. 90 (Sarajevo: ICG,
2000) pp. 4-5.
6 HRW, Bosnia-Hercegovina: a Failure in the Making -  Human Rights and the Dayton Agreement, 
June 1996, vol. 8, no. 8 (NY, NY: HRW, 1996) pp. 12-13.
7 See ICG, Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation, ICG Balkans Report no. 17 (Sarajevo: 
ICG, 1996) p. 14.
274
In the Una Sana canton, dominated by Bosniaks, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) identified in 1997 patterns of violence against individuals or parties not 
affiliated with the SDA. They note that the SDA dominated almost all aspects of 
government in the Canton, including police forces, and did not tolerate any 
opposition to its rule. The report documents abuses by the police against figures of
Q
the opposition, and against people suspected of common criminal offences. They 
point out that the rights of individuals with no connections to the SDA are not 
equally protected in the area.9
In the RS, paramilitary organisations were created during the war and, after 
the GFA was concluded, continued their activities, aiming at ‘destabilizing the peace 
process, creating opposition to IFOR and international agencies within the Bosnian 
Serb population in Republika Srpska, stirring up general animosity towards the other 
entity -the Bosnian-Croat Federation... and destroying any moderate-line Serb 
elements including Bosnian Serb opposition parties and individuals not affiliated 
with the SDS’.10 Several sources quoted in a HRW report assert that the war-time 
aim of the SDS -the creation of an ethnically pure Serb territory in BiH that would 
eventually be joined with Serbia proper- continued to be openly advocated by RS 
authorities, in violation of the Dayton agreement.11 Local paramilitary cells, linked
8 The most famous case of abuse against opposition leaders is that o f Haris Silajdzic, who was 
attacked by a group o f youths carrying SDA placards during a meeting o f his party in Cazin, near 
Bihac in June 1996. Witnesses reported that the local police did nothing to protect him. See The 
Times, 22 June 1996.
9 See HRW, Bosnia and Hercegovina: Politics o f Revenge -  The Misuse o f  Authority in Bihac, Cazin, 
and Velika Kladusa, vol. 9, no. 9 (New York, NY: HRW, 1997) pp. 14-15, 22-26.
10 IFOR source quoted in HRW, Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Continuing Influence o f  Bosnia’s Warlords, 
vol. 8, no. 17 (New York, NY: HRW, 1996) p. 2.
"Ibid., pp. 2, 12, 30.
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• 19 •to the SDS were organised to implement these objectives. In Doboj and Teslic, 
HRW reported the existence of underground paramilitary organisations, known to 
IFOR, under the direct authority of the SDS, who operated in the region and were 
responsible for human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing.13 In addition, they 
prevented FoM, and discouraged non-Serbs from visiting or returning to the area.14 
They also targeted opposition parties and well to do or influential Serbs who were 
not members of the SDS. The report notes that police forces did not do anything to 
prevent the activities of these organisations.
In fact, reported violations were committed by these organisations with the 
support and at times the active participation of the RS police and demobilised Serb 
soldiers. They included: destruction of non-Serb homes, beatings of non-Serbs, 
demarcation of the IEBL as a ‘border of separation’, surveillance of movements and 
attacks on non-Serbs attempting to enter the area, compulsory ‘travel permits’ for 
people wishing to cross the IEBL, controls of vehicles near the IEBL15, intimidation 
and violence against members -including Serbs- of opposition parties or Serbs not 
belonging to the SDS, obstruction of the freedom of association and demonstration. 
In addition, anti-IFOR media campaigns were organised, describing IFOR and other
12 A US State Department report pointed to the existence o f paramilitary or ‘secret police’ forces, 
under the authority o f the ruling party, in Bosniak- and Croat-dominated areas as well. The continuing 
existence o f these forces is a violation of the Dayton agreement. See US State Department, Bureau of  
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report Human Rights 
Practices fo r  1996, released 30 January 1997 [report on-line] (accessed 16 May 2000); available from 
www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1996 hrp report/bosniahe.htm 1: Internet.
13 HRW reported the existence of two paramilitary organisations in the Doboj-Teslic-Derventa-Brcko 
area: the ‘Zigosani’ (the ‘Stigmated’) and the 'Razbijaci Balije’ (the ‘Balija Breakers’), more 
‘specialised’ in operations in the Teslic area. See HRW, The Continuing Influence o f  Bosnia’s 
Warlords,pp. 17-18.
14 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
15 especially in the period prior to the September 1996 elections.
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international agencies as biased against the Serbs, and announcements made that if 
Mladic and Karadzic were arrested, international personnel would be taken 
hostage.16
The members of the ‘Stigmatised' included, among others, the heads of the 
SDS at the local and municipal levels, most notably the president of the Doboj town 
council and RS minister of defence, the Orthodox priest of Teslic, also a member of 
the RS national assembly, the manager of ‘Radio Doboj', the main radio station in 
the area, another member of the RS national assembly and head of the ‘PanterV 
(‘Panthers’) who operated in Bijeljina during the war, and two heads of war-time 
paramilitary units responsible for atrocities against non-Serbs. The report also 
identified three companies, controlled by the SDS, which provided financial backing
• 17to the paramilitaries and supplied them with weapons.
The situation in these three areas demonstrated that the SDS and the HDZ 
power structures had every intention of pursuing their policies of ethnic cleansing 
started during the war. They used the very same people that were in place during to
16 See HRW, The Continuing Influence o f Bosnia's Warlords, pp. 30-42.
17 The companies are ‘Bozur’, ‘Omnikum’ and ‘M odex\ Ibid., p. 18. HRW conducted an investigation 
in the Prijedor area and came to similar conclusions: '[Rjecent reports on the municipalities o f  Doboj 
and Teslic... reveals similar patterns to the policies carried out in Prijedor. ’ Although the policies are 
the same, the actors carrying them out were different in the Prijedor case: the police, staffed by 
individuals indicted by the ICTY and known to IFOR, played a more central role in committing 
violations. Military forces were also directly involved in the destruction of properties belonging to 
minorities. In Foca, southeastern RS, HRW observed that six individuals indicted by the ICTY were 
actively engaged in local affairs, under the gaze of SFOR troops. Many more suspected to have been 
involved in ethnic cleansing during the war are also members o f the local administration and police 
forces, under the direct authority o f Pale. The report points to systematic obstruction o f freedom of 
movement, refugee return, and intimidation of political opponents and international staff. See HRW, 
Bosnia and Hercegovina: The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards o f  'Ethnic Cleansing’, vol. 9, no.l 
(New York, NY: HRW, 1997) and HRW, Bosnia and Hercegovina: "A Closed, Dark P lace”- Past 
and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca, vol. 10, no. 6 (New York, NY: HRW, 1998).
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continue to abuse minorities and individual rights, whilst resisting the process of 
reintegration as much as possible. The SDA, although initially in favour of a multi­
ethnic BiH, showed signs in early 1996 of adopting similar policies in the areas it 
controlled after the signing of the Dayton agreement. Police forces, in turn, have 
been unable or unwilling to protect individual rights and enforce the rule of law.
The structure of police forces in the post-war period is the product of two 
factors: the communist legacy and the experience of the war. Under communism, 
police forces were the agents of the state and were assigned the role of protectors of 
the state and its officials. However, police forces were fully integrated under the 
respective Republics’ ministries of the interior. The war in BiH brought about a 
fundamental change in the structure of these forces: they became ethnically based. 
The police continued, however, to be at the service of the ruling party, but now that 
the communists had gone, the new ruling elite were the nationalists. The conflict 
also created a deep symbiosis between the nationalist authorities, the police and 
various criminal networks. Police forces were deeply involved in ethnic cleansing, 
along with military forces, and various other criminal activities, such as trafficking, 
with the consent of the political authorities who directly appointed them. At the end 
of the hostilities, BiH had three police forces, with parallel structures of command, 
and each controlling a portion of the Bosnian territory. As explained in chapter four, 
the GFA did not fundamentally change this situation.
Trying to create democratic, integrated police forces in the Bosnian post-war 
context presents several challenges, that were outlined in this section. First, these 
forces are deeply politicised. Appointments during the war were made by the 
nationalists, based on ethnicity and loyalty. The rule of law, as defined in this thesis, 
holds no currency among the various police, who are the protectors of the rulers.
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This also means that the functions performed by the police go well beyond those of 
police forces in democratic states., including the preservation of the territorial 
divisions in BiH. Second, police forces are also involved in criminal activities. They 
have therefore a vested interest in the maintenance of the current structures, as they 
directly benefit from them.
The next section examines the work of IPTF in training police forces in BiH. 
It also examines the work of UNMIBH in monitoring BiH’s police forces, including 
redressing human rights violations by the police.
2. IPTF’s mandate - Training and Monitoring Police Forces: 
Impossible Tasks?
This section examines the role of IPTF in training and monitoring local 
police forces. As part of this effort, the UN has worked to integrate minorities in the 
entities’ police forces.18 Assessing the success of IPTF is particularly difficult 
because progress in reforming police forces along democratic lines is not easily 
quantifiable to the extent that the implementation of article IV of annex 1-B is. 
Moreover, as IPTF’s investigations have shown, police forces have continued to be 
responsible for human rights violations in spite of IPTF’s work. IPTF has 
nevertheless had some significant achievements.
First, police numbers in the country have been largely reduced, more in line 
with police numbers in democratic societies. Second, the slow process that has led to 
creation of a registry of all certified officers increases the transparency of these 
forces, and could potentially bring more accountability in case of misbehaviour, past
18 ‘Minority’ police are officers who do not belong to the ethnic community forming the majority o f  
the population in the area they are assigned to.
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or present. Third, IPTF put the issue of integration of minorities in the police on the 
agenda, and although progress in this area has been negligible, the framework and 
procedures for their integration are in place. Fourth, monitoring, and especially 
human rights investigations by IPTF have increased accountability, and led to the 
dismissal of a number of officers unfit to work in a democratic police force. This 
section also illustrates the difficulties created by leaving the control of security 
forces in the hands of the parties, whilst not granting enough enforcement powers 
and resources to external actors to reform them in depth.
Annex 11 of the GFA provided for the creation of a UN International Police 
Task Force (IPTF) to facilitate the reform and restructuring of the local police along 
democratic lines (see chapter four). IPTF’s mandate did not grant the monitors any 
executive law enforcement functions, but rather confined them to an advisory and 
training role, at least for the first 18 months of their mandate.19 In his report to the 
UN Security Council, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali specified that 
because the monitors did not have any enforcement powers, their ‘effectiveness will 
depend, to an important extent, on the willingness of the parties to cooperate with 
[IPTF]’. Considering the deep involvement of police forces in human rights 
violations during and after the conflict, as outlined in the previous section, with the 
support of their respective nationalist authorities, Boutros-Ghali’s hope for their co­
operation amounts to implicitly acknowledging that the UN force will be, for the
19 After December 1997, IPTF was authorised to conduct independent investigations into human rights 
violations committed by local police.
20 UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), 
S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995, para. 27. Boutros-Ghali asked for a force o f 1,721 monitors. The 
force was authorised for a period o f twelve months by UN Security Council resolution 1035, 21 
December 1995.
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most part, dependent on other international agencies, such as NATO and the OHR to 
enforce any standards.
Other difficulties have hampered the effective functioning of IPTF. The high 
turnover of personnel (IPTF monitors stay in the country for six months, 
investigators for 12 to 18 months) has prevented any institutional memory from 
developing. Monitors also leave the country around the time they are beginning to 
be familiar with the local political situation and actors. IPTF’s slow deployment also 
meant that the UN could not be operational throughout the country until the summer 
of 1996, just before the elections.
Finally, especially in the initial stages, many of the personnel seconded by 
governments to IPTF did not meet the minimum criteria required to work with the 
UN. In his March 1996 report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali noted that ‘the 
availability and professional suitability of police personnel’ was a major problem in 
the deployment of IPTF monitors. He continued: ‘Although the minimum 
qualifications required -eight years policing experience, ability to communicate in 
English and driving skills- have been specified to Governments, the number of those 
who failed to meet the criteria and to pass the required elementary tests upon arrival 
in the theatre has risen to alarming levels.’21
The first subsection examines the process of screening. The second 
subsection examines the issue of reintegration of minorities in the police and the 
third subsection looks at the results produced by the investigation powers granted to 
IPTF.
21 UN, Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/210, 29 March 
1996, para. 8. Selection Assistance teams were sent in early 1996 to countries offering large numbers 
o f monitors to help screen candidates before they arrived in BiH. UN, Report o f the Secretary General 
Pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), S/1996/460, 21 June 1996, para. 7.
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2.1. Training of Police Forces: Screening and Downsizing Bosnia-
Herzegovina’ s Police Forces
At the end of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s police numbers were extremely 
high: between 20,000 and 32,000 in the Federation (including 3,000 officers 
policing Croat-held areas) and between 10,000 and 50,000 in the RS.22 One of the 
first objectives of IPTF was to reduce the number of police throughout the country, 
in order to bring them more in line with democratic policing. Agreements concluded 
with RS and Federation authorities envisaged the reduction of police numbers to 
8,500 and 11,500 respectively. These agreements also provided for a process of 
vetting of all police in the country.
The Federation agreement aimed at screening out officers responsible for 
human rights violations, and identified as another major objective the creation of a 
force that would protect all citizens from crime and human rights abuses. It 
requested that the ethnic composition of police forces in the Federation reflect the 
pre-war ethnic make-up of the country. Under the agreement, all police officers in 
the Federation were required to re-apply for their positions. The certification process 
began with the cantonal ministers of internal affairs submitting a list of all the
22 At the end o f 1995, it was probably impossible to accurately assess the number o f police in the 
country, partly because some police units performed military functions. These figures are based on the 
following sources: UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1026, S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995, para. 22 and HRW, Beyond Restraint: Politics and the 
Policing Agenda o f  the United Nations International Police Task Force, vol. 10, no. 5 (New York, 
NY: HRW, 1998) p. 8.
23 HRW, Beyond Restraint, p. 8. An agreement on police reform was concluded between the 
Federation and the IPTF in Bonn-Petersberg, 25 April 1996. A similar agreement was signed with the 
RS authorities in December 1998. These figures were reduced by IPTF to 7,835 and 10,603 in 
September 2000. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, S/2000/1137, 30 November 2000, para. 10.
282
candidates to DPTF, after which the officers themselves were required to provide 
information to the UN regarding their personal and professional background. After 
an initial screening, the names of the successful officers were placed on an eligibility 
list. Their names were also published in local newspapers, so as to encourage people 
with information that could affect an officer’s status to come forward. Candidates 
not screened out at this stage received an identification card from IPTF, were 
provisionally certified by IPTF to exercise police functions and began a one-year 
probation period.24 During this period, police officers could be removed from the 
force if they were found by IPTF to be indicted by the ICTY or to have committed 
human rights violations, either before the start of the screening process or during it. 
In addition, they could also be dismissed for non-compliance with the GFA, or lack 
of co-operation with IPTF. In order to request the dismissal of an officer, IPTF 
would file non-compliance reports against the officers, stating the reasons for 
requesting their dismissal.
A similar accord was concluded with the RS authorities on 9 December 
1998. The agreement allowed the composition of the RS police to reflect the ethnic 
distribution of the population in the 1997 municipal elections, and stipulates that 
20% of the RS police are to be non-Serb. However, changes in the police are to 
reflect changes in the ethnic make up of the RS population, not vice-versa. This 
decision means that ‘the Republika Srpska agreement encourages intransigence to 
the return of refugees, as any change in the balance of the population in Republika
24 All officers had to go through a training programme as part of the certification process. The 
programme consists o f a two-day information course on the mandate and activities of IPTF, a one- 
week ‘human dignity’ course on democratic policing and a three-week ‘transition’ course focusing on 
basic police skills.
25 IPTF conducted background checks on all candidates during their one-year probation.
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9  f \Srpska will require changes in the police force to match.’ In addition, this 
stipulation does not help create the trust necessary for refugees to return to 
communities where the police is mostly, if not all, Serb. The agreement also 
authorises non-Serbs who lived in the RS in 1991 to apply as police officers.
The certification process has contributed to a substantial reduction of the 
police numbers, although as late as November 2000, IPTF did not know the exact 
number of police in the country, due to its own bureaucratic deficiencies and 
deception by the parties (this underscores the importance for the parties to maintain 
police forces as large as possible).27 A number of officers were screened out,
9R • ►although again exact numbers are unknown. Considering that registered police 
forces in the country number about 24,000, a rough estimate would put the number
9 0of police screened out between 6,000 and 58,000. These official numbers concern 
officers who have been authorised by IPTF, often pending a thorough background 
check, to exercise police duties in BiH. There may be non-certified officers still 
operating in the country who fall under the category of those supposedly screened 
out. The creation of a registry by IPTF was aimed at identifying these individuals.
In spite of these quantitative achievements, the process of vetting has 
suffered from two major deficiencies. First, by letting the local authorities be the 
sole recipients of the applications, IPTF allowed them to control and politicise the
26 HRW, Beyond Restraint, p. 9.
27 In April 2001 at the end of the screening process, 24,007 police had been identified and 
provisionally certified for the whole of BiH. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, S/2001/571, 7 June 2001, para. 5.
28 At the end o f the second wave o f certification, about 6.6% of officers (1,600) had been removed 
from the force because they failed the tests administered by IPTF, were found to have a criminal 
record or had lied about their past. Ibid., para. 5.
29 This estimate is based on the number of police at the end o f the war.
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process.30 Indeed, it turned out that in many cases, local authorities would only 
submit enough candidates to fill the positions; any rejection would mean that the 
post would not be filled.31 This practice has allowed the nationalists to remain in 
control of appointments, and to continue to determine the ethnic composition of 
police forces.32
Second, IPTF discovered in 1999 that some active Federation police, 
especially in areas dominated by the Croats, had avoided certification by IPTF. This 
led to a second wave of screening, still ongoing in the autumn of 2000. In effect, 
because of the lack of efficiency in the screening system and deception by the 
parties, many officers who should have received the sack were able to keep their 
jobs.
2.2. Integration of Minorities in the Police: Undoing the Results of the War
Another dimension of IPTF’s training mandate that is crucial for the 
rebuilding of a single politica space is the integration of officers from all ethnic 
groups in police forces. It is arguable that integrating minorities in police forces will
30 See HRW, Beyond Restraint, p. 11.
31 As explained above, all police are to re-apply for their positions as part o f the certification process. 
The technique has been widely used to prevent minorities from applying for positions.
32 In order to reduce the influence o f political parties over the police, the creation o f a post o f police 
commissioner to oversee the work o f the police in each canton o f the Federation has been envisaged 
by IPTF. A commissioner would be chosen in each canton by a board composed o f members o f civil 
society and IPTF representatives. This idea has been discussed with Federation authorities, but no 
commissioners had been put in place by November 2000. Interview by the author with Serge Rumin, 
Chief o f Local Police Registry Section, Human Rights Office, UNMIBH, Sarajevo, September 2000.
33 Serge Rumin told the author that one of the objectives o f the second screening process was to 
establish a reliable registry o f all police officers in BiH, a goal that the first screening process had 
failed to achieve. The second screening process also points to the absence o f a strategy for police
285
help create the safe environment required for refugee return. More realistically, both 
processes probably go hand in hand: refugee return should lead to the incorporation 
of minorities in the police, which in turn should lead to more returns. Several 
strategies have been adopted to encourage the creation of multi-ethnic forces.34 Two 
envisage the relocation of former police officers to an area where they lived before 
the war or even the transfer of current police officers to areas where they would be a 
minority. However, in addition to hostile working conditions for those transferred, 
discrepancies between wages in the Federation and the RS discourage transfers from 
the one entity to the other.35
Another strategy, implemented since October 1998 in the Federation, has 
been to set up police academies where Serb cadets would be trained for deployment 
in the Federation.36 A similar academy was organised in the RS in early 1999. These 
academies are under the authority of the entities’ ministers of internal affairs, and 
their work is monitored by IPTF. The following table shows how many minorities 
have graduated from the Federation academy between 1998 and November 2000:
reform on the part of IPTF, leading the mission to simply repeat its work. Interview by the author with 
Serge Rumin, Sarajevo, September 2000.
34 Jacques Paul Klein, Mandate Implementation Plan, 2000-2002, Briefing to the UN Security 
Council, 12 December 2000 [text on-line] (accessed 16 June 2001); available from 
www.unmibh.org/unmibh/mip.htm; Internet.
35 In 1999, Federation police officers earned the equivalent o f about 400 German Deutsche Marks 
(DEM) a month, whilst RS police earned as little as 80 DEM. There were differences within the 
Federation as well: Croat police in Mostar are paid double what their Bosniak counterparts receive. 
These differences do not take into account illegal activities, which provide significant sources o f  
income to members of the police from the dominant group. See ICG, Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four 
Years after the Peace Agreement, ICG Balkans Report no. 80 (Sarajevo: ICG, 1999) pp. 46-47 and 
footnote 267.
36 See UNMIBH, Police Academies Fact Sheet, 21 February 2001 [text on-line] (accessed 18 June
2001); available from www.unmibh.org/unmibh/iptf/academ.htm; Internet.
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Table VI: Minority Graduates from the Federation Police Academy, 1998-2000
Course Start, 
Federation 
Academy
Serb Graduates ‘Others’
Graduates
Total
April 1999 64 11 75
November 1999 64 5 69
July 2000 (for 
information, not 
graduated yet)
95
(candidates)
6 (candidates) 101 (candidates)
Source: UNMIBH, Police Academies Fact Sheet (21 February 2001, accessed 16 June 2001); 
available from http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/iptf/academ.htm; Internet.
The following table shows how many minorities have graduated from the RS 
academy between 1998 and November 2000;
Table VII: Minority Graduates from the RS Police Academy, 1998-2000
Course Start, 
RS Academy
Bosniak
Graduates
Croat
Graduates
‘Others’
Graduates
Total
July 1999 34 3 1 38
October 1999 38 3 0 41
February 
2000 (for 
information, 
not yet 
graduated)
50
(candidates)
5 (candidates) 3 (candidates) 58
(candidates)
October 2000 
(for 
information, 
not yet 
graduated)
86
(candidates)
7 (candidates) 2 (candidates) 95
(candidates)
Source: UNMIBH, Police Academies Fact Sheet (21 February 2001, accessed 16 June 2001); 
available from http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/iptf/academ.htm; Internet.
The numbers of graduates are, however, very small compared to the overall 
authorised police numbers in both entities. Assuming that the current cadets will all
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graduate, minorities incorporated in the Federation police since October 1998 
represent 2.1% of police forces; in the RS, 2.7%.37
Indeed, there has been considerable resistance from RS authorities to the 
incorporation of non-Serbs in the RS police, although the agreement concluded with 
IPTF stipulated that 20% of the RS police should be composed of minorities. 
However, the RS authorities have stalled the hiring of new officers, even though in
1999 IPTF submitted a list of 600 non-Serb candidates to the RS minister of internal
*11>
affairs. In effect, about 1,500 to 2,000 Serb police would have to be dismissed in 
order to reach the quota of 1,700 minority officers, a move that RS authorities from 
all political parties have consistently resisted.
In the Federation, the picture is more complex because of the lack of 
integration between Croat and Bosniak police. There, integration of minority police 
does not only concern Serbs, but also Croat and Bosniak officers in areas dominated 
by the other ethnic group. In spite of commitments made to IPTF, there still exist 
two police forces in the Federation. In cantons eight and ten for example, dominated 
by the HDZ Croats, there has been fierce resistance to integrating minorities in the
•JQ
police. In canton six, an investigation conducted by IPTF in May 1999 found that 
appointments ‘are exclusively in the control of dominant nationalist power 
structures... law enforcement agencies in Central Bosnia remain in the service of
37 In September 2000, James Lyon, head o f the ICG BiH project, told the author that minorities 
represented less than 5% in the entities’ police forces. In his June 2001 report, The UN Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan reported that minorities represented 5.2% and 2.2% (600 and 182) o f police 
forces in the Federation and RS respectively. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, S/2001/571, 7 June 2001, para. 17.
38 46 of them were accepted in the RS academy. See ICG, Is Dayton Failing?, pp. 44-45.
39 In April 1999, authorities from cantons eight and ten did not send any minority recruits to the 
Federation police academy, even though slots had been allocated to them. See ICG, Is Dayton 
Failing?, pp. 45-46.
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nationalist enclaves...’. The investigators also found that ‘as a direct result of the 
political control over policing in Canton 6, the police force has not been integrated.’ 
The report explains how two structures and chains of command have been 
maintained, and have consolidated the territorial gains made during the war.40 A 
similar situation in canton seven was identified by a report by the Ombudsman of 
the Federation 41 As far as Serbs are concerned, as outlined above, their integration 
into the Federation police has failed to meet the agreed target of 28%.
Two consequences of this situation can be identified at this point. First, the 
lack of presence of minorities in the police has a direct, negative impact on refugee 
return. To most refugees, the presence of mono-ethnic police forces means that their 
rights will not be protected and that their safety is at risk. A study conducted by the 
UNHCR in August 2000 considered three factors to determine whether an area can 
be deemed safe for return: legal safety, material security and physical security.42 The 
report states that ‘potential returnees regard security in the pre-conflict place of 
residence as vital when considering return.’43 The study also points to a clear 
correlation between security incidents and returns.44 This correlation highlights the 
role of the police in failing not only to protect minorities but also in being directly 
involved in violence against them, undermining respect for individual rights and for
40 Serge Rumin, interviewed by the author in September 2000, confirmed to the author that mixed 
cantons in the Federation still had parallel police structures and chains o f command. These forces 
conduct joint policing activities, although co-operation breaks down in cases o f crimes of an ethnic 
nature.
41 Ombudsmen o f the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report on [sic] Human Rights Situation 
in the Federation o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina for 1999 (Sarajevo: Ombudsmen o f the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2000) pp. 8-9.
42 UNHCR, Update o f  UNHCR’s Position on Categories o f  Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Need o f  International Protection, UNHCR internal document, August 2000.
43 Ibid., p.7.
44 / bid., p.7.
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the rule of law. Second, the mono-ethnic character of the police has fundamentally 
perpetuated the role assigned to them during the war, as protectors of nationalist 
officials and guarantors of the ethnic purity of the territories under their control. One 
of the consequences of the lack of integration of minorities is that the intimate 
relationship between nationalist politicians and the police forces has not been 
challenged. The next sub-section examines what UNMIBH has done to remedy 
human rights violations by the local police.
2.3. Monitoring by UNMIBH: Limitations of 1 Soft* and * Robust* 
Monitoring
Soft monitoring by IPTF personnel has consisted of observing and advising 
local police forces in BiH. Starting in 1998, IPTF began a policy of ‘co-location’ 
whereby IPTF’s field offices were located directly next to police stations in order to 
be in a better position to observe the activities of the police. Other monitoring 
mechanisms were devised, such as joint patrols with the police, or systematic 
reviews of planned checkpoints. Monitoring by IPTF has brought some results by 
increasing the costs of inappropriate behaviour on the part of the local police. 
However, several factors have undermined the ability of IPTF to maintain the costs 
of non-compliance.
First, although non-compliance reports were envisaged as a powerful tool in 
the hands of IPTF to enforce democratic standards of policing, the UN force has 
failed to make consistent use of it.45 Even though precise guidelines were given to
45 When used, non-compliance reports have led to significant changes in police behaviour. Roland 
Sinteff told the author that all Croat chiefs of police in canton seven were issued non-compliance 
reports between 1999 and 2001. According to him, these sackings have led to a significant 
improvement in police behaviour and to increased co-operation with Bosniak police officers.
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IPTF monitors regarding what constituted sufficient grounds to file such a report, it 
seems that many monitors are unaware of these standards.46 Institutional weaknesses 
also played a role in slowing down progress: communication between the monitors, 
who fill in the reports, and headquarters in Sarajevo is often poor, and both sides 
complained about the unresponsiveness of the other end of the hierarchy in either 
responding to requests for additional information on the reports or acting on non- 
compliance reports 47
Second, IPTF monitors themselves would sometimes turn a blind eye to 
certain behaviour, or lack of compliance. This problem highlights the difficult 
position in which monitors find themselves, having to establish and maintain a 
working relationship with the local police, whilst being supposed to sanction them if 
necessary. Coupled with the fact that many monitors also encountered hostility when 
trying to gain access to information, or request changes in police behaviour, there 
has been a reticence on the part of some IPTF personnel to fulfil their mandate 
robustly. In addition, many IPTF monitors come from states where democratic 
policing is not the norm. It is therefore difficult to expect them to hold the local 
police to standards that they themselves do not practice or agree with.
Third, different police cultures and attitudes to weapons affect the 
implementation of standards set by IPTF, even when the monitors come from 
Western states. For example, IPTF has produced a policy on the types and numbers 
of weapons that can be held by the police, which has been widely violated by the
Interview by the author with Colonel Roland Sinteff, Regional IPTF Commander, Mostar, 19 October 
* 2001 .
46 According to these guidelines, any violation o f annexes 4, 6 and 11 o f the GFA constitutes an act of  
non-compliance which should lead to the dismissal o f the officer. See HRW, Beyond Restraint, p. 12.
47 HRW, Beyond Restraint, p. 12. The high turn-over in IPTF (monitors usually stay for six months) 
has not helped create any institutional memory.
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. 48parties, who have sought to maintain police forces with some military capabilities. 
IPTF, often supported by SFOR, conducts inspections to verify compliance with this 
policy. The author was told of an incident where an American IPTF monitor 
inspected a police station in the RS, discovered a large amount of weapons, and 
confiscated only a few of these weapons because he felt that they were needed by 
the local police. The same station was later visited by a French EPTF monitor, who, 
under the same guidelines, confiscated most of the weapons on the grounds that they 
were incompatible with police work.49
As far as ‘robust’ monitoring is concerned, other issues have arisen. 
Following the conclusions of the 1996 PIC, the Security Council granted UNMIBH 
the authority to investigate human rights violations by law enforcement officers or 
violations resulting from negligent inaction.50 This addition to the UN’s monitoring 
mandate would enable UNMIBH to conduct investigations independently, and if 
needed to sanction inappropriate behaviour by decertifying police officers. Evidence 
gathered could also be used as additional information for background checks on 
police officers.51 Under the new mandate, the investigators could directly register 
complaints from the public and conduct an independent investigation to decide 
whether to pursue the case with the authorities. The UN investigators can also
48 UNMIBH, IPTF Commissioner Weapons Policy, 1 November 1999.
49 Interview by the author with Serge Rumin, Sarajevo, September 2000. The incident took place in 
the summer of 2000.
50 UN Security Council resolution 1107, 16 May 1997. The resolution authorised the creation o f a 
Human Rights Office within UNMIBH composed o f 120 investigators.
51 Investigators have a right to full access to people, sites and documents.
52 Under IPTF’s initial mandate, the force could only monitor investigations conducted by the police.
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• 53continue to monitor investigations by the local police following these complaints. 
Should the action taken by the local police to remedy the violations be deemed 
insufficient by IPTF monitors or the Human Rights Office investigators, especially 
brought in to conduct investigations, they would then pressure political authorities to 
address the situation. The overall purpose of these investigations is therefore to 
make the authorities responsible for enforcing human rights standards in the 
police.54
The Human Rights Office, the umbrella for the investigators, did not begin 
functioning until November 1997, when 64 investigators were sent into the field.55 
In addition to usual delays in UN deployment, evidence gathered over the course of 
1997 by Human Rights Watch shows that very few monitors already in the field 
were sufficiently trained to conduct investigations.56 In particular, few IPTF 
personnel had a clear idea of what constituted a human rights violation. These issues 
underscore the lack of knowledge among monitors of international human rights 
law, a problem that the UN has not been able to rectify, mainly because of 
insufficient training and the high turnover in the mission, which make solid 
knowledge of human rights law, but also of the local situation and IPTF’s mandate, 
a rare commodity.57
53 For a good description o f their mandate, see Claudio Cordone, “Police Reform and Human Rights 
Investigations: The Experience o f the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” International 
Peacekeeping 6, 4 (Winter 1999): 191-209.
54 Ibid.,-p. 194.
55 It was envisaged that eight investigators would be assigned to headquarters in Sarajevo, 49 between 
seven regional centres, and 62 in local IPTF stations.
56 See HRW, Beyond Restraint, pp. 14-16.
57 Serge Rumin expressed similar concerns in his interview with the author. The UN conducts a five- 
day training in human rights law for incoming IPTF monitors. Initiated in the first half o f 1996, the 
course has had a limited impact on the levels o f knowledge o f human rights law. Once again, the high 
turnover in the mission prevents any in depth human rights training.
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Moreover, as previously pointed out, many monitors come from states where 
international human rights law has very little to do with policing. Moreover, having 
a professional record clean of human rights violations is not one of the selection 
criteria for participation in the mission. In this context, many violations are not 
investigated or reported because IPTF monitors themselves do not see the point in 
doing so. Even recruitment of competent human rights investigators by UNMIBH 
has been difficult, because of the scope of knowledge that their function requires, 
ranging from experience in criminal investigation and internal affairs to knowledge 
of international human rights law.58
In areas where human rights investigations were conducted, very detailed 
and comprehensive reports have been produced by UNMIBH.59 In some of these 
areas, corrective measures have been taken and the situation has improved.60 
However, the culture of impunity that has allowed police forces to perpetrate 
violations has hardly been affected by UNMIBH’s work. Indeed, in all cases where 
disciplinary action was taken, it was based on UN recommendations, and came after 
substantial pressure on the part of the international agency. Consequently, efforts at 
getting the local authorities to comply and discipline the officers responsible have 
produced mixed results.
This issue underlines the lack of political leverage that UNMIBH possesses 
in enforcing compliance with its decisions. It stems from two factors. First, as 
described in chapter four, the UN did not take over policing in BiH. In its advisory 
role, IPTF does not actually command or control the police, which falls under the
58 HRW, Beyond Restraint, pp 14-16.
59 Since October 1997, investigations have been conducted in Sarajevo, Travnik, Vitez, Pale, Mostar, 
Jajce, Teslic, Gajevi, Brcko, Drvar and Stolac following reports o f human rights abuses.
294
local political authorities. IPTF can demand that disciplinary action be taken against 
police officers, but ultimately the final say rests with the local authorities, who 
sometimes have maintained officers in their functions, in spite of non-compliance 
reports issued by UNMIBH.
Second, when IPTF’s demands are not followed, the UN has little leverage 
of its own. It has turned to two agencies for support. IFOR/SFOR has supported 
IPTF’s activities, but inconsistently, and as a rule has tried to avoid meddling in 
civilian police issues. However, when rendered, the assistance provided by the 
NATO-led force has not been political, but rather operational, in support of ad hoc 
interventions such as the inspection of local police stations.
The HR, in turn, has the power to sanction officials for not acting on the non- 
compliance reports issued by IPTF. However, should political authorities not act on 
these demands for dismissals or disciplinary actions, IPTF has to build a case of 
non-compliance against the local authorities, in addition to the cases already built 
against the police officers found guilty, which could eventually lead to the removal 
of these authorities. Such a process is long and cumbersome. It gives a lot of room 
for manoeuvre for the local authorities to test IPTF’s determination to see its 
demands met. Indeed, only in one case in five years has an official been dismissed 
by the HR for consistent non-compliance with IPTF’s recommendations over a 
period of five months.61
60 These measures have mostly involved dismissal, temporary suspension or pay reduction for the 
officers found guilty.
61 Ante Barisic, minister of internal affairs o f canton 10 was removed from office on 3 April 2000 for 
failing to order the removal of Croat insignia from the uniforms of Croat police and for failing to 
enforce IPTF’s guidelines on weapons authorised in police stations. See OHR, Decision removing Mr. 
Ante Barisic from his position o f Minister o f Internal Affairs o f Canton 10 [text on-line] (Sarajevo, 3
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2.4. Implications of UNMIBH’ s Work for the Balance of Forces, Control
over Territory, the Security Dilemma and Democratisation
The picture emerging from this analysis suggests that the reform process of 
police forces is largely inconsistent. Some action against obstructionists or human 
rights abusers has been taken, but it is quite clear that many have slipped through the
ff)cracks. It seems that the international community did take action in areas where 
substantial and well-documented violations took place. Even though police 
numbers have been reduced, their role has not fundamentally changed. The lack of 
integration of police forces has not challenged either the symbiosis between 
nationalist authorities and the police: they remain the agents of the nationalists.
This unchanged role of agents of the ruling party has meant that these forces 
have continued to be used to maintain the control that the nationalists exercised over 
the territory they occupy. In addition, police forces have continued to play a role 
beyond the provision of internal security, as witnessed by the efforts made by IPTF 
to restrict the types and numbers of weapons that the police possess. Once again, the
April 2000, accessed 28 June 2001); available from http://www.ohr.int/decisions/20000403.htm; 
internet.
62 It is nearly impossible to obtain precise figures on how many officers have been dismissed since the 
start o f the vetting process. IPTF headquarters have no record o f non-compliance reports written 
before May 1997, when a computer database was set up. Any request for dismissal before that date 
would not appear on the record or may not even have taken place. The author was only able to find 
out that 28 officers had been decertified by IPTF between 1998 and the end of 2000. UNMIBH, 
Weekly Situation Report no. 41, 8-14 October 2001, para. 6, internal document.
63 IPTF reacted to violence against minorities or refugees following serious and well-publicised 
incidents. For example, IPTF obtained the dismissal of the chief o f the Stolac police station following 
a series o f incidents against Bosniak returnees. Stolac had been designated as a pilot return project, 
along with three other municipalities in the Federation, by the international community and was 
heavily monitored. See UNMIBH, Incidents in Canton 7 in the Context o f  Minority Returns, released
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lack of consistency on the part of the international agency has been exploited by the 
parties. The continuing mono-ethnic and undemocratic character of the police also 
contributes to an atmosphere of fear, both within local police stations, where more 
moderate officers are forced to ‘toe the line’ and support extremist positions, but 
also within the communities where these officers are working, hampering return and 
respect for human rights. Potential returnees are also discouraged because of the lack 
of trust that mono-ethnic police forces generate.
This situation has obvious consequences for democratisation. It creates a 
sense of impunity among the local police, and encourages confrontational behaviour 
with IPTF. There is a sense among local police that human rights violations and 
discriminatory behaviour can go unpunished, although not in all cases, which 
encourages them to test the limits of IPTF resolve. These attitudes undermine 
progress towards a single political space in BiH, where the rule of law is enforced 
impartially throughout the country by police forces. The next section, using the 
cases of the SBS and the police in Brcko, shows how substantial progress can be 
made in reforming and reintegrating police forces.
3. The State Border Service (SBS) and Policing in Brcko: Forced 
Reform and Reintegration -  The Wav Forward?
This section examines the development of the State Border Service (SBS) 
established in January 2000 by a Decision of the High Representative to police the 
borders of BiH and the reform of the police in the Brcko District. The SBS is 
interesting in several respects: first, it is multi-ethnic and completely integrated.
in July 1998 [report on-line] (accessed 16 June 2001); available from 
www.unmibh.org/news/hrrep/stolac2.htm.; internet.
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Second, it is under the direct authority of the state-level ministry of civil affairs and 
communications, making it the only statewide security service. UNMIBH has been 
the driving force behind the development of the SBS. There is also a strong interest 
on the part of EU member states to address the problem of BiH’s porous borders, as 
the country has been used as a port of entry into Western Europe by many 
immigrants from states like Iran and Turkey.64 There has been, therefore, significant 
political support for the project and substantial pressure has been applied on the 
Bosnian authorities to acquiesce to the project. It is arguable that the SBS model 
could serve as a template for a future Bosnian-wide police force.
The international community’s mandate in Brcko has been much more 
intrusive than elsewhere in the country. This is a direct consequence of the strategic 
location of the city, which makes it one of the sticking points of the peace process. 
Because of the importance of the city, the OHR was granted extensive 
administrative powers in the area in February 1997. Using these powers, the 
international administrator (the ‘Supervisor’) has mandated IPTF to create an 
integrated, multi-ethnic police force. The second sub-section examines the 
development of this force, and shows that like the SBS, the multi-ethnic and 
integrated character of the police is highly dependent on continuing pressures from 
the international community. The section concludes by arguing that consociational 
structures are probably the best template for common institutions, including the 
police, unless the international community is prepared to sustain fully integrated 
structures through resource-intensive supervision and control of these institutions. 
The first sub-section looks at the development of the SBS.
64 In the first eight months o f 2000, UNMIBH estimated that 14,000 people used BiH as a port of  
entry to Western Europe.
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3.1. Development of the SBS: The International Community Takes Control
There are 432 registered border crossings in BiH, and 40% of the country’s 
borders are rivers.65 Border controls before the creation of the SBS were exercised 
by the local police, and in Croat and Serb areas, were very relaxed.66 The 1997 Bonn 
PIC asked the Bosnian authorities to work on a common legislation for their border 
police. The 1998 Madrid PIC reiterated this request, and mandated UNMIBH as 
well as the HR to help create a unified border service.67 During 1999, the UN 
interviewed the officers assigned to border controls and estimated that 1,100 of them 
could potentially be hired in the new force, which would eventually comprise 3,000 
personnel.68
In the New York Declaration of 15 November 1999, following their meeting 
with the Security Council, the Presidency committed to basic principles for the SBS. 
Some of these are of particular significance: the SBS is under the authority of the 
ministry of civil affairs and communications, thus making the Service a state-wide 
institution69; the composition of the border police was to reflect the ethnic
65 Unless specified, the information included in this section is based on an interview by the author 
with Michael Chandler, Head o f the SBS Project, UNMIBH, Sarajevo, September 2000.
66 Transnational trafficking o f all sorts, as well as illegal immigration from countries such as Iran and 
Turkey, are very lucrative sources of income in Bosnia.
67 PIC, Bonn Implementation Conference 1997: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 -  Self-sustaining 
Structures, Bonn, 10 December 1997 and PIC, Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina -  The 
Way Ahead, Madrid, 16 December 1998.
68 There were about 1,450 border police in BiH in 1999, 660 in the RS and 790 in the Federation.
69 In his interview with the author, Muhammed Becic was hopeful that the ministry could in time be 
turned into a Bosnia-wide ministry o f the interior. Interview by the author with Muhammed Becic, 
Deputy Director of the SBS, Sarajevo, August 2000.
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distribution of the country in 1991; and all units of the service were to be fully 
integrated.70
After approval by the Presidency, the draft law on the SBS was passed to the
• 71Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, which considerably delayed the bill. The HR 
eventually imposed the Law on State Border Service on 13 January 2000, because of 
the lack of progress in passing the legislation. The law incorporated the three 
principles agreed on in New York. The main sticking point in the negotiations over 
the draft law had to do with the command of the SBS: the parties were in favour of 
three directors, one from each constituent people, a structure comparable to the 
Presidency and the SCMM secretariat, while UNMIBH favoured only one director. 
The HR gave in to that demand in his Decision: the Service would have one director,
77with two deputies, the chairmanship rotating between them every eight months. 
This debate over the structure of the new institution is similar to the one over the 
structure of the SCMM secretariat. It underscores the priority for Croats and Serbs 
of co-ordination, including consensual decision-making, over complete integration.
7TAll officers nonetheless report through a single chain of command.
The initial stages of the development of the SBS also show how important 
the role of the international community has been in pushing the project forward.
70 OHR, Principles on the Establishment o f a State Border Service, New York, 15 November 1999 
[text on-line] (accessed 21 June 2001); available from http://www.ohr.int/nvd/en-19991115-b.html; 
internet.
71 In his report, the UN SG identified ‘vested interests, which profit from the present lack of effective 
border control’ as obstructing the adoption of the law. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, S /1999/1260, 17 December 1999, para. 8.
72 Michael Chandler talked of a Bosniak ‘hang-up about command’, and told the author that they were 
quite disappointed not to be allocated the post o f director on a permanent basis. Interview with 
Michael Chandler.
73 Michael Chandler nonetheless recognised that officers tended to report to a superior of the same 
ethnic group, bypassing the normal chain of command when they could.
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Four border crossings were opened in June 2000.74 They are manned by multi-ethnic 
units, under the supervision of ‘support teams’, composed of border police officers 
from states members of the Schengen zone. The selection of candidates, interviews 
and training were also conducted under UNMEBH’s close supervision. In addition, 
three groups of 30 police offices were sent to Austria for training before being 
assigned to their units.
There is no official assessment of the success of the SBS in disrupting
nc
trafficking networks and curbing illegal immigration. However, the SBS 
experience offers some interesting lessons. First, the role of UNMIBH has been 
central in the development of the Service from its inception. Although achieving the 
creation of a multi-ethnic security force in BiH can be qualified as a success, the 
question of the self-sustainability of the SBS cannot be ignored. The role played by 
UNMIBH in this case is very similar to the one played by the OSCE in the 
implementation of annex 1-B, and chapter six has also pointed to the issue of self­
sustainability. However, the SBS model could serve as a template for further 
reintegration of police forces should there be political will on the part of the 
international community to invest the necessary resources. Several factors are 
crucial to the success of such endeavours.
First and foremost, the international community has to be willing to invest 
political and financial capital in the project. In the case of the SBS, the international 
community has been driving the SBS project by putting it on the agenda, setting the 
parameters (multi-ethnic, integrated, state-wide) and provided financial assistance in 
the initial stages of the project. However, by November 2000, no additional border
74 Sarajevo airport, Zvomik, Doljani, and Izacic.
75 The four border crossings taken over by SBS in 2000 left over 400 o f these crossings still controlled 
by the parties.
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crossings had been taken over by the SBS due to a lack o f  international and local
~ l f \funding for the project. Second, preference is to be given to mechanisms of co­
operation over complete integration in common structures. The disagreement over 
the number of directors, and the continuing relevance of ethnicity in relations within 
the SBS illustrate the importance of consociational mechanisms, such as parity and 
consensual decision-making, if any common institution is to succeed, unless the 
international community is prepared to make the necessary investment to sustain an 
entirely integrated project.
3.2. IPTF and the Police in Brcko
IPTF’s role in the Brcko area has been much more intrusive than anywhere 
else in the country. At Dayton, the area was not assigned to either of the entities, as 
no agreement could be reached over the issue. To the Serbs, Brcko is of vital 
importance because it links Western and Eastern RS together. To Bosniaks and 
Croats, not regaining control of the Brcko area would have amounted to a 
legitimisation of ethnic cleansing, as the pre-war Brcko opstina was ethnically 
dominated by non-Serbs.77 Until the outcome of the arbitration, the city of Brcko 
was placed in temporary custody with the RS.78 However, Serb authorities impeded
76 The lack of local funding can be easily attributed to the fact that some local politicians have no 
interest in helping the development of the SBS. In 2001, the SBS was able to expand its activities 
thanks to bilateral assistance and reductions in functioning costs. See UN, Report o f  the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, S/2001/571, 7 June 2001, para. 23.
77 The strategic importance of Brcko was not lost to the Bosniaks and Croats either.
78 At the end of the war, the Brcko opstina was divided in three: the city of Brcko itself was under 
Serb control and the Bosniaks and the Croats each controlled an area south of the city. Each zone had 
its own administration and police force.
302
refugee return, in an attempt to maintain the Serb demographic domination of the 
city.79
In the face of Serb resistance, the OHR was granted administrative powers in
February 1997 by the Arbitral Tribunal and nominated an international Supervisor
for the Brcko area. In October, the Supervisor ordered the creation of a multi-ethnic
police force with a single chain of command. IPTF and the Supervisor also
determined the number of police that would serve in the Brcko area, its ethnic
80composition and imposed two non-Serb deputies on the police chief. The decision
81was described by local Serb authorities as ‘drastic* and difficult to implement. The 
new police was inaugurated in December 1997, and has been operating since under 
the strict supervision of IPTF.
The relative success of IPTF in creating a multiethnic police in Brcko should 
not mask some essential components that make the situation unique. First, the 
strategic location of the opstina has given the area a lot of international attention. 
Incidents have occurred in Brcko, but the international community has been willing 
to devote substantial resources to the creation of a multi-ethnic police. Second, the 
selection of candidates, the training of cadets, and staffing plans were all thoroughly 
scrutinised and approved by IPTF. The nominations of the chief of police and his 
deputies were also directly made by the Supervisor. Finally, daily police work is
79 On 30 April and 1 May 1997, two buses o f visiting Croats and Bosniaks were stoned by a local 
angry mob, whilst the local police looked on. See Bosnet News, 3 May 1997.
80 The police was to comprise 120 Serb officers, 90 Bosniaks and 20 Croats. Brcko Arbitral Tribunal 
for Dispute Over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Order on Multi-Ethnic Police in the RS 
Municipality o f Brcko, 13 October 1997, para. 2-4 [text on-line] (accessed 25 June 2001); available 
from http://www.ohr.int/docu/d971013a.htm; Internet.
81 See RFE/RL Newsline, 14 October 1997.
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closely monitored by IPTF.82 This intrusive IPTF mandate was made possible by the 
special status granted to Brcko after October 1997, and strengthened by the March 
1999 final award, which turned the Brcko area into a District, under the direct 
authority of an international Supervisor. For all intents and purposes, Brcko became
O ')  #
an internationally supervised third entity. The achievements of IPTF m Brcko beg 
the question of self-sustainability, as identified in the case of the SBS. Indeed, would 
the police in Brcko remain integrated should the international community hand its 
control over to the parties?
3.3. The International Community* s Choice: Full Reintegration or 
Consociationalism?
The experience of the SBS and of police reform in Brcko highlights two 
options for the international community. First, complete reintegration of police 
forces is possible if the international community takes control, both politically and 
financially, of the process leading towards integrated police. This includes selecting, 
training and supervising the police. This option, very resource-intensive, is likely to 
require a long and sustained effort on the part of the international community. As 
shown in chapter five with regard to IFOR/SFOR’s secondary mandate, and by the 
difficulties encountered to finance the SBS, there is no political will on the part of 
the international community to make such a large-scale commitment. The second
82 A UN report mentions that every joint patrol was accompanied by an IPTF monitor. See UN, 
Report o f the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, S /1998/227, 
12 March 1998, para. 8.
83 Indeed, the award grants all powers of governance exercised by the entities to the new District. See 
Brcko Arbitration- Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Final 
Award, 5 March 1999, section II, para. 9 [text on-line] (accessed 25 June 2001); available from 
http://www.ohr.int/docu/d990305c.htm; Internet.
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option, based on a consociational model, recognises that complete reintegration is 
unlikely in the near future, but that certain mechanisms, such as consensual decision­
making and parity in key positions, can create the trust necessary to proceed with 
some measure of reintegration. This option may be worth considering if the 
international community hopes to reduce its presence and involvement in BiH.
4. Conclusion: UNMIBH: Impressive Mandate, Disappointing 
Results
This chapter has argued that the hard realist strategy adopted at Dayton, that 
of leaving the control of the police in the hands of the parties has only allowed for 
the continuation of the mono-ethnic and undemocratic character of these forces, but 
also consolidated their grip on territory and done nothing to reduce mistrust among 
the parties. UNMIBH and IPTF had been introduced as means to produce a gradual 
reform of the police towards multi-ethnic and democratic policing. Indeed, the 
mandate of the UN in BiH provided, although not exclusively, for a process of 
certification and training for all police in the country. It also envisaged the reduction 
of the number of officers in the respective forces and the integration of minorities in 
these reformed structures.
This ambitious mandate has borne some fruit as explained in this chapter. 
Numbers have been reduced, police officers identified and in some cases dismissed 
for being unfit to exercise police functions. However, the forces are still largely 
mono-ethnic, and have not significantly been sheltered from political influence, 
undermining efforts at rebuilding a single political space. In addition, police forces 
have continued to be responsible for human rights violations, especially in 
connection with returns, or to pursue a policy of non-intervention in the face of
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violations. UNMIBH has tried again to remedy these violations by launching 
independent investigations. As explained in this chapter, some of these have yielded 
results in the form of disciplinary action being taken against the offending officers. 
However, the inherent weaknesses of UNMIBH have created inconsistencies in the 
enforcement of UNMIBH’s recommendations and standards.
Several of these deficiencies have been identified in this chapter. First, the 
bureaucratic inefficiencies within UNMIBH have reduced the level of effectiveness 
of the UN force in screening out officers responsible for behaviour incompatible 
with democratic policing. Second, the lack of resources, financial and human, has 
hampered the ability of the UNMIBH decisively to affect the situation. Third, the 
high turnover in the mission is also reducing the effectiveness of UNMIBH 
personnel and preventing the development of an institutional memory. These three 
issues, not unfamiliar to UN peacekeeping operations, were nonetheless not really 
factored in when UNMIBH’s mandate was being drafted. Finally, UNMIBH’s lack 
of political leverage against the authorities, which was a direct consequence of the 
approach adopted at Dayton, has meant that the UN force must rely on other 
organisations for assistance to enforce its agenda.
Yet, the experience of the SBS and the integrated police force of Brcko 
points to the potential for reintegration and the development of democratic policing 
practices. However, the issue of self-sustainability is essential in this context. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, many common institutions in BiH survive mainly 
because of the ongoing scrutiny of the international community. The nationalist 
power structure is without doubt obstructing in depth reform of the police, but unless 
the international community is willing to engage in a long and resource-intensive
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effort to sustain integrated structures, consociational solutions should be envisaged 
as a substitute. The next chapter will draw final conclusions from this research.
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Conclusion: Linking the Security and Political Components 
of Peacebuilding Within a Hard Realist/Liberal Framework: 
the Need for a Coherent Strategy
This thesis has examined the impact of SSR on democratisation in peacebuilding 
operations. Based on the evidence reviewed in this research, this thesis has argued 
that within the context of peacebuilding operations, pursuing a hard realist strategy 
with regard to SSR does not facilitate the transition towards democracy. This 
strategy has been characterised as seeking to leave the control over security forces in 
the hands of the parties and to create a military balance between them. The case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been used to illustrate the consequences of implementing 
such as strategy. Focusing on the implementation period extending from November 
1995 to November 2000, this thesis has also assessed the role of third parties, and 
their degree of control not only in restructuring the security sector, but also in 
assisting democratisation.
Two sets of conclusions regarding the security and political aspects of 
peacebuilding operations will be drawn here. The first set of conclusions concerns 
Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and the prospects for democratisation, including the 
rebuilding of a single political space, in the former Yugoslav republic. It will be 
argued that both the structure of the agreement and the incoherence of the 
international community have left the Bosnian security sector divided on a 
continuum between integration and separation, whilst undermining democratisation 
by leaving the nationalist power structure largely untouched. The second set of 
conclusions provides some insights into the hard realist approach to security sector 
reform and suggests conditions under which such an approach might assist 
democratisation. It also identifies three potential roles that external actors can play
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within a hard realist/liberal model of peacebuilding and discusses the degree of 
control that third parties can have within this model.
1. Bosnia-Herzeqovina: Failed Peacebuilding?
Many of the difficulties experienced in the implementation phase of the GFA 
stem from the structure of the agreement itself, which it has been argued, combines a 
hard realist approach o f SSR with democratisation, and from the international 
community’s lack of coherence in implementing the GFA.
Indeed, the agreement is a complicated mix between separatist and re- 
integrationist provisions. It reaffirms the existence of the Bosnian state within its 
internationally recognised borders, governed by common and democratic 
institutions, envisages the creation of a common currency and a single economic 
space, demands freedom of movement, guarantees a high level of human rights 
protection to all citizens and commits the parties to allowing refugees to return to 
their pre-war homes. However, the GFA also leaves the Bosnian state with no army 
and no police forces, whose control is assigned to the entities, divides the Bosnian 
territory into two highly autonomous entities, whose contours and ethnic 
composition are the result of ethnic cleansing, and seeks to create a military balance 
between them. The GFA implicitly assumes the reunification of the Federation, 
whilst in effect it continues to be largely divided along ethnic lines at the cantonal 
level. Indeed, eight out of ten cantons, which form the Federation, are controlled by 
either Croats or Bosniaks, whilst parallel police and military structures have 
endured. The tension between the hard realist, separatist elements of the GFA and its
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liberal, re-integrationist provisions has plagued the whole implementation phase 
because the GFA does not decisively choose between the two.
In this context, the second structural weakness of the GFA, more important, 
takes its significance: paucity of specific targets with deadlines attached. Indeed, the 
GFA only gives precise deadlines to the parties and implementers to achieve specific 
objectives in the following areas: the military provisions of annex 1-A, the 
negotiations on an arms control agreement and confidence building measures of 
annex 1-B and the holding of elections in annex 3. Apart from these deadlines, the 
parties and their international overseers are left with no specific priorities on where 
to take the peace process. In this context, the preferences and interests not only of 
the parties, but also of the external actors involved in the implementation of the GFA 
have led to intense bargaining between them. Two of the parties, the Croats and 
Serbs, have emphasised the separatist provisions of the GFA, whilst the international 
community and the Bosniaks have more often than not underlined the centripetal 
provisions of the agreement. This thesis has shown that the willingness of 
international agencies to use their resources to impose a certain outcome has often 
been essential to any progress in implementing the liberal provisions of the GFA and 
bringing their security forces closer together. However, this thesis has also raised the 
issue of self-sustainability, asking whether these outcomes could be indigeneously 
sustained should the international community hand the implementation of the peace 
agreement to local actors.
Third, this lack of prioritisation among the long list of objectives set by the 
GFA has been compounded by the high numbers of international institutions with 
different agendas and competing mandates involved in some aspect or another of the 
peace process. The involvement of MPRI, a private company, in the security sector
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has further undermined the coherence of the implementation effort. The picture that 
emerges from this analysis is one where the implementation of the GFA has been 
guided by the result of constant bargaining among the parties, the international 
community and between the parties and the international community, with no real 
end state being defined, because no agreement on what that end state should be has 
been reached.
This situation has left the implementing international agencies with the 
burden of setting priorities and shaping outcomes. In this context, external actors 
have been given a lot of de facto latitude to emphasise certain aspects of the 
agreement over others. The way international agencies have gone about interpreting 
and fulfilling their mandate has therefore played an essential role in the 
implementation phase. The guidance received from the PIC has not contributed to 
prioritising objectives either, rather leading to endless lists of goals to be achieved. 
What has been lacking in the implementation phase is an international strategy 
allocating international resources to specific, coherent objectives essential to achieve 
for the international community to be able to withdraw from BiH. A review of the 
activities of EFOR/SFOR, the OSCE, the OHR and the IPTF will show how both 
issues-the structure of the GFA and the priorities of implementers- have affected the 
security sector in BiH, as well as democratisation.
As discussed in chapter five, IFOR and SFOR approached their secondary 
mandate in minimalist terms until mid-1997, focusing almost exclusively on the 
their primary mandate. It has been shown that the detailed, three-step military plan 
contained in annex 1-A did stabilise the military situation, allowing IFOR to 
separate two of the parties and thereby paving the way for an institutionalsied 
military balance. Indeed, IFOR's primary mandate did not challenge the internal
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division of the Federation. However, the poor international response to the 
deteriorating situation in the Sarajevo suburbs was discussed to illustrate the 
consequences of leaving the parties in control of the security side of this transition, 
especially as there was no will on either side to preserve the ethnic composition of 
the areas in question.
The NATO-led force's mandate has consolidated the control exercised by the 
parties over the territories they occupied, with the exception of the Sarajevo suburbs, 
which were transferred to the Federation, whilst not affecting the military balance 
and contributing to the alleviation of the security dilemma. This leads to the 
conclusion that IFOR/SFOR’s primary mandate has not contributed positively to 
democratisation, because it has left untouched, although constrained, the nationalist 
power structure, which had been responsible in the first place for the division of the 
country in mono-ethnic statelets.
Although IFOR/SFOR’s strict monitoring of the EAF restrained the ability of 
the parties to use them for their political and military purposes, a great number of 
civilian aspects of the GFA suffered from IFOR/SFOR’s lack of support. Only 
during the summer of 1997 did SFOR begin to fulfil its secondary mandate by 
enforcing freedom of movement and arresting war criminals. Indeed, besides the 
parties, the NATO-led force is the only agency with the capacity to use force to 
impose a given outcome. The introduction of the MSU in 1998 seemed to signal an 
acknowledgement on the part of SFOR that in the absence of a state with the 
capacity to enforce the law impartially, it will have to step in. However, the lack of 
political will to make use of the MSU has rendered the unit largely ineffective. In 
other cases, SFOR’s resources were used to impose a strict and effective policy on 
the parties, such as the one developed with regard to freedom of movement, agreed
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between SFOR, IPTF and the OHR. In this case, an international strategy was 
agreed and developed, and the necessary resources invested into it. With regard to 
the arrest of war criminals and the protection of minorities, SFOR’s response has 
been more patchy.
Chapter five showed that SFOR did get involved in increasing the security of 
areas where minorities lived or returned, or proceeded to arrest war criminals, but 
these operations were mostly decided at the local or sector level, and did not 
represent a shift of policy for the entire force. Differences between the British, 
French and American sectors illustrate how their various capitals approached these 
issues from fundamentally different angles, leading to incoherence. Consequently, 
IFOR/SFOR presence has not fundamentally challenged the military and territorial 
divisions that existed at the end of the war. However, the force has helped restrain 
the military options open to the parties, and has begun undermining the links 
between nationalists and the armed forces. All this has undermined the control 
exercised by the parties over the territories they occupy, thereby bringing some 
measure of democratisation to BiH and helping the rebuilding of a single political 
space.
The military balance strategy, contained in annex 1-B of the GFA, has had a 
profound effect on the balance of forces in BiH. Annex 1-B is one of the most 
centrifugal provisions of the GFA, aiming at creating a military balance between the 
EAF. As explained in chapter six, the military balance strategy has consolidated the 
division of BiH in three military blocks. Largely implemented and sustained under 
the auspices of the OSCE, annex 1-B has also helped the parties achieve their 
various agendas. The Bosniaks received the military assistance they had been asking 
for during the war. Within the limits set at Dayton, they have increased their military
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potential, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Croats also benefited from 
‘Train and Equip’, and managed to maintain parallel military structures, although the 
weakening of the HDZ in 2001 may affect this situation. The Serbs consolidated 
their own military structures, deeply integrated with those of the FRY, but have seen 
their military advantage reduced dramatically in the face of the Federation military 
build-up. In early 2000, the OSCE began to develop a new strategy, arguing that the 
two regimes created under annex 1-B -the arms control and confidence-building 
measures- were means in need of an end. This ‘end’ was later defined as an 
integrated military, with the sole mission of defending the borders of the Bosnian 
state.
The regimes set up under annex 1-B have since become, in the eyes of the 
OSCE, the building blocks that would lead to integration in the military realm. Their 
role is seen by the international institution as creating the necessary trust and 
stability among the parties to induce them to move forward with the integration, 
restructuring and downsizing of their forces. However, MPRI has played a 
destabilising role in that the company, by building up the military capacity of the 
Federation, has increased mistrust among Serb authorities, who are asked to 
integrate their forces with a counterpart whose military strength is still being 
increased. The OHR, in turn, began working in early 2000 on common defence 
institutions, hoping to develop the SCMM into an embryo of a national ministry of 
defence, with a common defence doctrine, which was agreed by the Presidency in 
2001. In retrospect, both the OSCE and the OHR have steered the parties away from 
the initial separatist content of annex 1-B. They have, however, encountered 
considerable resistance to their efforts at integrating the Bosnian military sector.
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Co-ordination, however, has made more progress. The secretariat of the 
SCMM has the potential to evolve into a co-ordinating mechanism, where all parties 
are equally represented and decisions made by consensus. Given that other efforts at 
integration, like the SBS and the police in Brcko, have only made headway under 
intense pressure from the international community, which is not likely to be 
sustainable in the long term for lack of political will, a strategy of co-ordination over 
integration of the security sector may be more promising. However, such a strategy 
carries the risk of further legitimising the nationalist power structure, and solidifying 
their grip on the new common institutions. Consequently, there is a real danger that 
these co-ordination mechanisms may become nothing more than institutionalised 
‘talking shops’.
Reform of the police is one of the main axes of the democratisation process 
called for by the GFA. Indeed, a multi-ethnic police force working to protect 
individual rights and to sustain the rule of law would increase the security needed, 
for example, for Bosnians to travel throughout the territory of BiH, and in the case 
of refugees, to return to their pre-war homes, knowing that the police will protect 
their right to do so. However, the war left Bosnia with a legacy of police forces at 
the service of the nationalist power structure, and deeply involved in human rights 
violations. The mandate of IPTF, which was to help reform the police, has consisted 
of a monitoring role, ranging from soft to robust monitoring, and of training 
functions. It does not grant monitors any enforcement powers to intervene in place 
of the police, or to command the police to act in case of flagrant human rights 
violations. In the long term, this policy should put the responsibility for reform on 
the local authorities, but IPTF’s mandate limits its impact in the short term on 
stopping violations.
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However, within the period studied, IPTF's monitoring functions, but more 
importantly IPTF's institutional weaknesses, have only marginally prevented the 
parties from using police forces to maintain their control over territory. The 
introduction of investigation powers in UNMIBH’s mandate in 1997 has equipped 
the UN mission with a valuable tool to identify the role of the police in failing to 
stop human rights violations. However, the recommendations made in the reports 
produced by the investigators have only been partially implemented. Chapter seven 
discussed the difficulties that UNMIBH encounters in getting the local authorities to 
take action against offending officers. These difficulties stem from the mission’s 
mandate which does not directly give the authority to UNMIBH to dismiss 
individuals. Moreover, because co-operation with local police is essential to fulfil 
their mandate, IPTF monitors have been reluctant in some cases to damage this co­
operation by vigorously enforcing their mandate, indirectly allowing the use of 
police forces for other purposes that the provision of internal security.
As far as training is concerned, the hard realist strategy of leaving control 
over the police in the hands of the parties has not facilitated their reintegration. This 
ongoing control of the police by the parties has made it easier for the parties to 
control the process of police reform, as well as the ethnic composition of these 
forces. For example, chapter seven pointed out UNMEBH's lack of success in getting 
a substantial number of minorities to be reintegrated in the police. Once again, this 
control over the police has been translated into continuing control over territory. In 
turn, the cases of the SBS and of the Brcko police, which are both integrated forces, 
also illustrated the difficulty of creating self-sustainable structures for the police. For 
all the success at reintegration they constitute, these forces function to a large extent 
thanks to consistent efforts by the international community. Chapter seven suggested
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that joint policing may constitute a viable alternative to internationally supervised 
integration and complete separation.
As developed in chapter seven, the institutional weaknesses of the UN 
mission in Bosnia have limited its impact on the police. Several difficulties were 
identified in chapter seven. First, the high turnover in the mission has considerably 
hampered any kind of effective training of monitors and in depth knowledge of the 
local police. Second, there are huge differences among IPTF monitors with regard to 
policing and human rights standards to be expected from the local police. These 
differences stem from policing practices in their countries of origin, not all of which 
are democratic, and from contrasting cultural attitudes to the possession of guns as 
between one democratic country and another (e.g. France and the US). This point is 
important, as it affects the balance of forces by restricting the possibility of using 
police forces for military purposes. Indeed, these differences have allowed the 
parties to maintain police forces with some military capability. Third, the 
bureaucratic inefficiencies of UNMIBH have rendered the process of certification 
inconsistent, whilst allowing officers who should have been dismissed to slip 
through the cracks. Finally, UNMIBH’s lack of resources has prevented it from 
making an impact at critical moments of the peace process. The transfer of the 
Sarajevo suburbs comes to mind here as well as the difficulties encountered in 
funding the SBS. In the case of the Sarajevo suburbs, the promised monitors had not 
been sent by the time of the transfer, seriously hampering their impact on an 
extremely volatile situation. In the case of the SBS, the lack of international support 
for the SBS has considerably slowed down the development of the only state-wide 
security force.
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The lack of an overall strategy for the security sector in BiH has plagued the 
five years of implementation examined in this thesis. The disconnection between the 
various security provisions of the GFA has meant that reform of the police and of 
the military have been isolated from each other. Whilst the ethnic reintegration of 
police forces has been actively pursued by IPTF since 1998, NATO, the OSCE and 
the OHR did not pursue similar policies until the end of 1999, after four years of 
implementation had solidified the division of the military sector into three separate 
blocks, despite largely symbolic unified structures in the Federation. In this context, 
the fact that the EAF did not change their mission to the defence of BiH’s borders 
within the period studied, instead working towards a military balance, gave the 
nationalists no incentive to want to integrate police forces. Indeed, the destabilising 
role of MPRI in increasing mistrust between the parties illustrates how the military 
balance strategy has deepened the divisions of the country, and strengthened the 
position of the nationalists, casting doubt on the self-sustainability of the BiH-wide 
regimes and institutions created since the war.
As argued earlier, there is no common vision for the security sector on the 
part of the international community, beyond generic objectives such as ‘stability’, 
‘reintegration of forces’, ‘downsizing and restructuring’, ‘political neutrality’ and 
‘common institutions’. This situation goes to the heart of the GFA, which did not 
resolve the fundamental issue of the borders of the Bosnian state, if  any. The debate 
over the security sector is just a manifestation of this issue, and the international 
agencies involved with the security sector have been either unable or unwilling to 
pursue a coherent strategy. The fact that, whilst the OHR is trying to develop a state­
wide defence institution, the secretariat of the SCMM, UNMIBH struggles to find 
assistance to expand the only state-wide, integrated security institution, the SBS,
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shows the incoherence of the international community with regard to the security 
sector.
The consequences for democratisation of this incoherence and of the hard 
realist approach to SSR adopted in the GFA are patent. The implementation of the 
GFA has left the security sector in BiH fragmented, and ranging from complete 
separation (between the two EAF armies) to complete integration (the SBS and the 
Brcko police). The Bosnian state still has no army and no police, with perhaps the 
exception of the SBS, and the nationalists have to a large extent managed to 
maintain their control over security forces, and over the territories they control.
This situation impacts on the creation of a single political space, and 
illustrates how the parties have largely maintained the division of the Bosnian 
territory into three quasi mono-ethnic statelets. Refugee return has made headway, 
but returns to areas where returnees are in the ethnic minority were still marginal 
during the period studied, because security was still problematic, even though the 
issue has other dimensions. Freedom of movement has been established, but again 
the international community is the driving force behind this accomplishment. 
Discrimination against minorities in sectors like education, employment and access 
to public services is still rife, and used as a way to prevent returns.
Finally, the period under study shows that two of the three elements of 
democracy, as defined in this thesis, namely individual rights and the rule of law are 
still largely a fiction in BiH, because the power structure that prevents respect for 
them is still in place. As for elections, within the period studied, they did not assist 
the emergence of substantial democratic forces, but rather served to further 
legitimise the nationalist power structure. However, the role played by the 
nationalist power structure should not obscure the fact that the transition to the rule
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of law and respect for individual rights also has to do with the adoption of liberal 
norms by the government institutions and the wider Bosnian society. Indeed, as 
discussed in chapter one, democratic institutions cannot exist without supporting 
values found in the wider society. This thesis has nonetheless pointed to the role of 
the nationalist power structure within a hard realist strategy of SSR in hampering 
such developments in order to prevent the redistribution of political resources that 
democratisation entails.
2. Is a Hard Realist/Liberal Peacebuilding Model Unworkable?
The difficulties encountered since the end of the war by external actors 
involved in the implementation of the GFA seem to indicate that the hard 
realist/liberal model of peacebuilding, considered in chapter two, does not hold 
much promise in facilitating democratisation. Some additional conclusions, 
however, can be drawn regarding this model of peacebuilding, and also regarding 
the roles and degree of authority that third parties can exercise within that model. 
These conclusions support the view that it is not so much the model itself, but the 
role of the hard realist strategy of SSR and of third parties within that model, that 
determines whether it facilitates the transition towards democracy.
An obvious lesson to be learned from the Bosnian case is that a hard realist 
strategy of SSR will give legitimacy to and strengthens the position of the various 
parties to the peace process and their leaders. Indeed, the hard realist approach does 
not initially challenge the military power of the parties, nor the political and 
economic benefits derived from that power. Consequently, a hard realist model of
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SSR enables the parties to maintain their control over the territory they occupy, and 
leaves them with the means, at least initially, to wreck the peace process.
If the parties are committed to peace, a hard realist strategy of SSR can assist 
democratisation by guaranteeing the security of the parties through the creation of an 
institutionalised military balance between them and through their ongoing control 
over security forces. This military balance and control over all security forces will 
alleviate the security dilemma they face until sufficient trust has been rebuilt by the 
process of democratisation to proceed with demilitarisation.
Because the parties’ position is consolidated by the structure of the hard 
realist model of SSR, it is therefore likely to be more conducive to power-sharing 
arrangements between the parties than to majoritarian democracy. Chapter three has 
argued that these can be compatible with democracy within a consociational model. 
This means that the establishment of a majoritarian democracy is unlikely, at least in 
the short-term. In the case of ethnic conflict, it may even be that such arrangements 
are the only viable option to prevent a return to open conflict.
What is understood by ‘military balance’ within a hard realist strategy of 
SSR is also a point that should be emphasised. As explained in chapter two, the 
concept has various meanings, and in operational terms is not only determined by 
quantitative factors, but also by qualitative factors. More importantly, the kind of 
‘balance’ that was sought in the GFA was not parity in weapons, but actually gave a 
military advantage to the Federation army, which has turned out to be one of the 
most destabilising factors in the Bosnian peace process. This argues against creating 
a military balance by arming one side in order to give it a military advantage, 
regardless of it being the victim of aggression; rather, such an endeavour should aim 
at reducing the overall level of weaponry in the country and at creating a military
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equilibrium between the parties. The concept advanced here is to induce the parties 
to agree to a certain ratio of weapons and forces between them, as close as possible 
to a military equilibrium, that can be verified and monitored. In other words, to get 
the parties to agree on a baseline for weapons and forces. However, the kind of 
weapons to be included in a military balance agreement is also an important issue.
In BiH, because the CFE template was used, the accent was put on heavy, 
offensive weapons. These are obviously easier to monitor, but many internal 
conflicts have been fought with light weapons, which are more difficult to control, 
especially when the factions are poorly organised, and operate more as gangs than 
organised military or police forces. The idea of cantonment tried in Bosnia does 
nonetheless hold some promise. Indeed, it allowed IFOR/SFOR to concentrate 
troops in certain areas and to limit their movements, whilst also regularly verifying 
the cantonment of all types of weapons. The creation of ZoS also helped create a 
weapons-free zone between the parties. These measures contribute to the objective 
of the hard realist strategy, that of ensuring their security.
Banking on a genuine commitment to peace on the part of the parties is a 
dangerous exercise, which has led to many disappointments on the part of the 
international community, not least in BiH. In turn, assuming that parties are 
systematically bent on obstructing the peace process is however too simplistic. The 
success of a hard realist/liberal model of peacebuilding, which initially accepts the 
distribution of power among the parties, will therefore be largely dependent on two 
factors. First, the parties must be in agreement that the hard realist strategy of SSR is 
aimed at ensuring their physical security until the political mechanisms for 
managing and resolving conflict without violence have become self-sustainable. 
This model assumes that the parties have reached a ‘hurting stalemate’, and they are
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ready to begin the post-conflict transition. In other words, the hard realist strategy 
amounts to a phased, balanced demilitarisation effort whose agenda is not set by 
technical considerations, but clearly linked to the development of the above 
mechanisms, as wished by the parties. This presupposes a clear agreement between 
the parties, and among external actors, on the role played by SSR within the overall 
peacebuilding process. This demilitarisation effort, which can take years, therefore 
becomes a political exercise at state-building and conflict resolution.
Second, the success of a hard realist strategy of SSR in facilitating the 
transition towards democracy also depends on how far third parties are willing to 
invest their resources, not only military but also diplomatic, in propping up the 
commitment of the parties to the peace process by increasing the costs of non- 
compliance. In other words, third parties need to tread a thin line between allowing 
the parties to enjoy the benefits of their military position, at least initially, whilst 
ensuring that this position is not used to undermine democratisation. The resources 
at the disposal of third parties also need to be reckoned with when thinking about the 
costs of non-compliance. The case of BiH is unique in the sense that third parties 
involved in the implementation of the GFA have brought to BiH enormous political 
and military resources, that the UN, the principal peacebuilding institution, cannot 
match.
Continuing on the issue of the role played by third parties, the regional 
dimension of the hard realist/liberal model of peacebuilding also has to be reckoned 
with. Indeed, as with BiH, it is likely that regional powers will have an impact on the 
local balance of forces, and should therefore be included in the design of the military 
balance. The Bosnian case illustrated the importance of involving neighbouring 
states in the peace process, but also in arms control regimes stemming from the
323
agreement, especially if the conflict involves ethnic groups aspiring to be joined 
with neighbouring states.
Taking into consideration the regional dimension of a peace process is a 
common theme in the literature on conflict resolution. However, developments in 
BiH in 2001 have shown that the most recalcitrant parties can be brought to heel if 
the support they receive from neighbouring states is diminished, even within a hard 
realist/liberal model of peacebuilding. Unless the issue of the borders of the state are 
not settled during the negotiation phase, a hard realist model of SSR can assist 
democratisation if external actors, international or regional, are willing to invest the 
necessary resources, in a coherent manner, in order to affect the calculations of the 
parties towards implementation of the agreement. Without an agreement over 
borders, a hard realist/liberal strategy only serves to decisively harden the divisions 
created during the war, and to support separatist tendencies.
As far as specific roles played by third parties within a hard realist model of 
SSR are concerned, three roles were identified in this research: ‘balancer’, 
‘mediator’ and ‘verifier’. Third parties play a role of ‘balancer’, deterring factions 
from returning to hostilities by committing to militarily ‘punish’ any faction that 
would initiate hostilities. This role is essential, as it offers a security guarantee to the 
parties, whose perceptions of the military balance may lead them to reinitiate 
hostilities before their perceived military advantage is lost.
External actors also assist the transformation of the security sector, as in 
BiH, by using assistance offered in the context of the military balance to induce 
change in the parties’ police and armed forces, such as partial reintegration, 
increased co-ordination, information exchange, downsizing or retraining. These 
changes can indeed be presented as confidence-building measures. Third parties
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must therefore entrench their position in the post-conflict phase, and act as mediators 
between the parties in reshaping the security sector, with the objectives of 
democratisation and self-sustainability integrated in their strategy.
Finally, third parties act as ‘verifiers’ as they check that the parties’ 
behaviour is in accordance with the agreement(s) to reform the security sector, or 
other confidence-building measures as agreed between the parties. This function of 
verifier also includes checking that the behaviour of the parties is in accordance with 
other aspects of the overall peace agreement, such as those that concern 
democratisation. In the absence of a state that has the monopoly of legitimate 
violence, as in BiH, this function can go as far as taking on the role of enforcer of 
the rule of law and protector of individual rights, traditionally devolved to the state 
in democratic countries.
The final point that this section seeks to discuss concerns the degree of 
authority that third parties exert over the implementation of the peace agreement. 
The cultural specificity of the democratic model and the security risks associated 
with a hard realist strategy of SSR are likely to require external actors to entrench 
themselves in the peace process for a number of years, which is unlikely to be 
sustainable politically for most parts of the world. However, the length and depth of 
international presence in BiH, and the central role of external actors in establishing 
and maintaining an institutionalised military balance and pursuing the reform of the 
police, whilst pushing for democratisation, argue against any quick fix solutions. 
Based on the evidence reviewed in the case of BiH, it is likely that third parties will 
have to arbitrate some key issues between the parties, thereby exerting a 
considerable amount of control over the peace process. The scope and duration of 
these arbitration powers is nonetheless difficult to determine, but their use to defend
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democratic principles instead of specific institutional mechanisms may reduce the 
time commitment of third parties to the peace process.
Indeed, in order to create structures that will be locally sustainable after third 
parties withdraw, these may have to consider other types of political arrangements 
than majoritarian democracy. The question for third parties is not, therefore, whether 
it is possible to create reintegrated and democratic institutions that can be self- 
sustainable, but rather how to create self-sustainable institutions that are compatible 
with democracy. Indeed, third parties should use their resources to mediate, not 
arbitrate, the creation of local institutional mechanisms for resolving conflict 
peacefully, whatever form they may take, that are compatible with democracy. This 
points to the conclusion that a hard realist model of SSR is more compatible with 
soft realist political arrangements, such as power-sharing than with majoritarian 
democracy. However, as explained in the introduction, there is considerable overlap 
between soft realist and liberal solutions to internal conflict. Therefore, a hard realist 
approach to SSR is not incompatible with democracy, but democratic power-sharing 
arrangements may necessitate shorter and less intrusive commitments on the part of 
third parties.
3. Conclusion
This conclusion has pointed to two sets of difficulties arising from the GFA: 
the structure of the agreement itself, tom between its separatist and re-integrationist 
provisions, and the incoherence of the international community with regard to SSR 
in BiH. It has been argued that the hard realist model applied in BiH has not 
significantly helped democratisation, including the rebuilding of a single political
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space, whilst leaving the nationalist power structure largely untouched. It has been 
suggested that the international community is in need of a coherent strategy for the 
entire security sector in BiH, which assigns specific resources in support of 
objectives that support democratisation.
The Bosnian predicament has also been used to assess the potential of a hard 
realist/liberal model of peacebuilding. It has been argued that it is less the nature of 
the model itself, which combines a hard realist approach to SSR with efforts at 
democratisation, that determines the success of the democratisation effort than the 
place of SSR within the overall peacebuilding process as well as the roles played by 
and commitment of third parties to push democratisation forward. Finally, three 
roles for external parties were discussed: ‘balancer’, ‘mediator* and ‘verifier’, as 
well as the need for third parties to rethink the use of their resources to mediate the 
creation of self-sustainable mechanisms, compatible with democracy, for the 
peaceful resolution of conflict, instead of arbitrating every issue.
This thesis is an attempt to make a contribution to the literature on 
peacebuilding by examining the relationship between the security and political 
aspects of peacebuilding operations. It has proposed an alternative model of 
peacebuilding, trying to incorporate realist considerations into the analysis of such a 
complex and difficult endeavour. Above all, this thesis has tried to show the 
importance of remaining engaged with conflict in all its forms, and to work towards 
its transformation.
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Annex III: Authorised Weapon Holdings under Article IV of
Annex 1-B
Battle 1,025 410 410
BiH-
Federation
273
BiH-
RS
137
Armoured 850 340 340 
Combat
227 113
Artillery 3,750 1,500 1,500 1,000 500
Combat 155 62 62 
Aircraft
41 21
Attack 53 21 21 
Helicopters
14 7
Source: Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control, art. IV, section 1.
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Annex IV: Actual Weapon Holdings under Article IV of Annex
1-B, as of 15 December 1999
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